📊 Multi-Framework Template for Democratic Process Threat Analysis
🎯 Attack Trees · Kill Chain · Diamond Model · Political Threat Taxonomy · Actor Profiling
📋 Document Owner: CEO | 📄 Version: 3.5 | 📅 Last Updated: 2026-04-25 (UTC)
🏢 Owner: Hack23 AB (Org.nr 5595347807) | 🏷️ Classification: Public
📌 Template Instructions: Copy to
analysis/daily/YYYY-MM-DD/{articleType}/. Save asthreat-analysis.mdin the workflow's own folder (never overwrite another workflow's files). Each threat requires evidence citations and multi-framework analysis. See methodologies/political-threat-framework.md.
🚨 Anti-Pattern Warning: Generic threat descriptions without attack trees are REJECTED. Every threat analysis MUST include:
- Threat Analysis Context (metadata header with ID, date, scope)
- Political Threat Taxonomy coverage check (all 6 democratic function categories assessed)
- Attack Tree for the top threat (Mermaid diagram showing how the threat could succeed)
- Kill Chain assessment (what stage has the threat progressed to?)
- Diamond Model for the primary threat actor
- Threat Actor Profile with ICO (Intent-Capability-Opportunity) assessment
- Evidence tables with dok_id citations, severity scores, and confidence labels
- Forward indicators — what MCP-detectable signals indicate escalation?
DO NOT use STRIDE categories (S/T/R/I/D/E). Use the Political Threat Taxonomy categories: Narrative Integrity, Legislative Integrity, Accountability, Transparency, Democratic Process, Power Balance.
Good example: THREAT_MODEL.md — this is the formatting quality standard.
📐 Template Contract — every fill of this template MUST satisfy this row.
Slot Value Owning methodology per-artifact-methodologies.mdOwning gate check Check 1 (Family A — Threat Taxonomy + attack tree) — see 05-analysis-gate.mdRequired inputs search_anforanden,get_voteringar, OSINT framingHorizon band per-run (per scripts/horizon-context.ts)Output family Family A — Core Synthesis Aggregation order 11 of 30 in canonical order (see scripts/render-lib/aggregator/order.ts)Reader Intelligence Guide row generated from threat-analysis.md(seescripts/render-lib/aggregator/reader-guide.ts)Canonical evidence anchor | claim | evidence (dok_id / vote / MP intressent_id / primary-source URL) | retrieved_at | confidence |— every analytical claim row uses this schema.Cross-reference:
README.md §Template ↔ Methodology ↔ Gate-Check Matrix.
| Element | Value |
|---|---|
| F3EAD Stage | EXPLOIT / ANALYZE — characterises political threats to democratic function across the 6-dimension Political Threat Taxonomy and feeds risk-assessment cascading chains, scenario-analysis tail scenarios, and forward-indicators escalation signals. |
| PIRs Served | PIR-1 (coalition stability), PIR-5 (institutional risk), PIR-7 (foreign-policy alignment); add PIR-4 (Election 2026 pathway) when threats target electoral integrity; PIR-2 (opposition cohesion) when threats target opposition coordination capacity. |
| Admiralty Floor | B2 floor on every threat row; A1 required when an entry quotes verbatim primary actor statements (motions, votes, ministerial declarations, public speeches); F6 ungraded entries are flagged and downgraded; suspected disinformation must be tagged [low-source-reliability]. |
| WEP + ODNI | Threat actor capability, intent, and opportunity (ICO) each carry WEP-phrased likelihood; threat severity is 1–5 with descriptive consequence narrative; confidence label per row uses 5-level scale. |
| Source Diversity Floor | ≥3 primary + ≥1 secondary source per HIGH threat (severity ≥ 4); HIGH threats with single-source provenance must be downgraded to MEDIUM or flagged [unconfirmed]; foreign-actor threats require ≥1 cross-language corroboration where feasible. |
| SAT(s) Applied | Red Team (adversarial perspective); Devil's Advocacy (challenge dominant threat hypothesis); Diamond Model walk-through (adversary–capability–infrastructure–victim); Kill-Chain mapping; ACH (when ≥2 competing threat hypotheses); Premortem (for HIGH-severity rows). |
| ICD 203 Standards | 1 (objectivity), 2 (independent — no political alignment), 5 (sourcing), 6 (logical argumentation — attack-tree decomposition shown), 7 (uncertainty), 9 (alternative analysis — Devil's Advocacy + ACH). |
⚠️ STRIDE is NOT used. The Political Threat Taxonomy (Narrative Integrity · Legislative Integrity · Accountability · Transparency · Democratic Process · Power Balance) replaces STRIDE for political analysis. STRIDE remains valid only for the platform's software security inTHREAT_MODEL.md.
