Sikkerhet og Multi-Tenancy

🎯 Hva Denne Labben Dekker

Denne labben gir omfattende veiledning om hvordan man implementerer sikkerhet i bedriftsklasse og multi-tenancy for MCP-servere. Du vil lære å designe sikre, kompatible systemer som beskytter sensitiv detaljhandelsdata samtidig som du muliggjør fleksible tilgangsmønstre på tvers av flere leietakere.

Oversikt

Sikkerhet er avgjørende i detaljhandelsapplikasjoner som håndterer kundedata, betalingsinformasjon og forretningsintelligens. Denne labben dekker hele sikkerhetsarkitekturen fra autentisering og autorisasjon til dataisolasjon og samsvarsmonitorering.

Vi implementerer en "defense-in-depth"-strategi som kombinerer Azure identitetstjenester, PostgreSQL Row Level Security, applikasjonsnivåkontroller og omfattende revisjonslogging for å skape en robust, kompatibel plattform.

Læringsmål

Ved slutten av denne labben vil du kunne:

Implementere Row Level Security i bedriftsklasse for dataisolasjon mellom leietakere
Designe sikre autentiserings- og autorisasjonsmønstre med Azure
Konfigurere omfattende revisjonslogging for samsvarskrav
Anvende "defense-in-depth"-sikkerhetsstrategier på alle applikasjonslag
Validere sikkerhetsimplementeringer gjennom systematisk testing
Overvåke sikkerhetshendelser og reagere på potensielle trusler

🔐 Multi-Tenant Sikkerhetsarkitektur

Oversikt over Sikkerhetslag

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│               Azure Front Door                  │ ← WAF, DDoS Protection
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│              Application Gateway                │ ← SSL Termination, Rate Limiting
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                MCP Server                       │ ← Authentication, Authorization
│  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  │           Connection Layer                  │ ← Connection Pooling, Circuit Breakers
│  ├─────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  │         Business Logic Layer               │ ← Input Validation, Business Rules
│  ├─────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  │           Data Access Layer                │ ← Query Sanitization, RLS Context
│  └─────────────────────────────────────────────┤
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│              PostgreSQL RLS                    │ ← Row Level Security, Audit Triggers
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Multi-Tenancy Modeller

Vår implementering bruker modellen Shared Database, Shared Schema med Row Level Security:

Fordeler:

Kostnadseffektiv ressursutnyttelse
Forenklet vedlikehold og oppdateringer
Sterk dataisolasjon gjennom RLS
Samsvarsvennlige revisjonsspor

Ulemper:

Krever nøye design av RLS-policyer
Skjemaendringer påvirker alle leietakere
Behov for robuste backup/gjenopprettingsprosedyrer

🛡️ Implementering av Row Level Security

Grunnlaget for RLS

-- Enable RLS on all multi-tenant tables
ALTER TABLE retail.customers ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
ALTER TABLE retail.products ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
ALTER TABLE retail.sales_transactions ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
ALTER TABLE retail.sales_transaction_items ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
ALTER TABLE retail.product_embeddings ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;

-- Create application role for MCP server
CREATE ROLE mcp_user LOGIN;
GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA retail TO mcp_user;
GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA retail TO mcp_user;

Administrasjon av Butikkontekst

-- Function to securely set store context
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION retail.set_store_context(store_id_param VARCHAR(50))
RETURNS void
LANGUAGE plpgsql
SECURITY DEFINER
SET search_path = retail, pg_temp
AS $$
DECLARE
    user_info RECORD;
BEGIN
    -- Validate store exists and is active
    SELECT store_id, store_name, is_active 
    INTO user_info
    FROM retail.stores 
    WHERE store_id = store_id_param;
    
    IF NOT FOUND THEN
        RAISE EXCEPTION 'Store not found: %', store_id_param
            USING ERRCODE = 'invalid_parameter_value',
                  HINT = 'Verify store ID and ensure it exists in the system';
    END IF;
    
    IF NOT user_info.is_active THEN
        RAISE EXCEPTION 'Store is inactive: %', store_id_param
            USING ERRCODE = 'insufficient_privilege',
                  HINT = 'Contact administrator to activate store';
    END IF;
    
    -- Set the secure context
    PERFORM set_config('app.current_store_id', store_id_param, false);
    PERFORM set_config('app.store_name', user_info.store_name, false);
    PERFORM set_config('app.context_set_at', extract(epoch from current_timestamp)::text, false);
    
    -- Log context change for audit
    INSERT INTO retail.security_audit_log (
        event_type,
        user_name,
        store_id,
        ip_address,
        user_agent,
        details,
        severity
    ) VALUES (
        'store_context_set',
        current_user,
        store_id_param,
        inet_client_addr()::text,
        current_setting('application_name', true),
        jsonb_build_object(
            'store_name', user_info.store_name,
            'timestamp', current_timestamp,
            'session_id', pg_backend_pid()
        ),
        'INFO'
    );
END;
$$;

-- Grant execute to MCP user
GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION retail.set_store_context TO mcp_user;

