sample_cases_summarized.csv

Case Title,Link,Case Content,Content Length,Summary
"Zahoor Ahmad Rather vs Sheikh Imtiyaz Ahmad on 5 December, 2018",https://indiankanoon.org/docfragment/85514936/?formInput=doctypes%3A%20supremecourt%20year%3A%202018,"Take notes as you read a judgment using ourVirtual Legal Assistantand get email alerts whenever a new judgment matches your query (Query Alert Service). Try out ourPremium Member Services--Sign up todayand get free trial for one month.
Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J

Civil Appeals @ SLP (C)Nos 30797-30798/2017:

The qualification for the post of Technician-III was “Matric with ITI”. The

qualification for the post of Junior Engineer, which ranks higher in the

hierarchy of posts, was a B E (electrical) / diploma (electrical).
4.    On 23 February 2013, an advertisement was issued by the J & K

State Service Selection Board (SSSB) for filling up the posts of Technician-

III in the Power Development Department for various districts including3Budgam, Srinagar and Ganderbal. Note 3 of the advertisement contained

the following stipulations, which every applicant was required to fulfil:
5.     The appellants applied for the post of Technician-III. The first

appellant holds a Diploma in Electrical Engineering. Appellants 2, 3 and 4

hold a Diploma in Electronics and Communication. Appellants 5 and 6 hold

a Diploma in Electrical Engineering. None of them possesses the ITI

certification.

6.    On 14 August 2014, a list of disqualified candidates was notified by

the SSSB. The appellants were not part of that list and were called for a

written test on 23 August 2014. On 20 November 2014, a notification was

issued for the purpose of shortlisting candidates who had cleared the

written test, for the interview. The notification reflected the category – open

or reserved – under which each candidate was considered. Interviews were

conducted for the districts of Budgam, Srinagar and Ganderbal at which the

appellants appeared.

7.    On 31 January 2015, the SSSB held its 116 th meeting at which,

among the subjects on the agenda, was the following:
8.    The Minutes of the Meeting record that the following decision was

arrived at by the Board:

9.    A select list was published on 23 April 2015. The appellants were not

included in the select list. The reason for the omission is that none of them

possessed an ITI qualification. Aggrieved by their non-inclusion, the

appellants instituted writ proceedings seeking consideration of their

candidature for selection to the post of Technician-III on the basis of their

position in the merit list. The appellants sought the quashing of the select

list framed for the three districts without considering their position in merit

and desired the reframing of the select list.

10.   The learned Single Judge by a judgment dated 1 August 2017

allowed the writ petitions on the ground that it was not open to the SSSB to

exclude the appellants after the process of selection was set in motion and

they had been subjected to a written test as well as an interview. In the view

of the learned Single Judge, the rules could not have been changed after

the selection process had been initiated, particularly since the list of

disqualified candidates did not include them. The learned Single Judge

noted that a candidate possessing a Diploma – electrical is entitled to

appointment to the post of Junior Engineer which ranks higher than the

post of Technician – III. Hence, in this line of reasoning, if the appellants

were eligible to hold a higher post, their qualification was adequate for the6post of Technician-III and a Diploma in Electrical Engineering pre-supposes

the acquisition of the lower qualification of Matric with ITI. In this view of the

matter, the select list was quashed and the SSSB was directed to reframe it

according to the merit secured by the appellants and other candidates.

Directions were issued for making appointments on the basis of the select

list as reframed.

11.   In the Letters Patent Appeals which were filed before the High Court,

the Division Bench reversed the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The

Division Bench held that the advertisement mandated an ITI in the relevant

trade as a condition of eligibility and the SSSB had not granted any

weightage to a higher qualification, in terms of Note 12. Moreover, the

SSSB had categorically taken a decision on 31 January 2015 that it was

only an ITI in the relevant trade with a Matric qualification that meets the

prescribed qualifications.In arriving at this conclusion, the Division Bench

has inter alia relied on a judgment of this Court inP M Latha v State of

Kerala1.

12.   Ms Kaveeta Wadia, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

appellants has underlined the significance of the provisions contained in

Note 12 to the advertisement dated 23 February 2013. The submission is

that the prescribed qualification of a Matric with ITI is “the bare minimum

1 (2003) 3 SCC 5417requirement of job” and the Note contemplates that weightage can be

granted to a higher qualification in the relevant line or discipline as may be

decided by the Board. Learned counsel has buttressed her submissions by

urging that:

Ms Wadia Placed reliance on a series of advertisements issued by the

Board and on the mark-sheets of ITI with a lateral entry to the diploma

course. Devoting a considerable amount of industry to her research, Ms

Wadia has painstakingly placed on the record these documents in the form

of a compilation on the record. Ms Wadia urged that there is no prohibition

on the holder of a diploma in seeking appointment as Technician-III.

Besides the fact that there is an absence of a prohibition, learned counsel

submitted that Note 12 clearly indicates that the prescribed qualifications

constitute the bare minimum requirement of the job and that a candidate

with a higher qualification cannot be disqualified. This, in her view, is also

the position which has been adopted by the Board in an affidavit filed in

April 2001 before the High Court inRavinder Singh v State2. Learned

counsel relied on the orders passed in those proceedings by the High

Court.Finally it was urged, placing reliance on a judgment of this Court in


2 SWP 1706/2000 CMP No 2727/20008Jyoti KK v Kerala Public Service Commission3that where a person has

acquired a higher qualification, it can be stated to presuppose the

acquisition of the lower qualification prescribed for the post. In the absence

of any exclusion of a person holding higher qualifications, it was urged, a

diploma holder cannot be disqualified from applying for the post of

Technician-III.

13.        On the other hand, it has been urged on behalf of the SSSB by Mr

Riyaz Ahmad Jaan, learned senior counsel, that:

3 (2010) 15 SCC 5969
(vi)     The Board decided against the grant of any such weightage;
(vii)     No right of the appellants has been infringed and the process

            which has been followed is fair; and
(viii) The Board has plainly acted in pursuance of the position that the

            prescribed qualification for the post of Technician-III is Matric with

            ITI. A diploma holder does not fulfil that requirement.


Adopting these submissions, Mr Shoeb Alam, learned counsel for the State

of Jammu & Kashmir urged that the SSSB did not change the ‘rules of the

game’ mid-stream, as the learned Single Judge seemed to suggest. On the

contrary, the SSSB had affirmed the prescribed qualifications.
14.     On 4 December 1996, the Government of Jammu and Kashmir

through its Planning and Development Department notified its sanction to

the creation of 23,297 posts. Among them was the post of Technician-III.

The qualification prescribed for the post of Technician-III is “Matric with ITI”.
15.     The Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services Decentralisation and

Recruitment Act, 2010 provides in Section 5 that appointment to district,

divisional and state cadre posts shall be made by the competent authority

on the basis of a selection made by the Public Service Commission or the

State Service Selection Board, as the case may be. Section 6 provides

thus:
16.    Rules of 2010 have been framed under the provisions of the Act 4.

Rule 6 provides for the constitution of the Services Selection Board. The

Board has a three-tier set up comprising of selection committees at the

state level, divisional level and district level.                Rule 13 sets out the

procedure for inviting applications and eligibility for different cadres. Sub-

rules (1) and (3) of Rule 13 provide as follows:
…

              (3)      The district offices of the Board shall advertise
              the District cadre vacancies of the concerned district
              referred to it by the requisitioning authority and invite
              applications for selection to the said posts from such
              permanent residents of the State who are residents of
              that District and possess the prescribed qualification,
              eligibility   and     experience     for  such     posts.”
              (emphasis supplied)

Rule 14(1) provides for the preparation of a select list:
voce shall not be less than three times and more than five
             times the number of vacancies to be filled up. The final
             selection shall be made by the Board on the basis of
             marks / points obtained in viva-voce added to the marks /
             points obtained in the written test plus the weightage that
             may be provided for any higher / additional / special
             qualification (on pro-rata basis).”



The select list which is finalised by the respective committees has to be

recommended to the requisitioning authority with the prior approval of the

Board, under Rule 14(4). The said rule reads thus:
17.   Under the above provisions as well as in the advertisement which

was issued by the Board, every candidate must possess the prescribed

academic/professional/technical qualification and must fulfil all other

eligibility conditions.      The prescribed qualifications for the post of

Technician-III in the Power Development Department is a Matric with ITI in

the relevant trade. The Board at its 116th meeting took notice of the fact

that in some districts, the interviews had been conducted for candidates

with a diploma in Electrical Engineering while in other districts candidates

with a diploma had not been considered to be eligible for the post of12Technician-III. Moreover, candidates with an ITI in diverse trades had also

been interviewed for the post. The Board resolved at its meeting that only

an ITI in the relevant trade namely the Electrical trade is the prescribed

qualification specified in the advertisement.

18.   The learned Single Judge was persuaded to accept the submissions

of the petitioners who had moved the Writ Petition primarily on two

grounds. The first was that the Board had changed the rules in the midst of

the selection process. In holding thus, the learned Single Judge was clearly

in error. The Board did not bring about any change in the rules or the

norms governing the selection mid-stream.       There was no deviation from

prescribed requirement for the post, of ITI with Matric. In fact the Board

resolved to adhere to the qualification which was prescribed in the

advertisement.An anomalous situation had arisen as a consequence of

which, despite the prescribed qualifications, interviews of diploma holders

had been conducted in some districts. This was plainly in breach of the

conditions of the advertisement and was rectified by the Board. The second

ground which weighed with the learned Single Judge was that the holder of

a diploma is eligible for the higher post of Junior Engineer and hence a

candidate who holds a diploma must be “pre-supposed” to hold the lower

qualification of an ITI. This line of reasoning appears to be based on the

judgment of a two Judge bench of this Court inJyoti KK(supra). Before13adverting to the decision in Jyoti KK, it would be necessary to advert to

some of the decisions of this Court on the subject.

19.InPM Latha(supra), a two judge Bench of this Court rejected the

contention that the B.Ed. qualification is a higher qualification than the

Trained Teachers Certificate (TTC) and that a B.Ed. candidate should be

held to be eligible to compete for the post of a primary school teacher. This

Court held:
20.   The decision in Jyoti KK arises from a case where the Public

Service Commission had invited applications to the post of a Sub-Engineer


5 id at page 546
6(2003) 3 SCC 54814(Electrical) in the Kerala State Electricity Board. The qualifications

prescribed for the post were:

suppose the acquisition of a lower qualification. The absence of such a rule

in the present case makes a crucial difference to the ultimate outcome. In

this view of the matter, the Division Bench of the High Court was justified

in reversing the judgment of the learned Single Judge and in coming to the
10 id at page 17718conclusion that the appellants did not meet the prescribed qualifications.

We find no error in the decision of the Division Bench.
23.   While prescribing the qualifications for a post, the State, as employer,

may legitimately bear in mind several features including the nature of the

job, the aptitudes requisite for the efficient discharge of duties, the

functionality of a qualification and the content of the course of studies which

leads up to the acquisition of a qualification. The state is entrusted with the

authority to assess the needs of its public services.             Exigencies of

administration, it is trite law, fall within the domain of administrative decision

making. The state as a public employer may well take into account social

perspectives that require the creation of job opportunities across the

societal structure.   All these are essentially matters of policy.       Judicial

review must tread warily. That is why the decision in Jyoti KK must be

understood in the context of a specific statutory rule under which the

holding of a higher qualification which presupposes the acquisition of a

lower qualification was considered to be sufficient for the post. It was in the

context of specific rule that the decision in Jyoti KK turned.
24.   Ms Wadia sought to draw sustenance from the fact that the holder of

an ITI certification can obtain lateral entry to the diploma course. The point

of the matter, however, is that none of the appellants fit the description of

candidates who had secured an ITI certification before seeking a lateral19entry to a diploma course. Plainly, when an ITI with matric is required, a

person who does not hold that qualification is not eligible.
25.   The submission based on Note 12, urged by Ms Wadia, cannot be

accepted.    The stipulation that the qualification prescribed is the bare

minimum requirement of the job emphasises that it is an essential

requirement, a threshold which cannot be dispensed with. Under Note 12,

the Board is entitled to assign additional weightage for a higher

qualification. Whether such a weightage should be assigned is a matter for

the Board to determine. The SSSB did not assign an additional weightage

for a higher qualification. In not exercising an enabling power, no fault can

be found with the SSSB. An enabling provision postulates a discretion

which may or may not be exercised. A candidate has no vested right to

assert that the Board must as a mandate assign an additional weightage to

a higher qualification. Whether to do so or not is a matter for the Board to

determine. All that Note 12 postulates is that the mere possession of the

prescribed qualification will not entitle a candidate to be called for the

written test or interview. The Board may shortlist among eligible candidates

by granting a weightage to a higher qualification in the relevant line or

discipline. But the words “as may be decided by the Board” in Note 12

indicate that the Board is vested with a discretion in pursuance of an

enabling power which it may or may not exercise.

26.   Ms Wadia, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants,

however, urged that a peculiar situation arises in the present case because

the appellants were permitted initially to appear for the written test and the

interview. Their names were not contained in the disqualification list. Ms

Wadia submitted that the appellants would have become age barred by

now to pursue any future application. Recourse to our jurisdiction underArticle 142is warranted particularly since the appellants have spent nearly

four years in pursuing their quest for the job of Technician III. They had

even succeeded before the learned Single Judge. Hence, the rigors of the

hardship, which the appellants confront, can be met by a suitable direction

for age relaxation in their case. As we have noted in the earlier part of this

judgment, the appellants applied in 2013 in pursuance of the advertisement

that was issued by the SSSB. They were pursuing their remedies in the

writ proceedings which ultimately culminated in the order of the learned

Single Judge dated 1 August 2017. The Letters Patent Appeal was allowed

on 12 October 2017. Having regard to these circumstances, we are of the

view that the appellants should be granted an age relaxation to the extent

of four years should they apply for any other post that may be advertised

by the State of Jammu and Kashmir in the next two years.            The age

relaxation of four years shall be available to the appellants for any post

advertised upto 30 November 2020.          Save and except for the above

direction in regard to age relaxation, we have not interfered with the21judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeals

shall, accordingly, stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.




Civil Appeal No.11855 of 2018 @ SLP (C)No 31196 of 2017:
27.   Leave granted.

28.   This appeal is also disposed of in the same terms, conditions,

observations   and directions     as   in Civil Appeal Nos.11853-11854

of 2018 @ SLP (C) Nos 30797-30798 of 2017.

.....................................................J
                                             [UU Lalit]


                                            .....................................................J
                                            [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]
New Delhi;
December 05, 2018",2917,"On the other hand, it has been urged on behalf of the SSSB by Mr Riyaz Ahmad Jaan, learned senior counsel, that: 3 15 SCC 5969 (vi) The Board decided against the grant of any such weightage; (vii) No right of the appellants has been infringed and the process which has been followed is fair; and (viii) The Board has plainly acted in pursuance of the position that the prescribed qualification for the post of Technician-III is Matric with ITI. The Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services Decentralisation and Recruitment Act, 2010 provides in Section 5 that appointment to district, divisional and state cadre posts shall be made by the competent authority on the basis of a selection made by the Public Service Commission or the State Service Selection Board, as the case may be. Sub- rules (1) and (3) of Rule 13 provide as follows: ... (3) The district offices of the Board shall advertise the District cadre vacancies of the concerned district referred to it by the requisitioning authority and invite applications for selection to the said posts from such permanent residents of the State who are residents of that District and possess the prescribed qualification, eligibility and experience for such posts.” (emphasis supplied) Rule 14(1) provides for the preparation of a select list: voce shall not be less than three times and more than five times the number of vacancies to be filled up. The final selection shall be made by the Board on the basis of marks / points obtained in viva-voce added to the marks / points obtained in the written test plus the weightage that may be provided for any higher / additional / special qualification (on pro-rata basis).” The select list which is finalised by the respective committees has to be recommended to the requisitioning authority with the prior approval of the Board, under Rule 14(4). The final selection shall be made by the Board on the basis of marks / points obtained in viva-voce added to the marks / points obtained in the written test plus the weightage that may be provided for any higher / additional / special qualification (on pro-rata basis).” The select list which is finalised by the respective committees has to be recommended to the requisitioning authority with the prior approval of the Board, under Rule 14(4)."
"The State Of Bihar vs Devendra Sharma on 17 October, 2019",https://indiankanoon.org/docfragment/108226258/?formInput=doctypes%3A%20supremecourt%20year%3A%202019,"Take notes as you read a judgment using ourVirtual Legal Assistantand get email alerts whenever a new judgment matches your query (Query Alert Service). Try out ourPremium Member Services--Sign up todayand get free trial for one month.
HEMANT GUPTA, J.

1)      This judgment shall dispose of two sets of appeals; one by

        the State arising out of an order dated July 12, 2011 passed

        by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at

        Patna1 whereby, the appeals filed by the State were

        dismissed directed against the order passed by the learned

        Single Judge on October 6, 2009; and another set of appeals

        arising out of an order passed by the Division Bench of the

        High Court on September 24, 2014 whereby the order passed

        by the learned single Bench on October 6, 2009 was set

        aside. Some other Appeals are also on board against the

        orders passed by the High Court on other dates.
2)      Since the issue in the appeals is common arising out of same

        or similar facts, therefore, such appeals have been taken up

        for hearing together.
3)      Brief facts leading to the present appeals are that large

        number of candidates were appointed against Class III or

        Class IV posts in the Health Department in Government of

1    for short, ‘High Court’4Bihar till 1990 or so. The services of such employees were

        terminated which led to number of writ petitions before the

        High Court. The first round of cases came to end with the

        order of three Judge Bench of this Court reported asAshwani Kumar & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors.2. This

        Court held that recruitments made by Dr. Mallick were

        arbitrary, capricious, null and void after considering the

        Government order dated December 3, 1980 as well as

        Government resolution dated March 25, 1983.        It was also

        held that none of the appointees have any accrued right in

        the absence of sanctioned posts. It was held that the whole

        exercise remained in the realm of an unauthorised adventure.

        Nothing could come out of nothing. Ex nihilo nihil fit. Zero

        multiplied by zero remains zero.    It was held that army of

        employees under the Scheme had got to be cleared lock,

        stock and barrel so that public confidence in Government

        administration would not get shattered and arbitrary actions

        would not get sanctified.

4)      It is thereafter in another round, the Division Bench of the

        High Court inState of Bihar & Ors. v. Purendra Sulan Kit

        & Ors.3decided approximately 819 Letters Patent Appeals

        and the writ petitions. The High Court noticed that the entry

        to Class III and Class IV posts in the health department during

        the same period were through back door method and, in
2    (1997) 2 SCC 1
3    2006 SCC OnLine Pat 2905many cases, through forged and fabricated letters of

       appointment or through transfer orders without actual

       appointments and, in some cases, appointments were made

       without       availability   of   sanctioned   posts   made        by   the

       authority not competent to appoint.The High Court directed

       the Department of Health in the Government of Bihar to

       scrutinize the cases of affected employees afresh on the

       basis of relevant materials and in view of the law declared by

       this Court inSecretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. v.

       Umadevi(3) & Ors.4. The High Court held as under:
4   (2006) 4 SCC 16employees as a result of the exercise to be
                        undertaken by them and their final decision in
                        the light of this judgment and order.”
5)      It is in pursuance to such direction; the State constituted a

        Committee         of   five    officers5   to    examine     the   facts   of

        individual’s case. Two members of the State Committee did

        not participate in the proceedings nor signed the Report but

        remaining three members submitted its report on December

        31, 2008.        After considering the facts of each individual’s

        case, the employees were put in following three categories:
5    for short, ‘State Committee’7October 6, 2009 whereby, the report submitted by three

        members on December 31, 2008 was quashed with a

        direction to reinstate the employees.
7)      The order dated October 6, 2009 was challenged by the State

        in some of the intra-court appeals before the High Court.

        Such appeals were dismissed on March 29, 2011, inter alia,

        on the ground that inquiry was conducted in violation of the

        principle of natural justice as only three members have

        signed the Report. It was thus held that such termination is

        contrary to the judgment of this Court inState of

        Karnataka & Ors. v. M.L. Kesari & Ors.6 Itwas found that

        since the writ petitioners have worked for more than ten

        years, therefore, the services are entitled to be reguarlised.Such judgment is reported asThe State of Bihar & Ors. v.

        Binay Kumar Singh & Ors.7.This Court has allowed some

        of the appeals arising out of order dated March 29, 2011 inState of Bihar v. Kirti Narayan Prasad8. In the meantime,

        many appeals filed by the State were dismissed by the High

        Court on many dates including June 30, 2010, July 12, 2011,

        July 14, 2011, July 20, 2011, April 15, 2013, October 30, 2013

        and November 30, 2015 which are subject matter of

        challenge in the present appeals.

8)      The order passed by the learned Single Judge also gave rise
6    (2010) 9 SCC 247
7    2011 (3) PLJR 547
8    2018 SCC OnLine SC 2618to LPA No. 1623 of 2009 and other appeals. Such appeals

     were allowed by consent on February 11, 2010 whereby, one-

     man Committee under the Chairmanship of Hon’ble Mr.

     Justice Uday Sinha, a retired Judge of the High Court was

     entrusted the task of looking into various facts of the nature

     of appointment with the view to adjudicate the legality of

     their   appointments     and     continuance    in    service.

     Subsequently, LPA No. 560 of 2010 and some other appeals

     were allowed on March 23, 2010 in the light of order passed

     in the aforesaid LPA but without any consent. The said orders

     were challenged before this Court in Civil Appeal No.6484 of

     2011 and other matters. The appeals were allowed by this

     Court on August 8, 2011, inter alia, on the ground that

     without consent, the appeal could not be disposed of in terms

     of LPA No. 1623 of 2009 and other connected appeals. The

     appeals were directed to be decided afresh. It is thereafter,

     the Division Bench passed an order on September 24, 2014

     setting aside the order passed by the learned Single Bench

     on October 6, 2009.

9)   The Division Bench held that in view of the appointments

     being illegal and void ab initio, the services cannot be

     reguarlised and that the judgment of the Division Bench of

     the High Court in Binay Kumar Singh is contrary to the Full

     Bench judgment inRam Sevak Yadav & Anr. v. The State9of Bihar & Ors9, wherein the appellants were appointed on

       Class IV posts by the Civil Surgeon in the Health Department

       as in the present set of appeals but their services were

       terminated in the year 2001 for the reason that their

       appointments were illegal. The Full Bench of the High Court

       held as under:
9   2013 Lab IC 1607 (FB)10hold that they were appointed against vacant
                 sanctioned post and possessed qualifications
                 for the same. They were terminated before
                 (Uma Devi) (supra) and have sought to retain
                 their status by virtue of Court proceedings
                 and are therefore not entitled to the benefits
                 of paragraph 53. The issue of any procedural
                 irregularity  for   a   finding    of  forged
                 appointment is therefore irrelevant.”
10) The Division Bench in its order dated September 24, 2014,

     following the Full Bench judgment of that court, now subject

     matter of challenge by the employees in these appeals, held

     as under:
In the present case, the appointments of the
                writ petitioners have been repeatedly held to
                be non est or void ab initio. The question of
                regularization of their service even by
                invoking paragraph 44 of the judgment in the
                matter ofUma Devi(3) (supra) shall not
                arise.”
11) The appointments in the Health Department to Class III and

     Class IV posts firstly came up for consideration before this12Court in Ashwani Kumar. This Court examined the following

     points:
A situation had arisen which required immediate action for

     clearing the stables and for eradicating the evil effects of

     these   vitiated   recruitments      so    that   the    Tuberculosis

     Eradication Scheme could be put on a sound footing.               The

     High Court had directed the State to appoint a Committee to

     thoroughly investigate the entire matter.          Such Committee

     had issued public notices. 987 candidates appeared before

     the Committee. This Court held that the material supplied by

     the employees concerned was taken into consideration and

     then the Committee came to a firm decision to the effect that

     all these appointments made by Dr Mallick were vitiated from

     the inception and were required to be set aside and that is

     how the impugned termination orders were passed against17the appellants. Thus, it was held that the principles of natural

     justice were not violated if no opportunity was given to the

     employees concerned to have their say in the matter before

     their appointments were recalled and terminated.
16) However, while answering point No. 4, the State was directed

     to start a fresh exercise for recruiting Class III and Class IV

     employees against available 2250 vacancies or even more

     vacancies. The second round of cases started with the report

     of the State Committee constituted in terms of directions of

     the High Court in Purendra Sulan Kit.

17) When the present set of appeals came up for hearing before

     this Court on April 3, 2018, this Court found the following four

     categories of cases:
Therefore, the forgery is in the basic eligibility condition to

       undertake ANM course, which will vitiate the process of

       appointment.       For the reasons recorded in Kirti Narayan

       Prasad, Civil Appeal Nos. 7906 of 2019, 7919 of 2019 and

       7920 of 2019 are dismissed.

20) Coming to third category of cases, Mr. Mukherjee, learned

       counsel for the State referred to the separate Government

       Circulars dated December 3, 1980 in respect of Class III and

       Class IV category posts. It is contended that appointments on

       such circulars have been found to be illegal by this Court in

       Ashwani Kumar, which view was in fact, approved later by

       Constitution Bench judgment in Uma Devi, wherein this

       Court held as under:
10 for short, ‘ANM’20made in a permanent vacancy, but the same
               should soon be followed by a regular
               recruitment and that appointments to non-
               available posts should not be taken note of
               for regularisation. The cases directing
               regularisation have mainly proceeded on the
               basis that having permitted the employee to
               work for some period, he should be absorbed,
               without really laying down any law to that
               effect, after discussing the constitutional
               scheme for public employment.
xx          xx                  xx
53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There
               may be cases where irregular appointments
               (not illegal appointments) as explained in S.V.
               Narayanappa [(1967) 1 SCR 128 : AIR 1967
               SC 1071] , R.N. Nanjundappa [(1972) 1 SCC
               409 : (1972) 2 SCR 799] and B.N.
               Nagarajan [(1979) 4 SCC 507 : 1980 SCC
               (L&S) 4 : (1979) 3 SCR 937] and referred to in
               para 15 above, of duly qualified persons in
               duly sanctioned vacant posts might have
               been made and the employees have
               continued to work for ten years or more but
               without the intervention of orders of the
               courts or of tribunals. The question of
               regularisation of the services of such
               employees may have to be considered on
               merits in the light of the principles settled by
               this Court in the cases above-referred to and
               in the light of this judgment…………….”
               (Emphasis Supplied)
21) In Uma Devi, the argument that the employees have

    legitimate expectations was negated when this Court held as

    under:
Though, there is a case that the State had
made regularisations in the past of similarly
situated employees, the fact remains that
such regularisations were done only pursuant
to   judicial   directions,   either    of   the
Administrative Tribunal or of the High Court
and in some cases by this Court….
47.     When a person enters a temporary
employment or gets engagement as a
contractual or casual worker and the
engagement is not based on a proper
selection as recognised by the relevant rules
or    procedure,  he    is  aware    of   the
consequences of the appointment being
temporary, casual or contractual in nature.
Such a person cannot invoke the theory of
legitimate expectation for being confirmed in
the post when an appointment to the post
could be made only by following a proper
procedure for selection and in cases
concerned, in consultation with the Public
Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of
legitimate expectation cannot be successfully
advanced by temporary, contractual or casual22employees….”
22) The State Committee has examined all the appointments and

     segregated appointments based on forged documents and

     also irregular appointments.   Once the detailed report has

     been submitted examining the merit of each candidate, and

     when the judgment of this Court in Ashwani Kumar and

     Uma Devi conclusively answer the questions against the

     employees, no further discussion on the arguments raised

     would survive.   However, since the arguments have been

     addressed in respect of the third category of cases i.e.

     appointments made by a person who was not competent to

     make the appointments, we shall consider as to what will be

     the effect of such appointments.

23) Mr. Mukherjee, learned counsel for the State referred to

     various Government orders issued from time to time and

     submitted that such category has to be examined in two

     groups; one where the appointments were made by the

     incompetent authority; and second, the appointments made

     by the competent authority but without any sanctioned post

     and without following the procedure for appointment to public

     post.

24) It is admitted that there is no statutory rule in terms of

     proviso toArticle 309of the Constitution for appointment to

     Class III and Class IV categories in the State. The matter of23appointment is regulated by the Executive instructions. Mr.

Mukherjee has referred to Bihar Health Manual. Chapter I of

the Manual deals with Organisation and functions of the

Health Department of the State. It was pointed out that from

May 1, 1953, the Medical and the Public Health Departments

were    amalgamated       into    one    department     called   the

Department of Health under the Director of Health Services.

It was pointed out that the Director of Health Services is the

appointing    authority    in     respect   of   all   non-gazetted

appointments in the department including the Subordinate

Medical Service. To assist the Director, there is one Additional

Director and three Deputy Directors along with other

gazetted officers including Assistant Directors of Health

Services (M. and C.H.).        The relevant extract of the Manual

reads as under:
3. The Director of Health Services is the
             appointing authority in respect of all non-
             gazetted appointments in the department
             including the Subordinate Medical Service.
(No. 7759., dated the 9th June 1916)”
6. The following powers are also delegated to
             the Director of Health Services being a Head
             of Department under respective Codes, rules
             and orders:-
The powers of Assistant Director of Health Services are

    contained in Clause 9 which reads as under:
(Govt. order no. 262/HD, dated the 13th July,
                 1953.)”
26) The Civil Surgeons in Districts as also State Leprosy Officer

     and Director, T B Demonstration Centre are subordinate to

     the Director of Health Services.      The powers of Assistant

     Director of Public Health are as under:
(Govt. order no. 27680-H date dated the 1st
                 November, 1954).”26
27) A circular was issued by the State on September 5, 1979 with

     regard to retrenchment of Government/Semi-Government

     employees appointed on category III and IV temporary posts

     on ad-hoc basis. Thereafter, separate circulars were issued

     providing for procedure for appointment on category III and IV

     posts on December 3, 1980.        The relevant clause for the

     purposes of determining the person competent to make

     appointment in respect of Category III posts reads as under:
Officer of Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe
                available in the department will be the
                second member. In case no such officer is
                available, if the officer of that category is
                available in another department, then he will
                be included in the Committee and if even this27is also not possible, then Joint/Dy. Secretary of
the Personnel Department, who perform the
works related to Scheduled Caste/Scheduled
Tribe, will be appointed as a Member.
(ii) For preparation of merit list at District
level, District Head of the attached
Establishment will be the Chairman of
selection committee constituted and any
other senior officer of that Establishment,
who is nominated by their District level Head,
will be its member. Second Member will be
the District Welfare Officer so that at the time
of preparation of merit list of government
orders regarding maintenance no violation is
committed.
government that appointments on category 3
posts are not being made according to the
procedure prescribed in the above-said
resolution. The act of working against the
prescribed procedure clearly means the
violation of government orders, which is a
matter of regret. Therefore, it is expected
that the appointments on category 3 posts
are made according to the procedure
prescribed     in    the     above-mentioned
Resolution. It will be the responsibility of
each appointing authority to ensure that the
procedure with regard to appointment on
category 3 posts is followed strictly. In cast it
is found that prescribed procedure has not
been followed by the appointing authority
with regard to appointment on category 3
posts, then Government will have to take
necessary action against him. Inquiry will be
conducted immediately on receiving the
complaint that the officer has not followed the
prescribed procedure and if the charge is
found proved, the officer will be placed under
suspension immediately and departmental
action will be taken to remove him from
services. Such incorrect appointments will be
cancelled immediately.”28
28) Similar is the circular in respect of appointment to Category

     IV post.   On January 20, 1992, the State issued a circular

     regarding transfer and posting of Class III and Class IV

     employees of Health Department and it was decided that the

     employees shall be decentralized at the District level. It was

     communicated that transfer and posting as far as possible

     shall remain within the jurisdiction of appointing officer.

