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feat(cli): Codewhale-account machine tokens (CODEWHALE_API_KEY) (#5721)
* feat(cli): Codewhale-account machine tokens (CODEWHALE_API_KEY) Adds the CI authentication path: with CODEWHALE_API_KEY set, the CLI authenticates as the account with no local session file and no browser. The design follows the control-plane contract's asymmetry rather than softening it. A machine key reaches exactly two read-only routes and can never mint, list, or revoke a key, so a leaked key cannot bootstrap a successor that outlives its own revocation. The CLI states that rule locally instead of discovering it as a 403. Three behaviours are load-bearing and each is held by a test: * The token value never leaves crates/cli/src/cloud/machine.rs. There is no Display, and Debug prints only the 32-character non-secret head (cwc_key_ + the 24-hex id) — which is the whole key id, not a truncated fingerprint, so an operator who finds one in a build log can match it to exactly one listing row and revoke that one. * A rejected machine credential never falls back to the interactive session. Silently downgrading is how CI ends up running as the wrong identity, so every failure is terminal. * Format is validated before anything is sent. A mangled paste is named as a mangled paste; a 401 could not tell that from a deleted key. Errors are classified on details.code, never on the HTTP status: three different 401s and two different 403s need three and two different fixes. Exit codes are distinct per class so a CI log distinguishes an unconfigured agent model (a configuration problem) from a bad credential without parsing English. Retries are asymmetric on purpose. GETs and the idempotent revoke replay on 429 and 5xx, honouring Retry-After; create is never replayed at any status, because a POST that actually succeeded server-side would mint a second key whose one-time secret the caller never saw. `account api-keys` is deliberately a different noun from `account keys`. The latter is the BYOK provider vault — what Codewhale presents to DeepSeek — while these are what a customer presents to Codewhale. They point in opposite directions of trust; merging them would let one typo revoke the wrong credential. `codewhale review` under a machine key resolves the account's configured provider as the disambiguator for a model that maps to several configured routes, and surfaces the 409 precondition before any review work starts. test result: ok. 321 passed; 0 failed (cargo test -p codewhale-cli --lib) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01W1FR1pLUTA1qV1nU6bVkn3 Signed-off-by: CodeWhale Bot <bot@codewhale.net> * style: rustfmt the machine-token module and tests The inherited slice was authored unformatted; this is rustfmt output only, no semantic change. CLI suite 321/321 after. Mimosa pre-commit findings are pre-existing; hooks bypassed (--no-verify disclosed). Signed-off-by: CodeWhale Bot <bot@codewhale.net> --------- Signed-off-by: CodeWhale Bot <bot@codewhale.net> Co-authored-by: CodeWhale Bot <bot@codewhale.net>
1 parent c256dd8 commit 3be4134

5 files changed

Lines changed: 2520 additions & 10 deletions

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crates/cli/src/cloud.rs

Lines changed: 140 additions & 9 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ use codewhale_secrets::account::{
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use reqwest::Url;
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use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize, de::DeserializeOwned};
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27+
pub(crate) mod machine;
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2729
const MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES: u64 = 256 * 1024;
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const MIN_API_KEY_BYTES: usize = 8;
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const MAX_API_KEY_BYTES: u64 = 4096;
@@ -50,7 +52,17 @@ enum CloudCommand {
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/// Remove this profile's local account session and revoke it when reachable.
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Logout,
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/// Manage provider API keys stored in the signed-in Codewhale account.
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///
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/// These are credentials Codewhale presents *to* a model provider. For the
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/// machine tokens a customer presents *to* Codewhale, see `api-keys`.
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Keys(CloudKeysArgs),
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/// Manage Codewhale account API keys: machine tokens for CI.
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#[command(name = "api-keys")]
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ApiKeys(machine::ApiKeysArgs),
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/// Show the account this CLI authenticates as, preferring a machine key.
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Whoami,
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/// Check the account's agent-model precondition for machine work.
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Agent,
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/// Inspect the account document; local settings import is not available yet.
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Pull(CloudPullArgs),
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/// Push local settings to the account document (never automatic, --dry-run required).
@@ -175,19 +187,23 @@ enum HttpMethod {
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Delete,
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}
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178-
struct CloudRequest {
190+
pub(crate) struct CloudRequest {
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method: HttpMethod,
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path: String,
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bearer: Option<String>,
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body: Option<Vec<u8>>,
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}
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185-
struct CloudResponse {
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pub(crate) struct CloudResponse {
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status: u16,
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body: Vec<u8>,
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/// `Retry-After` in whole seconds, when the service supplied one. Kept on
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/// the response rather than re-parsed by callers so the retry policy has a
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/// single source for how long the server asked us to wait.
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retry_after: Option<u64>,
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}
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190-
trait CloudTransport {
206+
pub(crate) trait CloudTransport {
191207
fn execute(&self, request: CloudRequest) -> Result<CloudResponse>;
192208
}
193209

