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random.c
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315 lines (258 loc) · 7.79 KB
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/*
This file is part of macSSH
Copyright 2016 Daniel Machon
SSH program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "ssh-options.h"
#include "misc.h"
/* this is used to generate unique output from the same hashpool */
static uint32_t counter = 0;
/* the max value for the counter, so it won't integer overflow */
#define MAX_COUNTER 1<<30
static unsigned char hashpool[SHA1_HASH_SIZE] = {0};
static int donerandinit = 0;
#define INIT_SEED_SIZE 32 /* 256 bits */
/* The basic setup is we read some data from /dev/(u)random or prngd and hash it
* into hashpool. To read data, we hash together current hashpool contents,
* and a counter. We feed more data in by hashing the current pool and new
* data into the pool.
*
* It is important to ensure that counter doesn't wrap around before we
* feed in new entropy.
*
*/
/* Pass len=0 to hash an entire file */
static int
process_file(hash_state *hs, const char *filename,
unsigned int len, int prngd)
{
static int already_blocked = 0;
int readfd;
unsigned int readcount;
int ret = MACSSH_FAILURE;
#ifdef DROPBEAR_PRNGD_SOCKET
if (prngd) {
readfd = connect_unix(filename);
} else
#endif
{
readfd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
}
if (readfd < 0) {
goto out;
}
readcount = 0;
while (len == 0 || readcount < len) {
int readlen, wantread;
unsigned char readbuf[4096];
if (!already_blocked && !prngd) {
int res;
struct timeval timeout;
fd_set read_fds;
timeout.tv_sec = 2;
timeout.tv_usec = 0;
FD_ZERO(&read_fds);
FD_SET(readfd, &read_fds);
res = select(readfd + 1, &read_fds, NULL, NULL, &timeout);
if (res == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Reading the randomness source" \
"'%s' seems to have blocked.\nYou may need" \
"to find a better entropy source.", filename);
already_blocked = 1;
}
}
if (len == 0) {
wantread = sizeof(readbuf);
}
else {
wantread = MIN(sizeof(readbuf), len - readcount);
}
#ifdef DROPBEAR_PRNGD_SOCKET
if (prngd) {
char egdcmd[2];
egdcmd[0] = 0x02; /* blocking read */
egdcmd[1] = (unsigned char) wantread;
if (write(readfd, egdcmd, 2) < 0) {
dropbear_exit("Can't send command to egd");
}
}
#endif
readlen = read(readfd, readbuf, wantread);
if (readlen <= 0) {
if (readlen < 0 && errno == EINTR) {
continue;
}
if (readlen == 0 && len == 0) {
/* whole file was read as requested */
break;
}
goto out;
}
sha1_process(hs, readbuf, readlen);
readcount += readlen;
}
ret = MACSSH_SUCCESS;
out:
close(readfd);
return ret;
}
void addrandom(unsigned char * buf, unsigned int len)
{
hash_state hs;
/* hash in the new seed data */
sha1_init(&hs);
/* existing state (zeroes on startup) */
sha1_process(&hs, (void*) hashpool, sizeof(hashpool));
/* new */
sha1_process(&hs, buf, len);
sha1_done(&hs, hashpool);
}
static void write_urandom()
{
#ifndef DROPBEAR_PRNGD_SOCKET
/* This is opportunistic, don't worry about failure */
unsigned char buf[INIT_SEED_SIZE];
FILE *f = fopen(MACSSH_URANDOM_DEV, "w");
if (!f) {
return;
}
genrandom(buf, sizeof(buf));
fwrite(buf, sizeof(buf), 1, f);
fclose(f);
#endif
}
/* Initialise the prng from /dev/urandom or prngd. This function can
* be called multiple times */
void seedrandom()
{
hash_state hs;
pid_t pid;
struct timeval tv;
clock_t clockval;
/* hash in the new seed data */
sha1_init(&hs);
/* existing state */
sha1_process(&hs, (void*) hashpool, sizeof(hashpool));
#ifdef DROPBEAR_PRNGD_SOCKET
if (process_file(&hs, DROPBEAR_PRNGD_SOCKET, INIT_SEED_SIZE, 1)
!= DROPBEAR_SUCCESS) {
dropbear_exit("Failure reading random device %s",
DROPBEAR_PRNGD_SOCKET);
}
#else
/* non-blocking random source (probably /dev/urandom) */
if (process_file(&hs, MACSSH_URANDOM_DEV, INIT_SEED_SIZE, 0)
!= MACSSH_SUCCESS) {
macssh_exit("Failure reading random device /dev/urandom", errno);
}
#endif
/* A few other sources to fall back on.