RLS-policyer

-- Customers RLS Policy
CREATE POLICY customers_store_isolation ON retail.customers
    FOR ALL
    TO mcp_user
    USING (
        store_id = current_setting('app.current_store_id', true)
        AND current_setting('app.current_store_id', true) IS NOT NULL
        AND current_setting('app.current_store_id', true) != ''
    )
    WITH CHECK (
        store_id = current_setting('app.current_store_id', true)
        AND current_setting('app.current_store_id', true) IS NOT NULL
        AND current_setting('app.current_store_id', true) != ''
    );

-- Products RLS Policy with additional business rules
CREATE POLICY products_store_isolation ON retail.products
    FOR ALL
    TO mcp_user
    USING (
        store_id = current_setting('app.current_store_id', true)
        AND current_setting('app.current_store_id', true) IS NOT NULL
        AND current_setting('app.current_store_id', true) != ''
        AND is_active = TRUE  -- Additional business rule
    )
    WITH CHECK (
        store_id = current_setting('app.current_store_id', true)
        AND current_setting('app.current_store_id', true) IS NOT NULL
        AND current_setting('app.current_store_id', true) != ''
    );

-- Sales Transactions RLS Policy
CREATE POLICY sales_transactions_store_isolation ON retail.sales_transactions
    FOR ALL
    TO mcp_user
    USING (
        store_id = current_setting('app.current_store_id', true)
        AND current_setting('app.current_store_id', true) IS NOT NULL
        AND current_setting('app.current_store_id', true) != ''
    )
    WITH CHECK (
        store_id = current_setting('app.current_store_id', true)
        AND current_setting('app.current_store_id', true) IS NOT NULL
        AND current_setting('app.current_store_id', true) != ''
    );

-- Transaction Items RLS Policy (via join)
CREATE POLICY sales_transaction_items_store_isolation ON retail.sales_transaction_items
    FOR ALL
    TO mcp_user
    USING (
        transaction_id IN (
            SELECT transaction_id 
            FROM retail.sales_transactions 
            WHERE store_id = current_setting('app.current_store_id', true)
        )
    )
    WITH CHECK (
        transaction_id IN (
            SELECT transaction_id 
            FROM retail.sales_transactions 
            WHERE store_id = current_setting('app.current_store_id', true)
        )
    );

-- Product Embeddings RLS Policy
CREATE POLICY product_embeddings_store_isolation ON retail.product_embeddings
    FOR ALL
    TO mcp_user
    USING (
        store_id = current_setting('app.current_store_id', true)
        AND current_setting('app.current_store_id', true) IS NOT NULL
        AND current_setting('app.current_store_id', true) != ''
    )
    WITH CHECK (
        store_id = current_setting('app.current_store_id', true)
        AND current_setting('app.current_store_id', true) IS NOT NULL
        AND current_setting('app.current_store_id', true) != ''
    );

Testing og Validering av RLS

-- Test RLS policies with different store contexts
DO $$
DECLARE
    test_result RECORD;
    customer_count INTEGER;
    product_count INTEGER;
BEGIN
    -- Test Seattle store context
    PERFORM retail.set_store_context('seattle');
    
    SELECT COUNT(*) INTO customer_count FROM retail.customers;
    SELECT COUNT(*) INTO product_count FROM retail.products;
    
    RAISE NOTICE 'Seattle store - Customers: %, Products: %', customer_count, product_count;
    
    -- Test Redmond store context
    PERFORM retail.set_store_context('redmond');
    
    SELECT COUNT(*) INTO customer_count FROM retail.customers;
    SELECT COUNT(*) INTO product_count FROM retail.products;
    
    RAISE NOTICE 'Redmond store - Customers: %, Products: %', customer_count, product_count;
    
    -- Verify data isolation
    IF customer_count > 0 AND product_count > 0 THEN
        RAISE NOTICE 'RLS policies are working correctly';
    ELSE
        RAISE WARNING 'RLS policies may not be configured correctly';
    END IF;
END;
$$;

🔑 Autentisering og Autorisasjon

Integrasjon med Azure Entra ID

# mcp_server/security/authentication.py
"""
Azure Entra ID authentication for MCP server.
"""
import os
import jwt
import aiohttp
import asyncio
from typing import Dict, Optional, List
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from azure.identity.aio import DefaultAzureCredential
from azure.keyvault.secrets.aio import SecretClient
import logging

logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)

class AzureAuthenticator:
    """Handle Azure Entra ID authentication and token validation."""
    
    def __init__(self):
        self.tenant_id = os.getenv('AZURE_TENANT_ID')
        self.client_id = os.getenv('AZURE_CLIENT_ID')
        self.audience = os.getenv('AZURE_AUDIENCE', self.client_id)
        self.issuer = f"https://login.microsoftonline.com/{self.tenant_id}/v2.0"
        
        # Cache for JWKS (JSON Web Key Set)
        self._jwks_cache = None
        self._jwks_cache_expiry = None
        
        # Key Vault for secrets
        self.key_vault_url = os.getenv('AZURE_KEY_VAULT_URL')
        self.credential = DefaultAzureCredential()
        
        if self.key_vault_url:
            self.secret_client = SecretClient(
                vault_url=self.key_vault_url,
                credential=self.credential
            )
    
    async def validate_token(self, token: str) -> Dict:
        """Validate JWT token from Azure Entra ID."""
        
        try:
            # Get signing keys
            signing_keys = await self._get_signing_keys()
            
