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/**
* Model-facing Consumer of the `ctx.shell` capability seam. Background calls
* register process handles with `ctx.jobs`; their work uses job cancellation
* rather than the tool-call signal after an id is returned.
*
* TODO(permissions): deployment policy belongs in `tools/pre-execute` and
* sandboxing executors; see docs/architecture.md § Where new behavior goes.
* @module @deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-bash
*/
import type { Context } from '@deepseek-ai/cordis'
import z from '@deepseek-ai/schemastery'
import { isAbsolute, resolve as resolvePath } from 'node:path'
import { defineTool, TOOL_ABORTED } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-tools'
import type { GenericCallView, TerminalCallView, ToolExecution, ToolResult, ToolResultView } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-tools'
import { HarnessError } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-llm'
import type { Agent } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-agent'
import type {} from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-system-prompt'
import type {} from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-jobs'
import type {} from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-user-approval'
import type {} from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-shell-env'
import type { SandboxExecutionPolicy, SandboxMode } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox'
import { ESCALATION_TARGETS, approveEscalation, canonicalPath, validateEscalationArgs } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox'
import type { SandboxPolicyService } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-policy'
import { DSH_ENV_PREFIX } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-shell'
import type { ShellRunResult } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-shell'
import { processOutcome } from './background.ts'
import { parseExitStatus, renderProcessRead, renderResult } from './render.ts'
export const name = 'tool-bash'
export const inject = ['tools', 'shell', 'systemPrompt', 'shellEnv']
/** Configuration for the bash tool. */
export interface Config {
/** Expose `run_in_background` (default true); disabled calls are also rejected. */
enableRunInBackground?: boolean
}
/** Runtime configuration schema for the bash tool plugin. */
export const Config: z<Config> = z.object({
enableRunInBackground: z.boolean().default(true),
})
/** Parsed tool args; execute validates value constraints absent from ParameterSchemaSpec. */
interface BashToolArgs {
command: string
description: string
timeoutMs?: number
workdir?: string
run_in_background?: boolean
sandbox_permissions?: string
justification?: string
}
function validateBashArgs(args: BashToolArgs): void {
if (args.command.trim().length === 0) {
throw new Error('invalid command: expected a non-empty string')
}
if (args.description.trim().length === 0) {
throw new Error('invalid description: expected a non-empty string')
}
if (args.timeoutMs !== undefined && (!Number.isFinite(args.timeoutMs) || args.timeoutMs <= 0)) {
throw new Error(`invalid timeoutMs: expected a positive number, got ${JSON.stringify(args.timeoutMs)}`)
}
// The escalation pairing (sandbox_permissions ⇔ justification, non-empty) is
// the shared rule both enforcing families validate identically.
validateEscalationArgs(args.sandbox_permissions, args.justification)
}
function bashDescription(backgroundEnabled: boolean, escalationModes: readonly SandboxMode[]): string {
const background = backgroundEnabled
? 'Set `run_in_background: true` for long-running commands: the call returns a job id immediately; read its output with `job_output` and stop it with `job_kill`.'
: 'Background execution is not available; long-running commands must finish within the timeout.'
const base = 'Execute a bash command (`bash -c`) and return its stdout/stderr. '
+ 'Each call runs in a fresh shell: no state (cwd, variables, functions) persists between calls — '
+ 'pass `workdir` instead of using `cd`. Non-zero exits are reported as `[exit code: N]`. '
+ `Current harness environment facts are exposed through managed \`$${DSH_ENV_PREFIX}*\` variables; inspect them when needed. `
+ 'Commands may run under a file sandbox; a blocked file operation is reported as `[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]` — a policy denial, not a bug in the command; do not retry another way. '
+ 'Long output is truncated to its tail; the full output is saved to a file whose path is reported when available. '
+ background
if (escalationModes.length === 0) return base
return base + ' Attempting a command the sandbox may deny is safe and expected: run it and read the '
+ 'marker rather than assuming the denial. When a command is denied and a wider mode would let it '
+ 'succeed, escalate immediately in the same turn — the one sanctioned exception to a denial: retry '
+ 'the exact same command once with `sandbox_permissions` (the narrowest wider mode that suffices) '
+ 'plus a one-sentence `justification`. Do not detour through chat to ask permission first — the '
+ 'approval prompt raised by that retry is how the user consents. If the session states approval '
+ 'prompts are disabled, there is no exception: a denial is final — do not set `sandbox_permissions`. '
+ 'Never escalate speculatively: ground the request in a real denial — normally the one this command '
+ 'just hit; escalating up front is fine only when this session already denied the same access. '
+ 'A rejected escalation is final for that command — stop and explain, never work around '
+ 'it — but it does not forbid attempting or escalating other commands later.'
