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taico_1 Incident Report

Summary

Impact

  • Estimated loss: unknown
  • Main affected assets: unknown
  • Attacker gain reproduced: $223255.73 (USD ratio: 1.000x)

Reproduction

  • PoC status: verified
  • Forge test: pass
  • Proof kind: economic_proof

Root Cause

  • Finding: Bridge message execution released 130 ETH from a prior remote-signal entitlement that is not proven in the supplied transaction scope
  • In short: The current transaction calls MainnetBridge.processMessage with a message whose hash is proven through SignalService, then the bridge consumes ETH quota and releases _message.value to the recipient.
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: medium
  • Violated invariant: A destination-chain bridge release must be backed by a source-chain message signal that was created by a value-escrowing sendMessage for the exact message hash and amount.

The current transaction calls MainnetBridge.processMessage with a message whose hash is proven through SignalService, then the bridge consumes ETH quota and releases _message.value to the recipient. The in-transaction branch and 130 ETH effect are proven, but the supplied artifacts do not include the source-chain sendMessage or checkpoint-authoring provenanc...

Mechanism:

  • The exploit entered through processMessage((uint64,uint64,uint32,address,uint64,address,uint64,address,address,uint256,bytes),bytes) before reaching the vulnerable accounting path.
  • The current transaction calls MainnetBridge.processMessage with a message whose hash is proven through SignalService, then the bridge consumes ETH quota and releases _message.value to the recipient.
  • The accounting update violated the invariant: A destination-chain bridge release must be backed by a source-chain message signal that was created by a value-escrowing sendMessage for the exact message hash and amount.

Key evidence:

  • PoC result reports status pass with forge build and test passing.
  • Attack flow identifies the replayed transaction, processMessage entrypoint, and 130 ETH economic payout.
  • Trace frontier links processMessage to proveSignalReceived, consumeQuota, and the final 130 ETH recipient call.

Affected Contracts

Address Name Role
0xd60247c6848b7ca29eddf63aa924e53db6ddd8ec ERC1967Proxy / MainnetBridge primary bridge contract executing the payout branch
0x9e0a24964e5397b566c1ed39258e21ab5e35c77c ERC1967Proxy / SignalService remote-signal proof gate consumed before payout
0x91f67118dd47d502b1f0c354d0611997b022f29e ERC1967Proxy / QuotaManager secondary quota accounting gate

Limitations

  • tx_scope_gap: the decisive source-chain sendMessage or prior setup transaction that created the proven signal is not included in the supplied artifacts.
  • prior_state_provenance_gap: the transaction consumes a prior checkpoint/remote signal state, but the artifacts do not prove who authored that checkpoint or whether the remote signal was economically backed.