            # Decode token header to get key ID
            unverified_header = jwt.get_unverified_header(token)
            key_id = unverified_header.get('kid')
            
            if not key_id:
                raise ValueError("Token missing key ID")
            
            # Find the corresponding key
            signing_key = None
            for key in signing_keys:
                if key['kid'] == key_id:
                    signing_key = jwt.algorithms.RSAAlgorithm.from_jwk(key)
                    break
            
            if not signing_key:
                raise ValueError(f"Unable to find signing key for kid: {key_id}")
            
            # Validate and decode token
            payload = jwt.decode(
                token,
                signing_key,
                algorithms=['RS256'],
                audience=self.audience,
                issuer=self.issuer,
                options={
                    'verify_exp': True,
                    'verify_aud': True,
                    'verify_iss': True
                }
            )
            
            # Extract user information
            user_info = self._extract_user_info(payload)
            
            # Log successful authentication
            logger.info(
                "User authenticated successfully",
                extra={
                    'user_id': user_info['user_id'],
                    'email': user_info.get('email'),
                    'tenant_id': payload.get('tid')
                }
            )
            
            return user_info
            
        except jwt.ExpiredSignatureError:
            logger.warning("Token has expired")
            raise ValueError("Token has expired")
        except jwt.InvalidAudienceError:
            logger.warning(f"Invalid audience in token. Expected: {self.audience}")
            raise ValueError("Invalid token audience")
        except jwt.InvalidIssuerError:
            logger.warning(f"Invalid issuer in token. Expected: {self.issuer}")
            raise ValueError("Invalid token issuer")
        except Exception as e:
            logger.error(f"Token validation failed: {str(e)}")
            raise ValueError(f"Token validation failed: {str(e)}")
    
    async def _get_signing_keys(self) -> List[Dict]:
        """Get JWKS from Azure Entra ID with caching."""
        
        current_time = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
        
        # Check if cache is valid
        if (self._jwks_cache and self._jwks_cache_expiry and 
            current_time < self._jwks_cache_expiry):
            return self._jwks_cache
        
        # Fetch new JWKS
        jwks_url = f"{self.issuer}/keys"
        
        async with aiohttp.ClientSession() as session:
            async with session.get(jwks_url) as response:
                if response.status != 200:
                    raise Exception(f"Failed to fetch JWKS: {response.status}")
                
                jwks_data = await response.json()
                
        # Cache for 1 hour
        self._jwks_cache = jwks_data['keys']
        self._jwks_cache_expiry = current_time.replace(
            hour=current_time.hour + 1
        )
        
        return self._jwks_cache
    
    def _extract_user_info(self, payload: Dict) -> Dict:
        """Extract user information from JWT payload."""
        
        return {
            'user_id': payload.get('oid') or payload.get('sub'),
            'email': payload.get('email') or payload.get('preferred_username'),
            'name': payload.get('name'),
            'tenant_id': payload.get('tid'),
            'roles': payload.get('roles', []),
            'groups': payload.get('groups', []),
            'app_roles': payload.get('app_roles', []),
            'scope': payload.get('scp', '').split() if payload.get('scp') else [],
            'expires_at': datetime.fromtimestamp(payload['exp'], timezone.utc),
            'issued_at': datetime.fromtimestamp(payload['iat'], timezone.utc)
        }
    
    async def get_user_store_access(self, user_id: str) -> List[str]:
        """Get list of stores the user has access to."""
        
        try:
            # This would typically query your user/store mapping
            # For demo, we'll use a simple Key Vault secret
            secret_name = f"user-{user_id}-stores"
            
            if self.secret_client:
                secret = await self.secret_client.get_secret(secret_name)
                store_list = secret.value.split(',')
                return [store.strip() for store in store_list if store.strip()]
            
            # Fallback: return default store access
            logger.warning(f"No store mapping found for user {user_id}, using default")
            return ['seattle']  # Default store access
            
        except Exception as e:
            logger.error(f"Failed to get store access for user {user_id}: {e}")
            return []  # No access if we can't determine stores

# Global authenticator instance
azure_authenticator = AzureAuthenticator()

Autorisasjons-Middleware

# mcp_server/security/authorization.py
"""
Authorization middleware and decorators for MCP server.
"""
import functools
from typing import Dict, List, Optional, Callable, Any
from fastapi import HTTPException, status, Request
from fastapi.security import HTTPBearer, HTTPAuthorizationCredentials
import logging

logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)

security = HTTPBearer()

class AuthorizationError(Exception):
    """Custom authorization error."""
    pass

class RoleBasedAuth:
    """Role-based access control implementation."""
    
