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What NeoAgent is allowed to do, where each capability runs, and the limits to know before connecting accounts.
Security and permissions
Server-side checks decide what the agent may do; model instructions are not a security boundary.
NeoAgent reads web pages, email, messages, files, integration and MCP results, and any of it can carry prompt injection.
🛂 Tool permissions {#tool-permissions}
Set them under Settings › Permissions. Built-in tools outside these categories (reading files, browsing, memory, tasks, messaging) run without a prompt, subject to run trust.
http_request with any method except GET, HEAD or OPTIONS
Ask me
Call User
call_user
Ask me
Skill Changes
create_skill, update_skill, delete_skill
Block
External & MCP Tools
Integration tools, MCP tools and any other tool not built into NeoAgent
Ask me
Setting
Effect
Block
The tool never runs
Ask me
The run pauses until you decide
Allow
The tool runs without asking until you change it
When a run pauses, the prompt states why and offers four answers:
Deny. The call is blocked and the model is told not to retry.
Allow once. This call only.
Allow session. This tool for the rest of the run.
Always allow. Sets the whole category to Allow.
30-second timeout. An unanswered prompt blocks the call.
Global security mode
Mode
Behaviour
Default (recommended)
The category settings above apply
Always ask
Every categorized tool asks; Block still blocks
Allow all
No prompts and no Block; only manager limits and who-is-asking checks remain
Server override.NEOAGENT_TOOL_SECURITY_MODE (default, always_ask or allow_all) forces one mode for every account.
Managers win. A category a manager switched off stays off in every mode.
🧭 Run trust {#run-trust}
Server code tracks who each run acts for and what it has read, so a persuaded model cannot argue past these checks.
Who is asking
Run started from
Acts for
The app, CLI, voice, wearable, your own tasks, your WhatsApp self-chat, a DM from an approved sender
You
A group chat, or a DM let in by an Anyone policy
Someone else
A GitHub mention thread
The public, limited to a fixed tool list
Runs for someone else may reply in their chat, search the web and use media sent with the message; anything else asks.
Approved people in a group. A message from a person you approved by name (not by role) skips that question, so your own requests in a group follow your security mode. The run still uses channel memory and the group persona.
Slash commands such as /memory and /tasks answer only senders who act for you.
Channel memory. Runs for someone else use memory scoped to that chat and never see your core memory.
What it has read
A run becomes tainted once it reads outside content (any tool result except the agent's own bookkeeping, or an event-triggered task's payload), and then asks you before it:
Call
Why
Messages or emails a recipient you did not name
Injected text could pick where data goes
Sends a write request (POST, PUT, …) to a host you did not name
Same, for webhooks and APIs
Puts a credential-shaped string or a server secret in an outbound argument
Credential exfiltration
Creates or edits a task, core memory or skill, or adds an MCP server
The injection would outlive the run
Replies stay quiet. Answers to the originating chat, and notifications to a task's configured target, do not ask.
Marked memories. Memories saved by a tainted run are tagged external-source and cannot silently replace established facts.
Shared trust. Subagents and delegated agents share their parent's trust record.
Allow all skips taint checks but never the who-is-asking checks.
Content handling
Fenced data. Messages, channel history, voice transcripts and event payloads are wrapped as data; the fence cannot be closed from inside.
Invisible characters. Unicode tag characters, supplementary variation selectors and bidi overrides are stripped from tool arguments and results.
No auto-loaded images. Images in agent replies show as a link chip that opens only on tap.