🛡️ Evolving Threat Landscape for Planned Architecture Changes
🔍 STRIDE • MITRE ATT&CK • WAF Integration • Self-Hosted Fonts • Enhanced Monitoring
📋 Document Owner: CEO | 📄 Version: 1.0 | 📅 Last Updated: 2026-02-26 (UTC)
🔄 Review Cycle: Quarterly | ⏰ Next Review: 2026-05-26
🏷️ Classification: Public (Corporate Website)
This document analyzes emerging threats associated with planned architecture changes to the Hack23 homepage, complementing the current THREAT_MODEL.md. As the homepage evolves from a basic static website to incorporate enhanced security controls (WAF, self-hosted fonts, automated monitoring), new threat vectors and mitigations must be systematically assessed.
- 🎭 STRIDE per planned component: Systematic threat categorization for new architecture elements
- 🎖️ MITRE ATT&CK mapping: Cloud-specific attack technique mapping for new services
- 🏗️ Asset-centric analysis: New asset protection requirements
- 🎯 Scenario-centric modeling: Attack simulation for planned changes
- ⚖️ Risk-centric assessment: Business impact on enhanced infrastructure
Based on FUTURE_SECURITY_ARCHITECTURE.md and FUTURE_ARCHITECTURE.md:
| Change | Current State | Future State | Target |
|---|---|---|---|
| Web Application Firewall | No WAF | CloudFront WAF with OWASP rule set | H1 2026 |
| Font Hosting | Google Fonts CDN (external dependency) | Self-hosted fonts in S3 | H1 2026 |
| Log Analysis | Manual CloudTrail review | Automated anomaly detection | H2 2026 |
| DNS Resilience | Single DNS provider | Multi-provider DNS with failover | H2 2026 |
| Security Headers | Basic CSP | Advanced CSP with reporting endpoint | H1 2026 |
| SLSA Level | Level 3 | Level 4 with hermetic builds | H1 2026 |
Integrated with:
- 🎯 Hack23 AB Threat Modeling Policy
- 🛠️ Secure Development Policy
- 🌐 Network Security Policy
- 🔒 Cryptography Policy
Cross-References:
- 🛡️ THREAT_MODEL.md - Current threat model
- 🏗️ FUTURE_SECURITY_ARCHITECTURE.md - Security controls roadmap
- 🔄 FUTURE_ARCHITECTURE.md - Architecture evolution
| Dimension | Current Level | Future Level | Change Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🔐 Confidentiality | Public | Public | No change — remains public content |
| 🔒 Integrity | Low | Low-Medium | WAF and enhanced monitoring improve integrity assurance |
| ⚡ Availability | Standard | Enhanced | Multi-provider DNS and WAF DDoS protection |
| STRIDE Category | Threat | Risk | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🔍 Spoofing | WAF rule bypass via request smuggling | Medium | AWS managed rule sets, regular rule updates |
| 🛠️ Tampering | WAF configuration tampering via IAM compromise | Medium | IAM least privilege for WAF management, CloudTrail logging |
| 🚫 Repudiation | WAF log gaps hiding blocked attacks | Low | CloudWatch Logs integration, S3 log archival |
| 📢 Information Disclosure | WAF error messages revealing internal architecture | Low | Custom error pages, generic block responses |
| ⚡ Denial of Service | WAF rate limiting misconfiguration causing self-DoS | Medium | Staged rollout, canary testing, rate limit tuning |
| 👑 Elevation of Privilege | WAF bypass leading to unauthorized access to S3 origin | Low | Origin Access Control (OAC), no direct S3 access |
| STRIDE Category | Threat | Risk | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🔍 Spoofing | N/A — fonts served from same origin | N/A | Same-origin serving eliminates CORS issues |
| 🛠️ Tampering | Font files modified in S3 bucket | Low | S3 versioning, CloudTrail data events, SRI hashes retained |
| 🚫 Repudiation | Font update without change tracking | Low | Git version control, S3 versioning |
| 📢 Information Disclosure | Font file metadata leaking information | Very Low | Standard web fonts, no custom metadata |
| ⚡ Denial of Service | Increased S3 bandwidth for font serving | Low | CloudFront caching, minimal font file sizes |
| 👑 Elevation of Privilege | N/A — static font files | N/A | No executable content in font files |
Net Security Improvement: Eliminates external supply chain dependency (Google Fonts CDN), removes cross-origin request complexity, and consolidates all content under same security boundary.
