Merge pull request #110 from athoelke/crypto-fix-formatting

Fix broken bullet list formatting in KDF definitions

Author: athoelke

doc/crypto/api/ops/kdf.rst

@@ -216,9 +216,11 @@ Key derivation algorithms
 
     *   The seed, which is forwarded to the TLS-1.2 PRF, is the concatenation of the ``ClientHello.Random + ServerHello.Random``.
     *   The other secret depends on the key exchange specified in the cipher suite:
-        * For a plain PSK cipher suite (:RFC:`4279#2`), omit `PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET`.
-        * For a DHE-PSK (:RFC:`4279#3`) or ECDHE-PSK cipher suite (:RFC-title:`5489#2`), the other secret should be the output of the `PSA_ALG_FFDH` or `PSA_ALG_ECDH` key agreement performed with the peer. The recommended way to pass this input is to use a key derivation algorithm constructed as :code:`PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(ka_alg, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(hash_alg))` and to call `psa_key_derivation_key_agreement()`. Alternatively, this input may be an output of `psa_raw_key_agreement()` passed with `psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()`, or an equivalent input passed with `psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()` or `psa_key_derivation_input_key()`.
-        * For a RSA-PSK cipher suite (:RFC:`4279#4`), the other secret should be the 48-byte client challenge (the ``PreMasterSecret`` of :RFC:`5246#7.4.7.1`) concatenation of the TLS version and a 46-byte random string chosen by the client. On the server, this is typically an output of `psa_asymmetric_decrypt()` using `PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT`, passed to the key derivation operation with `psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()`.
+
+        -   For a plain PSK cipher suite (:RFC:`4279#2`), omit `PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET`.
+        -   For a DHE-PSK (:RFC:`4279#3`) or ECDHE-PSK cipher suite (:RFC-title:`5489#2`), the other secret should be the output of the `PSA_ALG_FFDH` or `PSA_ALG_ECDH` key agreement performed with the peer. The recommended way to pass this input is to use a key derivation algorithm constructed as :code:`PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(ka_alg, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(hash_alg))` and to call `psa_key_derivation_key_agreement()`. Alternatively, this input may be an output of `psa_raw_key_agreement()` passed with `psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()`, or an equivalent input passed with `psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()` or `psa_key_derivation_input_key()`.
+        -   For a RSA-PSK cipher suite (:RFC:`4279#4`), the other secret should be the 48-byte client challenge (the ``PreMasterSecret`` of :RFC:`5246#7.4.7.1`) concatenation of the TLS version and a 46-byte random string chosen by the client. On the server, this is typically an output of `psa_asymmetric_decrypt()` using `PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT`, passed to the key derivation operation with `psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()`.
+
     *   The label is ``"master secret"`` or ``"extended master secret"``.
 
     .. subsection:: Compatible key types