    # Define role hierarchy
    ROLE_HIERARCHY = {
        'store_admin': ['store_manager', 'store_user', 'store_readonly'],
        'store_manager': ['store_user', 'store_readonly'],
        'store_user': ['store_readonly'],
        'store_readonly': []
    }
    
    # Define permissions for each role
    ROLE_PERMISSIONS = {
        'store_admin': [
            'read_all', 'write_all', 'delete_all', 'manage_users'
        ],
        'store_manager': [
            'read_all', 'write_transactions', 'write_inventory', 'read_reports'
        ],
        'store_user': [
            'read_products', 'read_customers', 'write_transactions'
        ],
        'store_readonly': [
            'read_products', 'read_basic_reports'
        ]
    }
    
    @classmethod
    def has_permission(cls, user_roles: List[str], required_permission: str) -> bool:
        """Check if user has required permission."""
        
        user_permissions = set()
        
        for role in user_roles:
            # Add direct permissions
            user_permissions.update(cls.ROLE_PERMISSIONS.get(role, []))
            
            # Add inherited permissions
            inherited_roles = cls.ROLE_HIERARCHY.get(role, [])
            for inherited_role in inherited_roles:
                user_permissions.update(cls.ROLE_PERMISSIONS.get(inherited_role, []))
        
        return required_permission in user_permissions
    
    @classmethod
    def get_user_stores(cls, user_info: Dict) -> List[str]:
        """Extract stores user has access to from user info."""
        
        # This would typically come from your user management system
        # For demo, we'll extract from custom claims or groups
        
        stores = []
        
        # Check for direct store assignments in groups
        for group in user_info.get('groups', []):
            if group.startswith('store_'):
                store_id = group.replace('store_', '')
                stores.append(store_id)
        
        # Check for app-specific roles
        for role in user_info.get('app_roles', []):
            if 'store:' in role:
                _, store_id = role.split('store:', 1)
                stores.append(store_id)
        
        return list(set(stores))  # Remove duplicates

def require_auth(required_permission: str = None, require_store_access: bool = True):
    """Decorator to require authentication and authorization."""
    
    def decorator(func: Callable) -> Callable:
        @functools.wraps(func)
        async def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
            # Extract request from args (FastAPI dependency injection)
            request = None
            for arg in args:
                if isinstance(arg, Request):
                    request = arg
                    break
            
            if not request:
                raise HTTPException(
                    status_code=status.HTTP_500_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
                    detail="Request object not found"
                )
            
            # Get authorization header
            auth_header = request.headers.get('Authorization')
            if not auth_header or not auth_header.startswith('Bearer '):
                raise HTTPException(
                    status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
                    detail="Missing or invalid authorization header",
                    headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Bearer"}
                )
            
            token = auth_header.split(' ')[1]
            
            try:
                # Validate token
                user_info = await azure_authenticator.validate_token(token)
                
                # Check required permission
                if required_permission:
                    user_roles = user_info.get('roles', [])
                    if not RoleBasedAuth.has_permission(user_roles, required_permission):
                        raise HTTPException(
                            status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
                            detail=f"Insufficient permissions. Required: {required_permission}"
                        )
                
                # Check store access
                if require_store_access:
                    user_stores = RoleBasedAuth.get_user_stores(user_info)
                    if not user_stores:
                        raise HTTPException(
                            status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
                            detail="No store access configured for user"
                        )
                    
                    # Set default store context (first accessible store)
                    request.state.current_store = user_stores[0]
                    request.state.accessible_stores = user_stores
                
                # Add user info to request state
                request.state.user_info = user_info
                request.state.user_id = user_info['user_id']
                
                # Call the original function
                return await func(*args, **kwargs)
                
            except ValueError as e:
                raise HTTPException(
                    status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
                    detail=str(e),
                    headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Bearer"}
                )
            except AuthorizationError as e:
                raise HTTPException(
                    status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
                    detail=str(e)
                )
        
        return wrapper
    return decorator

def require_store_context(store_param: str = 'store_id'):
    """Decorator to validate and set store context."""
    
    def decorator(func: Callable) -> Callable:
        @functools.wraps(func)
        async def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
            # Get store_id from kwargs
            store_id = kwargs.get(store_param)
            
            if not store_id:
                raise HTTPException(
                    status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
                    detail=f"Missing required parameter: {store_param}"
                )
            
            # Extract request from args
            request = None
            for arg in args:
                if isinstance(arg, Request):
                    request = arg
                    break
            
            if not request or not hasattr(request.state, 'accessible_stores'):
                raise HTTPException(
                    status_code=status.HTTP_500_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
                    detail="Authentication required before store context validation"
                )
            
            # Validate user has access to requested store
            if store_id not in request.state.accessible_stores:
                raise HTTPException(
                    status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
                    detail=f"Access denied to store: {store_id}"
                )
            
            # Set store context in request state
            request.state.current_store = store_id
            
            return await func(*args, **kwargs)
        
        return wrapper
    return decorator

🔍 Revisjon og Samsvar

Omfattende Revisjonslogging

-- Security audit log table
CREATE TABLE retail.security_audit_log (
    log_id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT uuid_generate_v4(),
    event_type VARCHAR(100) NOT NULL,
    user_name VARCHAR(100) NOT NULL,
    user_id VARCHAR(100),
    store_id VARCHAR(50),
    ip_address INET,
    user_agent TEXT,
    request_id VARCHAR(100),
    session_id VARCHAR(100),
    resource_type VARCHAR(100),
    resource_id VARCHAR(100),
    action VARCHAR(50) NOT NULL,
    success BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT TRUE,
    failure_reason TEXT,
    details JSONB,
    severity VARCHAR(20) DEFAULT 'INFO',
    created_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
    