See
osint-tradecraft-standards.mdfor canonical Admiralty / WEP / SAT / ICD 203 definitions, andpolitical-threat-framework.mdfor the 6-dimension taxonomy, attack-tree templates, kill-chain stages, and Diamond Model adaptation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Threat Analysis ID | [REQUIRED: THR-YYYY-MM-DD-NNN] |
| Analysis Date | [REQUIRED: YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM UTC] |
| Analysis Period | [REQUIRED: e.g. "2026-W13 (2026-03-23 to 2026-03-29)"] |
| Produced By | [REQUIRED: workflow name] |
| Political Context | [REQUIRED: 2–3 sentences on current political situation] |
| Overall Threat Level | [REQUIRED: LOW / MODERATE / HIGH / SEVERE] |
Severity Scale Reference: 1=Negligible (routine), 2=Minor (self-correcting), 3=Moderate (intervention needed), 4=Major (formal response required), 5=Severe (constitutional crisis). See methodologies/political-threat-framework.md §9 for full calibration table.
AI Instructions: Replace placeholder text with actual threats identified from document analysis. Category nodes should be color-coded by severity using the standard palette (🔴 severe → 🟢 negligible).
graph LR
subgraph "🏷️ Political Threat Taxonomy"
NI["🎭 Narrative Integrity<br/>Disinformation & False Framing"]
LI["📝 Legislative Integrity<br/>Policy Corruption & Manipulation"]
AC["🚫 Accountability<br/>Oversight Evasion & Obstruction"]
TR["🔇 Transparency<br/>Information Suppression"]
DP["⛔ Democratic Process<br/>Procedural Obstruction"]
PB["👑 Power Balance<br/>Concentration & Overreach"]
end
NI --> NI1["[Highest Narrative Integrity threat]"]
LI --> LI1["[Highest Legislative Integrity threat]"]
AC --> AC1["[Highest Accountability threat]"]
TR --> TR1["[Highest Transparency threat]"]
DP --> DP1["[Highest Democratic Process threat]"]
PB --> PB1["[Highest Power Balance threat]"]
style NI fill:#7B1FA2,color:#FFFFFF
style LI fill:#D32F2F,color:#FFFFFF
style AC fill:#FF9800,color:#FFFFFF
style TR fill:#FFC107,color:#000000
style DP fill:#4CAF50,color:#FFFFFF
style PB fill:#1565C0,color:#FFFFFF
%% Threat instance nodes: color by severity (1–5 scale)
style NI1 fill:#9E9E9E,color:#FFFFFF,stroke-dasharray: 5 5
style LI1 fill:#9E9E9E,color:#FFFFFF,stroke-dasharray: 5 5
style AC1 fill:#9E9E9E,color:#FFFFFF,stroke-dasharray: 5 5
style TR1 fill:#9E9E9E,color:#FFFFFF,stroke-dasharray: 5 5
style DP1 fill:#9E9E9E,color:#FFFFFF,stroke-dasharray: 5 5
style PB1 fill:#9E9E9E,color:#FFFFFF,stroke-dasharray: 5 5
Threats involving actors misrepresenting facts, identities, or political positions to manipulate public discourse or parliamentary outcomes.