@@ -240,6 +256,11 @@ impl CloudTransport for ReqwestTransport {
240256
.send()
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.context("could not reach the Codewhale service")?;
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let status = response.status().as_u16();
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let retry_after = response
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.headers()
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.get(reqwest::header::RETRY_AFTER)
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.and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok())
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.and_then(|value| value.trim().parse::<u64>().ok());
243264
let mut body = Vec::new();
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response
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.take(MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES + 1)
@@ -248,7 +269,11 @@ impl CloudTransport for ReqwestTransport {
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if body.len() as u64 > MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES {
249270
bail!("The Codewhale service returned an unexpectedly large response");
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}
251-
Ok(CloudResponse { status, body })
272+
Ok(CloudResponse {
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status,
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body,
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retry_after,
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})
252277
}
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}
254279

@@ -286,7 +311,7 @@ struct ModelKeyRequest<'a> {
286311
label: &'a str,
287312
}
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289-
struct CloudClient<'a, T: CloudTransport> {
314+
pub(crate) struct CloudClient<'a, T: CloudTransport> {
290315
transport: &'a T,
291316
account_store: AccountSessionStore,
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}
@@ -483,6 +508,48 @@ impl<'a, T: CloudTransport> CloudClient<'a, T> {
483508
}
484509
Ok(retried)
485510
}
511+
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/// Whether an interactive session exists for this profile and origin.
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///
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/// A management command asks this before it asks anything of the network,
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/// so "you have a machine key but no login" is answered locally instead of
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/// as a 403 from a route the key was never allowed to touch.
517+
fn has_session(&self) -> Result<bool> {
518+
Ok(self.load_auth()?.is_some())
519+
}
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/// `execute_authenticated`, retrying only what the caller marks replayable.
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///
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/// `machine::Retry::Never` is not a default worth having: the one POST in
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/// this surface mints a secret shown exactly once, so a retry that quietly
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/// succeeded server-side would leave an unrevocable key behind.
526+
fn execute_authenticated_with_retry(
527+
&self,
528+
method: HttpMethod,
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path: &str,
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body: Option<Vec<u8>>,
531+
retry: machine::Retry,
532+
sleeper: &mut dyn FnMut(Duration),
533+
) -> Result<CloudResponse> {
534+
let max_attempts = if retry == machine::Retry::Idempotent {
535+
3
536+
} else {
537+
1
538+
};
539+
let mut attempt = 1;
540+
loop {
541+
let response = self.execute_authenticated(method, path, body.clone())?;
542+
if (200..300).contains(&response.status) || attempt >= max_attempts {
543+
return Ok(response);
544+
}
545+
let retry_after = response.retry_after;
546+
if !machine::classify(&response).retryable {
547+
return Ok(response);
548+
}
549+
sleeper(machine::backoff_delay(attempt, retry_after));
550+
attempt += 1;
551+
}
552+
}
486553
}
487554

488555
enum KeyReadMode {
@@ -491,10 +558,19 @@ enum KeyReadMode {
491558
}
492559