     Clause 3 and 6 of the said circular reads as under:
ray technician, Physiotherapist, Occupational
                 Therapist, Ophthalmic Assistant, Broadcast
                 Trainer, Health Trainer, Dy. District Mass
                 Media Officer, Stenographer, Cholera Worker,
                 Special Cholera Worker, Movie Player etc.”
6. On the above basis, all the earlier orders
                 are superseded by the following order:
The powers conferred on Assistant Director in terms of clause

     13(c) of Chapter I of Bihar Health Manual empowers Assistant

     Director (Public Health) to appoint non-gazetted epidemic

     staff   like    Health    Assistants        and   Vaccinators      against

     sanctioned posts but only in case of emergency.                 A finding

     has been recorded in Ashwani Kumar that 2250 posts were

     sanctioned whereas 6000 appointments were made.                       The

     Tuberculosis eradication under the 20-Point Programme was

     not an emergency activity which may empower the Assistant

     Director to make large number of appointments but again

     such emergent powers could be exercised only in respect of

     sanctioned posts.

30) The exception in respect of appointing authority came with

     the circular dated December 3, 1980 which contemplated30that suitable candidates be selected as per requirement from

     common merit list by the competent authorities of Secretariat

     and attached offices; District Collector and equivalent Officer

     In charge of the Divisional Offices.      Dr. Mallick, Deputy

     Director in the subordinate offices of the Directorate of Health

     Services was not competent to make appointments against

     Category III or Category IV posts in view of the provisions of

     the Manual as also in terms of the circular dated December 3,

     1980 recorded by this Court in Ashwani Kumar as well.
31) Though, certain appointments have been made by Civil

     Surgeon which Mr. Mukherjee does not dispute as he was the

     competent authority but it is argued that none of the

     requirements to fill up the public post was adhered to.

     Appointments were made to the public posts without

     following any procedure and without there being any

     sanctioned post.

32) An argument was raised on behalf of learned counsel for the

     employees that some of the appointments have been made

     by Regional Deputy Director as four posts of Assistant

     Director were converted into that of Regional Deputy Director.

     We do not find any merit in the said argument. The post of

     Assistant Director was provided in the Directorate of Health

     Services with no delegation of appointment except in the

     case of emergency against sanctioned posts. Such Regional31Deputy    Director    has   not      been   conferred   power    of

     appointment against Class III and Class IV posts. Therefore,

     the   Assistant      Director     was   incompetent     to   make

     appointments      against   the    sanctioned   posts   except   in

     emergent cases and so is Regional Deputy Director.
33) In Ashwani Kumar, this Court has dealt with the

     appointments made against Class III and IV category posts in

     the Health Department itself. The reasoning recorded therein

     is that the appointments have been proved to be made not

     against the sanctioned posts and in a manner, which is wholly

     arbitrary, capricious and, therefore, employees will not get

     any right to seek regularisation of their services.
34) In Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 20033 of 2012,

     the respondent was appointed by Dr. A.A. Mallick.            Such

     appointments have been found to be illegal by this Court in

     Ashwani Kumar.         We find that there is no reason to re-

     examine the appointments made by Dr. A.A. Mallick.           Such

     appointments have been adversely commented upon inAshwani Kumarcase. Therefore, no right will accrue in

     favour of the respondent.         Consequently, the appeal arises

     out of SLP (Civil) No. 20033 of 2012 is allowed and the order

    passed by the High Court is set aside.
35) Lastly, it is argued that employees have been working for

     many years, some for more than 25 years, therefore,

     humanitarian view should be taken to set aside the order of32termination and regularise their services so as to make them

      entitled to pension and other retirement benefits.
36) We do not find any merit in the said argument. A Full Bench

      of the High Court inRita Mishra & Ors. v. Director,

      Primary Education, Bihar & Ors.11while dealing with

      appointment in the education department claiming salary

      despite the fact that letter of appointment was forged,

      fraudulent or illegal, declined such claim. It was held that the

      right to salary stricto sensu springs from a legal right to

      validly hold the post for which salary is claimed. It is a right

      consequential to a valid appointment to such post. Therefore,

      where the very root is non-existent, there cannot subsist a

      branch thereof in the shape of a claim to salary. The rights to

      salary, pension and other service benefits are entirely

      statutory in nature in public service. Therefore, these rights,

      including the right to salary, spring from a valid and legal

      appointment to the post. Once it is found that the very

      appointment is illegal and is non est in the eye of law, no

      statutory entitlement for salary or consequential rights of

      pension and other monetary benefits can arise.
37) Such judgment of the Full Bench was approved by three Judge

      Bench of this Court in a Judgment reportedR. Vishwanatha

      Pillai v. State of Kerala & Ors.12. This Court held as under:
member Committee. 91 candidates have been found to be a

    case   of   irregular   appointment.       Such    candidates   are

    continuing in service. None of the candidates in the present

    set of appeals could point out that they were appointed in a

    manner meant for filling up of vacant post of public

    appointment i.e. by advertisement and by giving opportunity34to all eligible candidates to apply.

39) This Court inState of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Manshu

      Kumbhkar13, while allowing of the appeal of the State found

      that the respondent was not sponsored by the employment

      exchange. There was no advertisement and there was not

      even any properly constituted committee to make the

      selection.

40) This Court inState of Bihar v. Upendra Narayan Singh &

      Ors.14allowed the appeal of the State and thatSection 4of

      Employment       Exchanges      (Compulsory     Notification   of

      Vacancies) Act, 1959 casts a duty on the employer in every

      establishment in public sector in the State or a part thereof to

      notify every vacancy to the employment exchange before

      filling up the same.

41) This Court inUnion of India & Anr. v. Raghuwar Pal

      Singh15was examining a case, where the appointment letter

      came to be issued without approval of the competent

      authority, then whether such appointment letter issued to the

      respondent, would be a case of nullity or a mere irregularity?

      If it is a case of nullity, affording opportunity to the incumbent

13 (2007) 8 SCC 249
14 (2009) 5 SCC 65
15 (2018) 15 SCC 46335would be a mere formality and non-grant of opportunity may

      not vitiate the final decision of termination of his services.

      This Court held that in absence of prior approval of the

      competent authority, the Director Incharge could not have

      hastened issuance of the appointment letter. The act of

      commission and omission of the Director Incharge would,

      therefore, suffer from the vice of lack of authority and nullity

      in law.

42) InNidhi Kaim & Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh &

      Ors.16, a three Judge Bench was dealing with admission of

      students to MBBS Course on the basis of illegal and unfair

      admission process. The Court held as under:
“92.    …Having      given    our    thoughtful
                    consideration to the above submission, we
                    are of the considered view that conferring
                    rights or benefits on the appellants, who had
                    consciously participated in a well thought out,
                    and meticulously orchestrated plan, to
                    circumvent well laid down norms, for gaining
                    admission to the MBBS course, would amount
                    to espousing the cause of “the unfair”. It
                    would seem like allowing a thief to retain the
                    stolen property. It would seem as if the Court
                    was not supportive of the cause of those who
                    had adopted and followed rightful means.
                    Such a course would cause people to question
                    the credibility of the justice-delivery system
                    itself. The exercise of jurisdiction in the
                    manner suggested on behalf of the appellants
                    would surely depict the Court's support in
                    favour of the sacrilegious. It would also
                    compromise the integrity of the academic
                    community. We are of the view that in the
                    name of doing complete justice it is not
16 (2017) 4 SCC 136possible for this Court to support the vitiated
              actions of the appellants through which they
              gained admission to the MBBS course.

xx            xx           xx
94. …Even in situations where a juvenile
              indulges in crime, he has to face trial, and is
              subjected to the postulated statutory
              consequences. Law, has consequences. And
              the consequences of law brook no exception.
              The appellants in this case, irrespective of
              their age, were conscious of the regular
              process of admission. They breached the
              same by devious means. They must
              therefore, suffer the consequences of their
              actions. It is not the first time that admissions
              obtained by deceitful means would be
              cancelled. This Court has consistently
              annulled academic gains arising out of
              wrongful admissions. Acceptance of the
              prayer made by the appellants on the
              parameter suggested by them would result in
              overlooking the large number of judgments
              on the point. Adoption of a different course,
              for the appellants, would trivialise the
              declared legal position. Reference in this
              behalf may be made to the judgments relied
              upon by the learned counsel representing
              Vyapam.
108. …In the facts and circumstances of the
              case in hand, it would not be proper to
              legitimise the admission of the appellants to
              the MBBS course in exercise of the jurisdiction
              vested in this Court underArticle 142of the
              Constitution. We, therefore, hereby decline
              the above prayer made on behalf of the
              appellants.”
43) In another three Judge Bench judgment in Chairman and37Managing Director, Food Corporation of India & Ors. v.
Jagdish Balaram Bahira & Ors.17, the Court was examining

      the consequences of false caste certificate produced to seek

      appointment. The Court held as under:

45) In light of the above discussion, we find that the order dated

     July 12, 2011 or other similar orders passed by the High Court

     cannot be sustained in law and, thus, are set aside.                 The

     appeals filed by the State are allowed.
46) We do not find any error in the order of the High Court dated

     September 24, 2014, and, therefore, the appeals filed by the

     candidates against such order are dismissed.             The pending

     applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
.............................................J.
                                                (L. NAGESWARA RAO)



                                 .............................................J.
                                                      (HEMANT GUPTA)
NEW DELHI;
OCTOBER 17, 2019.
39",4757,"1) This judgment shall dispose of two sets of appeals; one by the State arising out of an order dated July 12, 2011 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Patna1 whereby, the appeals filed by the State were dismissed directed against the order passed by the learned Single Judge on October 6, 2009; and another set of appeals arising out of an order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court on September 24, 2014 whereby the order passed by the learned single Bench on October 6, 2009 was set aside. The High Court noticed that the entry to Class III and Class IV posts in the health department during the same period were through back door method and, in 2 2 SCC 1 3 2006 SCC OnLine Pat 2905many cases, through forged and fabricated letters of appointment or through transfer orders without actual appointments and, in some cases, appointments were made without availability of sanctioned posts made by the authority not competent to appoint.The High Court directed the Department of Health in the Government of Bihar to scrutinize the cases of affected employees afresh on the basis of relevant materials and in view of the law declared by this Court inSecretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. The High Court noticed that the entry to Class III and Class IV posts in the health department during the same period were through back door method and, in 2 2 SCC 1 3 2006 SCC OnLine Pat 2905many cases, through forged and fabricated letters of appointment or through transfer orders without actual appointments and, in some cases, appointments were made without availability of sanctioned posts made by the authority not competent to appoint. The High Court noticed that the entry to Class III and Class IV posts in the health department during the same period were through back door method and, in 2 2 SCC 1 3 2006 SCC OnLine Pat 2905many cases, through forged and fabricated letters of appointment or through transfer orders without actual appointments and, in some cases, appointments were made without availability of sanctioned posts made by the authority not competent to appoint. The High Court noticed that the entry to Class III and Class IV posts in the health department during the same period were through back door method and, in 2 2 SCC 1 3 2006 SCC OnLine Pat 2905many cases, through forged and fabricated letters of appointment or through transfer orders without"
"Kamal Singh vs State Of Haryana on 29 July, 2010",https://indiankanoon.org/docfragment/43739226/?formInput=doctypes%3A%20supremecourt%20year%3A%202010,"Take notes as you read a judgment using ourVirtual Legal Assistantand get email alerts whenever a new judgment matches your query (Query Alert Service). Try out ourPremium Member Services--Sign up todayand get free trial for one month.
1.            Leave granted.

2.            Ten   persons   in   all,   Kamal   Singh   the   appellant 

            herein and his brothers, Randhir Singh, Attar Singh & 

            Baljeet Singh, Anees, son of Attar Singh, Ramrati wife 

            of   Kamal   Singh,   Maya   wife   of   Attar   Singh   and   Urmila 

            wife   of   Baljeet   Singh   along   with   two   others   were 

            brought   to   trial   for   offences   punishable   under 

            Sections   148,   302,   307,   149   for   the   first   eight 

            persons and for the other two underSections 420,467,468,471,120Band200of the IPC.  Of the ten persons 

            aforesaid,   only   Kamal   Singh,   the   appellant   was   armed 

            with  a   licensed  shot   gun  which   is  the   alleged  murder 

            weapon.     As   per   the   prosecution   story,   Wazir   Singh, 

            P.W. 7, resident of Village Khatiwas had two sons Phul 


CRL.A. NO.      OF 2010 @ SLP(CRL.) 3244 OF 2009                                                                         REPORTABLE2Kumar   deceased   and   Anil   Kumar,   whereas   Sumer   Singh, 

            Rakesh   and   Chhatar   Singh   were   the   brothers   of   Wazir 

            Singh.   A piece of shamlat land in front of the house 

            of  Rakesh,   Ramesh  and   Sumer  Singh,   was  being   used  by 

            the latter to tether his cattle.   Kamal Singh's house 

            was   also   close   by.     On   the   9th  of   May,   2002,   Manti, 

            wife  of   Rakesh  was   tethering  her   cattle  in   this  plot 

            of   land   when   Ramrati   accused   hit   a   buffalo   with   a 

            stick   and also warned Manti not to tie the cattle at 

            that place. A quarrel soon ensued   but the matter was 

            ultimately settled.   On the 10th  of May, 2002 i.e., on 

            the   very   next   day,   at   about   6:00p.m.   the   appellant 

            armed   with   his   .12   bore   licensed   gun   along   with   the 

            other accused climbed up to the roof of his house and 

            started   abusing   the   complainant   party.     Wazir   Singh, 

            Sumer Singh, Abhimanyu son of Sumer Singh, Phul Kumar, 

            Maya   Ram   and   Chhatar   Singh     attempted   to   pacify   him 

            but   without   success.   On   the   contrary,   Randhir   Singh, 

            Baljeet Singh and Attar Singh raised a lalkara calling 

            upon   the   appellant   to   sort   out   the   other   party   once 

            and for all.   The appellant thereupon fired a shot at 

            Phul Kumar into the left side of his chest on which he 

            fell down and as Randhir Singh and Chhattar Singh came 

            forward   to   assist   Phul   Kumar,   the   appellant   again 

            fired two shots hitting them as well.  All the accused 


CRL.A. NO.      OF 2010 @ SLP(CRL.) 3244 OF 2009                                                                         REPORTABLE3also hurled brick bats and caused several injuries to 

            the witnesses and as Maya Ram, Indrawati and Phulwati 

            came   forward   to   rescue   the   injured,   the   appellant 

            again   fired   from   his   gun   hitting   them   as   well.     On 

            hearing the sound of the gun shots a number of persons 

            rushed to the spot on which all the accused came down 

            from the roof and ran away. They also found that Phul 

            Kumar   and   Maya   Ram   had   died   of   their   injuries. 

            Chhattar   Singh   and   Indrawati   were,   however,     shifted 

            to the PGI, Rohtak whereafter Wazir Singh PW 7, lodged 

            a   report   at   police   station     Sadar,   Dadri.     Chhattar 

            Singh also died a short time later.   The accused were 

            arrested   over   several   days   and   on   the   statement   made 

            by   the   appellant,   the   weapon   of   offence   i.e.,   his 

            licensed shot gun along with some catridges was taken 

            into   possession.                               On   the   completion   of   the 

            investigation, the accused were brought to trial.  The 

            trial   court   relying   primarily   on   the   statements   of 

            P.W. 7-Wazir Singh and PW 16 - Indravati and PW 17 - 

            Ravinder, injured   and PW - 18 Umed Singh   convicted 

            and sentenced  eight of the accused viz., Kamal Singh, 

            Randhir   Singh,   Baljeet   Singh,   Attar   Singh,   Ramrati, 

            Mayaram, Urmila and Anil for offences punishable underSections   148,302,307read   withSection   149of   the 

            IPC and also for the offence punishable under Section 


CRL.A. NO.      OF 2010 @ SLP(CRL.) 3244 OF 2009                                                                         REPORTABLE427   of   theArms   Actwith   respect   to   the   appellant. 

            Urmila, Dr. Surya Prakash Singh and Ram Chander were, 

            however, given the benefit of doubt and were acquitted 

            of all charges levelled against them.

3.            An   appeal   was   thereafter   taken   to   the   High 

            Court.    The  High   Court  acquitted   all  but   the  present 

            appellant on the plea that no injuries had been caused 

            by any of them which revealed that their common object 

            was   not   to   cause   the   death   of   anybody   and   it   also 

            appeared   that   the   entire   family   of   the   appellant   had 

            been   implicated   for   reasons   of   enmity.     The   plea 

            raised   by   the   appellant   that   his   case   fell   within 

            Exception   II   to   Section   300   was   repelled   for   the 

            reason   that   there   was   no   evidence   to   show   that   the 

            conduct of the complainant party had resulted in some 

            apprehension   in   his   mind   of   serious   injury   at   their 

            hands   and   the   story   that   he   had   been   first   attacked 

            with brick bats and lathis could not be believed as he 

            had no injuries on his person.

4.            Mr.   Sushil   Kumar,   the   learned   senior   counsel, 

            has confined his submission only to the plea that the 

            appellant   had   exceeded   the   right   of   private   defence 

            although it has also been submitted that as there was 


CRL.A. NO.      OF 2010 @ SLP(CRL.) 3244 OF 2009                                                                         REPORTABLE5no   charge   under   Section   302   simplicitor   against   the 

            appellant,   he   could   in   fact   claim   an   outright 

            acquittal.   The learned counsel has submitted that in 

            the   circumstances   he   would   not   go   into   the 

            technicalities of the matter and confine himself only 

            to   the   benefit   of   Exception   II   to   Section   300.     The 

            learned counsel has brought to out notice the findings 

            of  the   trial  court   in  this   matter  which   we  reproduce 

            hereunder:
It has been pointed out that even as per the findings 

            of the trail court a case of exceeding   the right of 

            private   defence   was   clearly   made   out   and   the 

            appellant,   was   therefore,   liable   to   be   convicted   and 

            sentenced   under   Section   304   Part   I   ofIPCand   not 

            Section 302 thereof.

5.            Mr.   Rao   Ranjit,   the   learned   counsel   for   the 

            State has however, pointed out that the very basis of 

            the  argument   made  by   Mr.  Sushil   Kumar  was   lacking  as 

            there was no evidence to indicate that any attack had 

            been  made   on  the   appellant  as   there  were   no  injuries 

            on his person and the story that the door of his house 

            had   been   broken   by   the   complainant   party   was 

            fallacious   as   there   was   no   evidence   to   that   effect. 

            He   has,   further,   submitted   that   the   appellant   had, 

            without   any   basis   and   without   any   apprehension   of 


CRL.A. NO.      OF 2010 @ SLP(CRL.) 3244 OF 2009                                                                         REPORTABLE7injury, caused the death of three persons.
6.            We   have   heard   and   considered   the   arguments 

            advanced by the the learned counsel.

7.            As   per   the   appellant's   defence   given   in   his 

            examination underSection 313Cr.P.C. he was returning 

            from Siwani i.e. his place of employment and was going 

            towards his house carrying his licensed gun and as he 

            was   passing   by   the   house   of   Ramesh,   he   had   been 

            encircled   by   the   complainant   party   and   at   that   time 

            Phul Kumar had tried to give him a lathi blow on which 

            he   had   fired   one   shot   from   his   gun   killing   him.     He 

            further stated that he had then run to his own house 

            and   closed   the   door   but   the   complainant   party   had 

            attempted   to   break   open   the   door   on   which   he   had 

            rushed   to   the   roof   and   fired   several   shots   in   self 

            defence   resulting   in   two   deaths   and   some   injuries   to 

            the witnesses as well.

8.            In this situation we are called upon to examine 

            which of the two theories is correct.

9.            We notice that there are three deceased in this 

            matter.   As per the admitted position   the injury on 


CRL.A. NO.      OF 2010 @ SLP(CRL.) 3244 OF 2009                                                                         REPORTABLE8Phul Kumar had been inflicted from a very short range 

            whereas the injuries to the others had caused from the 

            roof   of   the   house   which   would   be   8   to   10   feet   high. 

            This   fact   is   verifiable   from   the   medical   evidence   as 

            well.     The   post   mortem   examination   of   Phul   Kumar's 

            body   revealed   a   rat   hole   injury   1""   X   .75""   with 

            inverted  margins   and  tattooing   and  lacerations   around 

            it.   It is evident from this injury that the pellets 

            had   entered     the   body     enmasse   and   had   exited   from 

            injury   no.2     on   the   rear   side   of   the   body   as   the 

            margins were everted.  The premise that the injury had 

            been   caused   from   virtually   point   blank   range   is 

            supported   by   the   observations   made   in   Modi's   Medical 

            Jurisprudence   and   Toxicology,   Twenty   Third   Edition, 

            under   the     Chapter   'Injuries   by   Mechanical   Violence' 

            at pp.722:-
10.           We further see that PW 12 Dr. U.S. Sisodia who 

            had performed the post mortem examination on the deadbody   also   opined   that   in   that   the   injury   No.   1appeared   to   have   been   caused   by   a   single   projectile 

            from   a   very   close   range.     It   is   nevertheless   the 

            admitted   position   that   the   weapon   used   by   the 

            appellant was his licensed shot gun is even otherwise 

            proved   as   pellets   had   been   recovered   from   the   dead 

            body   of   Maya   Ram.     The   doctor,   therefore,   obviously 


CRL.A. NO.      OF 2010 @ SLP(CRL.) 3244 OF 2009                                                                         REPORTABLE10mistook a shot fired from point blank range, as being 

            from   a   single   projectile.     When   a   comparison   of   the 

            injuries  on   Phul  Kumar's   body  with   those  on   the  dead 

            bodies of the other two victims ie. Chhattar Singh and 

            Maya Ram is made it stands revealed that they had been 

            shot   from   a   distance   of   10   to   12   feet   which   is   the 

            appellant's   defence.     Admittedly,   in   the   case   of 

            Chhattar   Singh   also     there   appears   to   be   blackening 

            around the wounds but the distance is definitely much 

            greater   than   that   in   the   case   of   Phul   Kumar   as   the 

            dispersal   of   pellets   would   show.     Likewise,   in   the 

            case of Maya Ram, there were multiple pellet injuries 

            but   no   blackening   or   scorching   and   on   dissection 

            several   pellets   had   been   located.     To   our   mind, 

            therefore,   the   story   projected   by   the   appellant   that 

            the   injury   caused   to   Phul   Kumar   was   at   ground   level 

            and   from   a   very   short   distance   when   he   had   been 

            attacked   by   him   and   that   the   injuries   to   the   others 

            had   been   caused   when   he   had   fired   from   the   roof,   is 

            supported   by   the   medical   evidence.     There   is   yet 

            another     circumstance   which   to   out   mind   goes   to   the 

            root of the matter.   The positive finding of the High 

            Court   is   that   the   story   that   the   accused   party   had 

            gone   to   the   roof   and   thrown   brickbats   at   the 

            complainant   party   was   incorrect   and   it   is   on   that 


CRL.A. NO.      OF 2010 @ SLP(CRL.) 3244 OF 2009                                                                         REPORTABLE11basis   that   seven   of   the   accused   had   been   given   the 

            benefit of doubt and acquitted.  The photographs which 

            have   been   produced   on   record   by   the   prosecution, 

            however,  clearly show the presence of  a large number 

            of brick bats lying around the house belonging to the 

            appellant.     The   prosecution   story,   therefore,   with 

            regard to the brick bats having been disbelieved, the 

            possibility that the story projected by the appellant 

            could   be   the   correct   one,   cannot   be   ruled   out.     We 

            also   notice   from   the   record   including,   the   FIR   that 

            there   is   no   reference   whatsoever   to   the   pelting   of 

            stones by the accused.

11.           In   a   matter   relating   to   the   right   of   private 

            defence   or   exceeding   the   right   of   private   defence 

            some element of guess work based on common experience 

            has indeed to come into play and it is for that reason 

            that the Courts have gone so far as to rule that even 

            though an accused may not stake a claim to the right 

            of   private   defence,   the   Court   can   still   give   the 

            benefit if it emanates from the evidence.  In the case 

            of a claim to the benefit of Exception II we feel that 

            it is impossible to accept that a person who has been 

            attacked, and in this case by several persons to know 

            exactly where and when to stop and to use a hackneyed 


CRL.A. NO.      OF 2010 @ SLP(CRL.) 3244 OF 2009                                                                         REPORTABLE12expression,   the   evidence   cannot   be   weighed   in   golden 

            scales.    The  claim   to  this   Exception  is   also  perhaps 

            the most risky and tenuous for an accused, although it 

            is   often   the   most   appropriate   one.     The   advice 

            tendered   by   an   experienced   defence   counsel   is 

            invariably   ignored   in   favour   of   that   of   the     co-

            prisoners who act as untrained legal advisors and warn 

            an   accused   against   taking   such   a   plea.   The   defence 

            version   given   by   the   appellant   is   that   he   had   been 

            attacked by half a dozen persons and he had managed to 

            save himself as he was carrying his gun which he had 

            used with telling effect.  The trial court has given a 

            somewhat unusual explanation  by saying that though it 

            could   be   a   case   of   exceeding   the   right   of   private 

            defence   but   the   benefit   could     not   be   given   to   the 

            appellant, the suggestion being that the gun ought to 

            have been used not as a weapon but as a lathi.   With 

            great respect, to the learned judge, this observation 

            belies logic and is absurd.  It cannot be ignored that 

            the  appellant   was  a   Commando  and   an  ex-member   of  the 

            National   Security   Guard   and   had   been   trained   in   the 

            use of weapons, and was at the relevant time employed 

            as a security guard in a bank premises and to expect a 

            person like him when attacked, and that too by six or 

            seven persons, to cover in fear and to use the weapon 


CRL.A. NO.      OF 2010 @ SLP(CRL.) 3244 OF 2009                                                                         REPORTABLE13as a lathi, cannot be countenanced.

12.           We   are,   accordingly,   of   the   opinion   that   Mr. 

            Sushil   Kumar's   plea   that   the   appellant   had   exceeded 

            the   right   of   private   defence   must   be   accepted.     We 

            make an order in the above terms and allow the appeal 

            to   this   limited   extent.     We   also   direct   that   the 

            conviction against the appellant be modified from one 

            under   Section   302   to   304   Part   I   and   the   sentence   is 

            also   modified   from   life   to   ten   years   rigorous 

            imprisonment;   all   other   parts   of   sentence   being 

            maintained as it is.

..........................J
                                                                     [HARJIT SINGH BEDI]





                                                                      .........................J
                                                                      [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD]

           NEW DELHI
           JULY 29, 2010.
",2330,"Ten persons in all, Kamal Singh the appellant herein and his brothers, Randhir Singh, Attar Singh & Baljeet Singh, Anees, son of Attar Singh, Ramrati wife of Kamal Singh, Maya wife of Attar Singh and Urmila wife of Baljeet Singh along with two others were brought to trial for offences punishable under Sections 148, 302, 307, 149 for the first eight persons and for the other two underSections 420,467,468,471,120Band200of the IPC. OF 2010 @ SLP(CRL.) 3244 OF 2009 REPORTABLE3also hurled brick bats and caused several injuries to the witnesses and as Maya Ram, Indrawati and Phulwati came forward to rescue the injured, the appellant again fired from his gun hitting them as well. 7-Wazir Singh and PW 16 - Indravati and PW 17 - Ravinder, injured and PW - 18 Umed Singh convicted and sentenced eight of the accused viz., Kamal Singh, Randhir Singh, Baljeet Singh, Attar Singh, Ramrati, Mayaram, Urmila and Anil for offences punishable underSections 148,302,307read withSection 149of the IPC and also for the offence punishable under Section CRL.A. The learned counsel has brought to out notice the findings of the trial court in this matter which we reproduce hereunder: It has been pointed out that even as per the findings of the trail court a case of exceeding the right of private defence was clearly made out and the appellant, was therefore, liable to be convicted and sentenced under Section 304 Part I ofIPCand not Section 302 thereof. The learned counsel has brought to out notice the findings of the trial court in this matter which we reproduce hereunder: It has been pointed out that even as per the findings of the trail court a case of exceeding the right of private defence was clearly made out and the appellant, was therefore, liable to be convicted and sentenced under Section 304 Part I ofIPCand not Section 302 thereof."
"The State Of Bihar And Anr vs Amit Kumar @ Bachcha Rai on 20 April, 2017",https://indiankanoon.org/docfragment/20784982/?formInput=doctypes%3A%20supremecourt%20year%3A%202017,"Take notes as you read a judgment using ourVirtual Legal Assistantand get email alerts whenever a new judgment matches your query (Query Alert Service). Try out ourPremium Member Services--Sign up todayand get free trial for one month.
Leave granted.
This criminal appeal is filed by State of Bihar against the  final  judgment
and order dated 14.02.2017 passed in Criminal  Miscellaneous  No.  53391  of
2016, by the High Court of Judicature at Patna, wherein the High  Court  has
passed following order:
[20]Nimmagadda Prasad v. CBI, (2013) 7 SCC 466;Y.S. Jagan Mohan
Reddy v. CBI, (2013) 7 SCC 439.
-----------------------
REPORTABLE",99,Take notes as you read a judgment using ourVirtual Legal Assistantand get email alerts whenever a new judgment matches your query (Query Alert Service). Try out ourPremium Member Services--Sign up todayand get free trial for one month. Take notes as you read a judgment using ourVirtual Legal Assistantand get email alerts whenever a new judgment matches your query (Query Alert Service). Try out ourPremium Member Services--Sign up todayand get free trial for one month. Take notes as you read a judgment using ourVirtual Legal Assistantand get email alerts whenever a new judgment matches your query (Query Alert Service). Take notes as you read a judgment using ourVirtual Legal Assistantand get email alerts whenever a new judgment matches your query (Query Alert Service). Try out ourPremium Member Services--Sign up todayand get free trial for one month. Take notes as you read a judgment using ourVirtual Legal Assistantand get email alerts whenever a new judgment matches your query (Query Alert Service). Try out ourPremium Member Services--Sign up todayand get free trial for one month. Take notes as you read a judgment using ourVirtual Legal Assistantand get email alerts whenever a new judgment matches your query (Query Alert Service).
"Khoday Distilleries Ltd. (Now Khoday ... vs Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare ... on 1 March, 2019",https://indiankanoon.org/docfragment/127522483/?formInput=doctypes%3A%20supremecourt%20year%3A%202019,"Take notes as you read a judgment using ourVirtual Legal Assistantand get email alerts whenever a new judgment matches your query (Query Alert Service). Try out ourPremium Member Services--Sign up todayand get free trial for one month.
A.K. SIKRI, J.
Leave granted.