| Threat ID | Threat Description | Threat Actor | Evidence Sources | Severity (1–5) | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
NI-001 |
[REQUIRED: e.g. "Coordinated disinformation campaign misattributing policy position to coalition party"] |
[REQUIRED: e.g. "Foreign state actor / domestic opposition / media outlet"] |
[REQUIRED: dok_id or URL] |
[#] |
[REQUIRED: 1 sentence] |
NI-002 |
[OPTIONAL] |
[OPTIONAL] |
[OPTIONAL] |
[#] |
[OPTIONAL] |
Narrative Integrity Threat Level: [LOW / MODERATE / HIGH / SEVERE]
Threats involving manipulation of legislative texts, parliamentary records, budget figures, or official statistics to corrupt policy outcomes.
| Threat ID | Threat Description | Threat Actor | Evidence Sources | Severity (1–5) | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
LI-001 |
[REQUIRED: e.g. "Undisclosed lobbying altering committee report recommendations"] |
[REQUIRED: e.g. "Industry lobby / coalition ally ministry"] |
[REQUIRED: dok_id] |
[#] |
[REQUIRED] |
LI-002 |
[OPTIONAL] |
[OPTIONAL] |
[OPTIONAL] |
[#] |
[OPTIONAL] |
Legislative Integrity Threat Level: [LOW / MODERATE / HIGH / SEVERE]
Threats involving actors denying statements, votes, commitments, or policy positions to evade accountability — especially relevant in Swedish parliamentary context where voting records are public.
| Threat ID | Threat Description | Threat Actor | Evidence Sources | Severity (1–5) | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
AC-001 |
[REQUIRED: e.g. "Government minister contradicts Riksdag voting record on climate policy"] |
[REQUIRED: e.g. "Statsråd / party spokesperson"] |
[REQUIRED: voterings-id or dok_id] |
[#] |
[REQUIRED: e.g. "Publish voting record cross-reference"] |
AC-002 |
[OPTIONAL] |
[OPTIONAL] |
[OPTIONAL] |
[#] |
[OPTIONAL] |
Accountability Threat Level: [LOW / MODERATE / HIGH / SEVERE]
Threats involving suppression, delay, or selective disclosure of politically significant information that citizens have a right to know.
| Threat ID | Threat Description | Threat Actor | Evidence Sources | Severity (1–5) | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
TR-001 |
[REQUIRED: e.g. "Classified government inquiry suppresses key findings from SOU report"] |
[REQUIRED: e.g. "Departement / committee chair"] |
[REQUIRED: dok_id or reference] |
[#] |
[REQUIRED: e.g. "FOI request tracking, MCP monitoring"] |
TR-002 |
[OPTIONAL] |
[OPTIONAL] |
[OPTIONAL] |
[#] |
[OPTIONAL] |
Transparency Threat Level: [LOW / MODERATE / HIGH / SEVERE]
Threats involving obstruction, delay, or blockage of normal democratic processes — votes, committee work, public consultations, or legislative timelines.
| Threat ID | Threat Description | Threat Actor | Evidence Sources | Severity (1–5) | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
DP-001 |
[REQUIRED: e.g. "Systematic filibustering of budget committee deliberations to delay vote"] |
[REQUIRED: e.g. "Opposition bloc / specific party"] |
[REQUIRED: calendar ref or dok_id] |
[#] |
[REQUIRED: e.g. "Track committee session attendance and delay patterns"] |
DP-002 |
[OPTIONAL] |
[OPTIONAL] |
[OPTIONAL] |
[#] |
[OPTIONAL] |
Democratic Process Threat Level: [LOW / MODERATE / HIGH / SEVERE]
Threats involving actors accumulating disproportionate political power beyond their constitutional mandate — e.g. bypassing Riksdag oversight, concentrating ministerial authority, or circumventing checks and balances.
