Refine submission framing and README positioning

Author: 01rabbit

README.md

@@ -13,10 +13,26 @@
 [![local-only](https://img.shields.io/badge/operation-local--only-lightgrey)](docs/THREAT_MODEL.md)
 [![Security Policy](https://img.shields.io/badge/security-policy-informational)](SECURITY.md)
 
-Phasmid is a field-evaluation prototype for local-only coercion-aware storage. It is the reference implementation of the Janus Eidolon System, a two-slot local storage architecture designed to separate visible disclosure from protected local state under practical risks such as device seizure, compelled access, and over-disclosure.
+> When encryption is strong enough, attackers may stop attacking the cipher and start attacking the human.
+
+Phasmid is a field-evaluation prototype for local-only coercion-aware deniable storage.
+
+It is designed for situations where an attacker may not break the cipher, but may seize a device, inspect it, or compel a person to disclose access.
+
+Phasmid is the reference implementation of the Janus Eidolon System, a two-slot local storage architecture designed to separate visible disclosure from protected local state under practical risks such as device seizure, compelled access, and over-disclosure.
+
+## Why Phasmid exists
+
+Most encryption tools assume the user can safely refuse disclosure. In field conditions, that assumption may fail.
+
+Phasmid treats coercion, inspection, and over-disclosure as first-class design constraints. It does not try to defeat all forensic analysis; it explores controlled disclosure behavior on local-only constrained devices under documented limits.
+
+## What Phasmid is not
 
 Phasmid is research software. It is not a replacement for full-disk encryption, hardware-backed key storage, an audited classified-data handling system, or a complete solution to compelled disclosure.
 
+Phasmid does not claim anti-forensic evasion, law-enforcement bypass, perfect deniability, guaranteed secure deletion, remote wipe, or remote unlock.
+
 **Who this is for:** security researchers, field-risk evaluators, and local-only disclosure-control experiments. It is not for casual file encryption.
 
 ## Concept Track Baseline

docs/submissions/README.md

@@ -9,6 +9,30 @@ Use these files to keep one technical core while adjusting audience framing:
 - [`TRACK_PRIVACY_RESEARCH.md`](TRACK_PRIVACY_RESEARCH.md): privacy-and-research framing package
 - [`TRACK_FIELD_OPERATIONS.md`](TRACK_FIELD_OPERATIONS.md): field-operations framing package
 
+## Regional Mapping Guidance
+
+Use the same technical core and demo order for every region, then adjust framing only:
+
+- Europe-oriented submissions: start from `TRACK_PRIVACY_RESEARCH.md`
+  - Recommended title: `Phasmid: Coercion-Safe Deniable Storage for Constrained Devices`
+  - Emphasis: compelled-access safety, over-disclosure reduction, explicit claims/non-claims
+- MEA-oriented submissions: start from `TRACK_FIELD_OPERATIONS.md`
+  - Recommended title: `Phasmid: Field-Ready Coercion-Aware Storage for Constrained Devices`
+  - Emphasis: constrained-device field readiness, operational resilience, safe fallback behavior
+
+## Reuse-Risk Control
+
+To avoid appearing as duplicate submissions across regions:
+
+- keep a fixed shared demo sequence in `COMMON_DEMO_RUNBOOK.md`
+- change audience framing, examples, and abstract wording by track
+- include a visible "what changed since prior submission" note in each final package
+
+Suggested internal release labels:
+
+- `Coercion-Safe Disclosure Edition` (privacy/research-first package)
+- `Field Operations Edition` (field-operations-first package)
+
 Draft handling rules:
 
 - Do not copy-paste these files as final public abstracts without review.