    -- Ensure proper indexing for security queries
    CONSTRAINT valid_severity CHECK (severity IN ('DEBUG', 'INFO', 'WARN', 'ERROR', 'CRITICAL'))
);

-- Indexes for security audit queries
CREATE INDEX idx_security_audit_event_type ON retail.security_audit_log(event_type);
CREATE INDEX idx_security_audit_user_name ON retail.security_audit_log(user_name);
CREATE INDEX idx_security_audit_store_id ON retail.security_audit_log(store_id);
CREATE INDEX idx_security_audit_created_at ON retail.security_audit_log(created_at);
CREATE INDEX idx_security_audit_success ON retail.security_audit_log(success);
CREATE INDEX idx_security_audit_severity ON retail.security_audit_log(severity);
CREATE INDEX idx_security_audit_details ON retail.security_audit_log USING GIN(details);

-- Function to log security events
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION retail.log_security_event(
    p_event_type VARCHAR(100),
    p_user_name VARCHAR(100),
    p_user_id VARCHAR(100) DEFAULT NULL,
    p_store_id VARCHAR(50) DEFAULT NULL,
    p_ip_address TEXT DEFAULT NULL,
    p_action VARCHAR(50) DEFAULT 'unknown',
    p_success BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
    p_failure_reason TEXT DEFAULT NULL,
    p_details JSONB DEFAULT NULL,
    p_severity VARCHAR(20) DEFAULT 'INFO'
)
RETURNS UUID
LANGUAGE plpgsql
SECURITY DEFINER
AS $$
DECLARE
    log_id UUID;
BEGIN
    INSERT INTO retail.security_audit_log (
        event_type,
        user_name,
        user_id,
        store_id,
        ip_address,
        action,
        success,
        failure_reason,
        details,
        severity
    ) VALUES (
        p_event_type,
        p_user_name,
        p_user_id,
        p_store_id,
        p_ip_address::INET,
        p_action,
        p_success,
        p_failure_reason,
        p_details,
        p_severity
    ) RETURNING log_id INTO log_id;
    
    RETURN log_id;
END;
$$;

-- Grant execute to MCP user
GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION retail.log_security_event TO mcp_user;

Sikkerhetsmonitoreringsvisninger

-- Failed authentication attempts
CREATE VIEW retail.security_failed_auth AS
SELECT 
    event_type,
    user_name,
    ip_address,
    COUNT(*) as attempt_count,
    MIN(created_at) as first_attempt,
    MAX(created_at) as last_attempt,
    ARRAY_AGG(DISTINCT failure_reason) as failure_reasons
FROM retail.security_audit_log
WHERE success = FALSE 
  AND event_type IN ('authentication_failed', 'token_validation_failed')
  AND created_at >= CURRENT_TIMESTAMP - INTERVAL '24 hours'
GROUP BY event_type, user_name, ip_address
HAVING COUNT(*) >= 3  -- 3 or more failures
ORDER BY attempt_count DESC, last_attempt DESC;

-- Suspicious access patterns
CREATE VIEW retail.security_suspicious_access AS
SELECT 
    user_name,
    user_id,
    COUNT(DISTINCT ip_address) as ip_count,
    COUNT(DISTINCT store_id) as store_count,
    ARRAY_AGG(DISTINCT ip_address::TEXT) as ip_addresses,
    ARRAY_AGG(DISTINCT store_id) as stores_accessed,
    MIN(created_at) as first_access,
    MAX(created_at) as last_access
FROM retail.security_audit_log
WHERE created_at >= CURRENT_TIMESTAMP - INTERVAL '1 hour'
  AND success = TRUE
GROUP BY user_name, user_id
HAVING COUNT(DISTINCT ip_address) > 3  -- Access from multiple IPs
   OR COUNT(DISTINCT store_id) > 2     -- Access to multiple stores
ORDER BY ip_count DESC, store_count DESC;

-- Data access patterns
CREATE VIEW retail.security_data_access_summary AS
SELECT 
    DATE_TRUNC('hour', created_at) as access_hour,
    store_id,
    resource_type,
    action,
    COUNT(*) as access_count,
    COUNT(DISTINCT user_id) as unique_users
FROM retail.security_audit_log
WHERE resource_type IS NOT NULL
  AND created_at >= CURRENT_TIMESTAMP - INTERVAL '24 hours'
GROUP BY DATE_TRUNC('hour', created_at), store_id, resource_type, action
ORDER BY access_hour DESC, access_count DESC;

Overvåking av Sikkerhetshendelser

# mcp_server/security/monitoring.py
"""
Security monitoring and alerting for MCP server.
"""
import asyncio
import asyncpg
from typing import Dict, List, Any
from datetime import datetime, timedelta
from dataclasses import dataclass
import logging

logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)

@dataclass
class SecurityAlert:
    """Security alert data structure."""
    alert_type: str
    severity: str
    message: str
    details: Dict[str, Any]
    timestamp: datetime

class SecurityMonitor:
    """Monitor security events and generate alerts."""
    
    def __init__(self, db_connection_string: str):
        self.db_connection_string = db_connection_string
        self.alert_handlers = []
        