| Threat ID | Threat Description | Threat Actor | Evidence Sources | Severity (1–5) | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
PB-001 |
[REQUIRED: e.g. "Government uses regulatory decree to bypass Riksdag legislative vote on migration policy"] |
[REQUIRED: e.g. "Statsminister / Justitiedepartementet"] |
[REQUIRED: dok_id or proposition ref] |
[#] |
[REQUIRED: e.g. "Track Konstitutionsutskottet (KU) granskning proceedings"] |
PB-002 |
[OPTIONAL] |
[OPTIONAL] |
[OPTIONAL] |
[#] |
[OPTIONAL] |
Power Balance Threat Level: [LOW / MODERATE / HIGH / SEVERE]
AI Instructions: Build an attack tree for the single most significant threat identified in Section 1. The root is the threat goal; decompose using AND/OR gates down to leaf-level actions. Color-code by feasibility.
graph TD
ROOT["🎯 GOAL: [REQUIRED: Primary threat goal<br/>e.g. 'Force ministerial resignation']<br/>(OR — any child path suffices)"]
ROOT --> PA["Path A: [REQUIRED: First attack path]<br/>(AND — all children required)"]
ROOT --> PB["Path B: [REQUIRED: Second attack path]<br/>(AND — all children required)"]
PA --> PA1["A1: [REQUIRED: First step]"]
PA --> PA2["A2: [REQUIRED: Second step]"]
PA --> PA3["A3: [REQUIRED: Third step]"]
PB --> PB1["B1: [REQUIRED: First step]"]
PB --> PB2["B2: [REQUIRED: Second step]"]
style ROOT fill:#D32F2F,color:#FFFFFF
style PA fill:#FF9800,color:#FFFFFF
style PB fill:#FF9800,color:#FFFFFF
%% Color leaf nodes by feasibility: green=easy, yellow=moderate, red=difficult
style PA1 fill:#FFC107,color:#000000
style PA2 fill:#FFC107,color:#000000
style PA3 fill:#4CAF50,color:#FFFFFF
style PB1 fill:#D32F2F,color:#FFFFFF
style PB2 fill:#FFC107,color:#000000
| Path | Steps Required | Feasibility (1–5) | Detectability (1–5) | Political Cost | Most Likely? |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Political Cost scale: VH = Very High · H = High · M = Medium · L = Low · VL = Very Low |
Rate the expected political cost to the attacker if the path is attempted or exposed (e.g. public backlash, coalition fracture, media scrutiny, loss of legitimacy, sanctions, or electoral damage).
| Path | Steps Required | Feasibility (1–5) | Detectability (1–5) | Political Cost | Most Likely? |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Path A | [#] |
[1-5] |
[1-5] |
[VH/H/M/L/VL] |
[Y/N] |
| Path B | [#] |
[1-5] |
[1-5] |
[VH/H/M/L/VL] |
[Y/N] |
Cheapest attack path: [REQUIRED: Which path has highest feasibility and lowest cost?]
Early warning indicators: [REQUIRED: What MCP-detectable signals precede each path?]
AI Instructions: Assess how far the primary threat has progressed along the Political Kill Chain. Mark each stage as Not Started / Active / Complete.
| Kill Chain Stage | Status | Evidence | Disruption Opportunity |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1️⃣ Reconnaissance | [Not Started / Active / Complete] |
[dok_id or reference] |
[How to stop here] |
| 2️⃣ Weaponization | [Not Started / Active / Complete] |
[dok_id or reference] |
[How to stop here] |
| 3️⃣ Delivery | [Not Started / Active / Complete] |
[dok_id or reference] |
[How to stop here] |
| 4️⃣ Exploitation | [Not Started / Active / Complete] |
[dok_id or reference] |
[How to stop here] |
| 5️⃣ Installation | [Not Started / Active / Complete] |
[dok_id or reference] |
[How to stop here] |
| 6️⃣ Command & Control | [Not Started / Active / Complete] |
[dok_id or reference] |
[How to stop here] |
| 7️⃣ Actions on Objective | [Not Started / Active / Complete] |
[dok_id or reference] |
[Recovery action] |
Current kill chain stage: [REQUIRED: 1-7]
Next expected stage: [REQUIRED: What happens next if unchecked?]