2)     Question of law in both these appeals is identical. However, factsSignature Not Verifiedof the Civil appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.Digitally signed by490 of 2012 are noted for discussion, as in this case, order dated
DEEPAK SINGH
Date: 2019.03.02
12:59:53 IST
Reason:
Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 490 of 2012 & Anr.              Page 1 of 27
7)     This review petition has been dismissed by the High Court vide

       orders dated September 09, 2011, inter alia, with the following

       observations:
Revenue Divisional Officer Officer and Another 4, this Court

       held that it will make no difference whether the review petition

       was filed in the High Court before the dismissal of the special

       leave petition or after the dismissal thereof. In either case, the

       doctrine of merger would apply, even when the special leave

       petition is dismissed in limine, which will bar the filing of the

       review petition before the High Court when the special leave

       petition is dismissed.
3   (2010) 8 SCC 383
4   (2011) 4 SC 602Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 490 of 2012 & Anr.           Page 8 of 27
13)     As against the aforesaid view, there is another line of cases

        holding that review petition is maintainable if no leave has been

        granted to file an appeal and there is dismissal of the special

        leave petition at the preliminary stage itself. These cases have

        taken a view that a preliminary stage does not constitute a

        binding precedent and, therefore, doctrine of merger would not

        apply. These cases are Palani Roman Catholic Mission v. S.

        Bagirathi Ammal5,Bhakra Beas Management Board v.

        Krishna Kumar Vij and Another6.

14)     After taking note of the aforesaid judgments, the reference order

        in the instant case makes a remark about the nature of conflict

        between them, which is noted in paragraph 11 of the judgment

        and is reproduced below:
State of Kerala and Others7, which is again a two Judge Bench.

        Though in this case situation was not where review petition was
5   (2009) 16 SCC 657
6   (2010) 8 SCC 701
7   2018 (11) Scale 141Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 490 of 2012 & Anr.        Page 9 of 27filed after the dismissal of the special leave petition, at the same

       time, dismissal of the special leave petition in limine was

       explained to mean that it was still a decision on merits by this

       Court.

16)    Having stated the manner in which the issue is dealt with in

       various judgments noted above, it would be apposite to first

       discuss the lawlaid down inAbbai Maligai Partnership Firm as

       well as Kunhayammed’s cases since both the judgments are

       rendered by three Judges’ Bench. Therefore, it is to be seen, in

       the first instance, as to whether they project conflicting views.
17)    Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm was a case under theRent

       Control Actand the appeal came from the High Court of Madras.

       In an eviction petition filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in the said

       case, the Rent Controller had ordered eviction of the appellants

       therein on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent as well

       as on the ground of bona fide requirement of the premises by

       respondent Nos. 1 and 2 for their own business. In appeal, the

       order of the Rent Controller was set aside as it was found that

       there was a bona fide dispute with regard to the title of the

       property which could be decided by the Civil Court.                 The

       respondents preferred review petitions thereagainst, which wereCivil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 490 of 2012 & Anr.       Page 10 of 27dismissed. They approached this Court by way of special leave

       petitions which were also dismissed. After the dismissal of these

       special leave petitions, the respondents therein filed review

       petition in the High Court with a delay of 221 days. The High

       Court condoned the delay and also entertained the review petition

       on merits and not only allowed those review petitions but even

       reversed the orders made earlier in the civil revision petitions by

       allowing those petitions and ordering eviction of the appellants/

       tenants.       In appeal against this order passed in review and

       revision petitions, this Court held that the jurisdiction exercised by

       the High Court, under the circumstances, was palpably

       erroneous. Entire discussion in this behalf is contained in one

       paragraph, which we reproduce below:
obstante clause and conveys a message that even in the field

       covered by the preceding articles, jurisdiction conferred byArticle

       136is available to be exercised in an appropriate case. It is an

       untrammelled reservoir of power incapable of being confined to

       definitional bounds; the discretion conferred on the Supreme

       Court being subjected to only one limitation, that is, the wisdom

       and good sense or sense of justice of the Judges. No right of

       appeal is conferred upon any party; only a discretion is vested in

       the Supreme Court to interfere by granting leave to an applicant

       to enter in its appellate jurisdiction not open otherwise and as of

       right.

20)    Exercise of jurisdiction underArticle 136and the manner in which

       it is dealt with is clarified as under:
Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1986) 4 SCC 146;Rup Diamonds v. Union of India,
    (1989) 2 SCC 356; Wilson v. Colchester Justices, (1985) 2 All ER 97 (HL); Supreme CourtEmployees' Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1989) 4 SCC 187;Yogendra Narayan Chowdhury
    v. Union of India, (1996) 7 SCC 1; V.M. Salgaocar & Bros.(P) Ltd. v. CIT, (2000) 5 SCC 373;
    Sree Narayana Dharmasanghom Trust v. SwamiPrakasananda, (1997) 6 SCC 78 and State of
    Maharashtra v. Prabhakar Bhikaji Ingle, (1996) 3 SCC 463.9Penu Balakrishna Iyer v. Ariya M. Ramaswami Iyer, AIR 1965 SC 195;Abbai Maligai Partnership
    Firm v. K. Santhakumaran, (1998) 7 SCC 386;Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji
    Dattatreya Bapat, (1969) 2 SCC 74;Sushil Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar, (1975) 1 SCC 774;Gopabandhu Biswal v. Krishna Chandra Mohanty, (1998) 4 SCC 447;Junior Telecom Officers
    Forum v. Union of India, 1993 Supp (4) SCC 693 and Supreme CourtEmployees' Welfare Assn.Case, (1989) 4 SCC 187.
Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 490 of 2012 & Anr.                        Page 17 of 27
(iii) Leave granted - dismissal without reasons - merger results 10.
22)    It may be pertinent to mention here that while laying down the

        second principle mentioned above, the Court took note of the

        judgment in Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm and discussed it in

        the following manner:
10Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P., AIR 1964 SC 1372.Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 490 of 2012 & Anr.            Page 18 of 27
23)    It may also be of interest to note that the Court dealt with the

       situation where the review is filed earlier in point of time and the

       special leave petition is filed thereafter, and dealt with the

       situation in the following manner:
Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.

       13792 of 2013: In this case, we find that the special leave petition

       was dismissed with the following order passed on January 05,

       2012:",1224,"Page 1 of 27 7) This review petition has been dismissed by the High Court vide orders dated September 09, 2011, inter alia, with the following observations: Revenue Divisional Officer Officer and Another 4, this Court held that it will make no difference whether the review petition was filed in the High Court before the dismissal of the special leave petition or after the dismissal thereof. Page 18 of 27 23) It may also be of interest to note that the Court dealt with the situation where the review is filed earlier in point of time and the special leave petition is filed thereafter, and dealt with the situation in the following manner: Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. Page 18 of 27 23) It may also be of interest to note that the Court dealt with the situation where the review is filed earlier in point of time and the special leave petition is filed thereafter, and dealt with the situation in the following manner: Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. Page 18 of 27 23) It may also be of interest to note that the Court dealt with the situation where the review is filed earlier in point of time and the special leave petition is filed thereafter, and dealt with the situation in the following manner: Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No."
"United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Satinder Kaur @ Satwinder Kaur And Ors. on 30 June, 2020",https://indiankanoon.org/docfragment/142302016/?formInput=doctypes%3A%20supremecourt%20year%3A%202020,"Take notes as you read a judgment using ourVirtual Legal Assistantand get email alerts whenever a new judgment matches your query (Query Alert Service). Try out ourPremium Member Services--Sign up todayand get free trial for one month.
INDU MALHOTRA, J.
Digitally signed byMUKESH KUMARDate: 2020.06.30
Leave granted.
Reason:1
1.   The deceased – Satpal Singh was residing in Doha, Qatar

     since 1984. The Employment Contract Form of the deceased

     dated 21.08.1984 revealed that he was engaged as a labourer

     initially for a period of one year on a salary of 750 Qatari

     Riyal p.m., and continued to live in Qatar where he was

     employed, till he passed away in a motor vehicle accident in

     India in 1998.

2.   Satpal Singh was visiting India in November, 1998. On

     18.11.1998, he was riding a scooter, with his wife as the

     pillion rider, when he met with an accident with a Maruti car

     bearing      No.   CH-01-M-6284   coming   from   the   opposite

     direction.
FIR No. 204 dated 18.11.1998 was lodgedu/S. 304A,279,337,427IPC at P.S. Sadar, Rajpura against the driver

     and owner of the offending car.
The FIR was lodged on the statement of Satinder Kaur –

     widow of the deceased, wherein she had stated that the

     accident had occurred due to the rash and negligent driving

     of the driver of the Maruti car. It was further stated that the

     accident took place while her husband was over-taking a

     tractor-trolley, when the Maruti car was coming at a high2speed from the opposite side. This led to the accident, and

     caused the death of Satpal Singh on the spot.
The Claimant No. 1 i.e. wife of the deceased was also

     seriously injured. Her right leg and jaw were fractured. The

     Claimant No. 1 remained in hospital for over a month. A rod

     was inserted in her leg, and remained in plaster for about 7

     to 8 months. The accident led to 25% permanent disability,

     which is borne out from the Disability Certificate issued by

     the Civil Surgeon, Patiala.

3.   Claim Petition bearing M.A.C. Application No. 152 was filed

     before the MACT, Patiala (Punjab) on 24.12.1998u/S. 166of

     the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 by the widow of the deceased,

     on     behalf   of   herself   and   her   3   minor   children   for

     compensation on the death of her husband. The Claimants

     prayed for compensation of Rs. 50 lacs, alongwith Interest

     @18% p.a. to be paid jointly and severally by the Insurance

     Company, and the driver and owner of the Maruti car.

     3.1.    A copy of the FIR was placed before the MACT, as also

             the Post Mortem Report which recorded the serious

             head injuries caused by the road accident on the

             deceased.
33.2.   The Claimants filed a photocopy of the Employment

       Contract Form dated 10.07.1984 certified by the

       Indian   Embassy     at   Doha,     which   records      the

       engagement of the deceased as a labourer by the firm

       Ali Al Fayyad Trading Contracting Est., Doha on a

       salary of 750 Qatari Riyal p.m., when he first shifted to

       Qatar.
3.3.   The Claimants also placed on record a letter dated

       27.06.1997 purported to have been issued by his

       employer – the High Speed Group to the Counsellor,

       New Zealand Consulate for issuance of a visa. It was

       stated that the General Manager of their company, Mr.

       Satpal Harbans Singh was intending to spend his

       annual vacation during June – August 1997 in New

       Zealand, and had been employed by this organization

       since 1984, and was now drawing a salary of $ 6,700

       p.m.

           It is relevant to note that this letter was not

       attested by the Indian Embassy at Doha.

3.4.   The Claimants placed on record the Passport of the

       deceased,   which   reveals   his    date   of   birth   as410.08.1958. The deceased was a little over 40 years of

            age at the time of the accident.
The passport entries reveal frequent foreign travel

            during the period 1986 till 1998 when he expired.
4.   The MACT vide Award dated 30.03.2001 held that a perusal

     of the first statement made by Claimant No. 1 – widow of the

     deceased in the FIR, revealed that her husband was over-

     taking a tractor–trolley when the accident occurred, because

     the Maruti car was coming at a high speed from the opposite

     side. Consequently, the MACT held that it was a case of

     contributory negligence on the part of the deceased Satpal

     Singh, as also on the part of the driver of the Maruti car.

     4.1.   The MACT applied the multiplier of 13, since the

            deceased was a little over 40 years of age at the time of

            his death.
4.2.   With respect to the income of the deceased, the MACT

            held that the letter dated 27.06.1997 issued by the

            High Speed Group, had not been proved by the

            Claimants, nor was it attested by the Indian Embassy

            at Doha, and therefore refused to take it into

            consideration.
54.3.   The MACT assumed that the income of the deceased

            Satpal Singh should be assessed just as an ordinary

            skilled worker, and assessed his income at Rs. 4,000

            p.m. The amount of dependency was taken as Rs.

            2,500 p.m. x 12 x 13 = Rs. 3.90 lacs. Since it was a

            case of contributory negligence, the compensation was

            reduced by 50%, which worked out to Rs. 1.80 lacs. An

            amount of Rs. 10,000 was awarded towards funeral

            expenses.
The compensation of Rs. 1,90,000 would carry

            Interest @9% p.a. from the date of filing the claim, till

            the date of payment.
4.4.   The MACT held all three respondents i.e. the driver of

            the Maruti car, the owner of the car, and the Insurance

            Company liable to pay the compensation awarded,

            jointly and severally.

5.   Aggrieved by the aforesaid Judgment, the Claimants filed an

     Appeal being F.A.O. No. 2294/2001 before the High Court for

     further enhancement.
65.1.   The High Court vide the impugned Judgment and

       Order dated 10.03.2014 upheld the findings of the

       MACT regarding contributory negligence.

5.2.   With respect to the income of the deceased, the High

       Court proceeded on the basis of the letter dated

       27.06.1997 issued by the High Speed Group, , wherein

       it was stated that Satpal Singh was working as a

       General Manager, and drawing a salary of $ 6,700 p.m.

       which would be equivalent to Rs. 2,68,000 p.m. at the

       time when the claim was filed.
5.3.   The High Court assessed the compensation on the

       basis of the income at Rs. 2,68,000 p.m. and adopted

       the multiplier of 12.
The contribution to the family was fixed at 50% of

       his    income,   which       would   approximately   be   Rs.

       1,34,000 p.m.

             Rs. 50,000 was awarded towards loss of estate,

       and Rs. 10,000 towards funeral expenses.
On this basis, the total compensation payable to

       the Claimants was computed at Rs. 96,78,000 after7making     a   partial   abatement   of   50%   towards

             contributory negligence.
The High Court held that since 50% of the income

             was provided to the wife and children, it was not

             necessary to provide for loss of consortium, and loss of

             love and affection.
5.4.    The High Court held the Insurance Company to be

             liable to pay the compensation, which would be

             distributed equally between the widow and children of

             the deceased. The enhanced amount of compensation

             would carry Interest @7.5% p.a. from the date of filing

             the claim, till realization.

6.   The Appellant – Insurance Company filed SLP (Civil) No.

     28548/2014 to challenge the impugned Judgment.
The Claimants also filed an SLP bearing SLP (Civil) No.

     12520/2015 claiming further enhancement of compensation.
7.   We have perused the pleadings and the documentary

     evidence placed on record before the Courts below, and have

     considered the oral submissions made by the Counsel for the

     parties.
8We are of the view that the judgments of both the MACT

        and the High Court are liable to be set aside, and the

        compensation is required to be awarded in accordance with

        the law expounded by this Court in various decisions.
8.      Relevant principles for assessment of compensation in

        cases of death as evolved by judicial dicta.
The criteria which are to be taken into consideration for

        assessing compensation in the case of death, are : (i) the age

        of the deceased at the time of his death; (ii) the number of

        dependants left behind by the deceased; and (iii) the income

        of the deceased at the time of his death.
InSarla Verma & Ors. v. Delhi Transport Corporation &

        Anr.,1this Court held that to arrive at the loss of dependency,

        the tribunal ought to take into consideration three factors :–
i) Additions/deductions to be made for arriving at the

             income;
ii) The deduction to be made towards the personal living

             expenses of the deceased; and
iii) The multiplier to be applied with reference to the age of

             the deceased.
1   (2009) 6 SCC 121.
9In order to provide uniformity and consistency in

   awarding compensation, the following steps are required to be

   followed :–

       “Step 1 (Ascertaining the multiplicand)
       The income of the deceased per annum should be determined.
       Out of the said income a deduction should be made in regard to
       the amount which the deceased would have spent on himself
       by way of personal and living expenses. The balance, which is
       considered to be the contribution to the dependant family,
       constitutes the multiplicand.
Step 2 (Ascertaining the multiplier)
       Having regard to the age of the deceased and period of active
       career, the appropriate multiplier should be selected. This does
       not mean ascertaining the number of years he would have lived
       or worked but for the accident. Having regard to several
       imponderables in life and economic factors, a table of
       multipliers with reference to the age has been identified by this
       Court. The multiplier should be chosen from the said table with
       reference to the age of the deceased.
Step 3 (Actual calculation)
       The annual contribution to the family (multiplicand) when
       multiplied by such multiplier gives the 'loss of dependency' to
       the family. Thereafter, a conventional amount in the range of
       Rs. 5,000/- to Rs. 10,000/- may be added as loss of estate.
       Where the deceased is survived by his widow, another
       conventional amount in the range of 5,000/- to 10,000/- should
       be added under the head of loss of consortium. But no amount
       is to be awarded under the head of pain, suffering or hardship
       caused to the legal heirs of the deceased.
       The funeral expenses, cost of transportation of the body (if
       incurred) and cost of any medical treatment of the deceased
       before death (if incurred) should also added.”
                                                   (emphasis supplied)
(a) Deduction for personal and living expenses

       The personal and living expenses of the deceased should

   be deducted from the income, to arrive at the contribution to

   the family.InSarla Verma(supra) (paras 30, 31 and 32), this10Court took the view that it was necessary to standardize the

deductions to be made under the head personal and living

expenses of the deceased.
Accordingly, it was held that :
2   (2013) 9 SCC 65.
12followed, unless a case for departure is made out. The Court

       held :
3   (2017) 16 SCC 680.
13
(b) Determination of Multiplier

             With respect to the multiplier, the Court inSarla Verma(supra), prepared a chart for fixing the applicable multiplier

       in accordance with the age of the deceased, after considering

       the     judgments     in   General     Manager,      Kerala    S.R.T.C.,

       Trivandrum v. Susamma Thomas & Ors.,4 U.P.S.R.T.C. & Ors.

       v.Trilok Chandra & Ors.,5 and New India Assurance Co. Ltd.

       v. Charlie & Ors.6

             Therelevant extract from the said chart i.e. Column 4

       has been set out hereinbelow for ready reference :–

              Age of the deceased                Multiplier (Column 4)
              Upto 15 years                      -
21 to 25 years                     1826 to 30 years                     1731 to 35 years                     1636 to 40 years                     1541 to 45 years                     1446 to 50 years                     1351 to 55 years                     1156 to 60 years                     961 to 65 years                     7Above 65 years                     5The Court inSarla Verma(supra) held :–

             “42. We therefore hold that the multiplier to be used should be
             as mentioned in column (4) of the Table above (prepared by
             applying Susamma Thomas, Trilok Chandra and Charlie),
4   (1994) 2 SCC 176.
5   (1996) 4 SCC 362.
6   (2005) 10 SCC 720.
14which starts with an operative multiplier of 18 (for the age
       groups of 15 to 20 and 21 to 25 years), reduced by one unit for
       every five years, that is M-17 for 26 to 30 years, M-16 for 31 to
       35 years, M-15 for 36 to 40 years, M-14 for 41 to 45 years, and
       M-13 for 46 to 50 years, then reduced by two units for every
       five years, that is, M-11 for 51 to 55 years, M-9 for 56 to 60
       years, M-7 for 61 to 65 years and M-5 for 66 to 70 years.”
                                                    (emphasis supplied)

       In Reshma Kumari (supra), this Court affirmed Column 4

   of the chart prepared inSarla Verma(supra), and held that

   this would provide uniformity and consistency in determining

   the multiplier to be applied.The Constitution Bench inPranay Sethi(supra) affirmed the chart fixing the multiplier

   as expounded inSarla Verma(supra), and held :–

       “44. At this stage, we must immediately say that insofar as the
       aforesaid multiplicand/multiplier is concerned, it has to be
       accepted on the basis of income established by the legal
       representatives of the deceased. Future prospects are to be
       added to the sum on the percentage basis and “income” means
       actual income less than the tax paid. The multiplier has already
       been fixed in Sarla Verma which has been approved in Reshma
       Kumari with which we concur.
…
       59.6. The selection of multiplier shall be as indicated in the
       Table in Sarla Verma read with paragraph 42 of that
       judgment.”
                                                  (emphasis supplied)
(c) Age of the deceased must be the basis for determining

   the multiplier even in case of a bachelor.InSarla Verma(supra), this Court held that the

   multiplier should be determined with reference to the age of15the deceased.This was subsequently affirmed in Reshma

     Kumari (supra), and followed in a line of decisions.
A three-judge bench inMunna Lal Jain & Ors. v. Vipin

     Kumar Sharma & Ors.,7held that the issue had been decided

     in Reshma Kumari (supra), wherein this Court held that the

     multiplier must be with reference to the age of the deceased.The decision inMunna Lal Jain(supra) was followed by

     another three-judge bench of this Court inSube Singh & Ors.

     v. Shyam Singh(dead) & Ors.8

           The Constitution Bench inNational Insurance Company

     Limited v. Pranay Sethi & Ors.,9affirmed the view taken inSarla Verma(supra) and Reshma Kumari (supra), and held

     that the age of the deceased should be the basis for applying

     the multiplier.
Another three-judge bench inRoyal Sundaram Alliance

     Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mandala Yadagari Goud & Ors.,10traced

     out the law on this issue, and held that the compensation is

     to be computed based on what the deceased would have

     contributed to support the dependants. In the case of the

     death of a married person, it is an accepted norm that the
7 (2015) 6 SCC 347.
8 (2018) 3 SCC 18.
9 (2017) 16 SCC 680.
10 (2019) 5 SCC 554.
16age of the deceased would be taken into account. Thus, even

        in the case of a bachelor, the same principle must be applied.
The aforesaid legal position has recently been re-affirmed

        by this Court inSunita Tokas and Ors. v. New India

        Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors.11
(d) Future Prospects

             In the wake of increased inflation, rising consumer

        prices, and general standards of living, future prospects have

        to be taken into consideration, not only with respect to the

        status or educational qualifications of the deceased, but also

        other relevant factors such as higher salaries and perks

        which are being offered by private companies these days. The

        dearness allowance and perks from which the family would

        have derived monthly benefit, are required to be taken into

        consideration for determining the loss of dependency.
InSarla Verma(supra), this Court held :
11   2019 (11) SCALE 24.
17be read as ‘actual salary less tax’]. The addition should be only
    30% if the age of the deceased was 40 to 50 years. There
    should be no addition, where the age of deceased is more than
    50 years. Though the evidence may indicate a different
    percentage of increase, it is necessary to standardize the
    addition to avoid different yardsticks being applied or different
    methods of calculations being adopted. Where the deceased
    was self-employed or was on a fixed salary (without provision
    for annual increments etc.), the courts will usually take only the
    actual income at the time of death. A departure therefrom
    should be made only in rare and exceptional cases involving
    special circumstances.”
                                                  (emphasis supplied)


    InPranay      Sethi(supra),    the    Constitution      Bench

evaluated all the judicial precedents on the issue of future

prospects includingSarla Verma(supra), and devised a fixed

standard for granting future prospects. It was held :
employed or person on fixed salary, the addition should be 10%
between the age of 50 to 60 years. The aforesaid yardstick has
been fixed so that there can be consistency in the approach by
the tribunals and the courts.
19
59. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we proceed to record our
          conclusions:
The addition should be 30%, if the age of the deceased
          was between 40 to 50 years. In case the deceased was
          between the age of 50 to 60 years, the addition should be
          15%. Actual salary should be read as actual salary less
          tax.
59.4. In case the deceased was self-employed or on a
          fixed salary, an addition of 40% of the established
          income should be the warrant where the deceased was
          below the age of 40 years. An addition of 25% where the
          deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years and 10%
          where the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60
          years should be regarded as the necessary method of
          computation. The established income means the income
          minus the tax component. …”
                                                     (emphasis supplied)
(e) Three Conventional Heads

          InPranay Sethi(supra), the Constitution Bench held that

   in death cases, compensation would be awarded only under

   three     conventional     heads       viz.   loss    of    estate,     loss   of

   consortium and funeral expenses.
The Court held that the conventional and traditional

   heads, cannot be determined on percentage basis, because

   that     would     not    be    an     acceptable          criterion.    Unlike

   determination of income, the said heads have to be

   quantified,      which    has    to    be     based    on      a   reasonable

   foundation. It was observed that factors such as price index,20fall in bank interest, escalation of rates, are aspects which

have to be taken into consideration. The Court held that

reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of

estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be

Rs. 15,000/-, Rs. 40,000/- and Rs. 15,000/- respectively.

The Court was of the view that the amounts to be awarded

under these conventional heads should be enhanced by 10%

every three years, which will bring consistency in respect of

these heads.
a) Loss of Estate – Rs. 15,000 to be awarded
b) Loss of Consortium

       Loss of Consortium, in legal parlance, was historically

   given a narrow meaning to be awarded only to the spouse

   i.e. the right of the spouse to the company, care, help,

   comfort, guidance, society, solace, affection and sexual

   relations with his or her mate. The loss of companionship,

   love, care and protection, etc., the spouse is entitled to get,

   has to be compensated appropriately. The concept of non-

   pecuniary damage for loss of consortium is one of the

   major heads for awarding compensation in various

   jurisdictions such as the United States of America,21Australia, etc. English courts have recognised the right of

            a spouse to get compensation even during the period of

            temporary disablement.
InMagma General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanu Ram &

            Ors.,12this Court interpreted “consortium” to be a

            compendious     term,    which    encompasses       spousal

            consortium,   parental   consortium,   as   well   as   filial

            consortium. The right to consortium would include the

            company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and

            affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family.

            With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual relations

            with the deceased spouse.
Parental consortium is granted to the child upon the

            premature death of a parent, for loss of parental aid,

            protection, affection, society, discipline, guidance and

            training.
Filial consortium is the right of the parents to

            compensation in the case of an accidental death of a child.

            An accident leading to the death of a child causes great

            shock and agony to the parents and family of the

            deceased. The greatest agony for a parent is to lose their

12   (2018) 18 SCC 130.
22child during their lifetime. Children are valued for their

love and affection, and their role in the family unit.

    Modern jurisdictions world-over have recognized that

the value of a child’s consortium far exceeds the economic

value of the compensation awarded in the case of the

death of a child. Most jurisdictions permit parents to be

awarded compensation under loss of consortium on the

death of a child. The amount awarded to the parents is the

compensation for loss of love and affection, care and

companionship of the deceased child.
The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988is a beneficial legislation

which has been framed with the object of providing relief

to the victims, or their families, in cases of genuine claims.

In case where a parent has lost their minor child, or

unmarried son or daughter, the parents are entitled to be

awarded loss of consortium under the head of Filial

Consortium.
Parental Consortium is awarded to the children who

lose the care and protection of their parents in motor

vehicle accidents.
23The amount to be awarded for loss consortium will be

as per the amount fixed inPranay Sethi(supra).

    At this stage, we consider it necessary to provide

uniformity with respect to the grant of consortium, and

loss of love and affection. Several Tribunals and High

Courts have been awarding compensation for both loss of

consortium   and      loss    of     love    and    affection.The

Constitution Bench inPranay Sethi(supra), has recognized

only three conventional heads under which compensation

can be awarded viz. loss of estate, loss of consortium and

funeral expenses.
InMagma      General(supra),   this   Court   gave   a

comprehensive interpretation to consortium to include

spousal consortium, parental consortium, as well as filial

consortium. Loss of love and affection is comprehended in

loss of consortium.
The Tribunals and High Courts are directed to award

compensation for loss of consortium, which is a legitimate

conventional head. There is no justification to award

compensation towards loss of love and affection as a

separate head.
24
c) Funeral Expenses – Rs. 15,000 to be awarded

            The aforesaid conventional heads are to be revised every

     three years @10%.

9.   We will now apply the lawlaid down bythis Court in the

     aforesaid judgments, to compute the compensation payable

     to the dependants of the deceased Satpal Singh in the

     present case.
9.1.     We will first deal with the issue of assessing the

              income of the deceased. The MACT assumed that the

              deceased was a skilled worker, and fixed his income at

              Rs. 4,000 p.m.

                  It is pertinent to note that the income of the

              deceased in 1984 as per his Employment Contract

              Form dated 21.08.1984, was 750 Qatari Riyal p.m.

              This document was duly certified by the Indian

              Embassy at Doha.
The accident occurred on 18.11.1998, which is 15

              years after he shifted to Doha. The MACT could not

              have assumed the income of the deceased to have

              remained at Rs. 4,000 p.m. after having worked for

              over 14 years in Doha.
25The High Court has also erroneously awarded

compensation        on   the   basis   of   the   letter    dated

27.06.1997 purported to have been written by the High

Speed Group to the Counselor, New Zealand Consulate

for issuance of a visa to the deceased Satpal Singh who

was engaged by their organization since 1984, and was

drawing a salary of $ 6,700 p.m.

    The Insurance Company has seriously disputed

the authenticity of this letter.
We have perused the said letter, and are inclined

to accept the submission made on behalf of the

Insurance Company, that the said document was not

attested by the Indian Embassy at Doha, as per theDiplomatic & Consular Offices Oaths and Fees Act,

1948.
The said document was not proved by the

Claimants, and cannot form the basis of computing the

income of the deceased.
The    letter    dated     27.06.1997     seems        to   be

suspicious for two other grounds. One, as per the

Employment Contract Form dated 21.08.1984 certified26by the Indian Embassy at Doha, the deceased was

engaged by the firm Ali Al Fayyad Trading Contracting

Est., Doha in 1984. The letter dated 27.06.1997 issued

by the High Speed Group, stated that the deceased was

employed with them since 1984. This leads to a serious

doubt   about     the        authenticity     of    the     letter.

Furthermore, the salary is mentioned in U.S. Dollars,

rather than Qatari Riyal, even though the High Speed

Group is a local company in Qatar.
Second, the letter dated 27.06.1997 was addressed

to the Counselor, New Zealand Consulate for a visa to

be issued to the deceased for his annual vacation to

New Zealand during the period June – August, 1997.

The passport entries however, do not show that the

deceased travelled to New Zealand.
Consequently, we have serious doubts about the

authenticity    and     veracity    of      the    letter   dated

27.06.1997, and decline to make it the basis for

computing the income of the deceased at the time of

his death.
27The High Court by relying on the letter dated

27.06.1997, awarded an amount of Rs. 1,93,56,000 to

the Claimants, which after reducing by 50% on

account of contributory negligence, worked out to Rs.

96,78,000. It is pertinent to note that the Claimants

had prayed for an amount of Rs. 50 lacs             as

compensation in their claim petition before the MACT.

The High Court has committed an error in awarding

such an exorbitant amount on the basis of an

unverified document, the authenticity of which was

seriously disputed.
In the absence of any other evidence being

produced by the Claimants, the income of the deceased

would be required to be computed by taking his base

salary at 750 Qatari Riyal p.m. in 1984 as a skilled

labourer, as reflected in his Employment Contract

Form.
A perusal of the passport entries of the deceased

reveal that he had continued to remain in employment

for a period of over 14 years in Qatar till he passed

away in 1998. He was evidently doing fairly well, since28there are numerous entries of foreign travel in his

       passport during the 14 years of his stay in Doha. By

       taking an increment of 10% per annum from 1984 till

       1998, the notional income of the deceased could be

       fixed at 2590 Qatari Riyal p.m., which can be rounded

       off to 2600 Qatari Riyal p.m. As per the exchange rate

       prevailing in 1998, 1 Qatari Riyal was equivalent to

       12.41 INR. Accordingly, the income of the deceased

       would work out to 2600 x 12.41 = Rs. 32,266 p.m. i.e.

       Rs. 3,87,192 p.a.

9.2.   Even though inSarla Verma(supra), it was held that

       the deduction towards personal and living expenses

       should be 1/4th, if the number of dependant family

       members is four, in the present case, we feel that 50%

       of the income of the deceased would be required to be

       deducted, since he was living in a foreign country.