        # Alert thresholds
        self.thresholds = {
            'failed_auth_attempts': 5,      # per user per hour
            'multiple_ip_access': 3,        # different IPs per user per hour
            'excessive_data_access': 1000,  # queries per user per hour
            'privilege_escalation': 1,      # any attempt
            'unauthorized_store_access': 1  # any attempt
        }
    
    async def start_monitoring(self):
        """Start security monitoring loop."""
        logger.info("Starting security monitoring")
        
        while True:
            try:
                await self._check_security_events()
                await asyncio.sleep(300)  # Check every 5 minutes
            except Exception as e:
                logger.error(f"Security monitoring error: {e}")
                await asyncio.sleep(60)  # Short retry on error
    
    async def _check_security_events(self):
        """Check for security events and generate alerts."""
        
        conn = await asyncpg.connect(self.db_connection_string)
        
        try:
            # Check failed authentication attempts
            await self._check_failed_auth(conn)
            
            # Check suspicious access patterns
            await self._check_suspicious_access(conn)
            
            # Check data access anomalies
            await self._check_data_access_anomalies(conn)
            
            # Check unauthorized access attempts
            await self._check_unauthorized_access(conn)
            
        finally:
            await conn.close()
    
    async def _check_failed_auth(self, conn):
        """Check for excessive failed authentication attempts."""
        
        query = """
        SELECT 
            user_name,
            ip_address,
            COUNT(*) as attempt_count,
            MAX(created_at) as last_attempt
        FROM retail.security_audit_log
        WHERE success = FALSE 
          AND event_type IN ('authentication_failed', 'token_validation_failed')
          AND created_at >= CURRENT_TIMESTAMP - INTERVAL '1 hour'
        GROUP BY user_name, ip_address
        HAVING COUNT(*) >= $1
        """
        
        results = await conn.fetch(query, self.thresholds['failed_auth_attempts'])
        
        for record in results:
            alert = SecurityAlert(
                alert_type='failed_authentication',
                severity='HIGH',
                message=f"Excessive failed login attempts for user {record['user_name']}",
                details={
                    'user_name': record['user_name'],
                    'ip_address': str(record['ip_address']),
                    'attempt_count': record['attempt_count'],
                    'last_attempt': record['last_attempt'].isoformat()
                },
                timestamp=datetime.now()
            )
            
            await self._send_alert(alert)
    
    async def _check_suspicious_access(self, conn):
        """Check for suspicious access patterns."""
        
        query = """
        SELECT 
            user_name,
            user_id,
            COUNT(DISTINCT ip_address) as ip_count,
            ARRAY_AGG(DISTINCT ip_address::TEXT) as ip_addresses
        FROM retail.security_audit_log
        WHERE created_at >= CURRENT_TIMESTAMP - INTERVAL '1 hour'
          AND success = TRUE
        GROUP BY user_name, user_id
        HAVING COUNT(DISTINCT ip_address) >= $1
        """
        
        results = await conn.fetch(query, self.thresholds['multiple_ip_access'])
        
        for record in results:
            alert = SecurityAlert(
                alert_type='suspicious_access',
                severity='MEDIUM',
                message=f"User {record['user_name']} accessed from multiple IP addresses",
                details={
                    'user_name': record['user_name'],
                    'user_id': record['user_id'],
                    'ip_count': record['ip_count'],
                    'ip_addresses': record['ip_addresses']
                },
                timestamp=datetime.now()
            )
            
            await self._send_alert(alert)
    
    async def _check_unauthorized_access(self, conn):
        """Check for unauthorized store access attempts."""
        
        query = """
        SELECT 
            user_name,
            user_id,
            store_id,
            failure_reason,
            created_at
        FROM retail.security_audit_log
        WHERE success = FALSE 
          AND event_type = 'unauthorized_store_access'
          AND created_at >= CURRENT_TIMESTAMP - INTERVAL '1 hour'
        """
        
        results = await conn.fetch(query)
        
        for record in results:
            alert = SecurityAlert(
                alert_type='unauthorized_access',
                severity='HIGH',
                message=f"Unauthorized store access attempt by {record['user_name']}",
                details={
                    'user_name': record['user_name'],
                    'user_id': record['user_id'],
                    'store_id': record['store_id'],
                    'failure_reason': record['failure_reason'],
                    'timestamp': record['created_at'].isoformat()
                },
                timestamp=datetime.now()
            )
            
            await self._send_alert(alert)
    
    async def _send_alert(self, alert: SecurityAlert):
        """Send security alert to all configured handlers."""
        
        logger.warning(
            f"Security Alert: {alert.alert_type} - {alert.message}",
            extra={'alert_details': alert.details}
        )
        
        # Send to configured alert handlers
        for handler in self.alert_handlers:
            try:
                await handler.send_alert(alert)
            except Exception as e:
                logger.error(f"Failed to send alert via {handler.__class__.__name__}: {e}")
    
    def add_alert_handler(self, handler):
        """Add alert handler."""
        self.alert_handlers.append(handler)

🧪 Testing og Validering av Sikkerhet

Automatiserte Sikkerhetstester

# tests/security/test_security.py
"""
Comprehensive security tests for MCP server.
"""
import pytest
import asyncio
import asyncpg
from datetime import datetime, timezone
import jwt
from unittest.mock import Mock, patch

class TestRowLevelSecurity:
    """Test Row Level Security implementation."""
    