| Diamond Element | Assessment | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Adversary | [REQUIRED: Who? Name + party + role] |
[dok_id / reference] |
| Capability | [REQUIRED: What parliamentary/political tools do they wield?] |
[Seat count, committee positions, etc.] |
| Infrastructure | [REQUIRED: Alliances, media channels, institutional access] |
[Coalition structure, media relationships] |
| Victim | [REQUIRED: Who/what is targeted?] |
[Minister, policy, coalition stability] |
| Attribute | Assessment | Confidence |
|---|---|---|
| Intent | [REQUIRED: What do they want?] |
[VH/H/M/L/VL] |
| Capability | [REQUIRED: What can they actually do?] |
[VH/H/M/L/VL] |
| Opportunity | [REQUIRED: What upcoming events create windows?] |
[VH/H/M/L/VL] |
| Track Record | [REQUIRED: Have they acted on similar threats before?] |
[VH/H/M/L/VL] |
| Constraints | [REQUIRED: What limits their action?] |
[VH/H/M/L/VL] |
| Overall ICO Level | [REQUIRED: VERY HIGH / HIGH / MEDIUM / LOW / VERY LOW] |
[VH/H/M/L/VL] |
Use this matrix to summarize, for each threat category, the single highest-severity threat and its assessed severity score (1–5).
| Threat Category | Highest Threat | Severity | Threat Level |
|---|---|---|---|
| Narrative Integrity | [highest NI threat ID] |
[#] |
[LOW/MOD/HIGH/SEVERE] |
| Legislative Integrity | [highest LI threat ID] |
[#] |
[LOW/MOD/HIGH/SEVERE] |
| Accountability | [highest AC threat ID] |
[#] |
[LOW/MOD/HIGH/SEVERE] |
| Transparency | [highest TR threat ID] |
[#] |
[LOW/MOD/HIGH/SEVERE] |
| Democratic Process | [highest DP threat ID] |
[#] |
[LOW/MOD/HIGH/SEVERE] |
| Power Balance | [highest PB threat ID] |
[#] |
[LOW/MOD/HIGH/SEVERE] |
| Actor Type | Specific Actor | Primary Threat Category | Intent | Capability |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Government | [e.g. Statsminister] |
[Threat Category] |
[known/suspected/unknown] |
[HIGH/MED/LOW] |
| Opposition | [e.g. S party leadership] |
[Threat Category] |
[known/suspected/unknown] |
[HIGH/MED/LOW] |
| Media | [e.g. specific outlet] |
[Threat Category] |
[known/suspected/unknown] |
[HIGH/MED/LOW] |
| External | [e.g. EU Commission] |
[Threat Category] |
[known/suspected/unknown] |
[HIGH/MED/LOW] |
- [Threat ID]:
[Mitigation action — who does what by when] - [Threat ID]:
[Mitigation action] - [Threat ID]:
[Mitigation action]
Overall Threat Level: [REQUIRED: LOW / MODERATE / HIGH / SEVERE]
Assessment Confidence: [REQUIRED: VERY HIGH / HIGH / MEDIUM / LOW / VERY LOW]
| Condition | Escalate? | Action |
|---|---|---|
| Any threat category severity ≥ 5 | YES | Immediate breaking analysis; all-language deployment |
| ≥ 2 threat categories severity ≥ 4 | YES | Priority analysis; article within 2 hours |
| Overall threat level = SEVERE | YES | Editor notification + all-language deployment |
| Overall threat level = HIGH | MONITOR | Flag in daily synthesis; include in evening analysis |
| Overall threat level ≤ MODERATE | NO | Include in regular daily/weekly reporting |
Record all MCP tool calls and data files consulted during this threat analysis for reproducibility and audit traceability.
