security_zizmor.yml

name: security / zizmor

# zizmor runs static analysis over every workflow under .github/workflows looking for the well-known
# classes of GitHub Actions footguns: template injection from untrusted input, dangerous triggers
# like `pull_request_target`, unpinned `uses:` refs, excessive token scopes, secret exfiltration
# through job outputs, and a long tail of others.
#
# Public pull requests make workflow inputs and token scopes a security boundary.
#
# Findings at `low` confidence and above fail the job. Intentional exceptions belong in
# `.github/zizmor.yml` with a justification.

on:
  push:
    branches: [main]
    paths:
      - ".github/workflows/**"
      - ".github/actions/**"
      - ".github/zizmor.yml"
  pull_request:
    paths:
      - ".github/workflows/**"
      - ".github/actions/**"
      - ".github/zizmor.yml"
  schedule:
    # Catch findings introduced by newly-published advisories even in a week when no workflow changed.
    - cron: "0 9 * * 1"

concurrency:
  group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
  cancel-in-progress: true

permissions:
  contents: read

jobs:
  zizmor:
    name: Static analysis (zizmor)
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    timeout-minutes: 5
    permissions:
      contents: read
    steps:
      - name: Checkout
        uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
        with:
          persist-credentials: false

      - name: Run zizmor
        # `min-severity: low` blocks on the broadest set of findings without flagging
        # hypothetical-only informational notes.
        uses: zizmorcore/zizmor-action@70fb788f84895a7701f5643d103d587e460b5c99 # v0.6.3
        with:
          min-severity: low
          advanced-security: false
          config: .github/zizmor.yml