| STRIDE Category | Threat | Risk | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🔍 Spoofing | Attacker spoofing log entries to mask activity | Low | CloudTrail log integrity validation, log signing |
| 🛠️ Tampering | Adversary tampering with anomaly detection rules | Medium | IAM separation of duties, change management for detection rules |
| 🚫 Repudiation | Suppression of security alerts | Medium | Multi-channel alerting (email, SNS, CloudWatch), alert acknowledgment tracking |
| 📢 Information Disclosure | Alert content revealing security architecture details | Low | Sanitized alert messages, internal-only detailed reports |
| ⚡ Denial of Service | Alert fatigue from false positives | Medium | ML-based baseline tuning, graduated alert severity |
| 👑 Elevation of Privilege | Compromise of monitoring account to disable alerts | High | Dedicated security monitoring IAM role, cross-account logging |
| STRIDE Category | Threat | Risk | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🔍 Spoofing | DNS spoofing attack during provider failover | Medium | DNSSEC on both providers, DNS monitoring |
| 🛠️ Tampering | DNS record tampering at secondary provider | Medium | Registrar lock, 2FA on both providers, DNS monitoring |
| 🚫 Repudiation | DNS change without audit trail | Low | DNS provider audit logs, external DNS monitoring |
| 📢 Information Disclosure | Zone transfer exposing all DNS records | Low | AXFR disabled, minimal DNS records |
| ⚡ Denial of Service | Simultaneous attack on both DNS providers | Low | Geographic diversity, provider diversity |
| 👑 Elevation of Privilege | DNS provider admin account compromise | Medium | Separate credentials per provider, hardware MFA |
| ATT&CK ID | Technique | Tactic | Relevance to Future Architecture | Planned Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T1583.001 | Acquire Infrastructure: Domains | Resource Development | Multi-provider DNS increases attack surface | DNSSEC on both providers, registrar 2FA |
| T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application | Initial Access | WAF misconfiguration could expose bypass paths | AWS managed rules, regular penetration testing |
| T1562.008 | Impair Defenses: Disable Cloud Logs | Defense Evasion | Automated monitoring depends on log integrity | Cross-account logging, immutable log storage |
| T1059.009 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Cloud API | Execution | New WAF/DNS management APIs increase API attack surface | IAM least privilege per API, CloudTrail monitoring |
| T1499.002 | Endpoint DoS: Service Exhaustion Flood | Impact | Self-hosted fonts increase S3 bandwidth requirements | CloudFront caching, WAF rate limiting |
| Kill Chain Phase | New Defensive Capability | Improvement Over Current |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Reconnaissance | WAF blocks automated scanning | Currently unfiltered |
| 2. Weaponization | No change | Occurs off-target |
| 3. Delivery | WAF geo-blocking and rate limiting | Adds pre-authentication defense layer |
| 4. Exploitation | WAF OWASP rule set blocks common exploits | Currently relies on static content defense only |
| 5. Installation | SLSA Level 4 hermetic builds | Strengthens supply chain integrity |
| 6. Command & Control | Enhanced CSP reporting detects C2 attempts | Adds visibility to existing CSP blocks |
| 7. Actions on Objectives | Automated anomaly detection enables faster response | Currently manual log review |
| Current Threat | Future Mitigation | Risk Reduction |
|---|---|---|