[REQUIRED: List all analysis/daily/YYYY-MM-DD/{articleType}/data/ files consulted]
| # | Data Source | File / Tool Path | Data Type | Retrieved |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | [e.g. riksdag-regering-mcp] |
[e.g. search_dokument(doktyp="prop", rm="2025/26")] |
[e.g. Propositions] |
[YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM UTC] |
| 2 | [e.g. riksdag-regering-mcp] |
[e.g. search_voteringar(rm="2025/26")] |
[e.g. Voting records] |
[YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM UTC] |
| 3 | [e.g. riksdag-regering-mcp] |
[e.g. search_anforanden(parti="SD")] |
[e.g. Speeches] |
[YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM UTC] |
| 4 | [OPTIONAL] |
[path or tool call] |
[type] |
[timestamp] |
AI Instructions: Map which MCP tools provided evidence for each assessed threat category. This ensures every threat severity score has traceable data provenance aligned with the 6 canonical categories from
political-threat-framework.md.
| Threat Category | MCP Detection Tool | Key Parameters | Evidence Items | Detection Signal |
|---|---|---|---|---|
polarization |
[e.g. search_anforanden] |
[e.g. text="migration"] |
[#] |
[e.g. hostile debate language] |
regulatory-overreach |
[e.g. search_dokument_fulltext] |
[e.g. query="bemyndigande"] |
[#] |
[e.g. expanded delegated powers] |
institutional-erosion |
[e.g. search_dokument] |
[e.g. doktyp="bet", organ="KU"] |
[#] |
[e.g. KU criticism pattern] |
democratic-deficit |
[e.g. search_voteringar] |
[e.g. rm="2025/26"] |
[#] |
[e.g. procedural shortcuts] |
economic-disruption |
[e.g. get_propositioner] |
[e.g. rm="2025/26"] |
[#] |
[e.g. budget deadlock signals] |
societal-impact |
[e.g. search_dokument_fulltext] |
[e.g. query="välfärd"] |
[#] |
[e.g. welfare reduction patterns] |
📌 Note: All files listed MUST exist at the stated paths. Mark transient data as
(transient — not cached). Threat category identifiers use canonical slugs matchingThreatCategorytype in TypeScript.
AI Instructions: Compare current threat landscape with the most recent previous threat analysis. Show how each threat category evolved over time.
Previous Threat Analysis Reference: [REQUIRED: path to previous threat-analysis.md or "N/A — first analysis"]
timeline
title Threat Landscape Evolution
section Previous Assessment
[Date] : [Category]: [Level]
[Date] : [Category]: [Level]
section Current Assessment
[Date] : [Category]: [Level] — [↑/→/↓]
[Date] : [Category]: [Level] — [↑/→/↓]
| Threat Category | Previous Level | Current Level | Change | Key Driver of Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Narrative Integrity | [previous or N/A] |
[current] |
[↑/→/↓] |
[What changed?] |
| Legislative Integrity | [previous or N/A] |
[current] |
[↑/→/↓] |
[What changed?] |
| Accountability | [previous or N/A] |
[current] |
[↑/→/↓] |
[What changed?] |
| Transparency | [previous or N/A] |
[current] |
[↑/→/↓] |
[What changed?] |
| Democratic Process | [previous or N/A] |
[current] |
[↑/→/↓] |
[What changed?] |
| Power Balance | [previous or N/A] |
[current] |
[↑/→/↓] |
[What changed?] |
Overall Threat Trend: [REQUIRED: ↑ Escalating / → Stable / ↓ De-escalating]
New Threats Emerged: [REQUIRED: count and brief description]
Threats Resolved: [REQUIRED: count and brief description or "None"]
AI Instructions: Show how threat analysis findings feed into SWOT and Risk assessments. This ensures analytical coherence across frameworks.