}
/**
* Present foreground calls as terminals and background starts as generic cards.
* The command remains the title on both paths; foreground cwd is passed through
* for the bridge to resolve, while background descriptions remain card content.
*/
type BashCallArgs = { command: string; description: string; workdir?: string; run_in_background?: boolean }
function presentBashCall(args: BashCallArgs): GenericCallView | TerminalCallView {
if (args.run_in_background === true) {
return {
card: 'generic',
title: args.command,
kind: 'execute',
rawInput: args.command,
content: [{ type: 'text', text: args.description }],
}
}
return {
card: 'terminal',
title: args.command,
description: args.description,
...args.workdir !== undefined ? { cwd: args.workdir } : {},
}
}
/**
* Present completed foreground output as a terminal; background acknowledgements
* and execution errors use generic fenced output without an exit-status pill.
*/
function presentBashResult(args: unknown, result: ToolResult): ToolResultView | undefined {
const block = result.content.length === 1 ? result.content[0] : undefined
if (block === undefined || block.type !== 'text') return undefined
const raw = block.text
const isBackground = typeof args === 'object' && args !== null && (args as { run_in_background?: unknown }).run_in_background === true
// Background acknowledgements and errors have no terminal exit status.
if (isBackground || result.isError) {
return { card: 'generic', content: [{ type: 'text', text: `\`\`\`console\n${raw.replace(/\n+$/, '')}\n\`\`\`` }] }
}
// The exit marker becomes the card's exit pill, so it leaves the output body.
const { body, ...exit } = parseExitStatus(raw)
return { card: 'terminal', output: body, ...exit }
}
/**
* Resolve an explicit workdir first, making a relative one session-workspace-relative;
* otherwise use the filesystem identity of the session cwd and leave executor
* defaulting as the fallback. A resolved sandbox-policy root wins so workdir
* and confinement use the exact same per-call identity.
*/
function resolveWorkdir(
modelWorkdir: string | undefined,
exec: { agent?: Agent },
policyWorkspaceRoot?: string,
): string | undefined {
const headerCwd = exec.agent?.session.header.cwd
const sessionCwd = policyWorkspaceRoot ?? (headerCwd === undefined ? undefined : canonicalPath(headerCwd))
if (modelWorkdir === undefined) return sessionCwd
if (sessionCwd !== undefined && !isAbsolute(modelWorkdir)) {
return resolvePath(sessionCwd, modelWorkdir)
}
return modelWorkdir
}
/** Detach the executor DTO from readonly Service Definition types into plain JSON data. */
function canonicalBashResult(result: ShellRunResult) {
const output = (stream: ShellRunResult['stdout']) => ({
text: stream.text,
truncated: stream.truncated,
...stream.spillPath !== undefined ? { spillPath: stream.spillPath } : {},
})
return {
exitCode: result.exitCode,
signal: result.signal,
timedOut: result.timedOut,
aborted: result.aborted,
timeoutMs: result.timeoutMs,
stdout: output(result.stdout),
stderr: output(result.stderr),
...result.sandbox !== undefined ? {
sandbox: {
mode: result.sandbox.mode,
denied: result.sandbox.denied,
...result.sandbox.enforcement !== undefined ? { enforcement: result.sandbox.enforcement } : {},
...result.sandbox.runnerFailed !== undefined ? { runnerFailed: result.sandbox.runnerFailed } : {},
},
} : {},
}
}
/** Canonical background-handle properties shared by the bash output union. */
const BACKGROUND_OUTPUT_PROPERTIES = {
kind: { type: 'string', required: true, const: 'background' },
jobId: { type: 'string', required: true },
} as const
export function apply(ctx: Context, config: Config = {}): void {
const backgroundEnabled = config.enableRunInBackground ?? true
const defaultMode = ctx.shell.sandboxMode
