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Privacy and Security

Local-first privacy model

InstaClip is built around the principle that the creator's raw media and transcripts stay on their own machine:

  • Video files, audio proxies, transcripts, and thumbnails are stored under the local data/ directory.
  • The database is a local SQLite file.
  • No analytics, telemetry, or crash reporter is included in this edition.
  • No cloud account is required to run the core pipeline.

Network exposure

  • The FastAPI backend binds to 127.0.0.1:8765 only. It is not reachable from the LAN or the public internet by default.
  • The backend has no authentication layer: callers are trusted because they must already be on the same machine.
  • To change the bind address you must edit the source or pass --host; this is not recommended without adding authentication.

CORS and origin protection

CORS alone does not fully protect a local API from malicious web pages. The backend therefore layers three defenses:

  1. CORS allowlist — only Tauri webview origins (tauri://localhost, https://tauri.localhost, http://tauri.localhost), the Vite dev server (localhost:5173, 127.0.0.1:5173), and the Tauri dev server (localhost:1420, 127.0.0.1:1420) are allowed. No wildcard (*) origin.
  2. Host allowlist — requests whose Host header is not 127.0.0.1, localhost, or testserver are rejected with 403. This blocks DNS-rebinding attacks that repoint a malicious hostname to 127.0.0.1.
  3. Foreign-Origin POST guard — CORS blocks reading cross-origin responses, but simple POSTs can still execute server-side. State-changing methods (POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE) whose Origin header is not in the allowlist are rejected with 403.

These behaviors are verified in tests/test_local_api_guard.py and tests/test_security_hardening.py.

Credentials and secrets

  • No API keys, tokens, or certificates are committed to this repository.
  • .env.example contains only placeholder comments and example values.
  • .gitignore excludes .env, *.env.*, credential files (*credential*), certificates (*.pem, *.key, *.p12, *.pfx), and model weights (models/).
  • The clipper edition explicitly does not read local API keys (verified in tests/test_security_hardening.py).

Support bundle redaction

The /tester route can export a redacted support bundle. The redaction pass removes:

  • Google API keys
  • OpenAI / Anthropic-style keys
  • Meta (Facebook/Instagram) tokens
  • Discord-shaped tokens
  • TikTok tokens
  • Cloudflare tokens
  • Cloudflare tunnel URLs
  • Generic passwords

Tests in tests/test_security_hardening.py assert these patterns are removed.

Optional cloud judge

A cloud LLM-judge gateway is opt-in and disabled by default:

  • No requests are made unless CLIPPER_GATEWAY_URL is explicitly configured.
  • When configured, the tester_gateway module routes a subset of selection/review calls to the gateway.
  • When not configured, the app falls back to local engines and mocked paths; it never crashes due to a missing gateway.

What the commercial edition adds

The private commercial edition adds authenticated cloud surfaces:

  • Discord Clip Room bot and delivery integration.
  • Cloud gateway with user auth, refresh tokens, and quota accounting.
  • Publishing integrations with third-party platforms (Instagram, TikTok, YouTube).
  • Creator OS chat and memory sync.

These surfaces require tokens, service accounts, and external infrastructure, so they are excluded from the public edition.