* Add more here for other platforms */
#ifdef __linux__
/* Seems to be a reasonable source of entropy from timers. Possibly hard
* for even local attackers to reproduce */
process_file(&hs, "/proc/timer_list", 0, 0);
/* Might help on systems with wireless */
process_file(&hs, "/proc/interrupts", 0, 0);
process_file(&hs, "/proc/loadavg", 0, 0);
process_file(&hs, "/proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail", 0, 0);
/* Mostly network visible but useful in some situations.
* Limit size to avoid slowdowns on systems with lots of routes */
process_file(&hs, "/proc/net/netstat", 4096, 0);
process_file(&hs, "/proc/net/dev", 4096, 0);
process_file(&hs, "/proc/net/tcp", 4096, 0);
/* Also includes interface lo */
process_file(&hs, "/proc/net/rt_cache", 4096, 0);
process_file(&hs, "/proc/vmstat", 0, 0);
#endif
pid = getpid();
sha1_process(&hs, (void*) &pid, sizeof(pid));
/* gettimeofday() doesn't completely fill out struct timeval on
OS X (10.8.3), avoid valgrind warnings by clearing it first */
memset(&tv, 0x0, sizeof(tv));
gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
sha1_process(&hs, (void*) &tv, sizeof(tv));
clockval = clock();
sha1_process(&hs, (void*) &clockval, sizeof(clockval));
/* When a private key is read by the client or server it will
* be added to the hashpool - see runopts.c */
sha1_done(&hs, hashpool);
counter = 0;
donerandinit = 1;
/* Feed it all back into /dev/urandom - this might help if Dropbear
* is running from inetd and gets new state each time */
write_urandom();
}
/* return len bytes of pseudo-random data */
void genrandom(unsigned char* buf, unsigned int len)
{
hash_state hs;
unsigned char hash[SHA1_HASH_SIZE];
unsigned int copylen;
if (!donerandinit) {
macssh_exit("seedrandom not done", errno);
}
while (len > 0) {
sha1_init(&hs);
sha1_process(&hs, (void*) hashpool, sizeof(hashpool));
sha1_process(&hs, (void*) &counter, sizeof(counter));
sha1_done(&hs, hash);
counter++;
if (counter > MAX_COUNTER) {
seedrandom();
}
copylen = MIN(len, SHA1_HASH_SIZE);
memcpy(buf, hash, copylen);
len -= copylen;
buf += copylen;
}
memset(hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
}
/* Generates a random mp_int.
* max is a *mp_int specifying an upper bound.
* rand must be an initialised *mp_int for the result.
* the result rand satisfies: 0 < rand < max
* */
void gen_random_mpint(mp_int *max, mp_int *rand)
{
unsigned char *randbuf = NULL;
unsigned int len = 0;
const unsigned char masks[] = {0xff, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x3f, 0x7f};
const int size_bits = mp_count_bits(max);
len = size_bits / 8;
if ((size_bits % 8) != 0) {
len += 1;
}
randbuf = (unsigned char*) malloc(len);
do {
genrandom(randbuf, len);
/* Mask out the unrequired bits - mp_read_unsigned_bin expects
* MSB first.*/
randbuf[0] &= masks[size_bits % 8];
if (mp_read_unsigned_bin(rand, (unsigned char*) randbuf, len) != MP_OKAY) {
macssh_exit("Mem alloc error", errno);
}
/* keep regenerating until we get one satisfying
* 0 < rand < max */
} while (!(mp_cmp(rand, max) == MP_LT && mp_cmp_d(rand, 0) == MP_GT));
memset(randbuf, 0, len);
free(randbuf);
}
void* get_random_bytes(int size)
{
void *data = malloc(size);
int fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
read(fd, data, size);
return data;
}