const escalationModes: readonly SandboxMode[] = defaultMode === undefined ? [] : ESCALATION_TARGETS
const sandboxPolicy: SandboxPolicyService | undefined = defaultMode === undefined ? undefined : ctx.get('sandboxPolicy')
if (defaultMode !== undefined && sandboxPolicy === undefined) {
throw new Error('tool-bash: the mounted bash executor confines but ctx.sandboxPolicy is missing')
}
/** Resolve the complete standing policy for this call when a confining executor is mounted. */
const resolveSandboxPolicy = (exec: ToolExecution): SandboxExecutionPolicy | undefined =>
sandboxPolicy?.resolve(exec.agent === undefined ? {} : { session: exec.agent.session })
/**
* Resolve a sandbox-escalation request through `ctx.approval` BEFORE
* anything executes, delegating the shared fail-closed sequence (strict
* widening, channel resolution, outcome mapping) to
* {@link approveEscalation}. This tool contributes only the composition
* guard (the fields are unadvertised without a sandboxing executor, yet
* schema validation checks advertised keys only, so an unadvertised
* `sandbox_permissions` still reaches execute) and the approval
* ingredients. The shared policy resolver is required whenever the executor
* advertises confinement, so a split composition fails at tool-plugin load.
*/
const approveBashEscalation = (
mode: string,
justification: string,
exec: ToolExecution,
standingPolicy: SandboxExecutionPolicy | undefined,
): Promise<SandboxMode> => {
if (escalationModes.length === 0) {
throw new Error('sandbox_permissions is not available in this composition (no sandboxing executor to escalate)')
}
const effectiveMode = (standingPolicy as SandboxExecutionPolicy).mode
return approveEscalation(
{ requestedMode: mode, justification, effectiveMode, subject: 'command' },
{
approver: ctx.get('approval'),
agent: exec.agent,
callId: exec.callId,
toolName: 'bash',
signal: exec.signal,
},
)
}
// Cross-call guidance belongs in the prompt rather than one-call schema prose.
ctx.systemPrompt.section({
name: 'tool:bash',
order: 105,
text: 'Check the [exit code: N] marker on every bash result; investigate failures before moving on.',
})
ctx.tools.register(defineTool({
name: 'bash',
description: bashDescription(backgroundEnabled, escalationModes),
parameters: {
command: { type: 'string', required: true, description: 'The bash command to execute.' },
description: {
type: 'string',
required: true,
description: 'Clear, concise description of what this command does in active voice, '
+ '5-10 words (shown in the UI). Examples: "ls" → "List files in current directory"; '
+ '"git status" → "Show working tree status"; "npm install" → "Install package dependencies".',
},
timeoutMs: { type: 'number', description: 'Timeout in milliseconds. The executor applies its configured default and cap, and kills the command on expiry.' },
workdir: { type: 'string', description: 'Working directory for this command. Defaults to the session workspace; a relative path is resolved against it.' },
...backgroundEnabled ? {
run_in_background: { type: 'boolean' as const, description: 'Run in the background and return a job id immediately (collect with job_output, stop with job_kill). No timeout applies.' },
} : {},
...escalationModes.length > 0 ? {
sandbox_permissions: {
type: 'string' as const,
enum: [...escalationModes],
description: 'The wider sandbox mode this command needs. Only valid as a one-shot retry of a command the sandbox just denied; requires justification and user approval.',
},
justification: {
type: 'string' as const,
description: 'Required with sandbox_permissions: one sentence for the user explaining why this exact command needs the wider access.',
},
} : {},
},
output: {
schema: {
oneOf: [
{
type: 'object',