           The deceased had to maintain an establishment

       there,   and   incur   expenditure   for   the   same   in

       commensurate with the high cost of living in a foreign

       country. Therefore, we are of the view that the High29Court rightly deducted 50% of his income towards

       personal and living expenses.
9.3.   In the present case, the courts below failed to award

       any amount towards future prospects. The deceased

       Satpal Singh was just over 40 years of age at the time

       of his death. As per the judgment of the Constitution

       Bench inPranay Sethi(supra), future prospects @30%

       are to be awarded for computing the compensation

       payable to the Claimants.
9.4.   The multiplicand for computing the compensation

       would therefore, work out to Rs. 3,87,192 – 50% + 30%

       = Rs. 2,51,675.
9.5.   The deceased Satpal Singh was 40 years of age at the

       time of his death. Accordingly, the multiplier of 15

       would be the appropriate multiplier as per the table set

       out inSarla Verma(supra).
9.6.   Multiplying the multiplicand of Rs. 2,51,675 by the

       multiplier of 15, the loss of dependency payable to the

       Claimants would work out to Rs. 37,75,125.

9.7.   Insofar as the conventional heads are concerned, the

       deceased Satpal Singh left behind a widow and three30children as his dependants. On the basis of the

            judgments inPranay Sethi(supra) andMagma General(supra), the following amounts are awarded under the

            conventional heads :-
b) Parental Consortium: 40,000 x 3 = Rs. 1,20,000
iii) Funeral Expenses : Rs. 15,000

   9.8.     We affirm the deduction of 50% made by the MACT

            and the High Court towards contributory negligence.
10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the Claimants are

   awarded compensation as follows :
11. This Court vide Order dated 13.10.2014 had stayed the

   operation of the impugned judgment subject to the Appellant

   – Insurance Company depositing a sum of Rs. 10 lacs before

   the Trial Court. The Claimants were granted liberty to

   withdraw the same.

12. The Appellant – Insurance Company is directed to pay the

   balance amount of compensation within a period of twelve

   weeks’ from the date of this judgment.

13. The deceased Satpal Singh had died on 18.11.1998. His

   dependants have been pursuing legal proceedings for grant of

   compensation since the past 22 years. As a consequence, we

   deem it appropriate to direct that Interest @12% p.a. be paid

   on the total compensation awarded, from the date of filing

   the claim petition, till realization.
14. The Claimant No. 1 i.e. widow of the deceased has suffered

   permanent disability of 25% in this accident. She has single-32handedly raised her three minor children, and eked out her

    livelihood through agricultural activity.

        We direct that 50% of the total compensation (inclusive

    of interest) be given to the Claimant No. 1 i.e. widow of the

    deceased, and the balance 50% be divided equally between

    the three children.

15. The Civil Appeals are disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
...…...............………………J.
                                               (S. ABDUL NAZEER)



                                      ...…...............………………J.
                                                 (INDU MALHOTRA)



                                      ...…...............………………J.
                                               (ANIRUDDHA BOSE)

June 30, 2020.
New Delhi.
33",5023,"The Employment Contract Form of the deceased dated 21.08.1984 revealed that he was engaged as a labourer initially for a period of one year on a salary of 750 Qatari Riyal p.m., and continued to live in Qatar where he was employed, till he passed away in a motor vehicle accident in India in 1998. The Claimants filed a photocopy of the Employment Contract Form dated 10.07.1984 certified by the Indian Embassy at Doha, which records the engagement of the deceased as a labourer by the firm Ali Al Fayyad Trading Contracting Est., Doha on a salary of 750 Qatari Riyal p.m., when he first shifted to Qatar. With respect to the income of the deceased, the High Court proceeded on the basis of the letter dated 27.06.1997 issued by the High Speed Group, , wherein it was stated that Satpal Singh was working as a General Manager, and drawing a salary of $ 6,700 p.m. The funeral expenses, cost of transportation of the body (if incurred) and cost of any medical treatment of the deceased before death (if incurred) should also added.” (emphasis supplied) (a) Deduction for personal and living expenses The personal and living expenses of the deceased should be deducted from the income, to arrive at the contribution to the family.InSarla Verma(supra) (paras 30, 31 and 32), this10Court took the view that it was necessary to standardize the deductions to be made under the head personal and living expenses of the deceased. The selection of multiplier shall be as indicated in the Table in Sarla Verma read with paragraph 42 of that judgment.” (emphasis supplied) (c) Age of the deceased must be the basis for determining the multiplier even in case of a bachelor.InSarla Verma(supra), this Court held that the multiplier should be determined with reference to the age of15the deceased.This was subsequently affirmed in Reshma Kumari (supra), and followed in a line of decisions. The selection of multiplier shall be as indicated in the Table in Sarla Verma read with paragraph 42 of that judgment.” (empha"
"Chandra Prakash vs State Of Rajasthan on 9 May, 2014",https://indiankanoon.org/docfragment/14646960/?formInput=doctypes%3A%20supremecourt%20year%3A%202014,"Take notes as you read a judgment using ourVirtual Legal Assistantand get email alerts whenever a new judgment matches your query (Query Alert Service). Try out ourPremium Member Services--Sign up todayand get free trial for one month.
Dipak Misra, J.
On 26th January, 1996, a day of  celebration  and  conscientious
      remembrance of the “Red Letter Day” in the history  of  India  because
      26th January is the date in 1950, when our organic, inclusive,  humane
      and compassionate Constitution came into existence being given by  the
      people of this country to themselves and the nation has  been  obliged
      to jubilate  remembering  the  said  important  day  in  our  national
      history, for it  chartered  the  path  of  many  an  emancipation  and
      conferred on the people the highly cherished fundamental rights; about
      8.30 a.m., there was a blast  of  explosive  substances  between  Gate
      No.12 and Gate No. 13, towards the southern and eastern side of  Sawai
      Man Singh Stadium Jaipur, where the State level function  on  Republic
      Day was going to be celebrated.  Soon after the blast, Prahlad  Singh,
      the Station House Officer, Police Station lodged  an  FIR  about  9.30
      a.m. which was registered as FIR No. 39/1996.  As per  the  FIR,  when
      the blast took place, the people who had assembled were asked to leave
      the stadium so that there could be a check.  During the check, it  was
      found that due to the blast, a big size crater had come into existence
      at the scene of explosion.  That apart, by  the  said  explosion,  the
      sand hopped upward and fell on the places meant  for  sitting  in  the
      stadium and also on the roof.  The  glasses  of  the  windows  of  the
      pavilion near the explosion had broken into pieces. At the  time  when
      the explosion had occurred, only police  personnel  but  no  civilians
      were present in that part of the stadium. The public at  large,  which
      was present inside the Stadium, was informed to leave the  Stadium  so
      that the check and security could be carried out.   Due to  the  sound
      caused by the explosion, one Ramgopal Choudhary, an  employee  of  the
      Public Works Department, who was  passing  nearby,  had  met  with  an
      injury on his ear for which he was immediately sent to  the  hospital.
      On the basis of the  FIR,  offences  under  Section  120-B  read  withSections 307and427IPC, underSection 3of the Prevention of  Damage
      to Public Property Act, 1984 and underSection  3of  the  Explosive
      Substances Act, 1908 (for short “the 1908 Act”) and also underSection
      9Bof the Explosive Act,  1884  (for  brevity  “the  1884  Act”)  were
      registered  and   the   investigation   commenced.   Later   on,   the
      investigation of the case was transferred to C.I.D(C.B.).
2. During the investigation, an  anonymous  letter  in  Urdu  language
        dated 1st June, 1997 was sent  to  the  Superintendent  of  Police,
        wherein some information was given which was alleged to  have  been
        gathered by the senders who described themselves  as  well  wishers
        while they were in custody in the Central Jail, Jaipur, in  respect
        of the bomb-blast that took place on 26th January, 1996 at the  SMS
        Stadium, Jaipur.  In that letter, the names of some persons,  i.e.,
        Raies  Beg  of  Agra,  Dr.  Abdul  Hamid  of  Firozabad  and  Pappu
        Puncturewala were mentioned.  It was also mentioned that the ISI of
        Pakistan was behind the bomb-blast.   On  the  basis  of  the  said
        information,  the  investigating  officer  arrested  five  persons,
        namely, Abdul Hamid, Raies Beg, Abdul Mateen, Pappu  @  Saleem  and
        Chandra Prakash on various dates.
3. During the investigation, the investigating agency recovered a live
        time bomb from SMS Stadium and explosive items were recovered  from
        Roopwas, District Bharatpur.  In the course of  the  investigation,
        accused Pappu @ Saleem filed an application underSection  306of
        the Code of Criminal Procedure (for brevity “the Code”) before  the
        Chief  Judicial  Magistrate  on  14.8.1997  who,  by  order   dated
        30.8.1997, authorized the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate  No.
        6 to record the statement of the said accused under Section 164  of
        the Code and  thereafter,  the  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,  by  a
        reasoned order dated 20.9.1997,  allowed  the  application.   After
        carrying out the detailed investigation, the police laid the charge-
        sheet  against  the  arrested  accused  persons,  namely,   Chandra
        Prakash, Abdul Mateen, Raies Beg and Abdul Hamid.
4. All the accused persons abjured guilt,  pleaded  false  implication
        and, accordingly, faced trial.
5. The learned trial Judge framed different charges against  the  four
        accused persons and we think that it would be apt to refer  to  the
        charges framed against each of them.  As far as Chandra Prakash  is
        concerned, the charges that were  framed  against  him  were  under
        Section 9B of the 1884 Act and underSections 3,4,5read  withSection 6of the 1908 Act.  As far as Abdul Mateen is concerned, he
        was charged with the offences underSection 14of  the  Foreigners
        Act, 1946, underSections 3,4and5of the 1908 Act, under Section
        9B of the 1884 Act, under Section 3 of the Prevention of Damages to
        Public Properties Act and underSections 307,118,435and456IPC.
         As far as Raies Beg and Abdul Hamid are concerned, they were faced
        with similar charges, namely, under Section 9B  of  the  1884  Act,
        underSections 3,4and5read withSection 6of the 1908  Act  and
        underSections 307/120B,118/120Band435/120BIPC.
6. To  bring  home  the  charges  against  the  accused  persons,  the
        prosecution examined as many as 78 witnesses and brought on  record
        exhibits P-1 to P-296.  In defence,  no  witness  was  examined  on
        behalf  of  any  of  the  accused  persons.   However,  documentary
        evidence was produced by them, i.e., exhibits D-1 to D-5.  We shall
        refer to the  relevant  parts  of  the  testimonies  of  the  vital
        witnesses and advert to the documents which have been stressed  and
        emphasized upon by the prosecution at a later stage.
7.  The accused persons in their statements under Section 313  of  the
        Code took separate plea and hence, it is obligatory on our part  to
        record their pleas individually.  Abdul Mateen admitted that he  is
        a Pakistani and he had remained as a Pakistani always; that he  had
        never come to India before his arrest; that he  did  not  know  any
        person in India; that he never visited the places, namely,  Jaipur,
        Farah, Roopwas, Agra Firozabad or any other city; and that  he  had
        never given any information to the police and no recovery was  made
        by the police at his instance  and  he  had  never  identified  any
        place. The  plea  of  Abdul  Hamid  was  that  he  never  gave  any
        information to the police during the investigation of the case  and
        he did not furnish any information about the shop of Mohit Jain, PW-
         30, situated at Delhi and he had been falsely  implicated.   Raies
        Beg took the plea that due to communal riots he  had  been  falsely
        booked in the crime. Accused  Chandra  Prakash,  apart  from  false
        implication, denied any relationship with Pappu @ Saleem, PW-1, and
        further stated that no key was recovered from him and  he  did  not
        open any godown and room with his keys.  He  also  took  the  stand
        that he had not taken any room on rent in Krishi Upaz Mandi or  any
        shop near the power house on rent and disputed  the  recovery  from
        any shop. The trial court, appreciating the  oral  and  documentary
        evidence on record, by its judgment and order dated  22.04.2000  in
        Sessions Case no. 8/98, convicted all the accused and sentenced all
        of them individually in respect of all the specific charges  framed
        against them. The offence for which each of them  had  faced  trial
        has been already mentioned hereinabove. All the  accused  had  been
        sentenced separately by the learned trial Judge.
8. Accused Abdul Mateen was sentenced to undergo five  years  rigorous
        imprisonment and a fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default  of  payment  of
        fine to  further  undergo  one  year’s  simple  imprisonment  underSection 14of the Foreigners Act; ten years  rigorous  imprisonment
        and a fine of Rs.20,000, in default to further undergo  two  years’
        simple imprisonment under Section 4 of the Prevention of Damages to
        Public Property Act; three years rigorous imprisonment and  a  fine
        of Rs.3,000/-, in default to further  undergo  six  months’  simple
        imprisonment underSection 456IPC; to undergo ten  years  rigorous
        imprisonment and a fine  of  Rs.10,000/-,  in  default  to  further
        undergo two years’ simple imprisonment under Section 307 read  withSection 120BIPC; seven years rigorous imprisonment and a  fine  of
        Rs.7,000/-, in default to  further  undergo  one  and  half  years’
        simple imprisonment under Section 435 read withSection  120BIPC;
        five years rigorous imprisonment  and  a  fine  of  Rs.5,000/-,  in
        default to further undergo one  year’s  simple  imprisonment  under
        Section  118  read  withSection  120BIPC;  two  years  rigorous
        imprisonment and a  fine  of  Rs.2,000/-,  in  default  to  further
        undergo three months’ simple imprisonment under Section 9B  of  the
        1884 Act; imprisonment for  life  and  a  fine  of  Rs.20,000/-  in
        default to further undergo three years’ simple  imprisonment  underSection 3of the 1908 Act; seven years rigorous imprisonment and  a
        fine of Rs.7,000/-, in default to  further  undergo  one  and  half
        years’ simple imprisonment underSection 4of  the  1908  Act;  and
        five years rigorous imprisonment  and  a  fine  of  Rs.5,000/-,  in
        default to further undergo one  year’s  simple  imprisonment  underSection 5of the 1908 Act.
9. Accused Chandra Prakash was sentenced to undergo two years rigorous
        imprisonment and a  fine  of  Rs.2,000/-,  in  default  to  further
        undergo three months’ simple imprisonment under Section 9B  of  the
        1884 Act; ten years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.10,000/-
        , in default to further  undergo  two  years’  simple  imprisonment
        underSection 3read withSection 6of the 1908  Act;  seven  years
        rigorous imprisonment and a  fine  of  Rs.7,000/-,  in  default  to
        further undergo one  and  half  years’  simple  imprisonment  underSection 4read withSection 6of  the  1908  Act;  and  five  years
        rigorous imprisonment and a  fine  of  Rs.5,000/-,  in  default  to
        further undergo one year’s simple imprisonment underSection 5read
        withSection 6of the 1908 Act.
10. Accused Abdul Hamid and Raies Beg were  sentenced  to  undergo  two
        years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default to
        further  undergo  three  months’  simple  imprisonment;  ten  years
        rigorous imprisonment and a fine  of  Rs.10,000/-,  in  default  to
        further undergo two years simple  imprisonment  under  Section  307
        read withSection 120BIPC; seven years rigorous imprisonment and a
        fine of Rs.7,000/-, in default to  further  undergo  one  and  half
        years’ simple imprisonment under Section 435 read withSection 120BIPC; five years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.5,000/-,  in
        default to further undergo one  year’s  simple  imprisonment  under
        Section  118  read  withSection  120BIPC;  ten  years  rigorous
        imprisonment and a fine  of  Rs.10,000/-,  in  default  to  further
        undergo two years’ simple imprisonment underSection  3read  withSection 6of the 1908 Act; seven years rigorous imprisonment and  a
        fine of Rs.7,000/-, in default to  further  undergo  one  and  half
        years’ simple imprisonment underSection 4read withSection  6of
        the 1908 Act; and five years rigorous imprisonment and  a  fine  of
        Rs.5,000/-,  in  default  to  further  undergo  one  year’s  simple
        imprisonment underSection 5read withSection 6of the 1908 Act.
11. At this juncture, we think it appropriate  to  state  the  findings
        recorded by the learned trial Judge against each  of  the  accused.
        As far as Abdul Mateen is concerned, the trial court held  that  it
        was  clear  from  the  evidence  of  GPS  Wirk,  PW-69,   Assistant
        Commander, BSF, that Mhd. Ashlam Baba was the financial head  of  a
        terrorist organization by the name of “Harkat-ul-Ansar”, and during
        the course of investigation, the accused Abdul Mateen was  arrested
        from Srinagar and no passport or visa was found in his  possession.
        The offence punishable underSection 14of the Foreigners Act which
        had been levelled against him  was  established  beyond  reasonable
        doubt.  The live time bomb was duly  recovered  and  accused  Abdul
        Mateen had exclusive knowledge and it was he who planted  the  time
        bomb at that place and it was proven from the  testimonies  of  the
        witnesses.  From the evidence  of  the  approver,  Pappu,  and  the
        information underSection 27of  the  Evidence  Act,  it  could  be
        concluded that prior to 26.1.1996, two time bombs were implanted by
        accused Abdul Mateen.  It was clear from  the  testimonies  of  Jai
        Narayan, PW-6, and Gopal Saini, PW-7, that Abdul Mateen had led  to
        the recovery of the bomb and the charge of crime  punishable  underSection 9Bof the Explosive Act levelled against the accused  Abdul
        Mateen has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
12. In respect of Raies Beg and Abdul Hamid, the trial court held  that
        Abdul Hamid had been visiting accused Chandra  Prakash  at  Roopbas
        quite frequently and both the accused persons  had  helped  accused
        Abdul Mateen in the commission of the offence.  They used  to  meet
        at the Madarsa of village Farah and  the  conspiracy  was  hatched.
        The learned trial Judge came to hold that the  involvement  of  the
        said accused persons in the commission of the crime was reflectible
        from the evidence of number of witnesses and  the  prosecution  had
        established their role beyond any shadow of doubt.
13. Pertaining to  Chandra  Prakash,  the  Court  held  that  explosive
        substances including gelatin and dynamite  in  huge  quantity  were
        recovered from his possession on 1.8.1997.  Scanning the  evidence,
        it recorded that the dynamite was  used  in  both  the  bombs.   He
        further opined that Pappu @ Saleem,  PW-1,  was  an  associate  and
        colleague of accused Abdul Mateen and prior to  the  incident,  the
        explosive substance was brought from  Chandra  Prakash  in  village
        Farah, where Pappu @ Saleem used to live  with  him.   That  apart,
        Chandra Prakash was identified by Pappu and the key of  the  godown
        was with the accused and he opened the lock of the said godown from
        which 28 kattas of ammonium nitrate were recovered.   It  was  also
        clear from the evidence of Chetandass  Rawatani,  PW-34,  that  the
        goods which were recovered from the accused were utilized  for  the
        preparation of the explosive substance.
14. On the basis of the aforesaid findings and conclusions, the learned
        trial Judge convicted the accused persons and sentenced them as has
        been stated hereinbefore.
15. Being grieved by the aforesaid conviction and sentence, the accused
        persons preferred separate appeals before the High Court being D.B.
        Criminal (Jail) Appeal No. 318 of 2000, D.B. Criminal  Appeal  Nos.
        189 of 2000, 258  of  2000  and  369  of  2000.   The  State  filed
        application for grant of leave (D.B. Criminal Leave to  Appeal  No.
        26 of 2008) with an application for condonation of delay  of  seven
        years and nine months which was taken up  along  with  the  appeals
        preferred by the accused persons and the said appeal was  dismissed
        on the ground of delay.  However, it may be stated  here  that  the
        High Court also addressed to the merits of the case  of  the  State
        which pertained to enhancement of sentence and  did  not  find  any
        substance in the same.  As regards the  appeals  preferred  by  the
        accused persons, the appellate court did  not  perceive  any  merit
        and, resultantly, dismissed the same by way of judgment  and  order
        dated 3.2.2009.  Hence, the assail is to the judgment of conviction
        and  order  of  sentence  by  the  applications  of  special  leave
        petitions.
16.  Leave granted in all the special leave petitions.
17.  As all the appeals relate  to  defensibility  of  common  judgment
        passed by the High Court in respect of all the  accused-appellants,
        they are disposed of by a singular judgment.
18. Mr. Sushil K. Jain, learned  senior  counsel  for  the  appellants,
        criticizing the judgment of the trial court and that  of  the  High
        Court, has raised the following contentions: -
19.  Mr.  Balaji  Srinivasan,  learned  counsel   appearing   for   the
        appellants, Abdul Hamid and Raies Beg, submitted as under:-
appellants with the co-accused Abdul Mateen  in  the  crime  and
           nothing has been brought on record to establish the allegations.
           The only evidence that has been   recorded is that  Abdul  Hamid
           used to meet Abdul Mateen frequently at village Farah.
      B) There is no recovery of explosive substance  or  any  incriminating
         materials from the appellant’s house and  in  the  absence  of  any
         recovery, the appellant cannot be roped in the crime.
      C) The allegation of the prosecution with regard to  the  relation  of
         the appellant with Abdul Mateen does not have any substance and, in
         any case, there is no proof to establish the same.
      D) The bomb blast at SMS Stadium, Jaipur took place on 26.01.1996  and
         the accused was arrested on 8.06.1997 and identification parade was
         conducted  on  25.06.1997  about  one  and  half  years  after  the
         incident.  This  aspect  vitiates  the  identification  parade  and
         creates a dent in  the  case  of  the  prosecution  for  which  the
         appellants should be given the benefit of doubt.
20. Mr. Atul Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the  appellant  Abdul
        Mateen, in addition to the contentions raised by Mr. Jain  and  Mr.
        Balaji, has contended that no consent has been taken underSection
        7of the 1908 Act from the Central Government and hence, the entire
        trial is vitiated.
21. Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned Additional Advocate  General  appearing
        for the State of Rajasthan, supporting the  judgment  of  the  High
        Court, has submitted as follows: -
22. First, we shall deal with the issue of sanction.Section 7of  the
        1908 Act reads as follows: -
23. The learned counsel for Abdul Mateen has submitted that no  consent
        has been granted by the Central Government.In  this  context,  we
        may refer to the decision inState of M.P. v.  Bhupendra  Singh[1].
        In the said case, the consent for the prosecution  was  granted  by
        the Additional District Magistrate by notification dated  24.4.1995
        issued by the State Government.  The High  Court  has  quashed  the
        proceeding as there was no sanction.  This Court concurred with the
        said view on the ground that  it  was  within  the  domain  of  the
        Central Government to delegate the  authority  and,  in  fact,  the
        Central Government vide notification dated 2.12.1978 has  entrusted
        to the District Magistrates in the  State  of  Madhya  Pradesh  its
        consent underSection 7of the 1908  Act.   Thus,  there  could  be
        delegation by the Central Government to the District Magistrates.
24. It is relevant to note here that  the  consent  was  given  by  the
        concerned District Magistrate as Ext. P-277/278.  His authority was
        not questioned.  What was urged before the Court was that there had
        been no application of mind inasmuch as the relevant materials were
        not placed before him while according sanction.  When such a  point
        was not raised, the consequences have to  be  different.In  this
        regard, reference to a two-Judge Bench decision  inErram  Santosh
        Reddy  and  others  v.  State  of  Andhra   Pradesh[2]   would   be
        appropriate.  In the said case, the Court has observed as  follows:
25. From the aforesaid, we come to the  conclusion  that  the  District
        Magistrate had the authority to give consent for the prosecution.
26. The next facet of the challenge pertaining to sanction is that  the
        sanctioning authority had not perused the relevant materials.   The
        learned trial Judge, upon scrutiny of Ext. P-277/278, has expressed
        the opinion that the approval had been granted after perusal of the
        materials  on  record.   The  High  Court  has  observed  that  the
        consent/sanction order is a self-speaking and detailed one.  It has
        also  been  held  that  all  the  facts  have   been   taken   into
        consideration by the District  Magistrate  and  the  entire  police
        diary  was  made  available  to  him  at  the  time  of  grant   of
        sanction/approval.  With regard to  the  authority  of  consent  as
        postulated in the 1908 Act, reference to certain authorities  would
        be fruitful.InState of Tamil Nadu v. Sivarasanalias Raghu alias
        Sivarasa and others[3], the Court, while dealing with the effect ofSection 7of the 1908 Act, has observed as follows: -
27. Thereafter, the Court proceeded to state as follows: -
28. In view of the  aforesaid,  the  approval/consent  granted  by  the
        District Magistrate in  the  obtaining  factual  matrix  cannot  be
        treated as vitiated.
29. The third aspect of challenge to the sanction is that the  District
        Magistrate has not been examined as a witness to prove the order of
        sanction.  On a perusal of the document, we find that the same  has
        been proven by the competent  person  and  the  document  has  been
        marked as Ext. P-277/278.  We are of the  considered  opinion  that
        the examination of the District Magistrate to prove his consent  is
        really not necessary.
30. In view of the aforesaid analysis, the submission relating  to  the
        invalidity of the consent, as stipulated inSection 7of  the  1908
        Act,  does  not  commend  us  and,  accordingly,  the  same  stands
        rejected.
31. The next issue, to which we should advert to, pertains to the delay
        in holding the test identification parade.  The submission  of  Mr.
        Balaji Srinivasan, learned  counsel  appearing  for  accused  Abdul
        Hamid and Raies Beg, is that  there  has  been  enormous  delay  in
        conducting the test identification parade  in  respect  of  accused
        Abdul Hamid and Raies Beg.  There is no dispute that both  of  them
        were arrested on 8.6.1997 and the test  identification  parade  was
        held on 25.6.1997.  Thus, it is evident  that  they  were  arrested
        long after the occurrence but the test  identification  parade  was
        held within a period of three weeks from the date  of  arrest.   As
        the analysis of the trial court shows, they  could  not  have  been
        arrested as the materials could not be collected against  them  and
        things got changed at a later stage.In this regard, we may  refer
        with profit to  the  decision  inRamanand  Ramnath  v.  State  of
        M.P.[4], wherein identification parade was held within a period  of
        one month from the date of arrest.  This Court observed that  there
        was no unusual delay in holding the test identification parade.
32. That apart, the witnesses, namely Prem Prakash  Gupta,  PW-78,  and
        Mohit Jain, PW-30, have identified them in the Court.InState  of
        Maharashtra v. Suresh[5], it has been held as follows: -
33. The said legal position has been reiterated inAnil Kumar v.  State
        of U.P.[6]  Recently, in Munna Kumar Upadhyay aliasMunna Upadhyaya
        v. State of Andhra Pradeshthrough  Public  Prosecutor,  Hyderabad,
        Andhra Pradesh[7], a two-Judge Bench has observed thus: -
34. In view of the aforesaid, the submission that there has been  delay
        in holding the test identification parade does  not  really  affect
        the case of the  prosecution.   It  is  also  noteworthy  that  the
        witnesses had identified the accused persons in court  and  nothing
        has been elicited in the cross-examination even to create a  doubt.
        Thus, we repel the submission advanced by the learned  counsel  for
        accused Abdul Hamid and Raies Beg.
35. The next facet to be addressed is whether the evidentiary value  of
        the  testimony  of  approver  Pappu,  PW-1,  is  required   to   be
        considered.  Learned counsel for the State has drawn our  attention
        to Section 133 and illustration (b) toSection 114of  the  Indian
        Evidence Act, 1872.  They read as under: -
36. The aforesaid two provisions came to be considered inBhiva  Doulu
        Patil v. State of Maharashtra[8] wherein the Court held as follows:
37. In Mohd. Husain Umar Kochra etc. v. K.S. Dalipsinghji  and  another
        etc.[9], the Court observed thus: -
38. Having stated the legal  position  with  regard  to  the  statutory
        provisions, presently we shall proceed to  consider  the  requisite
        tests to be applied to accept the credibility of the  testimony  of
        the approver.  At this juncture, we may sit in a time  machine  and
        quote a passage from Sarwan Singh S/oRattan  Singh  v.  State  of
        Punjab[10] wherein it has been held as follows: -
39.InRavinder Singh v. State of Haryana[11], this Court has  observed
        that: -
40. Similar principles have been reiterated inMrinal Das and  Ors.  v.
        State of Tripura[12].
41.InA. Devendran v. State of T.N.[13], the Court has registered  the
        view  that  there  cannot  be  any  dispute  with  regard  to   the
        proposition that ordinarily  an  approver’s  statement  has  to  be
        corroborated in material particulars. Certain clinching features of
        involvement disclosed directly to an accused by an approver must be
        tested qua each accused from independent credible evidence  and  on
        being satisfied, the evidence of an approver can be  accepted.  The
        Court further observed that the extent  of  corroboration  that  is
        required before the acceptance of  the  evidence  of  the  approver
        would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case, however,
        the  corroboration  required  must  be  in   material   particulars
        connecting each of the accused with the offence, or in other words,
        the evidence of the approver implicating several accused persons in
        the commission  of  the  offence  must  not  only  be  corroborated
        generally but also qua each accused but that  does  not  mean  that
        there should  be  independent  corroboration  of  every  particular
        circumstance from an independent source.  The  court  proceeded  to
        state that all  that  is  required  is  that  there  must  be  some
        additional evidence rendering it probable that  the  story  of  the
        accomplice is true and the corroboration  could be both  by  direct
        or circumstantial evidence.Be it noted,  the  said  principle  was
        stated on the basis of pronouncements inRamanlal  Mohanlal  Pandya
        v. State of Bombay[14],Tribhuvan Nath v. State of Maharashtra[15],Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab(supra), Ram  Narain  v.  State  of
        Rajasthan[16]   andBalwant   Kaur   v.   Union   Territory    of
        Chandigarh[17].
42.InChandan and another v. State of Rajasthan[18],  the  Court  held
        that so far as the question  about  the  conviction  based  on  the
        testimony of the accomplice is concerned, the law is settled and it
        is established as a rule of prudence that the conviction could only
        be based on the testimony  of  the  accomplice  if  it  is  thought
        reliable as a whole  and  if  it  is  corroborated  by  independent
        evidence either direct or circumstantial,  connecting  the  accused
        with the crime.
43.InHaroon Haji Abdulla v. State of  Maharashtra[19],  the  view  in
        this regard was expressed in the following terms: -
44.InMajor E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay[20], it has  been  observed
        that this Court had never intended to lay down that the evidence of
        an approver and the corroborating  pieces  of  evidence  should  be
        treated in two different compartments, that is to  say,  the  court
        shall first have to consider the evidence of  the  approver  dehors
        the corroborated pieces of evidence and reject it if  it  comes  to
        the conclusion that his evidence is unreliable; but if it comes  to
        the conclusion that it is reliable, then it will have  to  consider
        whether that evidence is corroborated by any other evidence.
45.In Renuka Bai alias Rinku aliasRatan  and  another  v.  State  of
        Maharashtra[21], the Court held that the evidence of  the  approver
        is always to  be  viewed  with  suspicion  especially  when  it  is
        seriously suspected that he is suppressing some material facts.
46.InRanjeet Singh and another v. State of Rajasthan[22],  the  Court
        observed that while looking for corroboration, one must first  look
        at the broad spectrum of the approver’s version and then  find  out
        whether there is other evidence to lend assurance to that  version.
        The nature and extent of the  corroboration  may  depend  upon  the
        facts of each case and the corroboration need not be of any  direct
        evidence that the accused committed the  crime.  The  corroboration
        even by circumstantial evidence may be sufficient.
47. Keeping in view  the  aforesaid  principles  which  relate  to  the
        acceptance of the evidence of an approver,  we  have  bestowed  our
        anxious consideration and carefully perused  the  judgment  of  the
        trial court and that of the High Court.  Learned  counsel  for  the
        parties have taken us through the evidence of Pappu @ Saleem, PW-1.
         He has clearly deposed that Abdul Mateen  who  is  also  known  as
        Iqbal, used to visit the Madarsa at village  Farah.   Abdul  Hameed
        and Abdul Mateen were seen at village Farah many times without  any
        reason before the incicent.  As far as Abdul Hameed and  Raies  Beg
        are concerned, he has deposed that both the accused used to  go  to
        the house of Chandra Prakash in Roopwas to collect the “masala”  in
        a cover box.  Both of them used to meet Abdul Mateen in the Madarsa
        at village Farah on a number of  occasions.   He  used  to  contact
        Abdul Mateen from Firozabad many times and the watches  fixed  with
        bombs as timers were given at Farah by Abdul  Hameed  to  make  the
        bomb.  It has also come out in his evidence that Pappu  along  with
        Accused Raies Beg @ Raies Ahmad and other accused persons  used  to
        visit the Madarsa at village Farah.  His evidence also  shows  that
        Raies Beg and Pappu used to bring explosive from Roopwas to village
        Farah and he has mentioned that Raies Beg had brought five boxes of
        “masala” for Rs.10,000/- from the  house  of  Chandra  Prakash  and
        those boxes were unloaded at the Madarsa in Farah.  Pappu was asked
        to carry the boxes along with Raies Beg and Abdul Hameed.   He  has
        clearly deposed about the  conspiracy  that  was  told  to  him  by
        accused Abdul Mateen.  As far as Chandra Prakash is  concerned,  it
        had come in the evidence that though Pappu used to visit his  house
        at Roopwas along with other accused persons, yet he  used  to  stay
        outside the house of Chandra Prakash and the others used to  go  to
        bring “masala” from the house  of  Chandra  Prakash.   The  alleged
        “masala” used to be brought in boxes  from  time  to  time  to  the
        associates of Raies Beg and  Abdul  Hameed  who  used  to  come  to
        Madarsa at Farah.
48. From the analysis of the aforesaid evidence, it is clear that Pappu
        as approver has implicated himself in the crime.  He has  not  made
        any effort to give any statement  which  is  exculpatory.   He  has
        spoken quite graphically about the involvement of all  the  accused
        persons.  Mr.  Jain,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the
        appellant, would contend that he has used the word “masala” but not
        ammonium nitrate, but Pappu has clarified that though  he  was  not
        aware what was contained in the boxes, yet he was told by the other
        accused persons  later  on  that  it  contained  certain  explosive
        substances.  The said  aspect  has  been  corroborated  from  other
        ocular evidence as well as the seizure.
49. Presently, we shall advert to the various facets  of  corroboration
        in evidence against the accused persons.  As far as Chandra Prakash
        is concerned, on the basis of  the  approver  Chandra  Prakash  was
        arrested  on  1.8.1997  vide  Ext.P-37.   On  the  basis   of   the
        information of the  accused,  Chandra  Prakash,  the  Investigating
        Officer searched his house and godown and  recovered  28  boxes  of
        ammonium nitrate.  It has come out in  the  evidence  that  Chandra
        Prakash opened the lock of the godown the key of which was  in  his
        possession.  Bhup Singh, PW-32,  eye  witness  to  the  seizure  of
        articles from the godown  of  Chandra  Prakash,  has  categorically
        stated that the accused Chandra Prakash led to the recovery of  red
        and blue coloured bundles from the godown  of  the  building.   The
        office of PW-32 was also in the said building.   From  the  godown,
        fuse wires and five kilograms of grey coloured  material  was  also
        recovered.  The Investigating Officer, M.M. Atray, PW-71, has  also
        proven the factum of recovery.  Shivnath  Kuriya,  PW-22,  who  had
        accompanied the investigating team, has deposed that the  explosive
        which was used in the live  bomb  had  ammonium  nitrate/gelaltine.
        Chetan Das Rawatani, PW-34, who is an expert witness in respect  of
        explosives, approved his report Ext. P-49 and has deposed that  the
        ammonium nitrate that was seized from the godown of Chandra Prakash
        was in such a condition that it could be used to prepare a bomb.
50. Mr. Jain, as has been  stated  earlier,  has  seriously  criticized
        about the recovery from Chandra Prakash on the ground that when  he
        led to the discovery of the articles seized, he was  not  arrested.In this context, we refer with profit to the decision in Mohd. Arif
        aliasAshfaq v. State (NCT of Delhi)[23] wherein the  Court  opined
        thus: -
51.In this context, we may refer to the authority inVikram Singh  and
        others v. State of Punjab[24], wherein while  interpretingSection
        27of the Evidence Act, the Court opined that a bare reading of the
        provision would reveal that  a  “person  must  be  accused  of  any
        offence” and that he must be “in the custody of a  police  officer”
        and it is not essential that such an accused must be  under  formal
        arrest.
52.In this regard, a passage from the Constitution Bench  decision  inState of Uttar Pradesh v. Deoman Upadhyaya[25] is reproduced below:
53.InAnter Singh v. State of Rajasthan[26], after  referring  to  the
        decisions inMadan Singh v. State of Rajasthan[27],Mohd. Aslam  v.
        State of Maharashtra[28],Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor[29],Prabhoo
        v.  State  of  U.P.[30]  andMohd.   Inayatullah   v.   State   of
        Maharashtra[31], this Court summed up the following principles:-
The relevancy of the  fact  discovered  must  be  established
              according to the prescriptions relating to relevancy of other
              evidence connecting it with the crime in order  to  make  the
              fact discovered admissible.
2) The fact must have been discovered.
3)  The  discovery  must  have  been  in  consequence  of   some
              information  received  from  the  accused  and  not  by   the
              accused’s own act.
4) The person giving the information  must  be  accused  of  any
              offence.
5) He must be in the custody of a police officer.
6) The  discovery  of  a  fact  in  consequence  of  information
              received from an accused in custody must be deposed to.
(7)   Thereupon only  that  portion  of  the  information  which
                 relates distinctly or strictly to the fact  discovered  can
                 be proved. The rest is inadmissible.”
54.In this context, it would be fruitful to refer  to  the  ruling  inState of Maharashtra v. Damu[32] wherein it has been observed that:
55.InAftab Ahmad Anasari v. State of Uttaranchal[33], after referring
        to earlier decisions, a two-Judge Bench, appreciating the  material
        brought on record, came to hold that when the accused was ready  to
        show the place where he had concealed the clothes of the  deceased,
        the same was clearly admissible underSection 27of  the  Evidence
        Act because the same related distinctly to  the  discovery  of  the
        clothes of the deceased from that very place.
56.InBhagwan Dass  v.  State  (NCT  of  Delhi)[34],  relying  on  the
        decisions inAftab Ahmad Anasari(supra) andManu Sharma  v.  State
        (NCT of Delhi)[35], the Court opined  that  when  the  accused  had
        given a statement that related to the discovery of an electric wire
        by which the crime was committed, the said disclosure statement was
        admissible as evidence.
57. As the material brought on record would show, the  accused  was  in
        the custody of the investigating agency and the fact whether he was
        formally arrested or not will not vitiate the factum of leading  to
        discovery.  However, it may be stated that  the  accused  was  also
        arrested on that day.  We have dealt with  the  issue  that  formal
        arrest is not necessary as Mr. Jain has  seriously  contended  that
        the arrest was done after the recovery.  As we have  clarified  the
        position in law, the same would not make any difference.
58. As regards recovery from accused Abdul Mateen is concerned,  it  is
        borne out from the record that after his arrest  on  28.6.1997,  he
        gave information at 6.00 a.m. as contained  in  Ext.  P-255,  about
        another  bomb  and  on  the  basis  of  the  said  information  the
        Investigating Officer, PW-71,  visited  the  spot  along  with  the
        accused and at his instance a live bomb  was  recovered  which  was
        underneath the earth. In  the  said  information  the  accused  had
        stated that the two bombs were inside the SMS Stadium and he  could
        verify the places by going inside the stadium. In the  evidence  of
        Jai Narain, PW-6, Gopal Singh, PW-7 and  Shivnath,  PW-22,  it  has
        come on record that the bombs were recovered  at  the  instance  of
        accused Abdul Mateen on 28.6.1998.  This fact has been corroborated
        by Vinod Sharma, PW-16 and Gordhan, PW-10 who also accompanied  the
        investigating team.  Shivnath, PW-22, had clearly stated  that  the
        bomb recovered was high explosive time bomb  and  the  battery  was
        inside the timer and the  same  was  switched  on  and  he  further
        confirmed that electric detonator was  used  in  the  bomb.   Vinod
        Kumar, PW-16, also stated that the electric detonator was found  in
        the bomb and the same was neutralized.  Suresh Kumar Saini,  PW-67,
        in his deposition, gave description  of  loss  caused  due  to  the
        explosion of the time bomb.  He had further  deposed  that  lid  of
        stainless steel of casio watch had been recovered from the scene of
        crime.
59. On appreciating the aforesaid material, it is clear as crystal that
        the said accused has stated about the fact of planting of bomb at a
        particular site in the stadium and led to the said place from which
        the bomb was recovered.  The submission of Mr. Jain  is  that  such
        material cannot be put against the accused  being  inadmissible  in
        evidence.In this context, we  may  refer  to  a  two-Judge  Bench
        decision inPrakash  Chand  v.  State  (Delhi  Administration)[36]
        wherein the Court, after referring  to  the  decision  inHimachal
        Pradesh Administration v. Om Prakash[37], opined thus: -
60. The said principle  has  been  reiterated  inA.N.  Venkatesh  and
        another v. State of Karnataka[38].
61. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid enunciation of  law,  the
        submission of Mr. Jain leaves us unimpressed and we are inclined to
        hold that the said fact is a relevant fact which is  admissible  in
        evidence.
62. The next aspect that is to be adverted to is that ammonium  nitrate
        not being an explosive substance, mere possession cannot bring  the
        accused Chandra Prakash within the ambit of any offence.   In  this
        regard, we may refer toSection 4(d)of the 1884 Act.  It reads  as
        follows: -
63.Section 2of the 1908 Act, which deals with definitions,  reads  as
        follows: -
also any apparatus, machine, implement or material used, or
                 intended to be used, or adapted for causing, or  aiding  in
                 causing, any explosion in or with any explosive  substance;
                 also any part of any such apparatus, machine or implement;
(b)   the  expression  ""special  category  explosive  substance""
64. Keeping in view the broad definitions of  both  the  Acts,  we  are
        required to see what has  been  seized  from  the  accused  Chandra
        Prakash.  What is evincible from the  seizure  report,  Ext.  P-42,
        apart from ammonium nitrate, fuse wire and empty  boxes  were  also
        seized.  That apart, 17 packs containing blue  coloured  fuse  wire
        kept in plastic (polythene) bags and  four  boxes  containing  blue
        coloured fuse wire, “Sun brand  safety  fuse”  numbered  as  40208,
        40158,  39937,  40203  respectively,  one  carton   of   explosives
        detonating fuse measuring 1500  meters  in  length  and  38  kg  in
        weight, containing four wooden logs of red colour, 375  meter  wire
        in each Gattha and black coloured cap fitted  on  the  tip  of  the
        wire, three cartons of explosive Belgelative  90  (Gulla  Dynamite)
        net weight of each being 25 Kg. with “Division I  Class  II  safety
        distance category ZZ Bharat Explosive Ltd.  9  KM  Lalitpur  (U.P.)
        Date of manufacturing 4.6.97 batch No. 2” written on each box, four
        packets of O.D. Detonator containing 1600 detonators,  a  substance
        of light yellow colour kept inside a carton of paer  in  a  plastic
        bag weighing nearly 5 kg and 16 empty cartons, one of gulla and  15
        of fuse wire, were seized.
65.Section 2of the 1908 Act has a deeming provision which states that
        explosive substance would include  any  materials  for  making  any
        explosive substance.  Similarly,Section 4(d)of the 1884 Act has a
        broader  spectrum  which  includes  coloured  fires  or  any  other
        substances, whether  single  chemical  compound  or  a  mixture  of
        substances.  That apart, as we find, apart  from  ammonium  nitrate
        other articles had been seized.  The combination of  the  same,  as
        per the evidence of the expert witness, was sufficient to prepare a
        bomb for the purpose of explosion.  In addition to the  same,  huge
        quantity of ammonium nitrate was seized and  it  was  seized  along
        with other items.  The cumulative effect is that the possession  of
        these articles in such  a  large  quantity  by  the  accused  gives
        credence  to  the  prosecution  version  that  the  possession  was
        conscious and it was intended to be used for  the  purpose  of  the
        blast.
66. The next aspect which needs to be adverted  to  is  non-framing  of
        specific charge.  On a perusal of the  record,  we  find  that  the
        learned trial Judge has framed the charges specifically by  putting
        the charges to the accused.  The purpose of framing of  charges  is
        that the accused should be informed with certainty and accuracy  of
        the charge brought against him.  There  should  not  be  vagueness.
        The accused must know the scope and particulars in detail.In this
        context, we may refer to decision inSantosh  Kumari  v.  State  of
        Jammu and Kashmir and others[39],  wherein  it  has  been  held  as
        follows: -
If, therefore, the necessary information is conveyed to  him  in
           other ways and there is no prejudice, the framing of the  charge
           is not invalidated. The essential part of this part  of  law  is
           not any technical formula of words but the reality, whether  the
           matter was explained to the accused and  whether  he  understood
           what he was being tried  for.Sections  34,114and149IPC
           provide for criminal liability viewed from different  angles  as
           regards actual participants, accessories and men actuated  by  a
           common object or a common intention; and as explained by a five-
           Judge Constitution Bench  of  this  Court  inWillie  (William)
           Slaney v. State of M.P.[40] SCR at p.  1189,  the  charge  is  a
           rolled-up  one  involving   the   direct   liability   and   the
           constructive  liability  without  specifying  who  are  directly
           liable and who are sought to be made constructively liable.”
67.InK. Prema S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa  Rao[41],  the  Court  opined
        that though the charge specifically underSection 306IPC  was  not
        framed, yet all  the  ingredients  constituting  the  offence  were
        mentioned in the statement of charges.  In that context,  a  three-
        Judge Bench of this Court ruled that mere  omission  or  defect  in
        framing  of  charge  does  not  disable  the  criminal  court  from
        convicting the accused for the offence which is found to have  been
        proved on the evidence on record.The  said  principle  has  been
        reiterated inDalbir Singh v. State of U.P.[42],State of  U.P.  v.
        Paras Nath Singh[43] andAnnareddy  Sambasiva  Reddy  v.  State  of
        A.P.[44].
68. In the case at hand, as has been stated earlier, the  charges  have
        been framed and we do not find any vagueness.  That apart,  neither
        any prejudice has been caused nor has there  been  any  failure  of
        justice.  Thus, the submission of Mr. Jain in this regard leaves us
        unimpressed.
69. The next facet which deserves  to  be  addressed  pertains  to  the
        criminal conspiracy.  The submission of the learned counsel for the
        appellants is that the learned trial Judge has  inappositely  drawn
        certain inferences to show that there was a criminal conspiracy and
        the High Court has, without delving deep into the matter, concurred
        with the same. As per the evidence brought on record, it  is  clear
        as crystal that accused Abdul Mateen, Abdul  Hamid  and  Raies  Beg
        used to meet quite frequently at the Madarsa at village Farah.   It
        is also evident from the deposition of Kanchan Singh,  PW-11,  Shri
        Chand, PW-12, Murari Lal Sharma, PW-13,  and  Ashok  Kumar,  PW-17,
        that the accused Abdul Mateen, Raies Beg and Abdul  Hamid  used  to
        meet at the Madarsa at village Farah.   That apart, Pappu had  also
        deposed implicating himself that when there used to  be  discussion
        at madarsa in the  village  Farah  about  the  suitable  place  for
        planting the bomb, the timer of the bomb was supplied by Dr.  Abdul
        Hamid.  The chain of events and the participation  of  the  accused
        persons which had the genesis in the discussion and  the  meetings,
        the purchase of ammonium nitrate and other items, carrying  of  the
        boxes to the Madarsa and all other factors cumulatively  show  that
        there was conspiracy.
70. While dealing with the facet of criminal conspiracy, it has  to  be
        kept in mind that in case of a  conspiracy,  there  cannot  be  any
        direct evidence.  Express agreement between the parties  cannot  be
        proved.   Circumstances  proved  before,  during  and   after   the
        occurrence have to be considered to decide about the complicity  of
        the accused.  Such a conspiracy  is  never  hatched  in  open  and,
        therefore, evaluation of proved circumstances play a vital role  in
        establishing the criminal conspiracy.In  this  context,  we  may
        refer with profit to a passage from  Yogesh  aliasSachin  Jagdish
        Joshi v. State of Maharashtra[45]: -
71. The same  principles  have  been  stated  inPratapbhai  Hamirbhai
        Solanki v. State of Gujarat and another[47].
72.InYakub Abdul Razak Menon v. The  State  of  Maharashtra,  through
        CBI,  Bombay[48],  analyzing  various  pronouncements,  this  Court
        opined thus: -
73. Testing the present factual matrix on the anvil  of  the  aforesaid
        enunciation of law, we are of the considered view that the  opinion
        expressed by the learned trial Judge as well as by the  High  Court
        that there has been conspiracy between the parties  to  commit  the
        blast on a particular day cannot be found fault with.
74. Presently, we shall engage ourselves to deal with the conviction of
        accused Abdul Mateen for  the  offence  underSection  14of  the
        Foreigners Act, 1946.  The said provision reads as under: -
Explanation.  –  For  the  purposes  of  this  section,   the
              expression “visa” shall have the same meaning as assigned  to
              it under the Passport (Entry into  India)  Rules,  1950  made
              under thePassport  (Entry  into  India)  Act,  1920(34  of
              1920).”
75. The learned trial Judge, analyzing the material on record, has come
        to hold that the said Abdul Mateen is a resident of Pakistan and he
        had no valid document to be  in  India.   In  his  statement  under
        Section 313 of the Code, he had not disputed that he was not having
        passport or visa and he is  of  Pakistan  nationality.   Thus,  the
        offence under the said Act has been held to be  proved.   The  High
        Court has concurred with the said view.  In our considered opinion,
        the offence under the said Act has been  proved  beyond  reasonable
        doubt.
76. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we conclude and  hold  that  the
        grounds assailing the judgment  of  conviction  and  the  order  of
        sentence have no legal substantiality and,  accordingly,  they  are
        rejected.
77. The factual scenario of the instant case compels us to  state  that
        these kinds of activities by anyone breeds  lawlessness,  fear  and
        affects the fundamental unity of our great country.  A nation  with
        a desire to prosper is required to maintain high degree of law  and
        order   situation   apart   from   respecting    “imperatives    of
        internationalism”.   Certain  individuals  harbouring  unacceptable
        notions and  inexcusable  philosophy  and,  on  certain  occasions,
        because of enormous avarice, try to  jeopardize  the  cohesive  and
        collegial fabric of the State.  This leads to  national  decay  and
        gives rise to incomprehensible anarchy.  It reflects  non-reverence
        for humanity.  Be it categorically stated, every  citizen  of  this
        country is required to remember that national patriotism is founded
        on the philosophy of public  good.   Love  for  one’s  country  and
        humanity at large are eternally  cherished  values.   The  infamous
        acts of the appellants are really condemnable not only  because  of
        the  dent  they  intended  to  create  in  the  social  peace   and
        sovereignty of the nation, but also from the humane point  of  view
        as  they  are  founded  on  greed,  envy,  baseless  anger,  pride,
        prejudice and perverse feelings towards mankind.
78. We have, in agony and anguish, have expressed thus because  when  a
        devastating activity like the present one occurs  on  the  Republic
        Day of our country Bharat, it injures the nationality, disturbs the
        equilibrium of each individual citizen, creates a concavity in  the
        equanimity of the peace of the  State,  generates  a  stir  in  the
        sanctity and divinity of law and order situation which is paramount
        in any civilized State, attempts to endanger the economic growth of
        a country and, in the ultimate eventuate, destroys  the  conceptual
        normalcy of any habitat.  Law cannot remain silent to this  because
        it is the duty of law to resist  such  attacks  on  peace.   It  is
        manifest that the accused-appellants had conspired to send a savage
        stir among the citizenry of this country on the Republic Day.   The
        great country like ours cannot succumb to this  kind  of  terrorist
        activity as it is nationally as well as internationally  obnoxious.
        Such tolerance would tantamount to acceptance of defeat.  The  iron
        hands  of  law  has  to  fall  and  in  the  obtaining  facts   and
        circumstances, as the charges have been  proved  beyond  reasonable
        doubt, the law has rightly visited the appellants and, accordingly,
        we concur with the same.
79. Consequently,  all  the  appeals,  being  bereft  of  merit,  stand
        dismissed.
………………………………J.
                                                        [K.S. Radhakrishnan]






