Bump github.com/opencontainers/runc from 1.3.2 to 1.3.3

[dependabot]

Bumps github.com/opencontainers/runc from 1.3.2 to 1.3.3.

Release notes

Sourced from github.com/opencontainers/runc's releases.

runc v1.3.3 -- "奴らに支配されていた恐怖を"

[!NOTE] Some vendors were given a pre-release version of this release. This public release includes two extra patches to fix regressions discovered very late during the embargo period and were thus not included in the pre-release versions. Please update to this version.

This release contains fixes for three high-severity security vulnerabilities in runc (CVE-2025-31133, CVE-2025-52565, and CVE-2025-52881). All three vulnerabilities ultimately allow (through different methods) for full container breakouts by bypassing runc's restrictions for writing to arbitrary /proc files.

Security

• CVE-2025-31133 exploits an issue with how masked paths are implemented in runc. When masking files, runc will bind-mount the container's /dev/null inode on top of the file. However, if an attacker can replace /dev/null with a symlink to some other procfs file, runc will instead bind-mount the symlink target read-write. This issue affected all known runc versions.

• CVE-2025-52565 is very similar in concept and application to CVE-2025-31133, except that it exploits a flaw in /dev/console bind-mounts. When creating the /dev/console bind-mount (to /dev/pts/$n), if an attacker replaces /dev/pts/$n with a symlink then runc will bind-mount the symlink target over /dev/console. This issue affected all versions of runc >= 1.0.0-rc3.

• CVE-2025-52881 is a more sophisticated variant of CVE-2019-19921, which was a flaw that allowed an attacker to trick runc into writing the LSM process labels for a container process into a dummy tmpfs file and thus not apply the correct LSM labels to the container process. The mitigation we applied for CVE-2019-19921 was fairly limited and effectively only caused runc to verify that when we write LSM labels that those labels are actual procfs files. This issue affects all known runc versions.

Added

• runc update now supports configuring per-device weights and iops. (#4775, #4807, #4825, #4931)

Static Linking Notices

The runc binary distributed with this release are statically linked with the following [GNU LGPL-2.1][lgpl-2.1] licensed libraries, with runc acting

... (truncated)

Changelog

Sourced from github.com/opencontainers/runc's changelog.

[1.3.3] - 2025-11-05

奴らに支配されていた恐怖を

Security

This release includes fixes for the following high-severity security issues:

• CVE-2025-31133 exploits an issue with how masked paths are implemented in runc. When masking files, runc will bind-mount the container's /dev/null inode on top of the file. However, if an attacker can replace /dev/null with a symlink to some other procfs file, runc will instead bind-mount the symlink target read-write. This issue affected all known runc versions.

• CVE-2025-52565 is very similar in concept and application to CVE-2025-31133, except that it exploits a flaw in /dev/console bind-mounts. When creating the /dev/console bind-mount (to /dev/pts/$n), if an attacker replaces /dev/pts/$n with a symlink then runc will bind-mount the symlink target over /dev/console. This issue affected all versions of runc >= 1.0.0-rc3.

• CVE-2025-52881 is a more sophisticated variant of CVE-2019-19921, which was a flaw that allowed an attacker to trick runc into writing the LSM process labels for a container process into a dummy tmpfs file and thus not apply the correct LSM labels to the container process. The mitigation we applied for CVE-2019-19921 was fairly limited and effectively only caused runc to verify that when we write LSM labels that those labels are actual procfs files. This issue affects all known runc versions.

Added

• runc update now supports configuring per-device weights and iops. (#4775, #4807, #4825, #4931)

Commits

• d842d77 VERSION: release v1.3.3
• b370baf merge private security patches into ghsa-release-1.3.3
• 4edba17 rootfs: re-allow dangling symlinks in mount targets
• aca52c4 openat2: improve resilience on busy systems
• 8b7e3d7 merge #4931 into opencontainers/runc:release-1.3
• 2e82e55 tests: bfq: skip tests on misbehaving udev systems
• f1627a7 tests: clean up loopback devices properly
• 178e03c tests/int/update: fix getting block major
• f14cad5 runc update: handle duplicated devs properly
• 80da60e runc update: support per-device weight and iops
• Additional commits viewable in compare view

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