    @pytest.fixture
    async def db_connection(self):
        """Database connection for testing."""
        conn = await asyncpg.connect(
            "postgresql://mcp_user:password@localhost:5432/retail_test"
        )
        yield conn
        await conn.close()
    
    async def test_store_context_isolation(self, db_connection):
        """Test that RLS properly isolates data by store."""
        
        # Set Seattle store context
        await db_connection.execute("SELECT retail.set_store_context('seattle')")
        
        # Get customer count
        seattle_customers = await db_connection.fetchval(
            "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM retail.customers"
        )
        
        # Set Redmond store context
        await db_connection.execute("SELECT retail.set_store_context('redmond')")
        
        # Get customer count
        redmond_customers = await db_connection.fetchval(
            "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM retail.customers"
        )
        
        # Verify isolation (counts should be different)
        assert seattle_customers != redmond_customers or (
            seattle_customers == 0 and redmond_customers == 0
        )
    
    async def test_unauthorized_store_access(self, db_connection):
        """Test that invalid store access is blocked."""
        
        with pytest.raises(Exception) as exc_info:
            await db_connection.execute("SELECT retail.set_store_context('invalid_store')")
        
        assert "Store not found" in str(exc_info.value)
    
    async def test_cross_store_data_leakage(self, db_connection):
        """Test that users cannot access data from other stores."""
        
        # Set context to one store
        await db_connection.execute("SELECT retail.set_store_context('seattle')")
        
        # Try to insert data with different store_id
        with pytest.raises(Exception):
            await db_connection.execute("""
                INSERT INTO retail.customers (store_id, first_name, last_name, email)
                VALUES ('redmond', 'Test', 'User', 'test@example.com')
            """)

class TestAuthentication:
    """Test authentication and authorization."""
    
    def test_valid_jwt_token(self):
        """Test valid JWT token validation."""
        
        # Mock valid token
        token_payload = {
            'oid': 'user-123',
            'email': 'test@example.com',
            'name': 'Test User',
            'tid': 'tenant-123',
            'aud': 'app-client-id',
            'iss': 'https://login.microsoftonline.com/tenant-123/v2.0',
            'exp': int((datetime.now(timezone.utc)).timestamp()) + 3600,
            'iat': int((datetime.now(timezone.utc)).timestamp()),
            'roles': ['store_user']
        }
        
        # This would require mocking the JWKS endpoint
        # In real implementation, use proper test JWT tokens
        
    def test_expired_token_rejection(self):
        """Test that expired tokens are rejected."""
        
        token_payload = {
            'oid': 'user-123',
            'exp': int((datetime.now(timezone.utc)).timestamp()) - 3600,  # Expired
            'iat': int((datetime.now(timezone.utc)).timestamp()) - 7200
        }
        
        # Test would verify that expired tokens are rejected
        
    def test_invalid_audience_rejection(self):
        """Test that tokens with wrong audience are rejected."""
        
        token_payload = {
            'oid': 'user-123',
            'aud': 'wrong-audience',  # Invalid audience
            'exp': int((datetime.now(timezone.utc)).timestamp()) + 3600,
            'iat': int((datetime.now(timezone.utc)).timestamp())
        }
        
        # Test would verify that wrong audience tokens are rejected

class TestAuthorization:
    """Test role-based authorization."""
    
    def test_role_hierarchy(self):
        """Test that role hierarchy works correctly."""
        
        from mcp_server.security.authorization import RoleBasedAuth
        
        # Store admin should have all permissions
        assert RoleBasedAuth.has_permission(['store_admin'], 'read_all')
        assert RoleBasedAuth.has_permission(['store_admin'], 'write_all')
        assert RoleBasedAuth.has_permission(['store_admin'], 'delete_all')
        
        # Store user should have limited permissions
        assert RoleBasedAuth.has_permission(['store_user'], 'read_products')
        assert not RoleBasedAuth.has_permission(['store_user'], 'delete_all')
        
        # Store readonly should have minimal permissions
        assert RoleBasedAuth.has_permission(['store_readonly'], 'read_products')
        assert not RoleBasedAuth.has_permission(['store_readonly'], 'write_transactions')
    
    def test_permission_inheritance(self):
        """Test that permissions are properly inherited."""
        
        from mcp_server.security.authorization import RoleBasedAuth
        
        # Manager should inherit user permissions
        assert RoleBasedAuth.has_permission(['store_manager'], 'read_products')
        assert RoleBasedAuth.has_permission(['store_manager'], 'write_transactions')

# Security test runner
if __name__ == "__main__":
    pytest.main([__file__, "-v"])

Sjekkliste for Penetrasjonstesting

# security-test-checklist.yml
penetration_testing:
  
  authentication_bypass:
    - name: "Test authentication bypass attempts"
      tests:
        - "Missing Authorization header"
        - "Malformed JWT tokens"
        - "Replay attack with expired tokens"
        - "Token signature manipulation"
        - "Audience/issuer manipulation"
    
  authorization_escalation:
    - name: "Test privilege escalation attempts"
      tests:
        - "Role manipulation in token"
        - "Store access boundary testing"
        - "Cross-tenant data access attempts"
        - "Administrative function access"
    
  sql_injection:
    - name: "Test SQL injection vulnerabilities"
      tests:
        - "Parameter injection in search queries"
        - "Store ID manipulation"
        - "JSON parameter injection"
        - "Union-based injection attempts"
    
  data_exposure:
    - name: "Test for data exposure vulnerabilities"
      tests:
        - "Error message information disclosure"
        - "Timing attack possibilities"
        - "Cross-store data leakage"
        - "Audit log exposure"
    
  rate_limiting:
    - name: "Test rate limiting and DoS protection"
      tests:
        - "Authentication endpoint flooding"
        - "API endpoint rate limits"
        - "Resource exhaustion attempts"
        - "Connection pool exhaustion"

