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Node and EL. But is this a physical scope separation? Need to learn more.
EOA controlled by key pair. Contract controlled by code.
Every smart contract's persistent storage is just an array of 32 bytes. The root is a MPT hash. Does balance take up space of storage? Nope
Messages are just tx from contract without signature but then how do other contracts know the message is from the initial contract? And how does EVM verify the message (virtual tx)?
https://cs251.stanford.edu/lectures/lecture7.pdf [0]
Block Data Structure: world state root has MPT hash of all accounts on Ethereum.
It takes 16tb to run an archive node rn.
EVM still uses stack (max: 1024) to execute code but with JUMP instruction code.
Burn ether preventing off-chain fee refund agreement to proposers (I did not think before). A proposer could create/encourage fake txs to farm more ether reward if eth not burned and refund gas fee off-chain. The fee they paid would be less than eth reward to block proposer which is the case given there is ether inflation for block proposers. But why would proposers be incentivized to do this? They could just collect reward from block building without the trouble of creating fake txs unless the block reward is proportional to the txs they included?
In bitcoin's world, miners have fixed cost for mining the block but they do get fee reward as well. So this could apply to Bitcoin as well.
It is not due to the block reward as it is not proportional to the txs they included. But for the following reasons:
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Proposers could fake transactions to create an impression/illusion of higher activity on the chain. Given if they could get the gas fee back, the cost of artificially creating txs is very low (transaction fee + effort to inflate txs). But that would require you control majority of the validator nodes or can reliably predict the next block proposer. The former could be the case actually right now? Given there are 2-3 block builders building most of the blocks (builder == proposer?)
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To bid up the gas fee so other users have to pay more to get their txs included. This could require the same condition as above. As you intentionally pay a higher gas fee but can recover most of it back. It would be in the interest of proposers to do so. This would apply to Bitcoin as well. If majority of mining pools have an agreement. Could very well be the case for other chains.
Gas fee before EIP-1559 feels like a spam preventing mechanism rather than a fee market which prices different resources.
Encrypted mempool: total gas case has to be unencrypted. Cosmos has encrypted mempool. General idea no one have seen a complete solution available yet.
An epoch has 32 slots.
A validator will be randomly selected to be a proposer for a slot. So the validator is the proposer.
1 slot has 3 phases and a block:
propagation (broadcast) attestation aggregation (fork for a block (not sure if this is only rely to fork rule or other rules)) aggre propagration: broadcast the voted block
finality
first justifiy a block which mean 2/3 has pass the checkpoint ( what is checkpoint cmp to block? ) for it then the last justified block is the finalized block.
12s for a slot is based on the block time of PoW ETH
why have a slot instead of a block?
proposer can reorder txs in a slot. so I guess other validators has no way to verify the order of txs in a block when they attest to it. I guess this is why validators only follow the fork-choice rule
given the deadline for attesetion is 4 seconds, so that give you some idea on how much bot could MEV using the time advantage.
actually once is a validator is chosen to be a proposer, it can know therefore it could time the opportunity to spam txs.
https://www.paradigm.xyz/2023/04/mev-boost-ethereum-consensus https://epf.wiki/#/eps/week3
a commmitte is of 128 validators. a validator run a beacon node
still not sure why a committe concept is needed after watch all these video
PoW consensus use economic (hash power) to reach consensus which looks a lot simpler. Through it does give entity who has most computing power an advantage so it is more close to "real" economy where PoS could at certain time depeg from real economy power. As long as stakeholder/token holder has a little real world economy power(pay for server and bandwdith). (eth will have price but it is less impact by commodity price such as electricity ) it is easier to develop as independent set of stakerholders on its own economy compare to Bitcoin i.e. if someone is very good at investing/trading, he or she could acquire ether at lower price. But you alway need to pay for a market price for electricity. PoW resets the game each time but does make bitcoin's opeartion more close to "real world"
fork choice rule == LMD GHOST