                                                              ………………………………J.
                                                               [Dipak Misra]
      New Delhi;
May 9, 2014.
-----------------------",8004,"Accused Abdul Mateen was sentenced to undergo five years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo one year’s simple imprisonment underSection 14of the Foreigners Act; ten years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.20,000, in default to further undergo two years’ simple imprisonment under Section 4 of the Prevention of Damages to Public Property Act; three years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.3,000/-, in default to further undergo six months’ simple imprisonment underSection 456IPC; to undergo ten years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default to further undergo two years’ simple imprisonment under Section 307 read withSection 120BIPC; seven years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.7,000/-, in default to further undergo one and half years’ simple imprisonment under Section 435 read withSection 120BIPC; five years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default to further undergo one year’s simple imprisonment under Section 118 read withSection 120BIPC; two years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default to further undergo three months’ simple imprisonment under Section 9B of the 1884 Act; imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.20,000/- in default to further undergo three years’ simple imprisonment underSection 3of the 1908 Act; seven years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.7,000/-, in default to further undergo one and half years’ simple imprisonment underSection 4read withSection 6of the 1908 Act; and five years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default to further undergo one year’s simple imprisonment underSection 5read withSection 6of the 1908 Act. Accused Abdul Hamid and Raies Beg were sentenced to undergo two years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default to further undergo three months’ simple imprisonment under Section 9B of the 1884 Act; ten years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.10,000/- , in default to further undergo two years’ simple imprisonment underSection 3read withSection 6of the 1908 Act; seven years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.7,000/-, in"
"M/S S.R.S Travels By Its Proprietor K.T. ... vs The Karnataka State Road Transport ... on 6 February, 2025",https://indiankanoon.org/docfragment/126797712/?formInput=doctypes%3A%20supremecourt%20year%3A%202025,"Take notes as you read a judgment using ourVirtual Legal Assistantand get email alerts whenever a new judgment matches your query (Query Alert Service). Try out ourPremium Member Services--Sign up todayand get free trial for one month.
VIKRAM NATH, J.
1.     Delay, if any, is condoned.
2.     Leave granted.
CA@SLP(Civil) No.27833-27834 of 2011 etc. etc.Page 1 of 46
3.        These    appeals arise     out of the common
   judgment and order dated 28.03.2011 of the High
   Court of Karnataka in W.A. No. 5466 of 2004 and
   connected matters. In view of the multiple appeals
   that have been filed, there is a need to clarify the
   array of parties in the respective SLPs:
For clarity of reference in this judgment:
4.        The facts leading to the present appeals are as
follows:
The 1976 Act was enacted with the objective of
          acquiring privately operated contract carriages
          to curb their alleged detrimental operation in
          the State and to bring them under public
          control. Under the 1976 Act, once these
          contract       carriages        were       acquired,          all
          corresponding permits as well as certificates of
          registration      stood        vested     in        the    State
          Government.             Subsequently,           the        State
          Government transferred these vehicles and
          permits     to    State-owned           Road         Transport
          Corporations, notably including the KSRTC.
The KCCA Act



CA@SLP(Civil) No.27833-27834 of 2011 etc. etc.Page 3 of 464.2. The Act was challenged but upheld by this
       Court inState of Karnataka v. Ranganatha
       Reddy3and later reaffirmed inVijayakumar
       Sharma v. State of Karnataka4. In these
       decisions, the Supreme Court recognized that
       the 1976 Act’s purpose was to further the
       Directive Principles of State Policy underArticle
       39(b)and (c) of the Constitution and did not
       infringe       any     fundamental        rights     or
       constitutional principles.
4.3.MV ActEnactment:                 In 1988, the Motor
       Vehicles      Act, 19885      was enacted     by the
       Parliament.This Actcontains several provisions
       relevant to the present matter:Section 2(7)defines “Contract carriage” andSection 2(40)defines “Stage Carriage.” Moreover,Section 68deals with transport authorities; in particular,Section 68(2)provides for the composition of the
       State Transport Authority6 and the Regional
       Transport Authority7, mandating that each3AIR 1978 SC 2154AIR 1990 SC 20725MV Act6STA7RTA



CA@SLP(Civil) No.27833-27834 of 2011 etc. etc.Page 4 of 46include a Chairman with judicial experience
          along with other members—up to four for the
          STA and up to two for the RTA.Section 68(3)(b)empowers the STA to perform the duties of the
          RTA,         andSection   68(5)enables   both
          authorities, under rules made pursuant toSection 96, to delegate their powers and
          functions to any other authority or person
          subject to prescribed restrictions.
4.4. On 1 July 1989, the Karnataka Motor Vehicle
          Rules, 19898 were enacted. Under Rules 55 and
          56 of these Rules, the RTA and STA were
          empowered to delegate their powers to their
          secretaries, including the authority to grant
          contract carriage permits. Furthermore, on 27
          February 1990, the constitutionality of the
          KCCA Act was challenged on the ground of
          repugnancy.InVijay Kumar Sharma v. State
          of Karnataka9, this Hon'ble Court upheld the
          constitutionality of the KCCA Act, holding that8KMV Rules9(1990) 2 SCC 562



CA@SLP(Civil) No.27833-27834 of 2011 etc. etc.Page 5 of 46there    is   no    inconsistency          or    repugnancy
      between the KCCA Act and the MV Act.
4.5. In the subsequent decades, transport policy in
      Karnataka underwent shifts due to rising
      demand for public transport services, rapid
      urbanization, and the perceived inability of
      government-run corporations alone to meet
      commuter needs. Over time, committees such
      as the Tax Reforms Commission observed that
      strict limitations on private contract carriages
      had contributed to an artificial scarcity of public
      transport options. It was noted that in many
      rural and semi-urban areas, a shortage of
      KSRTC-run buses compelled travellers to rely
      on private goods vehicles, tractors, or other sub-
      optimal modes of travel, raising concerns of
      safety and inconvenience.
4.6. Enactment           of    the     2003           Repeal     Act
      (Karnataka Act No. 9 of 2003) - Responding to
      these     developments,        the   State        Legislature
      passed the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation
      and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act,



CA@SLP(Civil) No.27833-27834 of 2011 etc. etc.Page 6 of 46200310. Among other amendments (notably to
           taxation laws),Section 3of the 2003 Repeal Act
           repealed the 1976 KCCA Act. According to the
           Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to
           the 2003 Act, the legislative intent was to
           liberalize public transport, encourage private
           operators, and address “woeful shortages” in
           passenger services. The Legislature believed
           that removing the KCCA Act’s prohibitions
           would enable better competition, expanded
           services, and ultimately greater passenger
           comfort.
4.7. Challenge                 Before         the        High      Court     of
           Karnataka-             After 2003, private bus operators
           began applying for contract carriage permits
           under       the     more       liberal        regime.    In   some
           instances, Secretaries of the STA or RTAs
           granted these permits, relying on purported
           delegations under Rule 56. Meanwhile, KSRTC
           and its employees’ federation filed various writ
           petitions challenging (a) the validity of the 2003
           Repeal Act and (b) the power of the Secretaries10The 2003 Repeal Act orKarnataka ActNo.9 of 2003



CA@SLP(Civil) No.27833-27834 of 2011 etc. etc.Page 7 of 46to grant permits. They argued that the 1976 Act,
      having been upheld by the Supreme Court,
      could not be repealed without fresh Presidential
      assent, and contended that awarding permit-
      granting power which was quasi judicial to a
      single officer ought to remain vested only in
      multi-member bodies.
4.8. In a judgment and order dated 17 November
      2004 in W.P. No. 40339/2004 and related
      matters, the Single Judge of the High Court held
      that Rules 55 and 56 of the KMV Rules are null
      and void as ultra vires theMV Act, and that the
      delegation of the power to issue contract
      carriage and stage carriage permits, as well as
      to perform the functions of the STA/RTA, to the
      Secretary is not permissible. On 16 December
      2004, the Learned Single Judge of the High
      Court ruled that the repeal of the KCCA Act by
      Act No. 9/2003 is unconstitutional. Citing the
      decisions inRanganatha Reddy(Supra) andVijayakumar Sharma(Supra), the Judge
      observed that the State Government lacks the
      authority to repeal an Act that has received the



CA@SLP(Civil) No.27833-27834 of 2011 etc. etc.Page 8 of 46President’s assent. Since the KCCA Act falls
      under Entry 42 of theConcurrent List in the
      Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, ActNo.
      9/2003 was required to be sent for the
      President’s assent. It further noted that, by
      repealing the KCCA, the objective of the State
      Transport Undertaking could not be achieved,
      and that the issue could have been resolved by
      granting      additional     permits       to   the   State
      Transport Corporation.
4.9. Reference to Division Bench- Ultimately,
      appeals (W.A. Nos. 5466/2004, 60/2005, and
      connected       matters)     were    placed      before    a
      Division       Bench.       The       Division        Bench
      consolidated multiple challenges to the 2003
      Repeal Act, as well as the dispute about whether
      the Secretary, STA could lawfully grant permits.
4.10. Vide order dated 28.03.2011, the Division
      Bench of the High Court gave the following
      findings with respect to the main issues in these
      matters:
• SLP (C) Nos. 25787-956 of 2012: Filed by the
       Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation
       (KSRTC), primarily disputing the High Court’s
       conclusion that repealing the 1976 Act is
       constitutional. It wants the 2003 Repeal Act
       declared invalid but concurs with the High
       Court that the Secretary, STA/RTA, cannot
       grant or renew permits under delegated power.
5.    Before we delve into the specific controversies
arising in these appeals, it would be instructive to
first set out the relevant legal provisions that govern
the issues at hand. A clear understanding of these




CA@SLP(Civil) No.27833-27834 of 2011 etc. etc.Page 12 of 46enactments is vital to appreciate the two principal
questions that fall for our consideration.
I. Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act,1976Purpose and Scope- Enacted with the objective of
      acquiring privately operated contract carriages that
      were perceived to be functioning contrary to public
      interest. Once acquired, the vehicles, permits, and
      certificates of registration vested in the State
      Government, which, in turn, transferred them to
      state-owned road transport corporations such as
      KSRTC.
Judicial Endorsement- The 1976 Act was upheld
      by     this     Court   inState   of    Karnataka     v.
      Ranganatha Reddy11and later reaffirmed inVijayakumar Sharma v. State of Karnataka12.
      These decisions recognized that the statutory
      objective, furthering the Directive Principles underArticle 39(b)and (c) of the Constitution, did not
      violate any fundamental or constitutional rights.
AIR 1978 SC 21512(AIR) 1990 SC 2072