| T-03: Google Fonts supply chain compromise | Self-hosted fonts eliminate external dependency | 🔴→🟢 Eliminated |
| D-03: Single DNS provider failure | Multi-provider DNS with automatic failover | 🟡→🟢 Mitigated |
| RM-05: No WAF protection | CloudFront WAF with OWASP rule set | 🟡→🟢 Mitigated |
| R-03: Log analysis gaps | Automated anomaly detection with alerting | 🟡→🟢 Mitigated |
| New Threat | Source | Risk Level | Mitigation Strategy |
|---|---|---|---|
| WAF misconfiguration self-DoS | WAF rate limiting too aggressive | 🟡 Medium | Staged rollout, canary testing |
| Increased API attack surface | WAF/DNS management APIs | 🟡 Medium | IAM least privilege, API logging |
| Font serving bandwidth costs | Self-hosted fonts in S3 | 🟢 Low | CloudFront caching, font optimization |
| Multi-provider DNS sync issues | DNS record inconsistency between providers | 🟡 Medium | Automated DNS sync validation |
| Alert fatigue from new monitoring | Too many false positive alerts | 🟡 Medium | ML-based baseline tuning |
| Risk Category | Current Score | Future Score | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Supply Chain Risk | Medium | Low | ⬇️ Improved (self-hosted fonts) |
| Availability Risk | Medium | Low | ⬇️ Improved (multi-DNS, WAF) |
| Detection Capability | Low | High | ⬆️ Improved (automated monitoring) |
| Operational Complexity | Low | Medium | ⬆️ Increased (more services to manage) |
| Overall Risk Posture | Low-Medium | Low | ⬇️ Improved |
| Control | ISO 27001:2022 | NIST CSF 2.0 | CIS Controls v8.1 |
|---|---|---|---|
| CloudFront WAF | A.8.20 Network Security | PR.AC-5 Network integrity | CIS 13.1 Network monitoring |
| Self-Hosted Fonts | A.8.26 Application security requirements | PR.DS-2 Data in transit | CIS 2.7 Allowlisted software |
| Automated Monitoring | A.8.16 Monitoring activities | DE.CM-1 Network monitoring | CIS 8.2 Audit log collection |
| Multi-Provider DNS | A.8.22 Segregation of networks | PR.IR-1 Incident response plan | CIS 9.2 DNS filtering |
| SLSA Level 4 | A.8.25 Secure development lifecycle | PR.DS-6 Integrity checking | CIS 16.4 Secure software development |
Each planned change will undergo threat assessment before deployment:
- 📋 Pre-Assessment: Review this document for identified threats
- 🎯 STRIDE Validation: Confirm STRIDE analysis covers actual implementation
- 🛡️ Control Testing: Verify mitigations work as designed
- 📊 Risk Re-Assessment: Update risk scores post-implementation
- 📝 Document Update: Update THREAT_MODEL.md with actual findings
| Change | Success Metric | Monitoring Method | Review Period |
|---|---|---|---|
| WAF Integration | <1% false positive rate | WAF metrics dashboard | Monthly for 3 months |
| Self-Hosted Fonts | Zero external dependency alerts | Dependency scanning | Post-deployment |
| Automated Monitoring | MTTD <1 hour for critical events | Alert response tracking | Monthly |
| Multi-DNS | 100% uptime during provider failover | DNS health checks | Quarterly |
- 🎯 THREAT_MODEL.md - Current state threat model
- 🛡️ SECURITY_ARCHITECTURE.md - Current security architecture
- 🚀 FUTURE_SECURITY_ARCHITECTURE.md - Security enhancement roadmap
- 🏗️ FUTURE_ARCHITECTURE.md - Architecture evolution plan
- 🏷️ CLASSIFICATION.md - CIA triad classification
- 📋 CRA-ASSESSMENT.md - EU CRA conformity assessment
ISMS Policy References:
📋 Document Control:
✅ Approved by: James Pether Sörling, CEO
📤 Distribution: Public
🏷️ Classification: 
📅 Effective Date: 2026-02-26
⏰ Next Review: 2026-05-26 (Quarterly)
🎯 Framework Compliance: 
🔗 Related Documents: Threat Model, Security Architecture, Future Security Architecture, Threat Modeling Policy