| Threat Finding | Feeds Into → SWOT | Feeds Into → Risk | Feeds Into → Stakeholder |
|---|---|---|---|
[REQUIRED: e.g. NI-001: Disinformation campaign] |
[→ SWOT Threat T1] |
[→ RSK-002: Coalition stability L:3×I:4] |
[→ Media: HIGH impact] |
[REQUIRED: e.g. PB-001: Executive overreach] |
[→ SWOT Weakness W2] |
[→ RSK-001: Electoral integrity L:2×I:5] |
[→ Judiciary: HIGH impact] |
[OPTIONAL] |
[→ SWOT entry] |
[→ Risk entry] |
[→ Stakeholder group] |
Analytical Coherence Check: [REQUIRED: Confirm that all HIGH/SEVERE threats are reflected as SWOT Threats or Weaknesses AND as Risk Register entries. If gaps exist, either add missing entries to the corresponding SWOT/Risk template or provide a 1-sentence justification for why the threat does not warrant cross-methodology reflection.]
| Dimension | Assessment | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Electoral Impact | [REQUIRED: How do these threats affect September 2026 election positioning?] |
[Specific evidence] |
| Coalition Scenarios | [REQUIRED: Which coalition configurations are most threatened before 2026?] |
[Evidence] |
| Voter Salience | [REQUIRED: Which voter segments are most affected by these democratic threats?] |
[Evidence] |
| Campaign Vulnerability | [REQUIRED: How can opposition weaponize these threat findings?] |
[Evidence] |
| Policy Legacy | [REQUIRED: Will these threats materialize into electoral liabilities by Sept 2026?] |
[Evidence] |
Overall Electoral Significance: [REQUIRED: CRITICAL/HIGH/MODERATE/LOW/NEGLIGIBLE]
Most Likely Electoral Narrative: [REQUIRED: How will opposition frame these democratic integrity threats in 2026 campaign?]
| Level | Label | Criteria | Evidence Threshold |
|---|---|---|---|
| ⬛ 1 | VERY LOW | Speculation only, single unverified source | 0–1 sources, no corroboration |
| 🟥 2 | LOW | Circumstantial evidence, indirect indicators | 2 sources, indirect evidence |
| 🟧 3 | MEDIUM | Multiple independent sources, moderate corroboration | 3+ sources, moderate agreement |
| 🟩 4 | HIGH | Official records, documented data, direct evidence | Official docs, voting records, committee reports |
| 🟦 5 | VERY HIGH | Verified data + independent corroboration + expert consensus | Multiple official sources, cross-validated |
Link to sibling analysis files and same-day analysis from other article types.
| Related Analysis File | Relationship | Key Finding |
|---|---|---|
[REQUIRED: e.g. risk-assessment.md] |
[threat findings feed risk register] |
[1 sentence] |
[REQUIRED: e.g. swot-analysis.md] |
[threats map to SWOT T entries] |
[1 sentence] |
[REQUIRED: e.g. stakeholder-impact.md] |
[threats affect specific stakeholders] |
[1 sentence] |
[OPTIONAL: same-day analysis from different article type] |
[cross-reference] |
[1 sentence] |
Pre-commit validation — every item MUST be checked before finalising this analysis.