CA@SLP(Civil) No.27833-27834 of 2011 etc. etc.Page 13 of 46Subsequent Development- By virtue of Section 3
  of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and
  Certain     Other     Law     (Amendment)         Act,    2003(Karnataka ActNo. 9 of 2003), the 1976 Act stood
  repealed, which is one of the core issues challenged
  in these proceedings.
II. Karnataka Motor Vehicles                     Taxation    and
   (Amendment) Act, 2003

  Statement        of    Objects      and        Reasons-     The
  Legislature observed a shortage of passenger
  transport services, especially in rural and semi-
  urban areas, and took the view that permitting
  private operators in the contract carriage sector
  would help meet rising demand.Section 3of this
  enactment        repealed     the    1976       Act,   thereby
  removing      existing     curbs     on   private      contract
  carriage operation and paving the way for a more
  liberalized regulatory regime.
Legislative Competence- Enacted under the same
  legislative field (Entry 42, List III of the Seventh
  Schedule to the Constitution) that empowered the
  original 1976 Act. The Division Bench of the High



CA@SLP(Civil) No.27833-27834 of 2011 etc. etc.Page 14 of 46Court held that there was no requirement of fresh
  Presidential assent for the repeal, and it affirmed
  that the State Legislature was competent to affect
  such a repeal.
III.Motor Vehicles Act, 1988Chapter V: Control of Transport VehiclesSection 66: No owner can use or permit the use of
  a transport vehicle without a valid permit.Section      68(3):    Enumerates          the   powers and
  functions of the STA and RTA, including the grant
  of various permits.
Section 68(5): Permits the STA or RTA, “if
  authorised by the Rules made underSection 96,”
  to delegate any of its powers or functions to any
  other authority or person, subject to prescribed
  conditions.
Chapter VI: Special Provisions Relating to State
  Transport Undertakings (for completeness)- While
  primarily not at issue in these appeals, Chapter VI
  establishes procedures for formulating schemes
  granting     exclusive      rights    to   State   Transport
  Undertakings. This chapter was relevant in the



CA@SLP(Civil) No.27833-27834 of 2011 etc. etc.Page 15 of 46earlier era when nationalization of routes was
  prevalent; however, the main focus here is on
  whether the 1976 Act’s approach (acquiring
  contract carriages) could be rescinded by the 2003
  repeal.
IV. Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989

  Rule 54: Governs the manner in which the STA
  and the RTA conduct their business, including
  guidelines for meetings, quorums, and decision-
  making.
Rule 56: Delegation of Powers by the STA- Rule
  56(1)(d): Allows the STA to delegate its power to
  grant “a permit other than a stage carriage permit”
  to the Chairman, the Secretary, or an officer not
  below the rank of Regional Transport Officer. The
  High Court construed this provision to mean that,
  while the Rules contemplated delegation, the
  question      remained       whether      such   delegation
  extended to quasi-judicial functions (like granting
  contract carriage permits) or was confined to purely
  administrative powers.
CA@SLP(Civil) No.27833-27834 of 2011 etc. etc.Page 16 of 46
6.      In light of the foregoing factual matrix and the
contentions urged before us, the following principal
issues arise for determination:
judicial character.
7.      The learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants,
Mr. Devadatt Kamat, has advanced the following
main submissions:
They         submitted       that     by        incorporating
          amendments to the KMV Rules (notably, the
          inclusion       ofSection      96),     the    State    has
          unambiguously            affirmed         its   intention     to
          delegate routine functions, such as the issuance
          of contract carriage permits, to the Secretary.
7.5. Delegation                Does    Not      Subvert        Judicial
          Oversight: It is submitted that even if the power
          to grant permits were quasi-judicial, such
          functions       can     be   delegated          provided    the
          enabling statute expressly permits it. The
          Appellants have relied on the recent decision inNewtech Promoters & Developers Private
          Limited        v.    State    of    Uttar         Pradesh     &
          Others13, to support the view that quasi-judicial
          functions may be delegated when done so in
          accordance           with statutory         provisions. The
          Appellants stress that the delegation in this
          instance is limited to contract carriage, special,13(2021) 18 SCC 1



CA@SLP(Civil) No.27833-27834 of 2011 etc. etc.Page 20 of 46tourist, and temporary permits, matters that are
      routine and do not necessitate the full weight of
      collective     adjudication.        This     is      entirely
      consistent with the legislative scheme of theMV
      Actand the KMV Rules.
7.6. Operational Practicalities and the Necessity
      of Delegation: The Appellants submit that
      requiring the entire STA or RTA to sit on routine
      permit applications would be impractical and
      could lead to delays in service delivery. They
      argue that the Secretary, being a competent and
      experienced officer, is fully capable of exercising
      the delegated power without compromising the
      statutory framework. Such delegation is vital for
      the    smooth      functioning      of     the    transport
      regulatory system.
8.    The learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent
Corporation, Ms. Kiran Suri, has advanced the
following arguments on behalf of the KSRTC:
Ranganatha Reddy(Supra) andVijayakumar
      Sharma v. State of Karnatakabut also
      frustrates the statutory purpose of curbing the
      misuse of contract carriage permits. Moreover,
      the repeal undermines the public interest by
      removing a crucial mechanism that ensured
      that private operators did not convert contract
      carriage permits into an avenue for operating
      stage carriages, thus            protecting both the
      KSRTC’s statutory monopoly and the traveling
      public.
8.4. Financial and Operational Impact on KSRTC:
established operational framework. The abrupt



CA@SLP(Civil) No.27833-27834 of 2011 etc. etc.Page 23 of 46repeal     imposed      an    undue        financial   and
      operational burden on KSRTC, jeopardizing its
      economic viability and contravening the very
      objectives for which the 1976 Act was enacted.
8.5. On the Non-Delegability of the Power to Issue
      Permits: The Respondent Corporation concurs
      with the High Court’s holding that the power to
      grant Contract Carriage Permits is a quasi-
      judicial function, expressly vested in the STA or
      the RTA as composite bodies. The relevant
      provisions of theMV Act, particularlySections
      68,69, and74, together with Rule 56 of the
      KMV Rules clearly indicate that the power to
      issue such permits is intended to be exercised
      by a multi-member body and not by a single
      officer.
8.6. Inadmissibility of Delegation to a Single
      Officer: It is submitted that delegation of the
      permit-granting power to the Secretary (or any
      prescribed officer) is contrary to the statutory
      scheme. Such a delegation would effectively
      replace the collective decision-making process



CA@SLP(Civil) No.27833-27834 of 2011 etc. etc.Page 24 of 46with the unilateral discretion of a single official,
      thereby defeating the purpose of the quasi-
      judicial function entrusted to the STA/RTA. The
      learned Senior Counsel emphasizes that the
      legislative mandate, as enshrined inSection
      68(2)of the MV Act, requires that the STA be
      comprised of a Chairman (with judicial or
      appellate experience) and not more than three
      other members. No provision in the enabling Act
      permits the vesting of such critical power in a
      sole officer.
8.7. Excessive Delegation and Its Consequences:
CA@SLP(Civil) No.27833-27834 of 2011 etc. etc.Page 25 of 46making power must be strictly confined to the
      framework provided by the parent Act.
8.8. Legislative Intent and Judicial Oversight:
CA@SLP(Civil) No.27833-27834 of 2011 etc. etc.Page 26 of 468.10. State        Policy          Shifts        and       Recent
      Developments: It is further submitted that
      recent      policy     measures,           such    as     the
      nationalization of routes (as per the Gazette
      Notification      dated       07.03.2019)         and     the
      introduction of schemes like the “Shakthi
      Scheme” providing free bus services to women,
      further underscore the necessity for a robust,
      state-controlled transport framework. These
      developments accentuate the adverse impact
      of repealing the 1976 Act and the detrimental
      effect of delegating quasi-judicial powers to a
      single      officer     on      the    efficiency        and
      accountability of the state transport system.
9.    We shall now be dealing with each of the issues
that arise before us.
ISSUE I- VALIDITY OF THE 2003 REPEAL ACT
10. It is a well-settled principle that the power to
repeal a law is coextensive with the power to enact it.
In this context, the KCCA Act was enacted under
Entry 42 of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution,


CA@SLP(Civil) No.27833-27834 of 2011 etc. etc.Page 27 of 46and it received the assent of the President of India.
The KCCA Act was designed to bring privately
operated contract carriages under state control in
order to serve the public interest and to implement
the Directive Principles of State Policy, notably underArticle 39(b)and (c). However, over the ensuing
decades, the transport landscape in Karnataka
underwent          significant       changes—urbanization
intensified, public transport demand grew, and it
became increasingly evident that the restrictive
regime established by the KCCA Act was contributing
to an artificial scarcity of public transport services,
particularly in rural and semi-urban areas.
11. In response to these evolving circumstances,
the Legislature exercised its plenary power by
enacting the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and
Certain     Other      Law     (Amendment)       Act,   2003
(hereinafter, the 2003 Repeal Act), which repealed the
KCCA Act. The repeal was not an arbitrary act of
legislative whim but was backed by a clear statement
of objects and reasons that identified the deficiencies
in the existing regulatory framework and the
necessity to liberalize the transport sector. The



CA@SLP(Civil) No.27833-27834 of 2011 etc. etc.Page 28 of 46intention was to dismantle the statutory monopoly
that the KCCA Act had created for the KSRTC and to
open the door for private operators to address the
burgeoning public transport needs.
12. The Preamble to 2003 Repeal Act reads as
follows:
13. The contention advanced by the Respondent
Corporation (KSRTC) that repealing the KCCA Act is
unconstitutional because it effectively overrules the
decisions of the Supreme Court inRanganatha
Reddy(Supra) andVijayakumar Sharma(Supra)
fails to recognize the dynamic nature of legislative
policy. Those Supreme Court decisions merely
affirmed the constitutional validity of the KCCA Act
at the time of its enactment; they do not bind the
Legislature from modifying or repealing a statute
when subsequent developments warrant a change in
policy. Moreover, the argument that the repeal
should have required fresh presidential assent is
misplaced. A repeal statute does not recreate the
legal framework anew but rather extinguishes the
earlier Act’s operative provisions; it is not subject to
the same procedural requirements as an original
enactment when it comes to the need for fresh assent,
provided that the repeal falls within the legislative
competence of the State.
CA@SLP(Civil) No.27833-27834 of 2011 etc. etc.Page 30 of 46
14. Furthermore, the 2003 Repeal Act is rooted in
the practical realities of modern transport policy.
Contemporary            challenges,    such      as    increasing
demand for public transport services, congestion in
urban areas, and the need for efficient service
delivery, necessitated a more flexible regulatory
regime. The legislative history and the Statement of
Objects and Reasons attached to the 2003 Repeal Act
make it clear that the Legislature intended to remedy
the        inefficiencies   of   the   past      by   introducing
competition into the transport sector. The repeal of
the KCCA Act was thus a deliberate policy decision
aimed at fostering a more dynamic and responsive
transport framework rather than an attempt to
nullify well-established judicial pronouncements.
15. Additionally, it has been held on various
instances by this Court that a Legislature may,
subject to constitutional limitations, repeal any law it
has enacted. In Ramakrishna v. Janpad Sabha14, it
has been emphatically held that if the Legislature has
the power to enact a law on a particular subject, it
equally possesses the power to repeal that law. The14AIR 1962 SC 1073



CA@SLP(Civil) No.27833-27834 of 2011 etc. etc.Page 31 of 46relevant     paras    of    this   judgement     have   been
reproduced hereunder:
16. The KCCA Act was enacted under Entry 42
(Acquisition and requisition of property), and its
repeal by the 2003 Repeal Act was effected under
Entry 57 of List II, which deals with taxation—a
subject area where the State has independent
legislative competence. The repeal does not alter or
contradict the judicial interpretation of the KCCA Act;
rather, it reflects a conscious legislative choice to
adapt to new economic and social conditions.
17. In view of these considerations, the rationale
underlying the 2003 Repeal Act is sound and
consistent with the principles of legislative power.
The    arguments        advanced       by    the    Respondent
Corporation, that the repeal would amount to an
impermissible overruling of prior Supreme Court
decisions,     that    it   violates   the       requirement    of
presidential assent, or that it is otherwise beyond the
legislative competence of the State, are untenable.
The legislative intent, as clearly articulated in the



CA@SLP(Civil) No.27833-27834 of 2011 etc. etc.Page 35 of 462003 Repeal Act, was to improve public transport
services and to rectify the shortcomings of the earlier
regulatory regime. Accordingly, we hold that Section
3 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and
Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2003, which
repeals the KCCA Act, is constitutional. The KSRTC
challenging the repeal on these grounds have failed
to establish any defect in the exercise of the
Legislature’s power.
18. In view of the foregoing analysis, we concur with
the view taken by the Division Bench of the High
Court on this issue. We hold that Section 3 of the
Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain
Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2003, which repeals the
KCCA Act, is constitutional, and the State Legislature
has rightly exercised its power to repeal the Act.
ISSUE II- DELEGATION OF POWER TO GRANT
                  PERMITS
19. The next issue before us is whether the STA has
the power to delegate its functions, specifically, the
issuance of contract carriage, special, tourist, and




CA@SLP(Civil) No.27833-27834 of 2011 etc. etc.Page 36 of 46temporary permits, to its Secretary. In this regard,
the statutory framework provides clear guidance.
20.Section 68(5)of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
states:
This provision unambiguously confers upon the STA
and RTA the power to delegate its functions provided
that rules are framed underSection 96of the Act. In
the present context, the delegation in question
concerns the grant of permits that are not stage
carriage permits. This is further clarified in Rule
56(1)(d) of the KMV Rules, which reads as follows:
21. The       language      of    Rule    56(1)(d)    explicitly
differentiates between the grant of stage carriage
permits, which involve complex and inherently quasi-
judicial considerations, and other types of permits
that are essentially administrative in nature. The fact
that only the grant of stage carriage permits is
excluded       from      delegation       underscores        the
Legislature’s intention: routine and time-sensitive
permits such as contract carriage, special, tourist,
and temporary permits can be efficiently processed
through delegation to a competent officer like the
Secretary, thereby ensuring that administrative
functions are not unduly delayed by the need for a
full board’s involvement.
22.    The Respondents argue that permit-granting is
a quasi-judicial function that must be exercised
solely by the composite body of the STA or RTA, as
such functions require deliberation by multiple high-
ranking officials, ensuring that decisions are made
with due consideration and dissenting opinions. They
contend that delegating this power to a single officer


CA@SLP(Civil) No.27833-27834 of 2011 etc. etc.Page 38 of 46would undermine the judicial character of the
decision-making process. However, this argument
does not withstand if we have a closer analysis of the
statutory provisions.
23. Firstly, even if one accepts that the grant of
permits has a quasi-judicial element, it is an
established principle of administrative law that
quasi-judicial functions may be delegated if the
enabling     statute     expressly      provides       for     such
delegation. Here,Section 68(5)of the MV Act, coupled
with the specific language of Rule 56(1)(d) of the KMV
Rules makes it clear that the Legislature intended for
the STA to delegate certain routine permit functions.
The exclusion of stage carriage permits from this
delegation does not imply that all permit functions
are inherently non-delegable; rather, it reflects a
calibrated approach that distinguishes between
complex       adjudicatory       functions       and         routine
administrative tasks.
24. Secondly, from a practical standpoint, the STA
is entrusted with a wide range of responsibilities
under theMotor Vehicles Act, and its workload



CA@SLP(Civil) No.27833-27834 of 2011 etc. etc.Page 39 of 46necessitates delegation to ensure timely service
delivery. The Secretary, being a high-ranking officer
with      substantial         expertise          in   transport
administration, is well equipped to handle routine
permit applications. The delegation mechanism is not
a blank check for arbitrary decision-making; it
operates within the boundaries and conditions
prescribed by the enabling rules framed underSection 96of the MV Act. This ensures that, while
administrative efficiency is achieved, there remains
adequate oversight and accountability through the
broader STA framework.
25. Moreover, the High Court’s reasoning in this
regard appears to have conflated the inherent quasi-
judicial nature of certain decisions with the broader
statutory power of delegation. The High Court held
that because permit-granting is quasi-judicial, it
cannot be delegated to a single officer. However, this
view fails to recognize that delegation does not
remove judicial oversight from the process. Instead,
it merely streamlines routine functions that do not
require the full deliberative process of the STA. In
Newtech Promoters & Developers (P) Ltd. v. State



CA@SLP(Civil) No.27833-27834 of 2011 etc. etc.Page 40 of 46of U.P.15, this Court has affirmed that even quasi-
judicial functions may be delegated if the statute
provides for it and if appropriate safeguards are in
place. The relevant paras of this judgement are
reproduced hereunder:
What has been urged by the learned
       counsel for the promoters is hypothetical
       which does not arise in the facts of the
       case. If the delegation is made at any point
       of time which is in contravention to the
       scheme of the Act or is not going to serve
       the purpose and object with which power
       to delegate has been mandated underSection 81of the Act, it is always open for
       judicial review.
116. The further submission made by the
       learned counsel for the appellants thatSection 81of the Act permits the Authority
       to delegate such powers and functions to
       any member of the Authority which are
       mainly administrative or clerical, and
       cannot possibly encompass any of the core
       functions which are to be discharged by
       the Authority, the judicial functions are
       non-delegable, as these are the core
       functions of the Authority. The submission
       may not hold good for the reason that the
       power to be exercised by the Authority in
       deciding complaints underSection 31of
       the Act is quasi-judicial in nature which is
       delegable provided there is a provision in
       the statute. As already observed,Section
       81of the Act empowers the Authority to



CA@SLP(Civil) No.27833-27834 of 2011 etc. etc.Page 42 of 46delegate its power and functions to any of
       its members, by general or special order.”
26. Lastly, the practical impact of not allowing
delegation would be to overload the STA with routine
functions, potentially causing undue delays and
inefficiencies in the permit-issuance process. Such
delays could disrupt the balance of public transport
service delivery, which the Legislature clearly sought
to improve by liberalizing the regime for non-stage
carriage permits. In this light, the delegation of
routine permit-granting powers is not only legally
permissible but is also necessary to meet the
practical demands of an evolving transport sector.
27. In view of the above analysis, we conclude that
the power of the STA to delegate the issuance of
contract carriage, special, tourist, and temporary
permits to its Secretary is fully supported by the
statutory provisions ofSection 68(5)of the MV Act,
and Rule 56(1)(d) of the KMV Rules, 1989. The
delegation is a rational and necessary administrative
measure      that     facilitates    prompt      and     efficient
processing       of     permit       applications         without
undermining the oversight function of the STA.
CA@SLP(Civil) No.27833-27834 of 2011 etc. etc.Page 43 of 46Consequently, we reject the Respondents’ arguments
and hold that the High Court’s reasoning on the non-
delegability of permit-granting power is flawed. The
power to delegate, as provided by law, remains intact,
and any decision to the contrary is unsustainable in
light of both legislative intent and practical necessity.
28. In view of the discussions and analysis above,
we hold that:
29. Consequently, we direct that the appeals of the
respondent corporation (KSRTC) are dismissed, while
the appeals filed by the private bus operators and the



CA@SLP(Civil) No.27833-27834 of 2011 etc. etc.Page 44 of 46Karnataka State Road Transport Authority are
allowed.
30. The impugned orders of the High Court that
denied the delegation power of the STA are set aside,
and it is confirmed that the Secretary of the STA is
empowered to grant non-stage carriage permits
(including contract carriage, special, tourist, and
temporary permits) in accordance withSection 68(5)of the MV Act and Rule 56(1)(d) of the KMV Rules,
subject to the limitations and conditions prescribed
therein.
31. The appropriate authorities are directed to take
all necessary measures to implement the above
findings and ensure that the delegation of permit-
granting power is exercised in a manner consistent
with the statutory provisions and the objectives of
efficient public transport administration.
CA@SLP(Civil) No.27833-27834 of 2011 etc. etc.Page 45 of 46
32.    All pending applications are disposed of.
………………………………..J.
                                    [VIKRAM NATH]



                               ………………………………..J.
                                [PRASANNA B. VARALE]

NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 06, 2025




CA@SLP(Civil) No.27833-27834 of 2011 etc. etc.Page 46 of 46",4724,"4.3.MV ActEnactment: In 1988, the Motor Vehicles Act, 19885 was enacted by the Parliament.This Actcontains several provisions relevant to the present matter:Section 2(7)defines “Contract carriage” andSection 2(40)defines “Stage Carriage.” Moreover,Section 68deals with transport authorities; in particular,Section 68(2)provides for the composition of the State Transport Authority6 and the Regional Transport Authority7, mandating that each3AIR 1978 SC 2154AIR 1990 SC 20725MV Act6STA7RTA CA@SLP(Civil) No.27833-27834 of 2011 etc. etc.Page 4 of 46include a Chairman with judicial experience along with other members—up to four for the STA and up to two for the RTA.Section 68(3)(b)empowers the STA to perform the duties of the RTA, andSection 68(5)enables both authorities, under rules made pursuant toSection 96, to delegate their powers and functions to any other authority or person subject to prescribed restrictions. 40339/2004 and related matters, the Single Judge of the High Court held that Rules 55 and 56 of the KMV Rules are null and void as ultra vires theMV Act, and that the delegation of the power to issue contract carriage and stage carriage permits, as well as to perform the functions of the STA/RTA, to the Secretary is not permissible. Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and (Amendment) Act, 2003 Statement of Objects and Reasons- The Legislature observed a shortage of passenger transport services, especially in rural and semi- urban areas, and took the view that permitting private operators in the contract carriage sector would help meet rising demand.Section 3of this enactment repealed the 1976 Act, thereby removing existing curbs on private contract carriage operation and paving the way for a more liberalized regulatory regime. Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and (Amendment) Act, 2003 Statement of Objects and Reasons- The Legislature observed a shortage of passenger transport services, especially in rural and semi- urban areas, and took the view that permitting private operators in the contract carriage"
"Gulshan Kumar vs Institute Of Banking Personnel ... on 3 February, 2025",https://indiankanoon.org/docfragment/126361553/?formInput=doctypes%3A%20supremecourt%20year%3A%202025,"Take notes as you read a judgment using ourVirtual Legal Assistantand get email alerts whenever a new judgment matches your query (Query Alert Service). Try out ourPremium Member Services--Sign up todayand get free trial for one month.
R. MAHADEVAN, J.

1.             This writ petition has been filed as a Public Interest Litigation invoking

             jurisdiction underArticle 32of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of

             mandamus directing the Respondent Nos.1 to 4 to provide the petitioner with the

             facility of a scribe, compensatory time and all other facilities, to which he may

             be entitled, under the law, considering his disability status for the upcoming

             examinations, the details of which are tabulated below:Signature Not VerifiedDigitally signed byVISHAL ANANDDate: 2025.02.0315:37:55 ISTReason:2
The petitioner has also sought a direction to the Respondent No.5 to initiate

suitable action against the examining bodies that have failed to adhere to the

guidelines issued by the Respondent No.5 / Government of India, Ministry of

Social Justice and Empowerment, Department of Empowerment of Persons with

Disabilities (Divyangjan) vide Office Memorandum in F.No.29-6/2019-DD-III

dated 10.08.2022.

2.       Vide order dated 15.12.20221, this court clarified that the Respondent No.2

shall not insist on the requirement of a benchmark disability within the meaning

of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 20162 for the facility of a scribe,

having due regard to the judgment of this Court inVikas Kumar v. Union Public

Service Commission and Others3.
2.1.     Pursuant to the aforesaid order, the petitioner was provided with a scribe

and compensatory time during the examinations conducted by the Respondent

No.2 / State Bank of India, on 12.11.2022 and 17.12.2022 respectively, for the

posts of Clerk and Probationary Officer.
3.       Though at the first blush, the reliefs sought in this writ petition may appear

to have become infructuous due to the efflux of time, considering the nature of

the issue involved herein, we deem it fit and appropriate to delve into the same

and arrive at a possible solution, so as to streamline the legal position which has

been settled to an extent, and to ameliorate the plight of the persons with

disabilities4. The pleadings raised by the parties are restricted to this specific

scope.
1
4.        It is stated by the petitioner herein that he belongs to 'Teli' Caste which falls

under the category of Other Backward Class in the State of Bihar. In 2017, soon

after completing his degree, the petitioner was diagnosed with Focal Hand

Dystonia, a type of Writer's Cramp, classified as a chronic neurological condition.Under the RPwD Act, 2016, he was assessed with 25% permanent disability and

was issued with a Unique Disability ID by the Primary Health Care Centre,

Rajgir, Nalanda, Bihar. On 12.07.2021, after evaluation, the National Institute of

Mental Health and Neuro-Sciences Centre (NIMHANS), Bangalore, issued a

certificate in favour of the petitioner recognising his need for a scribe in written

examinations. Pursuant to the same, he appeared for his post-graduate final year

examination with the assistance of a scribe. Thereafter, he applied for various

examinations conducted by different recruitment bodies, however, he was not

provided with any facilities available to PwD candidates. According to him, such

facilities were restricted only to the Persons with Benchmark Disabilities5.

Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner is before us.
CONTENTIONS
5.        The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is a PwD

as defined underSection 2(s)of the RPwD Act, 2016. In the application forms5For short, the “PwBD”5issued by the respondents for recruitment, there was no clause for PwD candidates

to seek the facilities of scribe, compensatory time, etc. Such clause was made

available only for PwBD candidates. As a result, the petitioner was unable to

apply for these facilities and consequently, could not write the examination

effectively.
5.1.      The learned counsel further pointed out that the respondents have acted in

derogation to the principles enshrined by this Court inVikash Kumar(supra),

wherein, it was held that it would be discriminatory to restrict the facilities of a

scribe for only PwBD candidates.That apart, inAvni Prakash v. National Testing

Agency (NTA) & Others6, this Court has emphatically clarified that Benchmark

Disability is not a precondition to obtain a scribe or compensatory time in

examinations. Despite the same, the respondents continue to remain oblivious to

the actual legal position and ignorant towards their obligations. Therefore, the

petitioner has come to this court with the present writ petition for the above stated

relief.

6.        Denying the averments made by the petitioner, the Respondent Nos.1, 2

and 4 filed separate replies in the form of counter affidavits, which were reiterated

by their respective learned counsel, during the course of arguments before us. The

learned counsel appearing for the Respondent No.3 also made his submissions.62021 SCC Online SC 11126The sum and substance of the contentions raised on the side of the respondents

are as follows:
However, in accordance with the order of this court dated 15.12.2022, the

Respondent No.2 permitted the petitioner to appear for the examination, and the

petitioner subsequently, wrote the examination with the assistance of a scribe and

applicable compensatory time. Thus, according to the Respondent No.2, they8have complied with the directions issued by this Court as well as the guidelines

framed in the Official Memorandum dated 10.08.2022.
6.3.   It is submitted that the Respondent No.4 / Bihar Staff Selection

Commission is governed bysection 8of the Bihar Staff Selection Commission

Act, 2002, which requires it to formulate procedure for selection for different

services/posts with prior approval from the State Government. The State

Government of Bihar vide Letter No. 3433 dated 09.10.2007 approved the

procedure for selection for different services / posts, which included providing

facilities of a scribe and extra time to blind or low vision candidates.

Subsequently, vide Letter No. 9529 dated 01.07.2015 the State Government

extended the said facilities to candidates who are unable to write due to the

permanent absence of hand/hands or those suffering from cerebral palsy. Finally,

in view of the Office Memorandum dated 29.08.2018 issued by the Respondent

No.5, the State Government issued Letter No. 11 / AA.-Nyay-30 /2021 Sa/Pra.

10668 dated 29.06.2022 extending the benefits of providing facilities of a scribe

and extra time to all the candidates with 'Benchmark Disabilities'. It is further

submitted that as per clause 7(vi) of the advertisement published on 14.04.2022,

the Respondent No.4 provided the benefits of scribe to PwBD i.e., Blind or low

vision candidates, whose disability was 40% or more and who opted for such

facilities. It is also submitted that the petitioner did not approach the Respondent9No. 4 with a request to provide a scribe, and hence, he is not entitled to claim any

relief in this writ petition.

7.     We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel

appearing for the parties and also perused the materials available on record.



LEGAL POSITION
8.     Before proceeding further, we may take note of the legal framework and

judicial precedents rendered by this Court as well as by other countries, connected

to the issue involved herein.The RPwD Act, 2016emphasizes the rights of

disabled persons to participate in examinations with necessary accommodations.

The relevant provisions read as under:
Indian decisions
9.    This Court has reinforced the rights of PwD through several landmark

judgments, a few of which and the relevant observations therein are extracted

below, for better appreciation:
(ii)Avni Prakash(supra):
section (i) which prescribes a duty to make suitable modifications in the
      curriculum and examination system to meet the needs of students with disabilities.
      This duty can be fulfilled by providing extra time for the completion of
      examination papers and/or the facility of a scribe. The provision of inclusive
      education is not limited to children with disabilities but extends to adults with
      disabilities.Section 18provides that the Government and local authorities are
      duty-bound to take measures to promote, protect and ensure participation of PwD
      in adult education and continuing education programmes on an equal footing with
      others. Chapter VI prescribes special provisions for persons with benchmark
      disabilities, including reservations in higher educational institutions of not less
      than 5% seats underSection 32.

42. The provisions for reservation in Chapter VI specifically for PwBD are
          distinct from the provisions in Chapter III for PwD. PwD encompasses a wider
          group of which PwBD is a sub-set. This distinction extends to efforts underSection
          17to promote inclusive education.
Above all, theRPwD Act, 2016contains provisions mandating reasonable
          accommodation. The expression “reasonable accommodation” is defined inSection 2(y), which reads as under:
discrimination.”
(iii) Arnab Roy v. Consortium of National Law Universities and Another7“24. In a situation such as the present, the Court must have due regard,
          undoubtedly to the need for reasonable accommodation consistent with the
          provisions of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, as interpreted in the
          decision in Vikash Kumar. Equally, it would not be appropriate to ignore the7(2024) 5 SCC 79315genuine concerns which have been set up on behalf of the Consortium bearing on
      the need to maintain the integrity of the entrance test.
25. It is from this perspective that the Consortium has, in its Guidelines required
      that the candidate should not be above the 11th standard and in addition should
      not be affiliated with any test-preparatory or examination coaching centre. At the
      highest, a candidate could have a grievance if no such scribe meeting the said
      description is available. But as already noted above, the Consortium has taken
      upon itself the obligation to provide a scribe who meets with the stipulations which
      are contained in the Guidelines.
26. In other words, candidates appearing for the CLAT can either bring their own
      scribe or if it not possible to do so, request the Consortium to provide a scribe
      who is then made available to the candidate. During the course of the hearing, it
      has been agreed that where the Consortium provides a scribe, at least two days’
      time should be provided so as to enable the candidate to interact with the scribe.
      We are of the view that this is fair and proper. …”
10.   Thus, it can be easily deduced from the above decisions that the principle

of reasonable accommodation is central to ensure equality for all the persons with

disabilities; and denying the facility of scribe or compensatory time, constitutes

discrimination under theRPwD Act, 2016. This Court also wishes to diminish

the artificial distinction and bifurcation drawn between candidates with

disabilities and those with benchmark disabilities (40% disabled or more) by

extending various rights to candidates with disabilities that were earlier limited

only to those with benchmark disabilities. Further, the examination bodies are

stressed upon to implement accessibility measures, ensure that the examination

centres are physically accessible and equipped to accommodate disabled

candidates and ensure strict compliance of theRPwD Act, 2016to prevent

discrimination and provide equal opportunities for the persons with disabilities.16Foreign decisions
11.        The rights of the PwD have been recognized by the courts functioning in

other countries. In this regard, a few of the decisions rendered by the foreign

courts and the relevant paragraphs can be referred to as under:
39. Notably, however, the 1985 Manual said that “special education shares the
           basic purpose of all education: the optimal development of individuals as skillful,
           free, and purposeful persons, able to plan and manage life and to realize highest
           potential as individuals and as members of society” (s. 3.1 (emphasis added)). It
           added that “[a]ll children should be afforded opportunities to develop their full
           potential”
62. Meiorin and Grismer also directed that practices that are neutral on their face
           but have an unjustifiable adverse impact based on prohibited grounds will be
           subject to a requirement to “accommodate the characteristics of affected groups
           within their standards, rather than maintaining discriminatory standards
           supplemented by accommodation for those who cannot meet them” (Grismer, at
           para. 19).

