You signed in with another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You signed out in another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You switched accounts on another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.Dismiss alert
docs: reflect Layer 17 + Gaps 75/76 in README and llms.txt
Update Community vs API table and threat-library counts (150+ categories,
1,500+ regex patterns, 2,500+ semantic fingerprints). Document the new
AgenticExecutionMonitor (Layer 17) agentic gate — compiled/parallel execution
plan decomposition, per-node validation, and session fan-out tracking — and add
compiled-plan smuggling and UI-injection to the defended-attack list.
|**AgenticExecutionMonitor**| Plan decomposition + per-node validation + session fan-out tracking | Malicious calls hidden in compiled/parallel execution plans (DAGs) that evade sequential per-call inspection: dangerous nodes in "atomic" no-inspect batches, guard-disable steps ordered before payloads, hidden nodes absent from the approval summary, dependency cycles, and agent-swarm fan-out escalation |
182
183
183
184
The pre-flight gate blocks attacks before the model sees them. The post-flight gate
184
185
catches what slipped through — and teaches the system to pre-empt it next time.
@@ -203,6 +204,8 @@ Guardian protects your AI system from adversarial inputs designed to:
203
204
-**Poison RAG context** — indirect injection through retrieved documents or tool outputs *(API)*
204
205
-**Hijack agentic tool calls** — malicious tool name/argument patterns that trigger shell execution, exfiltration, or destructive operations *(API)*
205
206
-**Inject via tool outputs** — prompt injection payloads embedded in values tools return to the agent *(API)*
207
+
-**Smuggle calls in compiled plans** — malicious tool calls buried in parallel/"atomic" execution plans (DAGs) that evade sequential per-call review, plus agent-swarm fan-out escalation *(API)*
208
+
-**Exploit the rendering layer** — UI injection via `javascript:` links, `<img onerror>`, and HTML/JS escapes that target the LLM frontend rather than the model *(API)*
206
209
-**Exploit multi-turn context** — gradual manipulation across a conversation session
207
210
-**Bypass via translation or encoding** — obfuscation attacks designed to evade detection *(API)*
208
211
-**Abuse few-shot patterns** — using example structures to smuggle instructions *(API)*
@@ -211,23 +214,24 @@ Guardian protects your AI system from adversarial inputs designed to:
211
214
-**Coordinate across modalities** — split-channel attacks that distribute threat signals across text and visual inputs, each appearing benign in isolation *(API)*
212
215
-**Hide payloads in video** — injection content embedded across video frames, including temporally recurring signals designed to survive frame-level filtering *(API)*
213
216
214
-
The community edition covers seven categories (six OWASP-aligned attack vectors + an absolute-block child safety category). The API covers 140+.
217
+
The community edition covers seven categories (six OWASP-aligned attack vectors + an absolute-block child safety category). The API covers 150+.
215
218
216
219
---
217
220
218
221
## Community vs API
219
222
220
223
|| Community | API — Free | API — Pro | API — ENT |
0 commit comments