Stop _pkcs11h_util_hexToBinary() checking for trailing NUL

We are going to want to use this for parsing %XX hex escapes in RFC7512
PKCS#11 URIs, where we cannot expect a trailing NUL. Since there's only
one existing caller at the moment, it's simple just to let the caller
have responsibility for that check.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>

Author: David Woodhouse

lib/pkcs11h-serialization.c

@@ -369,6 +369,7 @@ pkcs11h_certificate_deserializeCertificateId (
 	CK_RV rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
 	char *p = NULL;
 	char *_sz = NULL;
+	size_t id_hex_len;
 
 	_PKCS11H_ASSERT (p_certificate_id!=NULL);
 	_PKCS11H_ASSERT (sz!=NULL);
@@ -414,7 +415,12 @@ pkcs11h_certificate_deserializeCertificateId (
 		goto cleanup;
 	}
 
-	certificate_id->attrCKA_ID_size = strlen (p)/2;
+	id_hex_len = strlen (p);
+	if (id_hex_len & 1) {
+		rv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+	certificate_id->attrCKA_ID_size = id_hex_len/2;
 
 	if (
 		(rv = _pkcs11h_mem_malloc (

lib/pkcs11h-util.c

@@ -110,12 +110,7 @@ _pkcs11h_util_hexToBinary (
 		p++;
 	}
 
-	if (*p != '\x0') {
-		return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
-	}
-	else {
-		return CKR_OK;
-	}
+	return CKR_OK;
 }
 
 CK_RV