(ii) Mental Disability Advocacy Center (MDAC) v. Bulgaria9 [European

Committee of Social Rights]

           “37. The Committee considers that all education provided by states must fulfil the
           criteria of availability, accessibility, acceptability and adaptability. It notes in this
           respect General Comment No. 13 of the Committee on Economic, Social and
           Cultural Rights of the United Nations International Covenant on Economic,
           Social and Cultural Rights on the right to education. In the present case, the
           criteria of accessibility and adaptability are at stake, i.e. educational institutions8[2012] 3 S.C.R9Decision in Complaint No. 41/2007 dated 03.06.200817and curricula have to be accessible to everyone, without discrimination and
          teaching has to be designed to respond to children with special speeds.”
(iii) International Association Autism Europe v. France10 [European Committee

of Social Rights]

          “48. As emphasised in the General Introduction to its Conclusions of 2003 (p.
10), the Committee viewsArticle 15of the Revised Charter as both reflecting and
          advancing a profound shift of values in all European countries over the past
          decade away from treating them as objects of pity and towards respecting them
          as equal citizens – an approach that the Council of Europe contributed to
          promote, with the adoption by the Committee of Ministers of Recommendation
          (92) 6 of 1992 on a coherent policy for people with disabilities. The underlying
          vision ofArticle 15is one of equal citizenship for persons with disabilities and,
          fittingly, the primary rights are those of “independence, social integration and
          participation in the life of the community”. Securing a right to education for
          children and others with disabilities plays an obviously important role in
          advancing these citizenship rights. This explains why education is now
          specifically mentioned in the revisedArticle 15and why such an emphasis is
          placed on achieving that education “in the framework of general schemes,
          wherever possible”. It should be noted thatArticle 15applies to all persons with
          disabilities regardless of the nature and origin of their disability and irrespective
          of their age.
49.Article 17is predicated on the need to ensure that children and young persons
          grow up in an environment which encourages the “full development of their
          personality and of their physical and mental capacities”. This approach is just as
          important for children with disabilities as it is for others and arguably more in
          circumstances where the effects of ineffective or untimely intervention are ever
          likely to be undone. The Committee viewsArticle 17, which deals more generally,
          inter alia, with the right to education for all, as also embodying the modern
          approach of mainstreaming.Article 17(1), in particular, requires the
          establishment and maintenance of sufficient and adequate institutions and
          services for the purpose of education. SinceArticle 17(1)deals only with children
          and young persons it is important to read it in conjunction withArticle 15(1)as
          far as adults are concerned.”10Complaint No. 13/200218
(iv) G.L. v. ITALY11 [European Court of Human Rights]

           “52. As regards the prohibition set forth inArticle 14of the Convention, the Court
           reiterates that discrimination means treating differently, without an objective and
           reasonable justification, persons in similar situations, and that “no objective and
           reasonable justification” means that the distinction in issue does not pursue a
           “legitimate aim” or that there is not a “reasonable relationship of proportionality
           between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised”.
53. When examining a case underArticle 14of the Convention, the Court must
           have regard to developments in international and European law and respond, for
           example, to any emerging consensus as to the standards to be achieved. To that
           effect, the Court notes the importance of the fundamental principles of universality
           and non-discrimination in the exercise of the right to education, which are
           enshrined in many international. It further emphasises that those instruments have
           recognised inclusive education, aimed at promoting equal opportunities for all,
           particularly for persons with disabilities. Inclusive education therefore forms part
           of the States’ international responsibility in this sphere.”
(v) T.H. v. BULGARIA12 [European Court of Human Rights]

           “109. In that context the Court considers it sufficient to emphasise that:
Article 2, third indent of the UN Convention provides that discrimination on the
           grounds of disability includes all forms of discrimination, including denial of
           reasonable accommodation.”
12.        Thus, it is clear from the above that the rights of disabled persons are less

instructive and more general and that, right to education, right to equality, and

right against discrimination accorded to them will only be truly realized, when

State structures form policies, laws, and rules to provide equal access and

reasonable accommodation to such persons.
DISCUSSION
13.        The law is settled that all the benefits given to PwBD candidates must also

be extended to PwD candidates, and there can be no discrimination between the

candidates in granting facilities such as scribes, compensatory time, etc., except13Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) dated 10.02.2022 in Case C‐485/2020for reservation, in writing the examinations. Earlier, the office memorandum

dated 29.08.201814 came to be issued, dealing with the entitlements and benefits

for PwBD candidates for all examinations irrespective of its nature and

irrespective of the authority conducting the examination.
14.        Notably, the Respondent No.5 issued Office Memorandum dated

10.08.2022, in compliance with the directions issued by this Court in Vikash

Kumar (Supra). In the said Office Memorandum, based on the recommendation

of the Expert Committee, certain guidelines were issued for conducting written

examination for persons with specified disabilities covered under the definition

ofSection 2(s)of the RPwD Act, 2016, but not covered under the definition ofSection 2(r)of the said Act, i.e. persons having less than 40% disability and

having difficulty in writing. For better appreciation, the relevant paragraphs of

the said Office Memorandum read as under:
In case the candidate is allowed to bring his own scribe, the qualification of the
scribe should be one step below the qualification of the candidate taking
examination. The person opting for own scribe should submit details of the own
scribe as per proforma at Appendix-II.

(f) There should also be flexibility in accommodating any change in scribe in case
of emergency. The candidates should also be allowed to take different scribe for
writing different papers especially for languages. However, there can be only one
scribe per subject.'
(g) The candidate should be allowed to use aids and assistive devices such as
prosthetics & orthotics, hearing aid as mentioned in para 2 of the certificate
issued by medical authority as per Appendix I.
(h) Compensatory time not less than 20 minutes per hour of the examination
should be allowed for persons who are eligible for getting scribe. In case the
duration of the examination is less than an hour, then the duration of the
compensatory time should be allowed on pro-rata basis. Compensatory time
should not be less than 5 minutes and should be in the multiple of 5.
(i) The examination bodies shall modify their application forms to incorporate
specific needs of this category of persons. In case, any incident has been reported
after filling up the form, the examination bodies shall inform the candidates to
obtain medical certificate as per these guidelines for facilitating grant of scribe
and/or compensatory time.
(j) As far as possible the examination for such persons may be held at ground
floor. The examination centres should be accessible for persons with disabilities.
(k) These guidelines are applicable to written examinations conducted by central
recruitment agencies as well as academic institutions. The States/UTs may adopt
these guidelines or issue similar guidelines to maintain uniformity.
(l) These guidelines are independent of the Guidelines for conducting written
examination for persons with benchmark disabilities issued by the Department of
Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities on 29.08.2018.
(m) The examining bodies shall ensure strict vigilance to check misuse of facility
of scribe.
4. All the recruitment agencies, Academics/Examination Bodies etc. under the
administrative control of each Ministry/Department may be advised
appropriately to ensure compliance of implementing these guidelines.
5. The above guidelines are issued with the approval of Hon'ble Minister (Social
Justice & Empowerment).
14.1. The aforesaid Office Memorandum dated 10.08.2022 was forwarded by

the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Financial Services,

vide communication No.FZ-3/3/2022-SCT dated 10.11.2022 to all recruitment

agencies / examination bodies, for strict compliance.

15.   It is the grievance of the petitioner herein that though the aforesaid Office

Memorandum dated 10.08.2022 came to be issued by the Respondent No.5 in

accordance with the directions of this Court, it fails to incorporate the essence of

reasonable accommodation and underscores the true meaning and purpose of theRPwD Act, 2016. According to the petitioner, the said Office Memorandum

contains the following defects:
However, the Respondent No.5 came up with a separate Office Memorandum

granting selective facilities, without any justification for restricting the facilities

for PwD candidates.
(ii)The Judgment in Vikash Kumar (supra) mandates that any disability

imposing a barrier to a candidate writing an examination should be remedied by

extending the necessary facilities. In the case of blind or low vision candidates,

the disability does not prevent them from “writing” per se, but it certainly imposes24a barrier to writing the examination. However, clause (3) of the Office

Memorandum only extends facilities to candidates who have “difficulty in

writing”. Furthermore, Clause 3(b) of the Office Memorandum creates confusion

and a problematic situation, where the rights of PwD candidates to receive

facilities in examinations can be denied simply because their disability is not

related to “writing”. This contradicts the entire purpose of the Act. Therefore, this

court may direct the Respondent No.5 to strike down the restrictions in clause (3)

and 3(b) and extend examination relaxations to all PwD candidates, regardless of

the nature, type, or form of disability.
(iii) The Office Memorandum does not provide for any facilities other than

a scribe and compensatory time. For instance, the 2018 OM includes provisions

that as far as possible, PwBD candidates should have the option to choose the

mode of taking the examination, such as in Braille, on a computer, in large print,

or even by recording their answers. These are also feasible as examining bodies

can easily use technology to convert question papers into large prints, e-text or

Braille, and can also convert Braille text into English or regional languages.

However, the same does not find any mention in the said Office Memorandum.

The Office Memorandum also sets specific criteria (both educational and

otherwise) for a scribe. Quite often, candidates face significant challenges in

finding a suitable scribe and ensuring their presence on the day of the

examination. At the same time, while the 2018 OM allowed candidates to use a25computer or other technological means for taking the exam, this option was not

extended to PwD candidates in the present OM. Therefore, the petitioner states

that if candidates are permitted to type their answers on computers, it would

eliminate the need for a scribe and also address the concerns of the examining

body regarding malpratice by reducing human interaction.
(iv) The Office Memorandum fails to prescribe a grievance redressal

mechanism to address instances where any relaxations are denied to PwD

candidates. As a result, the only remedy available to such candidates who are

denied the benefit of such relaxations, is to approach a writ court and seek redress

for the grievance.
15.1. The petitioner further highlighted the problems and inconveniences faced

by him during the examination process, which are as follows: (i) The application

forms for recruitment did not include provisions for PwD candidates, and the

requisite facilities were only provided upon specific requests from applicants;
(ii) Compensatory time was not displayed on the screen, leading to a failure by

the invigilators to provide the facility to PwD candidates; (iii) Some recruitment

agencies refused to provide the facilities of a scribe and extra time to PwD

candidates, citing that such provisions were contrary to the policy decisions of

their respective departments; (iv) In certain cases, the facilities of a scribe and

extra time were denied because the invigilators were not informed about the court

orders mandating strict compliance with such provisions; (v) In various26examinations, the benefits were provided only to PwBD candidates, due to a lack

of coordination and proper implementation. Thus, according to the petitioner,

these issues have a serious detrimental effect on the candidates, and as a result,

the guidelines framed by Respondent No. 5 should be reconsidered and

amended.
16.   On the other hand, the respondents categorically stated in their replies and

submissions that they have been following the directions of this Court as well as

the guidelines issued by Respondent No. 5 in the Office Memorandum dated

10.08.2022.
17.   However, there have been instances where examination bodies refused to

extend the benefits available to PwD candidates due to the absence of a clear-cut

grievance redressal mechanism, which continues to cause inconvenience and

injustice to several candidates, including the petitioner herein. Further, the

petitioner demonstrated that there are certain defects and lacunas in the guidelines

issued by Respondent No. 5, as well as in the implementation of this Court’s

directions, resulting in different authorities following disparate procedures. This

lack of uniformity causes confusion, discrimination, and undermines the

efficiency and effectiveness of the examination process. Therefore, in our

opinion, there is an urgent need for a uniform memorandum for examinations

applicable to all PwD candidates, and it is the responsibility of Respondent No. 5

to ensure its proper and just compliance.

18.        It is also to be pointed out that the constitution bench of this Court inKaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradeshand others15 considered the question as

to whether fundamental rights underArticles 19and21of the Constitution can

be claimed against anyone who is not a state instrumentality, and answered the

same in the affirmative with a majority of 4:1.It was clarified that rights underArticles 19and21can be enforced even against private entities and it overrides

the principlelaid down inRajbir(supra). Hence, the contention of the Respondent

No.1 that they are not amenable to writ jurisdiction cannot be countenanced by

us. It is noteworthy mentioning that the Office Memorandum clearly stated that

the guidelines are applicable to all the authorities. As such, the benefits conferred

by the statute should be provided for all the PwD candidates and they cannot be

denied on the ground of absence of accountability and/or lack of duty on

enforceability.

19.        In the ultimate analysis, we are of the considered view that the guidelines

issued by the Respondent No.5 pursuant to the directions of this Court, have to

be enforced, by extending the benefits for PwBD candidates to all PwD

candidates in writing their examinations, without any hindrance. Accordingly, we

direct the Respondent No.5 to revisit the Office Memorandum dated 10.08.2022,

remove the restrictions and grant relaxations in a reasonable manner and15Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 113 of 201628incorporate the following aspects and thereby, re-notify the same afresh, within a

period of two months:
making process, who fail to follow the guidelines set out by the Respondent No.5

and formulate guidelines which exclude PwD;
(x) sensitise the persons working for the respondent authorities, and train

them on a regular basis, to address the reasonable accommodation needs of PwDs;

and
(xi) ensure strict compliance of the letter and spirit of the judgments in

Vikash Kumar and Avni Prakash as well as the provisions of theRPwD Act, 2016,

with a special focus on ‘reasonable accommodation’.

20.   With the aforesaid directions, this writ petition stands disposed of. No

costs. Connected Miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
Post the matter after two months “for reporting compliance”.
…………………………J.
                                                              [J.B. Pardiwala]



                                                          …………………………J.
                                                              [R. Mahadevan]

NEW DELHI ;
FEBRUARY 03, 2025.",4511,"This writ petition has been filed as a Public Interest Litigation invoking jurisdiction underArticle 32of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of mandamus directing the Respondent Nos.1 to 4 to provide the petitioner with the facility of a scribe, compensatory time and all other facilities, to which he may be entitled, under the law, considering his disability status for the upcoming examinations, the details of which are tabulated below:Signature Not VerifiedDigitally signed byVISHAL ANANDDate: 2025.02.0315:37:55 ISTReason:2 The petitioner has also sought a direction to the Respondent No.5 to initiate suitable action against the examining bodies that have failed to adhere to the guidelines issued by the Respondent No.5 / Government of India, Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities (Divyangjan) vide Office Memorandum in F.No.29-6/2019-DD-III dated 10.08.2022. Vide order dated 15.12.20221, this court clarified that the Respondent No.2 shall not insist on the requirement of a benchmark disability within the meaning of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 20162 for the facility of a scribe, having due regard to the judgment of this Court inVikas Kumar v. The learned counsel appearing for the Respondent No.3 also made his submissions.62021 SCC Online SC 11126The sum and substance of the contentions raised on the side of the respondents are as follows: However, in accordance with the order of this court dated 15.12.2022, the Respondent No.2 permitted the petitioner to appear for the examination, and the petitioner subsequently, wrote the examination with the assistance of a scribe and applicable compensatory time. The learned counsel appearing for the Respondent No.3 also made his submissions.62021 SCC Online SC 11126The sum and substance of the contentions raised on the side of the respondents are as follows: However, in accordance with the order of this court dated 15.12.2022, the Respondent No.2 permitted the petitioner to appear for the examination, and the petitioner subsequently, wrote the examination with the assistance of a"
"State Of U.P vs Krishna Master & Ors on 3 August, 2010",https://indiankanoon.org/docfragment/572710/?formInput=doctypes%3A%20supremecourt%20year%3A%202010,"Take notes as you read a judgment using ourVirtual Legal Assistantand get email alerts whenever a new judgment matches your query (Query Alert Service). Try out ourPremium Member Services--Sign up todayand get free trial for one month.
J.M. Panchal, J.

1.   The State of Uttar Pradesh has questioned legality of

judgment dated April 12, 2002 rendered by Allahabad High

Court in Criminal Appeal No.574 of 2001 by which judgment

dated February 20, 2001 passed by the learned Special Judge

(EC Act)/Additional District Judge, Farrukhabad in Sessions

Trial No.17 of 1992 convicting the three respondents herein

underSection 302IPC and sentencing each of them to death2with fine of Rs.10,000/- in default RI for two years for

commission of murder of six persons is reversed and they are

acquitted.

2.   The facts emerging from the record of the case are as

under:

3.        On August 10, 1991, Ram Sewak, announced while

sitting on Chabutra of Ram Sewak that, at all costs, the girl

Sontara should come back. Otherwise, no one would be kept

alive even for the name sake. Sontara did not come back to

the village. In the midnight of August 10/11, 1991, at about

12   hours,   the   respondent   No.1,   i.e.,   Shrikrishna,   the

respondent No.2 Ram Sewak and the respondent No.3 Kishori

carrying country made pistols in their hands entered the

house of Guljarilal by jumping the southern wall of the house.

After entering into the house of Guljari, the respondents

started firing shots indiscriminately.      Because of the gun

shots, Guljari, Ramwati, wife of Guljari, Rakesh, Umesh and

Dharmendra sons of Guljarilal, were injured.         PW2 (Madan

Lal) who was sleeping at the place of incident, got up after5hearing gun shots and hid himself under the cot.               He

witnessed the whole incident from there.         First Informant

Jhabbulal and his wife Lilawati, on seeing this ghastly

incident, left their house and while making hue and cry

entered the house of Khemkaran.          The respondents after

killing Guljari and his family made search for the complainant

and his family members but they did not find them present in

the house.    At that very time, Baburam, brother of the first

informant, who had entered his shop out of fear, was also

dragged out by the respondents from the shop and shot dead.

After resorting to indiscriminate firing, the respondents left the

village and went towards the south by making two fires in the

air.

At the time of incident, the respondents were carrying

firearms and, therefore, no one dared to go near them. In the

incident, Umesh and Dharmendra who had received injuries

were removed to hospital but later on they also succumbed to

their injuries. The written report relating to the incident was

got scribed by Jhabbulal through a person named Radhey6Shyam and it was submitted at the police station at about

3.30 a.m. on 11.8.1991. The Investigating Officer, Mr. Gajraj

Singh recorded statements of those who were found to be

conversant with the facts of the case.   During the course of

investigation, he took into possession Ban (the thread by

which cot is woven), bed sheets etc. and prepared a memo. He

also picked up 315 bore bullet lying near the dead body of

Rakesh. Similarly, bullets of 315 bore lying near the cot on

which Dharmendra and Umesh slept were also seized.            He

inspected the place of incident and prepared the sketch. The

incriminating articles seized were sent to forensic science

laboratory for analysis. He held inquest on the dead bodies

and made arrangements for sending the dead body of four

persons to hospital for post mortem examination.              On

completion of investigation, the three respondents were

charged sheeted in the court of learned Chief Judicial

Magistrate,   Farrukhabad     for   commission    of   offences

punishable underSection 302read with 34IPC.          In due

course, the case was committed to Sessions Court for trial.7
The learned Additional Sessions Judge to whom the case

was   made   over   for   trial    framed   charges   against   the

respondents underSection 302read withSection 34of the

Indian Penal Code 1860.           The charge was read over and

explained to them. However, the respondents denied the same

and claimed to be tried.     The prosecution, therefore, in all,

examined nine witnesses including two eye-witnesses and

produced documents to prove its case. After the recording of

evidence of prosecution witnesses was over, the respondents

were explained by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, the

circumstances appearing against them in the evidence of the

witnesses and recorded their statements underSection 313of

the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.            In their further

statements, case of each of the respondent was that he was

falsely implicated in the case and, therefore, should be

acquitted.

The learned Judge of the Trial Court discussed the

evidence of the witnesses in great detail and found that the

evidence of the two eye-witnesses was trustworthy, cogent,8consistent and reliable. On the basis of testimony of the two

eye-witnesses, the Trial Court by judgment dated February 20,

2001 convicted each of the respondents underSection 302read withSection 34IPC.     The respondents were thereafter

heard by the learned Judge regarding sentence to be imposed

on them for commission of offences punishable underSection

302read withSection 34IPC. After hearing the respondents,

the learned Judge awarded capital punishment to each of the

three respondents and fine of Rs.10,000/- in default RI for two

years.    A direction   was   given   not   to   execute   capital

punishment until the same was confirmed by the High Court.

It was also directed that the amount of fine paid by the

respondents, be given to Madan Lal who was PW2 and son of

deceased Guljari as compensation.      The learned Additional

District Judge, Farrukhabad under a reference sent the

documents to the High Court for confirmation of the capital

punishment imposed on the respondents.

4.   Feeling aggrieved, the respondents preferred Criminal

Appeal No.574 of 2001. The reference made by the trial court9for confirmation of the death sentence awarded to the

respondents, was heard along with the appeal filed by the

respondents.   The High Court by the impugned judgment has

acquitted the respondents and rejected the reference made by

the trial court, for confirmation of the death sentence, giving

rise to the instant appeal.

5.   This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties

at length and in great detail. This Court has also considered

the documents forming part of the record.

6.   The fact that each of the six deceased had died homicidal

death is not disputed before this Court. The said fact was also

not disputed by any of the respondents before the High Court

or the trial court. From the evidence of two eye-witnesses as

well as that of Dr. S.K. Gupta, PW4, who had conducted

autopsy on the dead body of six deceased persons and on

perusal of their respective post-mortem notes, there is no

manner of doubt that the six deceased persons had died

homicidal death on account of firearm injuries.      The said10finding recorded by the trial court and confirmed by the High

Court, being eminently just, is hereby upheld.
7.   The time of occurrence is also not disputed by the

learned counsel of the respondents. It is admitted before this

Court that all the murders were committed in the night of

August 10, 1991. However, it was maintained by the learned

counsel for the respondents that none of the respondents were

assailants   and,     therefore,   acquittal   of   the   respondents

recorded by the High Court should not be lightly interfered

with by this Court.

8.   Before appreciating evidence of the witnesses examined

in the case, it would be instructive to refer to the criteria for

appreciation of oral evidence. While appreciating the evidence

of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of

witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once

that impression is found, it is undoubtedly necessary for the

Court to scrutinize the evidence more particularly keeping in

view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in

the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether11it is against the general tenor of the evidence and whether the

earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it

unworthy of belief.   Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not

touching the core of the case, hyper-technical approach by

taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the

evidence, attaching importance to some technical error

committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of

the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the

evidence as a whole.    If the court before whom the witness

gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about

the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness, the

appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach

due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the Trial Court

and unless the reasons are weighty and formidable, it would

not be proper for the appellate court to reject the evidence on

the ground of variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial

details.   Minor omissions in the police statements are never

considered to be fatal. The statements given by the witnesses

before the Police are meant to be brief statements and could

not take place of evidence in the court.           Small/trivial12omissions would not justify a finding by court that the

witnesses concerned are liars. The prosecution evidence may

suffer from inconsistencies here and discrepancies there, but

that is a short-coming from which no criminal case is free.

The main thing to be seen is whether those inconsistencies go

to the root of the matter or pertain to insignificant aspects

thereof.   In the former case, the defence may be justified in

seeking advantage of incongruities obtaining in the evidence.

In the latter, however, no such benefit may be available to it.

In the deposition of witnesses, there are always normal

discrepancies, howsoever, honest and truthful they may be.

These discrepancies are due to normal errors of observation,

normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental

disposition, shock and horror at the time of occurrence and

threat to the life.   It is not unoften that improvements in

earlier version are made at the trial in order to give a boost to

the prosecution case albeit foolishly. Therefore, it is the duty

of the Court to separate falsehood from the truth. In sifting

the evidence, the Court has to attempt to separate the chaff

from the grains in every case and this attempt cannot be13abandoned on the ground that the case is baffling unless the

evidence is really so confusing or conflicting that the process

cannot reasonably be carried out.       In the light of these

principles, this Court will have to determine whether the

evidence of eye-witnesses examined in this case proves the

prosecution case.

9.   From the impugned judgment, it becomes evident that

the High Court took into consideration the evidence tendered

by PW1 Jhabbulal and PW2 Madan Lal. The High Court, at

the very outset examined the evidence adduced by the

prosecution with regard to five murders committed in the

house of Guljari Lal and scanned the evidence of PW1,

Jhabbulal.   After noting that his house was undisputedly

situated to the north of house of Guljari and that both the

houses were separated by an intervening wall running East to

West, the High Court analysed the evidence of PW1 Jhabbulal.

The High Court took into consideration the claim of PW1

Jhabbulal that at the time of the incident, he was sleeping in

the courtyard of his house and that he had woken up on14hearing sounds of gun shots and was scared as a result of

which he stood by the side of the wall of courtyard to save

himself. On scrutiny of this witness, the High Court came to

the conclusion that on his own showing, it was not possible for

PW1, Jhabbulal to have witnessed the incident which occurred

inside the house of Guljari, more particularly when the two

houses were separated by a wall having height of more than

that of a normal person. The High Court thereafter proceeded

to examine the site plan Exhibit- Ka14 and concluded that

when the investigating officer had made inspection of the

scene of occurrence, PW1, Jhabbulal had claimed to have seen

the incident through holes (mokhana) in the intervening wall,

but in his substantive evidence tendered before the Court,

Jhabbulal had not claimed to have seen the incident through

the holes in the intervening walls. Thereafter, the High Court

again took notice of the statement made by PW1, Jhabbulal

that he was standing by the side of the wall of courtyard and

finally concluded that it was highly doubtful that Jhabbulal

who was present inside his own house had seen the incident

which occurred inside the house of Guljari.

10.   This Court finds that the abovestated reasons are the

only reasons specified by the High Court to disbelieve the eye-

witness account given by PW1, Jhabbulal. In order to find out

whether the reasons assigned by the High Court to disbelieve

the episode of five murders narrated by witness Jhabbulal, are

sound, this Court has undertaken the exercise of going

through the entire testimony of witness Jhabbulal recorded

before the Trial Court. As far as the incident which had taken

place in the house of Guljari is concerned, it was mentioned

therein that at about 12 O'clock, in the night, Master Shri

Krishna holding ponia gun and Ram Sewak as well as Kishori

holding country-made pistols tresspassed into the house of

Guljari after jumping over southern side wall of the house of

Gulzari and committed murder of Guljari, his wife Ramwati

and son Rakesh by firing gun shots. He also mentioned in his

testimony that because of the firing of gun-shots Umesh and

Dharmendra    who    were   sons   of   Gulzari   were   injured.

According to him, on witnessing the said incident, he with his

wife Leelawati left his home and went into the house of

Khemkaran rasing hue and cry. It was further mentioned by16the witness that the respondents had tried to trace his family

and they had gone inside the shop of his brother Baburam

and gunned him down after dragging him out of the shop.

What was claimed by this witness was that the incident was

also witnessed by Sarla Devi, daughter of Guljari, Rakesh and

Madan Lal, sons of Guljari and his brothers Mohanlal,

Rajaram and Kailash who were sons of Jiwan. It was asserted

by him that he had witnessed the incident in the light of

electric bulb. It was frankly admitted by him that no one had

dared to go near to the respondents because they were

carrying with fire arms.

It was further asserted by him that after the respondents

had left the place opposite the shop of his brother, he had

gone near his injured brother who was alive and had tried to

learn from Baburam as to who had assaulted him and

thereupon his brother had informed him that Shrikrishna

(respondent No.1), Ram Sewak (Respondent No.2) and Kishori

(Respondent No. 3) had assaulted him with fire arms.     It is

also mentioned by him that at his instance, FIR was reduced17into writing by Radhey Shyam as dictated by him and that he

had filed the same at the police station. The record of the case

shows that this witness was cross-examined at great length.

He was subjected to grueling cross-examination which runs

into 31 pages.      The first and firm impression which one

gathers on reading the testimony of this witness is that he is a

rustic witness. A rustic witness, who is subjected to fatiguing,

taxing and tiring cross-examination for days together, is

bound    to   get   confused   and   make   some   inconsistent

statements. Some discrepancies are bound to take place if a

witness is cross-examined at length for days together.