- Threat Context complete: All metadata fields filled (ID, date, period, producer, context, overall level)
- All 6 threat categories assessed: Narrative Integrity, Legislative Integrity, Accountability, Transparency, Democratic Process, Power Balance
- Attack Tree rendered: Section 2 Mermaid diagram has actual threat decomposition (no placeholders)
- Kill Chain assessed: Section 3 has current stage identified with evidence for each active stage
- Diamond Model filled: Section 4 has Adversary, Capability, Infrastructure, Victim with evidence
- ICO Profile complete: Intent, Capability, Opportunity, Track Record, Constraints all assessed
- Priority Mitigations listed: ≥2 specific mitigation actions with responsible actors
- Threat Evolution tracked: Section 8 compares with previous analysis (or "first analysis" noted)
- Cross-Methodology Linkage filled: Section 9 maps threats to SWOT, Risk, and Stakeholder entries
- MCP Data Provenance: All data sources listed; every threat severity score traceable
- No placeholder text remaining: Search for
[REQUIRED— zero hits expected - Political Threat Taxonomy used: NOT STRIDE categories — confirmed using NI/LI/AC/TR/DP/PB
- Election 2026 Threat Implications present: All 5 dimensions assessed with overall electoral significance rating
- 5-level confidence applied: Threat severity assessments use the full confidence scale where applicable
- Named actors: ≥2 named threat actors with party affiliations or institutional roles
Document Control:
- Template Path:
/analysis/templates/threat-analysis.md - Framework Reference: THREAT_MODEL.md, methodologies/political-threat-framework.md
- Version: 3.4
- Effective Date: 2026-04-25 (UTC)
- Key Changes v3.3: Added Election 2026 Threat Implications section, 5-level confidence scale reference, updated quality checklist
- Frameworks: Attack Trees, Kill Chain, Diamond Model, Political Threat Taxonomy, Threat Actor Profiling
- Advanced Sections: Threat Evolution Timeline, Cross-Methodology Linkage
- ISMS Alignment: ISO 27001:2022 A.5.7 (Threat Intelligence), NIST CSF 2.0 ID.RA (Risk Assessment), DE.CM (Security Continuous Monitoring)
- Classification: Public
- Owner: Hack23 AB (Org.nr 5595347807)
- Next Review: 2026-06-30
Purpose: AI-FIRST principle requires a Pass-2 read-back-and-improve. After producing this artifact in Pass 1, re-read it end-to-end and verify each item below. Document any remediation in
methodology-reflection.md§"Pass-2 audit log". Any unchecked ❌ box at the end of Pass 2 forces a Pass-3 rewrite of the affected section.
- Tradecraft anchors honoured — F3EAD stage matches the artifact's role; PIRs declared in the §Tradecraft Context block are actually addressed in the body; Admiralty grades attached to every external source; WEP band + ODNI confidence on every probabilistic judgement.
- Source diversity floor met — at least the minimum number of independent MCP sources required by the artifact's tradecraft block are cited; single-source claims are explicitly labelled
[SINGLE-SOURCE — corroboration pending]. - Evidence specificity — every quantified claim cites a
dok_id(Riksdag), an SCB / IMF dataflow code, or a named external source with date; no "according to data" / "studies show" hand-waves. - Named-actor discipline — every political claim names ≥ 1 person (party + role + dated act/quote) or labels the absence (
[diffuse — no named actor]). - Counter-narrative present — at least one explicit competing hypothesis, dissent quote, or framed objection appears in the body; "no opposition recorded" is itself a finding to label, not silence.
- Election 2026 lens applied — the §"Election 2026 Implications" subsection (or equivalent) addresses electoral salience, coalition pressure, and forward indicators; not boilerplate.
- No illustrative content shipped as fact — every
[REQUIRED]placeholder is filled OR removed; everyExample:block is clearly fenced or removed; no fabricateddok_id, vote count, or quote leaks into the final artifact. - Cross-references resolve — every
[link](file.md)in this artifact points to a file that exists in the run folder (analysis/daily/$ARTICLE_DATE/$SUBFOLDER/) or to a methodology / template underanalysis/. - Mermaid renders — every fenced
```mermaidblock parses (no missing class definitions, no orphan nodes, no >40-node graphs that overflow viewport on mobile). - Line-floor check — artifact length ≥ the per-artifact floor in
reference-quality-thresholds.json; shorter artifacts trigger Pass-2 rewrite, never a[truncated]note.