additionalProperties: false,
properties: BACKGROUND_OUTPUT_PROPERTIES,
},
{
type: 'object',
additionalProperties: false,
properties: {
kind: { type: 'string', required: true, const: 'foreground' },
exitCode: { required: true, oneOf: [{ type: 'integer' }, { type: 'null' }] },
signal: { required: true, oneOf: [{ type: 'string' }, { type: 'null' }] },
timedOut: { type: 'boolean', required: true },
aborted: { type: 'boolean', required: true },
timeoutMs: { type: 'number', required: true },
stdout: {
type: 'object',
additionalProperties: false,
required: true,
properties: {
text: { type: 'string', required: true },
truncated: { type: 'boolean', required: true },
spillPath: { type: 'string' },
},
},
stderr: {
type: 'object',
additionalProperties: false,
required: true,
properties: {
text: { type: 'string', required: true },
truncated: { type: 'boolean', required: true },
spillPath: { type: 'string' },
},
},
sandbox: {
type: 'object',
additionalProperties: false,
properties: {
mode: { type: 'string', required: true },
denied: { type: 'boolean', required: true },
enforcement: { type: 'string' },
runnerFailed: { type: 'boolean' },
},
},
},
},
],
},
render: (_args, value) => [{
type: 'text',
text: value.kind === 'background'
? `started background job ${value.jobId}`
: renderResult(value as { kind: 'foreground' } & ShellRunResult, escalationModes),
}],
},
async execute(args: BashToolArgs, exec) {
validateBashArgs(args)
// Description is display metadata; workdir defaults to the caller's session.
const standingPolicy = resolveSandboxPolicy(exec)
const approvedMode = args.sandbox_permissions !== undefined && args.justification !== undefined
? await approveBashEscalation(args.sandbox_permissions, args.justification, exec, standingPolicy)
: undefined
const policy = approvedMode === undefined
? standingPolicy
: { ...(standingPolicy as SandboxExecutionPolicy), mode: approvedMode }
const workdir = resolveWorkdir(args.workdir, exec, standingPolicy?.workspaceRoot)
const dshEnv = ctx.shellEnv.collect(exec)
const request = {
command: args.command,
...workdir !== undefined ? { workdir } : {},
...args.timeoutMs !== undefined ? { timeoutMs: args.timeoutMs } : {},
dshEnv,
...policy !== undefined ? { sandboxPolicy: policy } : {},
}
if (args.run_in_background === true) {
// Undeclared keys are allowed, so schema omission also needs enforcement.
if (!backgroundEnabled) {
throw new Error('run_in_background is disabled for this deployment (enableRunInBackground: false)')
}
const jobs = ctx.get('jobs')
if (jobs === undefined) {
throw new Error('background jobs unavailable: load @deepseek-ai/dsh-jobs and @deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-jobs')
}
// The caller owns cancellation until ctx.jobs commits detached ownership.
if (exec.signal.aborted) {
const error = new HarnessError('tool call aborted', TOOL_ABORTED)
error.name = 'AbortError'
throw error
}
// Task preflight finishes before the starter can spawn a process.
const id = jobs.start({
kind: 'bash',
label: args.command,
...exec.agent ? { owner: exec.agent } : {},
run: () => {
const proc = ctx.shell.start(ctx.shell.resolve(request))
return {
cancel: () => void proc.kill(),
done: proc.done.then(() => processOutcome(proc)),
readOutput: () => renderProcessRead(proc.readOutput(), proc.sandbox, escalationModes),
}
},
})
return { kind: 'background' as const, jobId: id }
}
const result = await ctx.shell.run(ctx.shell.resolve({
...request,
signal: exec.signal,
}))
if (result.aborted) {
const error = new HarnessError('tool call aborted', TOOL_ABORTED)
error.name = 'AbortError'
throw error
}
return { kind: 'foreground' as const, ...canonicalBashResult(result) }
},
presentCall: presentBashCall,
presentResult: presentBashResult,
}))
}