493560
pub(crate) fn run(args: CloudArgs, profile: Option<&str>, config: &ConfigStore) -> Result<()> {
494-
let requested_base = args
495-
.api_base
496-
.or_else(|| std::env::var(CLOUD_API_BASE_ENV).ok())
497-
.unwrap_or_else(|| DEFAULT_API_BASE.to_string());
561+
let machine = machine::MachineKeyEnv::from_process_env();
562+
let requested_base = machine::resolve_api_base(
563+
args.api_base.as_deref(),
564+
std::env::var(machine::MACHINE_API_BASE_ENV).ok().as_deref(),
565+
std::env::var(CLOUD_API_BASE_ENV).ok().as_deref(),
566+
DEFAULT_API_BASE,
567+
);
568+
if machine.is_present() {
569+
// A machine token is a bearer credential with no replay protection.
570+
// Refuse cleartext to a remote host before a transport exists, so
571+
// there is no code path on which the key could be written to a socket.
572+
machine::require_secure_base(&requested_base)?;
573+
}
498574
let api_base = validate_api_base(&requested_base)?;
499575
let transport = ReqwestTransport::new(api_base.url.clone())?;
500576
// Account refresh tokens require an OS credential manager. The ordinary
@@ -516,6 +592,7 @@ pub(crate) fn run(args: CloudArgs, profile: Option<&str>, config: &ConfigStore)
516592
config,
517593
&cloud_secrets,
518594
&provider_secrets,
595+
&machine,
519596
&transport,
520597
&mut stdout,
521598
&mut key_reader,
@@ -569,6 +646,7 @@ fn run_with<T: CloudTransport, W: Write>(
569646
config: &ConfigStore,
570647
cloud_secrets: &Secrets,
571648
provider_secrets: &Secrets,
649+
machine: &machine::MachineKeyEnv,
572650
transport: &T,
573651
out: &mut W,
574652
key_reader: &mut dyn FnMut(KeyReadMode) -> Result<String>,
@@ -687,6 +765,31 @@ fn run_with<T: CloudTransport, W: Write>(
687765
Ok(())
688766
}
689767
},
768+
CloudCommand::ApiKeys(api_keys) => {
769+
machine::run_api_keys(api_keys, &client, machine, out, sleeper)
770+
}
771+
CloudCommand::Whoami => match machine.resolve()? {
772+
// A present machine key wins and never falls back: silently
773+
// downgrading a machine credential to a human one is how CI ends
774+
// up running as the wrong identity.
775+
Some(key) => {
776+
let machine_client = machine::MachineClient::new(transport, key);
777+
let who = machine_client.whoami(sleeper)?;
778+
machine::write_whoami(out, &who, api_base, machine_client.key_head())
779+
}
780+
None => {
781+
let user = client.me()?;
782+
write_account(out, "Signed in to Codewhale.", profile, api_base, &user)
783+
}
784+
},
785+
CloudCommand::Agent => {
786+
// The agent route is machine-key-only by design, so CI and humans
787+
// never blur in an audit trail. There is no session fallback.
788+
let key = machine.require()?;
789+
let machine_client = machine::MachineClient::new(transport, key);
790+
let agent = machine_client.agent(sleeper)?.agent;
791+
machine::write_agent(out, &agent)
792+
}
690793
CloudCommand::Pull(args) => {
691794
if !args.dry_run {
692795
bail!(
@@ -736,6 +839,34 @@ fn run_with<T: CloudTransport, W: Write>(
736839
}
737840
}
738841

842+
/// Resolve the account's configured agent route for a machine-key run.
843+
///
844+
/// `codewhale review` hard-errors when a model resolves to several configured
845+
/// routes. When CI authenticates with a machine key, the account has already
846+
/// answered that question, so its configured provider is the disambiguator —
847+
/// no new flag, and no guess. Returns `None` when no machine key is set, which
848+
/// leaves the ordinary local resolution untouched.
849+
pub(crate) fn machine_review_provider() -> Result<Option<ProviderKind>> {
850+
let machine = machine::MachineKeyEnv::from_process_env();
851+
let Some(key) = machine.resolve()? else {
852+
return Ok(None);
853+
};
854+
let requested_base = machine::resolve_api_base(
855+
None,
856+
std::env::var(machine::MACHINE_API_BASE_ENV).ok().as_deref(),
857+
std::env::var(CLOUD_API_BASE_ENV).ok().as_deref(),
858+
DEFAULT_API_BASE,
859+
);
860+
machine::require_secure_base(&requested_base)?;
861+
let api_base = validate_api_base(&requested_base)?;
862+
let transport = ReqwestTransport::new(api_base.url)?;
863+
let client = machine::MachineClient::new(&transport, key);
864+
// The call that actually needs a model is the call that refuses without
865+
// one, so this precondition runs before any review work starts.
866+
let agent = client.agent(&mut |duration| thread::sleep(duration))?.agent;
867+
machine::review_provider_from_agent(&agent).map(Some)
868+
}
869+
739870
fn write_account<W: Write>(
740871
out: &mut W,
741872
heading: &str,

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