🎯 Viktige Lærdommer

Etter å ha fullført denne labben, bør du ha:

✅ Multi-Tenant Sikkerhet: Implementert Row Level Security for full dataisolasjon
✅ Azure Autentisering: Integrert Azure Entra ID med JWT-validering
✅ Rollebasert Autorisasjon: Konfigurert hierarkisk rolle- og tillatelsessystem
✅ Omfattende Revisjonslogging: Etablert sporing og monitorering av sikkerhetshendelser
✅ Sikkerhetstesting: Implementert automatiserte sikkerhetsvalideringstester
✅ Trusselmonitorering: Opprettet sanntidsdeteksjon og varsling av sikkerhetshendelser

🚀 Hva Nå

Fortsett med Lab 03: Miljøoppsett for å:

Konfigurere utviklingsmiljøer med sikkerhetsbeste praksis
Sette opp Azure-tjenester for autentisering og monitorering
Implementere sikre databaseforbindelser og hemmelighetsadministrasjon
Validere sikkerhetskonfigurasjoner i utviklingsmiljøer

📚 Ekstra Ressurser

Azure Sikkerhet

Azure Entra ID Dokumentasjon - Komplett guide til identitetsplattformen
Azure Key Vault - Tjeneste for hemmelighetsadministrasjon
Azure Sikkerhetsbeste Praksis - Veiledning for sikkerhet

Databasesikkerhet

PostgreSQL Row Level Security - Offisiell RLS-dokumentasjon
Sjekkliste for Databasesikkerhet - PostgreSQL sikkerhetsguide
Multi-Tenant Database Mønstre - Arkitekturmønstre

Sikkerhetstesting

OWASP Testing Guide - Omfattende sikkerhetstesting
JWT Sikkerhetsbeste Praksis - JWT sikkerhetsbetraktninger
API Sikkerhetstesting - API-spesifikk sikkerhetstesting

Forrige: Lab 01: Grunnleggende Arkitekturkonsepter
Neste: Lab 03: Miljøoppsett

Ansvarsfraskrivelse:
Dette dokumentet er oversatt ved hjelp av AI-oversettelsestjenesten Co-op Translator. Selv om vi tilstreber nøyaktighet, vær oppmerksom på at automatiserte oversettelser kan inneholde feil eller unøyaktigheter. Det originale dokumentet på dets opprinnelige språk bør anses som den autoritative kilden. For kritisk informasjon anbefales profesjonell menneskelig oversettelse. Vi er ikke ansvarlige for eventuelle misforståelser eller feiltolkninger som oppstår ved bruk av denne oversettelsen.

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Sikkerhet og Multi-Tenancy

🎯 Hva Denne Labben Dekker

Oversikt

Læringsmål

🔐 Multi-Tenant Sikkerhetsarkitektur

Oversikt over Sikkerhetslag

Multi-Tenancy Modeller

🛡️ Implementering av Row Level Security

Grunnlaget for RLS

Administrasjon av Butikkontekst

RLS-policyer

Testing og Validering av RLS

🔑 Autentisering og Autorisasjon

Integrasjon med Azure Entra ID

Autorisasjons-Middleware

🔍 Revisjon og Samsvar

Omfattende Revisjonslogging

Sikkerhetsmonitoreringsvisninger

Overvåking av Sikkerhetshendelser

🧪 Testing og Validering av Sikkerhet

Automatiserte Sikkerhetstester

Sjekkliste for Penetrasjonstesting

🎯 Viktige Lærdommer

🚀 Hva Nå

📚 Ekstra Ressurser

Azure Sikkerhet

Databasesikkerhet

Sikkerhetstesting

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Sikkerhet og Multi-Tenancy

🎯 Hva Denne Labben Dekker

Oversikt

Læringsmål

🔐 Multi-Tenant Sikkerhetsarkitektur

Oversikt over Sikkerhetslag

Multi-Tenancy Modeller

🛡️ Implementering av Row Level Security

Grunnlaget for RLS

Administrasjon av Butikkontekst

RLS-policyer

Testing og Validering av RLS

🔑 Autentisering og Autorisasjon

Integrasjon med Azure Entra ID

Autorisasjons-Middleware

🔍 Revisjon og Samsvar

Omfattende Revisjonslogging

Sikkerhetsmonitoreringsvisninger

Overvåking av Sikkerhetshendelser

🧪 Testing og Validering av Sikkerhet

Automatiserte Sikkerhetstester

Sjekkliste for Penetrasjonstesting

🎯 Viktige Lærdommer

🚀 Hva Nå

📚 Ekstra Ressurser

Azure Sikkerhet

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