Therefore, the discrepancies noticed in the evidence of a rustic

witness who is subjected to grueling cross-examination should

not be blown out of proportion.      To do so is to ignore hard

realities of village life and give undeserved benefit to the

accused who have perpetrated heinous crime.          The basic

principle of appreciation of evidence of a rustic witness who is

not educated and comes from a poor strata of society is that

the evidence of such a witness should be appreciated as a

whole.   The rustic witness as compared to an educated18witness is not expected to remember every small detail of the

incident and the manner in which the incident had happened

more particularly when his evidence is recorded after a lapse

of time.   Further, a witness is bound to face shock of the

untimely death of his near relative(s). Therefore, the court

must keep in mind all these relevant factors while appreciating

evidence of a rustic witness.    When the respondents were

firing from their respective fire arms, the High Court should

not have expected PW1 Jhabbulal to mention description of

the whole episode which had happened in a few minutes. The

rustic witnesses cannot be expected to have an exact sense of

time and so cannot be expected to lay down with precision the

chain of events. In the instant case, this Court is of the firm

opinion that the High Court gravely erred in not accepting

evidence of PW1, Jhabbulal. Jhabbulal being a rustic witness

is not expected to always have an alert mind and so have an

idea of direction, area and distance with precision from which

he had witnessed the incident. It is well to notice that in his

examination in chief, Jhabbulal never claimed that he was

standing by the side of the wall of courtyard nor it was claimed19by him that he had witnessed the incident through mokhana,

i.e. holes in the intervening walls.   Though the witness was

cross-examined for days together, he was never confronted

with his statement recorded underSection 161of the Code of

Criminal Procedure wherein he had allegedly stated before the

Police Officer that he had witnessed the incident through holes

in the intervening wall.      The witness having not been

confronted with his earlier police statement wherein he had

reportedly stated that he had seen the incident through the

holes in the intervening wall, this Court fails to understand as

to how the said statement allegedly made before the police

during the investigation could have been pressed into service

by the High Court to reject the substantive evidence of this

witness tendered before the Court wherein it was specifically

asserted that while in his house, he had witnessed the

incident of killing of five members of Guljari's family by the

respondents by firing gun shots.         The prosecution has

satisfactorily established that Baburam who was brother of

Jhabbulal, PW1, had lost his life because of gun shots fired at

him. The suggestion made by the defence to the witness that20he was making a false claim that Baburam was alive and that

on enquiry by him, Baburam had told him that the

respondents had assaulted him with fire arms, as he was

tutored by the police outside the court room was emphatically

denied by him.    It is interesting to note that to confuse this

witness he was cross-examined for days together on the point

as to where and in which direction houses of Kailash, Rajaram

Subedar, Darbari etc. were situated.     Such an attempt by

defence lawyer can hardly be approved. On re-appreciation of

evidence of Jhabbulal, this Court finds that he has not made

major improvements in his testimony before the Court and the

so-called discrepancies which are blown out of proportion by

the High Court are minor in nature and do not relate to the

substratum of the prosecution story.     To say the least, this

Court   finds   that the   approach   of the   High   Court   in

appreciating evidence of PW1 Jhabbulal who was a rustic

witness is not only contrary to the well settled principles

governing appreciation of evidence of a rustic witness but is

perverse.   At this stage, it would be well to recall to the

memory the weighty observations made by this Court as early21as in the year 1988 relating to appreciation of evidence and

the duties expected of a Judge presiding over a criminal trial.InState of U.P. v. Anilsingh, AIR 1988 SC 1998, it is observed

as under :

11.   There appears to be substance in the argument of the

learned counsel for the State that the feeble and insubstantial

reasons have been given to disbelieve the trustworthy evidence

of eye-witness, Jhabbulal as High Court had decided to give

undeserved benefit of doubt to the respondents and had

appreciated the evidence of PW1 Jhabbulal to find out

drawbacks and shortcomings in his evidence when, in fact,

there were none.
12.   Coming to the appreciation of evidence of another eye-

witness, Madan Lal, this Court finds that the first fact kept in

mind by the High Court was that at the time of occurrence,23this      witness   was   aged   about   six years   and that   his

examination in chief was recorded almost after ten years from

the date of occurrence, because at the time of recording of his

examination in chief before the Trial Court, he had mentioned

his age to be 16 years. It was highlighted by the High Court

that in his examination in chief, it was claimed by this witness

that he was sleeping on a cot along with his two brothers, i.e.,

deceased Umesh and deceased Dharmendra whereas his

mother was sleeping on another cot and that when the

accused had started firing he had slipped beneath the cot over

which he was sleeping, but at another place it was stated by

him that he was sleeping with his mother and had taken

shelter under the said cot and therefore, the witness was not

consistent as to the place from where he had witnessed the

incident. The High Court adverted to the statement made by

this witness that his elder sister, Sarla and elder brother

Rajesh were also sleeping under the Chhapper but had

managed to run away and Sarla had concealed herself behind

a heap of woods lying on the western side in the courtyard

itself.    After examining site plan Exhibit- ""ka"" 14 the High24Court observed that in the site plan, place where Sarla had

allegedly taken shelter was not indicated nor any heap of

woods was shown, and finally came to the conclusion that the

witness was not reliable.        The High Court took into

consideration the statement made by this witness that when

he had come out from beneath the cot, he had seen Sarla in

the house and that many persons had assembled at his house

after the occurrence but he was not able to identify them as he

was a small child nor any of the persons assembled near his

house had asked him as to who were the assailants and what

they had done and therefore the High Court deduced that this

witness was not present in the house at the time of         the

occurrence.   A strange reasoning was adopted by the High

Court to come to the conclusion that the witness was not a

reliable one because he was a child of about six years of age at

the time of occurrence. His statement in the trial court was

recorded after a gap of about 10 years.      It is inconceivable

that child of his understanding would recapitulate facts in his

memory witnessed by him long ago.         One of the reasons

assigned by the High Court to disbelieve this witness was that25Rajesh and Smt. Sarla who were of matured age and were in a

better position to depose about the incident were not produced

before the Trial Court for which no explanation whatsoever

was given by the prosecution.       The High Court readily

accepted submission made by the counsel for the respondents

that Rajesh and Smt. Sarla were not produced before the

Court because obviously they were not prepared to support

the false story set up by PW1, Jhabbulal in the FIR which was

lodged by him against the respondents on account of his

personal animosity. The High Court also found weight in the

submission advanced by the advocate for the respondents that

had these witnesses been produced before the Court, their

evidence would have gone against the prosecution. The High

Court again took notice of the fact that according to witness

Madan Lal he had taken shelter under the cot over which he

was sleeping along with his two brothers Umesh and

Dharmendra who were killed by the assailants in the incident

and concluded that it was ridiculous to believe that this

witness who was younger than his two deceased brothers had

taken shelter under the same cot without his presence being26noticed by the assailants. After noticing that Smt. Sarla and

Rajesh who were elder to the witness Madan Lal were not

alleged to have sustained any injury, the High Court

proceeded to record a finding of fact that these three children

were not present inside the house at the time of occurrence on

the spacious plea that if Madan Lal, PW2, and Rajesh as well

as Smt. Sarla had been present, they would not have been

spared by the assailants and that the theory set up at the trial

that all these three children had concealed themselves at

different places is not only an improvement but does not find

support from the evidence on record as well as the spot

inspection made by the investigating officer.
13.       The abovestated reasons are the only grounds on

which testimony of witness Madan Lal is disbelieved by the

High Court.   This Court fails to understand as to on what

principle and on which experience in real life, the High Court

made a sweeping observation that it is inconceivable that a

child of Madan Lal's understanding would be able to

recapitulate facts in his memory witnessed by him long ago.27There is no principle of law known to this Court that it is

inconceivable that a child of tender age would not be able to

recapitulate facts in his memory witnessed by him long ago.

This witness has claimed on oath before the Court that he had

seen five members of his family being ruthlessly killed by the

respondents by firing gun shots. When a child of tender age

witnesses gruesome murder of his father, mother, brothers

etc. he is not likely to forget the incident for his whole life and

would certainly recapitulate facts in his memory when asked

about the same at any point of time, notwithstanding the gap

of about ten years between the incident and recording of his

evidence. This Court is of the firm opinion that it would be

doing injustice to a child witness possessing sharp memory to

say that it is inconceivable for him to recapitulate facts in his

memory witnessed by him long ago. A child of tender age is

always receptive to abnormal events which take place in its life

and would never forget those events for the rest of his life. The

child would be able to recapitulate correctly and exactly when

asked about the same in future.         Therefore, the spacious

ground on which the reliable testimony of PW2, Madan Lal28came to be disbelieved can hardly be affirmed by this Court.

One of the reasons given by the High Court to disbelieve

testimony of witness Madan Lal is that Rajesh and Smt. Sarla

who were of mature age and were in a better position to

depose about the incident were not produced before the Court.

It is nobody's case that witness Madan lal was in charge of

prosecution case. The Public Prosecutor was in charge of the

case and it was for him to decide whether Rajesh and/or Smt.

Sarla should be examined or not.      The evidence of witness

Madan Lal, in no uncertain terms, discloses that his brother

Rajesh and sister Smt. Sarla were ready to depose before the

Court about the incident. However, for non-production of his

brother Rajesh and his sister Sarla before the Court, witness

Madan Lal was never responsible.      He had not taken any

decision for examining his brother Rajesh and Smt. Sarla. It

was the discretion and decision of the Public Prosecutor due to

which his brother and sister were not examined as witnesses.

At no stage of the trial, the defence had made a request to the

Trial Court to call upon the Public Prosecutor to examine

Rajesh and Smt. Sarla as witnesses.      It is the case of the29defence that Rajesh and Smt. Sarla had witnessed the incident

and if they had been examined as witnesses, they would have

deposed against the prosecution case that the respondents

were not responsible for murders of five family members of

Guljari    and brother   of   the   first   informant.   In such

circumstances, it was incumbent upon and open to the

defence to examine Rajesh and/or Smt. Sarla as defence

witness.    No prayer was made by the defence to examine

Rajesh and Smt. Sarla even as court witnesses. Therefore, for

non-examination of Rajesh and/or Smt. Sarla, witness Madan

Lal could not have been blamed nor his evidence could have

been brushed aside in a casual manner. The acceptance of

submission made by the counsel for the respondents that

Rajesh and Smt. Sarla were not produced because they were

not prepared to support the false story set up by PW1,

Jhabbulal in his FIR against the respondents on account of

his personal animosity, is not understandable at all and

appears to be figment of imagination of the defence. Nothing

could be brought on record or elicited from the cross-

examination of either PW1 Jhabbulal or PW2 Madan Lal to30show that they were ready and willing to allow real culprits

who had committed heinous crime and virtually wiped off

family of Guljari and murdered real brother of the first

informant to go scot free and implicate the respondents falsely

in such a serious case.

14.       One of the reasons given by the High Court for

disbelieving testimony of PW2, Madan Lal is that the evidence

indicated that a large number of villagers had gathered outside

the door of Gulzari Lal's house but not even one of them was

examined to justify that PW2 Madan Lal was present in his

house.   The High Court has further held that presence of

witness Madan Lal in his house becomes doubtful because if

he had been present inside the house at the time of

occurrence, his presence would have been noticed by the

assailants and he would not have been spared by them. To

say the least, these reasons are not tenable at all. As noticed

earlier, the case of witness Madan lal is that on hearing sound

of gun shots, he had slipped beneath the cot and from there

witnessed the whole incident.      This story appears to be31probable because the incident had taken place during night

time in the house and therefore it was possible for the witness

to slip beneath the cot without being noticed by the assailants.

It is nobody's case that the respondents, while killing Guljari

and his family, had seen below the cot to find out whether any

other member of Guljari's family was alive or not. Therefore,

to say that Madanlal must not have been inside the room

otherwise he would have been killed by the assailants is a far

fitted reason which does not appeal to this Court. It is true

that it has come in evidence that a large number of villagers

had gathered outside the door of Guljari Lal's house. But this

Court is of the opinion that it was not necessary for the

prosecution to examine any of the witnesses to prove that he

had seen PW2 Madan Lal in Madan Lal's house. PW2 Madan

Lal himself is competent to state before the Court whether he

was present in his house at the time of incident.       Witness

Madan Lal has given evidence in a simple manner without

making any noticeable improvements and/or embellishments

and, therefore, it was not necessary for the court to seek

corroboration to his assertion that he was in his house when32the incident had taken place.     What is relevant to notice is

that the court cannot forget the fact that at the time of

incident, PW2 Madan Lal was a tender aged child. Normally, a

child aged six years is not expected to be out of house at the

dead of night and he is expected to be in the company of his

parents.   Moreover, the testimony of witness Lajveer Singh,

PW3,   who    was   posted   at   Police   Station,   Kayamganj,

Farrukhabad shows that after registration of offences, ASI

Gajraj Singh had recorded statements of those persons who

were found to be conversant with the facts of the case and

Gajraj Singh had also recorded statement of witness Madan

Lal on August 11, 1991. If witness Madan lal had not been

present in his house at the time when the incident had taken

place, his police statement would not have been recorded by

ASI Gajraj Singh at all. Thus, the reasons on which presence

of PW2, Madan Lal is doubted is against the weight of

evidence, human conduct and preponderance of probabilities.

Further, at the time of incident, PW2, Madan Lal was of tender

age and, therefore, incapable of nurturing any grudge against

any of the respondents. No evidence could be produced nor33any suggestion was made to witness Madan Lal during his

cross-examination that something serious had happened

between the date of incident and recording of evidence of

witness Madan Lal in court, between Madan Lal and the

respondents that Madan Lal was out to implicate the

respondents falsely in such a serious case.

15.          One of the grounds mentioned by the High Court in

the impugned judgment for disbelieving the case of the

prosecution is that Rajesh who was brother of PW2, Madan Lal

and Smt. Sarla who is sister of witness Madan Lal as well as

few of those who had collected near the door of the house of

Guljari after the incident were not examined as witnesses in

this case.     As far as this ground is concerned, the Court

notices thatSection 134of the Indian Evidence Act specifically

provides that no particular number of witnesses shall, in any

case, be required for the proof of any fact. It is well known

principal of law that reliance can be placed on the solitary

statement of a witness if the court comes to the conclusion

that the said statement is the true and correct version of the34case of the prosecution.   The courts are concerned with the

merit and the statement of a particular witness and not at all

concerned with the number of witnesses examined by the

prosecution. The time-honoured rule of appreciating evidence

is that it has to be weighed and not counted.        The law of

evidence does not require any particular number of witnesses

to be examined in proof of a given fact. However, where, the

court finds that the testimony of solitary witness is neither

wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable, it may, in given set of

facts, seek corroboration but to disbelieve reliable testimony of

a solitary witness on the ground that others have not been

examined is to do complete injustice to the prosecution. This

Court, on re-appreciation of evidence, finds that the testimony

of witness Madan Lal is cogent, consistent and reliable.

Taking into consideration the manner in which witness Madan

Lal had testified before the Court and the fact that nothing

could be elicited in his lengthy cross-examination for days

together to impeach his credibility, this Court is of the view

that his testimony is reliable and can be accepted without any

reservations.   Therefore, non-examination of his brother or35sister or few others who had gathered near the house of

deceased Guljari Lal after the incident is of no significance and

does not affect credibility of testimony of the said witness.
Cumulative effect of the above discussion is that the High

Court was not justified in brushing aside testimony of PW2,

Madan Lal while considering case of the prosecution against

the respondents.

Yet another ground assigned by the High Court for

disbelieving the testimony of first informant Jhabbulal and

that of PW2 Madan Lal is that there was no electricity light in

the village and, therefore, the claim made by both the

witnesses that they had witnessed the incident in the light of

electricity is untrustworthy.      To begin with, this Court

proposes to refer to the First Information Report lodged by

witness Jhabbulal. The said report was brought on the record

as Exhibit Ka-1. In the report, it is clearly mentioned that at

the time of occurrence of the incident, there was electricity

light at the place of incident and with the help of the said light,

the first informant was able to witness the incident wherein36five members of deceased Guljari's family came to be

murdered by the respondents.     The witness Jhabbulal has

further stated that his brother Babu Ram, who was sleeping in

his shop was dragged out from the shop by the respondents by

breaking open the door of the shop and thereafter was

murdered by them by firing gun shots. Regarding murder of

Babu Ram also, it is mentioned in the First Information Report

that electric bulb was burning at his house at the time of

occurrence of the incident and, therefore, he was able to

witness the murder of his brother Babu Ram. PW2, Madan

Lal has stated that his father, mother and three real brothers

were murdered by the respondents by firing gun shots and

had asserted that at the time of the incident one bulb was

burning on the main gate of his house whereas another bulb

was burning on the thatched roof, i.e., near the place where

the deceased had slept during the night of the incident.

Though both the witnesses were cross-examined at great

length by the learned counsel for the defence, nothing

significant could be brought on record from which one can,

with certainty deduce that there was no light of electricity37bulbs at the place of the incident.        Apart from what is

mentioned by the two eye-witnesses regarding sufficiency of

electricity light in which they had witnessed the incident, the

sketch of the spot prepared by the Investigating Officer on

August 11, 1991 in the presence of independent witnesses and

produced as Exhibit Ka-14 shows that point `L' mentioned in

the panchnama of place of occurrence, a bulb has been shown

burning at the main gate of the house of PW2 Madan Lal

whereas another bulb is shown burning at the place

mentioned as `AL'.     Thus, assertion made by the two eye-

witnesses that they were able to witness the incident because

of availability of sufficient electricity light gets corroboration

from contemporaneous document, namely, Exhibit Ka-14.

According to the High Court, the place pointed by PW2, Madan

Lal where an electric bulb was hanging has not been shown in

the site plan and on the contrary it has been shown at a

different place. Even if it is assumed that the place mentioned

by PW2, Madan Lal where an electric bulb was hanging is

different from the place shown in the site plan, the fact

remains that an electric bulb was hanging at the place of38incident which is completely ignored by the High Court. It is

relevant to notice that PW2, during the course of recording of

his statement before the Court had mentioned that he had

shown to the Investigating Officer the place where the bulb

was hanging but he was not in a position to specify the reason

as to why the place shown by him to the Investigating Officer

was not mentioned in the site plan. It may be mentioned that

the Investigating Officer ASI Gajraj Singh, unfortunately,

expired before the commencement of the trial and, therefore,

another officer was examined who had taken a little part in the

investigation. Thus, the contradiction and/or omission in the

statement of the witness recorded underSection 161of the

Criminal Procedure Code could not be brought on the record

of the case. In such circumstances, there was no reason for

the High Court to disbelieve the claim made by PW2 Madan lal

that he had shown to the Investigating Officer the place where

the bulb was hanging.    Jhabbulal had stated in this evidence

that Guljari had taken electric line illegally be putting a wire

on the main line which proceeded to the tube well of Suresh

Chand DW1.     The High Court relied upon the testimony of39Suresh Chand that no villager had taken electricity from his

tube well line and thereafter concluded that there was

complete darkness in the whole village on account of

Amavasya of rainy season and, therefore, it was not possible

for the two eye-witnesses to witness the incident. It becomes

absolutely necessary for this Court to scan the evidence of

DW1.     DW1 in his evidence before the Court stated that he

was having a tubewell in village Lakhanpur prior to the date of

incident and that tubewell was being operated with the electric

power.    It was also mentioned by him that the electricity

connection was in running condition and that the electricity

line passes through the village. What is stated by the witness

is that during the night of the incident, he was not present in

his village Lakhanpur but had gone to his sister's house

situated in another village and that he had come back to his

village on the third day of the date of the incident.       If this

witness was not present on the date of incident, he was least

competent to depose before the Court as to whether on the

date of incident there was electricity light in the village or not.

A specific question as to whether on the fateful night electricity40was taken illegally by putting Katiya to his wire was put to this

witness.    This witness was not able to answer this specific

query naturally because he had admitted that on the date of

incident he was not present in the village.     The Trial Court

rightly observed that it was not concerned with the question

whether the electric power was being consumed by the

villagers legally or illegally and that the Court was only

concerned with the question whether there was sufficient light

on the date of incident to enable the witnesses to see the

incident.   The High Court has misread the evidence of DW1

Suresh Chand as well as that of PW2 Madan Lal, wherein it

was asserted by him that he had also taken illegal electricity

connection and was consuming the same through the bulbs

which according to him were burning on the date of incident.

Thus the reliable evidence of PW1 and PW2 cannot be brushed

aside on the ground that Investigating Officer had not taken

into possession the bulbs hanging on the place of incident.

Thus, the High Court was not justified in holding that there

was no electric power in the whole village and that there was

complete darkness on account of Amavasya of rainy season41due to which it was impossible for the eye-witnesses to witness

the incident. Further, the visibility capacity of urban people is

not the standard to be applied to the villagers. PW2 Madan

Lal has stated that the respondents had brought with them

torches but as light of electricity was available in the house,

torches were not put on. Thus, according to PW2 Madan Lal

the respondents had in the light of electric bulb recognized the

deceased persons and had fired gun shots on them. Further,

if light available was sufficient for the accused persons to

identify their targets for firing shots, there is no reason why

the witnesses would not be able to identify the respondents as

the assailants.   The statement of PW1 Jhabbulal that Guljari

had taken electric line illegally by putting a wire on the main

line which proceeded to the tube well was disbelieved by the

High Court on the ground that the Investigating Officer had

not mentioned either in the site plan or in the inspection note

that electric line had been taken in an unauthorized manner

from the main line which proceeded to the tube-well of Suresh

Chand. It is common experience of one and all that site plan

or panchnama of place of incident is being prepared to42indicate the state of things found at the place of incident. In

site plan, Investigating Officer is not supposed to note whether

electric line had been taken in an unauthorized manner or

not. That is not the purpose for which site plan is prepared in

a criminal case.       Thus, without sufficient reason the High

Court disbelieved the claim made by PW1 Jhabbulal that

deceased Guljari had taken electric line illegally by putting a

wire on the main line. On the facts and in the circumstances

of the case emerging from the record, this Court is of the

opinion that the High Court was not justified in coming to the

conclusion that there was complete darkness in the whole

village and, therefore, it was not possible for the eye-witnesses

to see the incident.

The High Court has further held that motive alleged

against deceased Guljari was developed for the first time

during trial by witness Jhabbulal and there was no motive for

the respondents to commit the murders of as many as five

persons of the family of Gulzari Lal. A conjoint and purposeful

reading of FIR with the reliable testimony of PW1 Jhabbulal43and that of PW2 Madan Lal makes it very clear that the

respondents were agitated and angry when the daughter of

respondent No.1 had eloped with the son of the first

informant. The evidence on record further shows that during

the time of first elopement, on one day son of the first

informant, i.e., Amar Singh, was spotted in the village and on

learning about the fact that son of the first informant was seen

in the village, the respondents were prepared to take revenge

to what is known as to maintain honour of the family.

However, the fact that Amar Singh was likely to be assaulted

by the respondents had become known to wife of Guljari who

had fore-warned Amar Singh and Amar Singh had, therefore,

left the village to save his life. The evidence also indicates that

the fact that Amar Singh had left the village all of a sudden

because of information conveyed by wife of the deceased

Gulzari that respondents were to assault him was later on

learnt by the respondents and, therefore, the respondents

were bearing a grudge against wife of Gulzari and against

Gulzari. The record further shows that when the daughter of

the respondent No.1 had returned to the village, Guljari in the44presence of the first informant had made a suggestion to the

respondent No.1 that he should get his daughter married with

the son of the first informant upon which the respondent No.1

had taken an offence and asked Gulzari not to play with the

honour of his family.    This Court is of the opinion that

sufficient evidence has been led by the prosecution to

establish motive which prompted the respondents to kill five

members of family of deceased Guljari. What weighed with the

High Court in disbelieving the motive suggested by the

prosecution was the fact that in the FIR lodged by PW1

Jhabbulal, it was not stated that because wife of Gulzari had

forewarned Amar Singh about impending assault on him by

the respondents, the respondents were not able to take

revenge against Amar Singh and that Gulzari had suggested to

the respondent No.1 to get his daughter married with son of

PW1. The High Court held that such story was developed for

the first time during trial by witness Jhabbulal who was

admittedly on inimical terms with the respondents. As far as

this aspect is concerned, this Court notices that the FIR need

not be an encyclopedia of all the facts and circumstances on45which the prosecution relies. The main purpose of the FIR is

to enable a police officer to satisfy himself as to whether

commission of cognizable offences is indicated so that further

investigation can be undertaken by him. The purpose of the

FIR is to set the criminal law in motion and it is not customary

to mention every minute detail of the prosecution case in the

FIR. FIR is never treated as a substantive piece of evidence

and has a limited use, i.e., it can be used for the corroborating

or contradicting the maker of it. Law requires FIR to contain

basic prosecution case and not minute details.          The law

developed on the subject is that even if an accused is not

named in the FIR he can be held guilty if prosecution leads

reliable   and   satisfactory   evidence   which    proves   his

participation in crime. Similarly, the witnesses whose names

are not mentioned in the FIR but examined during the course

of trial can be relied upon for the purpose of basing conviction

against the accused.    Non-mentioning of motive in the FIR

cannot be regarded as omission to state important and

material fact. As a principle, it has been ruled by this Court

that omission to give details in the FIR as to manner in which46weapon was used by accused is not material omission

amounting to contradiction. Further, this is a case wherein

FIR was filed by a rustic man and, therefore, non-mentioning

of motive in the FIR cannot be attached much importance.InSuperintendent of Police, CBI & Ors. vs. Tapan Kumar Singh,

AIR 2003 SC 4140, it has been held by this Court that mere

absence of indication about source of light in the FIR for

identifying assailants does not, in any way, affect prosecution

version. The FIR is not the last words in the prosecution case

and in some cases detailed FIR could be a ground for

suspicion. What is relevant to find out is whether the FIR was

lodged promptly and whether it is actuated by mala fides. The

record of this case indicates that FIR regarding gruesome

murder of six persons was filed promptly and without any

avoidable delay and, therefore, false implication of any of the

respondents in such a grievous case stands ruled out. There

is nothing on the record to show that FIR was result of

deliberation by the first informant with other persons. As the

FIR was lodged promptly, the informant, i.e., Jhabbulal's

evidence containing minor variations not affecting substratum47of prosecution story cannot be discarded on the ground that

motive which prompted the respondents to kill six persons

was not mentioned in the FIR. Further, it is well settled that

the prosecution is not supposed to prove motive when

prosecution relies on direct evidence, i.e., evidence of eye-

witnesses.    In this case, the prosecution has examined first

informant as PW1 who has lost his brother in the incident as

well as PW2 Madan Lal who lost five members of his family.

Their evidence is found to be trustworthy and unimpeachable.

As observed earlier, their evidence does not suffer from major

contradiction      and/or    improvements      nor      noticeable

embellishment have been made by them. As the prosecution

has led acceptable eye-witnesses account of the incident, this

Court is of the firm opinion that failure to establish motive

would not entitle the respondents to claim acquittal.
16.          There is yet another evidence in form of oral dying

declaration which implicates the respondents in the murder of

six persons i.e. oral dying declaration made by deceased

Baburam before his brother Jhabbulal.          The High Court48committed    serious error in disbelieving the oral dying

declration made by deceased Baburam before his real brother

Jhabbulal (PW1) implicating the respondents as his assailants.

The reasons given by the High Court for disbelieving oral dying

declaration was that it was not mentioned by witness

Jhabbulal either in his FIR or in his statement recorded underSection 161of Cr.P.C.   As observed earlier FIR need not be an

encyclopedia of minute details of the incident nor it is

necessary   to    mention   therein   the   evidence   on   which

prosecution proposes to rely at the trial. The basic purpose of

filing FIR is to set the criminal law into motion and not to state

all the minute details therein. It is relevant to notice that six

brutal and gruesome murders had taken place wherein fire

arms were used. The hard reality of life is that the persons

who has lost kith and kin in horrific incident is likely to suffer

great shock and therefore law would not expect him to

mention minutest details either in his FIR or statement underSection 161.     The question before the Court is whether the

assertion made by the witness that soon after the incident he

had gone to the place where his injured brother was lying and49on enquiry by him, his brother had told him that the

respondents were his assailants, inspires confidence of the

Court. Reading the evidence of the witness as a whole, this

Court points that it has ring of truth in it. There is nothing

improbable if a brother approaches his injured brother and

tries to know from him as to how he had received the injuries

nor it is improbable that an enquiry being made the injured

brother would not give reply/information sought from him.

The assertion by witness Jhabbulal that after the incident was

over he had gone near his injured brother and tried to know as

to who were his assailants, whereupon his injured brother had

replied that the appellants had caused injuries to him, could

not be effectively challenged during cross-examination of the

witness nor it could be brought on record that because of the

nature of the injuries received by Baburam he would not have

survived even for few minutes and must have died immediately

on the receipt of the injuries.

17.        The net result of the above discussion is that the

High Court has acquitted respondents who were charged for50commission of six murders in a casual and slipshod manner.

The approach of the High Court in appreciating the evidence is

not only contrary to the well settled principles of appreciation

of evidence but quite contrary to ground realities of life. The

High Court has recorded reasons for acquittal of the

respondents which are not borne out from the record and

quite contrary to the evidences adduced by the reliable eye-

witnesses. The High Court was not justified in upsetting well

reasoned conviction of the respondents recorded by the Trial

Court which after observing demeanour of the eye-witnesses

had placed reliance on their testimony. The High Court has

not taken into consideration the full text of the evidence

adduced by the witnesses and picked up sentences here and

there from the testimony of the witnesses to come to a

particular purpose.   For example, the High Court has not

taken into consideration the whole testimony of DW1 before

coming to the conclusion that there was complete darkness in

the village which prevented the eye-witnesses from witnessing

the incident. The general impression this Court has gathered

is that appreciation of evidence by the High Court is cursory51and has done injustice to the prosecution.

18.        On the facts and in the circumstances of the case,

this Court is of the firm opinion that it is firmly established by

the prosecution that respondents are persons who had

committed six murders on August 10/11, 1991 and, therefore,

liable to be convicted under Section 302 read withSection 34IPC.

19.        This Court has heard the learned counsel for the

parties regarding sentence to be imposed on each respondent

for having committed offence punishable under Section 302

read withSection 34IPC.     This Court notices that the Trial

Court had sentenced all the three respondents to capital

punishment.     There is no manner of doubt that killing six

persons and wiping almost the whole family on flimsy ground

of honour saving of the family would fall within the rarest of

rare case evolved by this Court and, therefore, the Trial Court

was perfectly justified in imposing capital punishment on the

respondents.     However, this Court also notices that the

incident had roughly taken place before 20 years, i.e., on52August 10/11, 1991. Further, the High Court had acquitted

the respondents by judgment dated April 12, 2002. After April

12, 2002 till this date, nothing adverse against any of the

respondents is reported to this Court.        To sentence the

respondents to death after their acquittal in the year 2002

would not be justified on the facts and in the circumstances of

the case. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that interest

of justice would be served if each of the respondent is

sentenced to RI for life and a fine of Rs.25,000/- each in

default RI for two years for commission of offence punishable

under Section 302 read withSection 34IPC.

20.       For the foregoing reasons, the appeal succeeds. The

judgment dated April 12, 2002 rendered by the High Court of

Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal appeal No.574 of 2001

acquitting the respondents of the offences punishable under

Section 302 read withSection 34IPC is hereby set aside. The

judgment of the Trial Court convicting each of the respondents

under Section 302 read withSection 34IPC is hereby restored

and each respondent is accordingly convicted underSection53302 read withSection 34IPC. For the commission of offence

punishable under Section 302 read withSection 34IPC, each

respondent is sentenced to RI for life and fine of Rs.25,000/-

each, in default, RI for two years. Out of the amount of fine, if

paid, a sum of Rs.50,000/- be paid to PW2, Madan Lal, as

compensation in view of the provisions of Section 357 of the

Code. The appeal accordingly stands disposed of.
............................J.
                                           [Harjit Singh Bedi]



                                           ............................J.
                                           [J.M. Panchal]
     New Delhi;
August 03, 2010.",9607,"The State of Uttar Pradesh has questioned legality of judgment dated April 12, 2002 rendered by Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No.574 of 2001 by which judgment dated February 20, 2001 passed by the learned Special Judge (EC Act)/Additional District Judge, Farrukhabad in Sessions Trial No.17 of 1992 convicting the three respondents herein underSection 302IPC and sentencing each of them to death2with fine of Rs.10,000/- in default RI for two years for commission of murder of six persons is reversed and they are acquitted. The witness having not been confronted with his earlier police statement wherein he had reportedly stated that he had seen the incident through the holes in the intervening wall, this Court fails to understand as to how the said statement allegedly made before the police during the investigation could have been pressed into service by the High Court to reject the substantive evidence of this witness tendered before the Court wherein it was specifically asserted that while in his house, he had witnessed the incident of killing of five members of Guljari's family by the respondents by firing gun shots. It was highlighted by the High Court that in his examination in chief, it was claimed by this witness that he was sleeping on a cot along with his two brothers, i.e., deceased Umesh and deceased Dharmendra whereas his mother was sleeping on another cot and that when the accused had started firing he had slipped beneath the cot over which he was sleeping, but at another place it was stated by him that he was sleeping with his mother and had taken shelter under the said cot and therefore, the witness was not consistent as to the place from where he had witnessed the incident. This Court fails to understand as to on what principle and on which experience in real life, the High Court made a sweeping observation that it is inconceivable that a child of Madan Lal's understanding would be able to recapitulate facts in his memory witnessed by him long ago.27There is no principle of law known to this Court that it is inconceivable that a child of tender age would not be able to recapitulate facts in his memory witnessed by him long ago. Apart from what is mentioned by the two eye-witnesses regarding sufficiency of"