Formal_Models.bib

@incollection{alma991001906059707991,
  title = {Trattato di sociologia generale / Vilfredo Pareto},
  booktitle = {Trattato di sociologia generale},
  author = {Pareto, Vilfredo},
  date = {1916},
  publisher = {G. Barbèra},
  location = {Firenze},
  langid = {italian},
  keywords = {Sociologia,Sociology}
}

@article{angristCredibilityRevolutionEmpirical,
  title = {The {{Credibility Revolution}} in {{Empirical Economics}}: {{How Better Research Design Is Taking}} the {{Con}} out of {{Econometrics}}},
  author = {Angrist, Joshua D and Pischke, Jörn-Steffen},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Angrist and Pischke - The Credibility Revolution in Empirical Economics How Better Research Design Is Taking the Con out.pdf}
}

@article{ansolabehereValencePoliticsEquilibrium,
  title = {Valence {{Politics}} and {{Equilibrium}} in {{Spatial Election Models}}},
  author = {Ansolabehere, Stephen and Snyder, James M},
  abstract = {Spatial models of two-party or two-candidate competition almost never have purestrategy Nash equilibria when the issue space has more than one dimension. This paper shows that the introduction of valence issues can create conditions where equilibria exist, even in a multidimensional setting. We derive sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria, and characterize the spatial locations of two competing parties or candidates when such equilibria exist. The party with the advantage on the valence dimension will generally take a moderate position on the positional issues. We consider the implications of these results for public perceptions of the parties, incumbency advantages, and realigning elections.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Ansolabehere and Snyder - Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models.pdf}
}

@article{ashworthAllElseEqual2015,
  title = {All {{Else Equal}} in {{Theory}} and {{Data}} ({{Big}} or {{Small}})},
  author = {Ashworth, Scott and Berry, Christopher R. and Mesquita, Ethan Bueno De},
  date = {2015-01},
  journaltitle = {Political Science and Politics},
  shortjournal = {APSC},
  volume = {48},
  number = {1},
  pages = {89--94},
  issn = {1049-0965, 1537-5935},
  doi = {10.1017/S1049096514001802},
  url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1049096514001802/type/journal_article},
  urldate = {2025-10-08},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Ashworth et al. - 2015 - All Else Equal in Theory and Data (Big or Small).pdf}
}

@article{ashworthMonotoneComparativeStatics2006,
  title = {Monotone {{Comparative Statics}} for {{Models}} of {{Politics}}},
  author = {Ashworth, Scott and Bueno De Mesquita, Ethan},
  date = {2006-01},
  journaltitle = {American Journal of Political Science},
  shortjournal = {American J Political Sci},
  volume = {50},
  number = {1},
  pages = {214--231},
  issn = {0092-5853, 1540-5907},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00180.x},
  url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00180.x},
  urldate = {2025-10-08},
  abstract = {We elucidate a powerful yet simple method for deriving comparative statics conclusions for a wide variety of models: Monotone Comparative Statics (                                Milgrom and Shannon 1994                              ). Monotone comparative static methods allow researchers to extract robust, substantive empirical implications from formal models that can be tested using ordinal data and simple nonparametric tests. When these methods apply, they can replace a diverse range of more technically difficult mathematics (facilitating richer, more realistic models), assumptions that are hard to understand or justify substantively (highlighting the political intuitions underlying a model's results), and a complicated set of methods for extracting implications from models. We present an accessible introduction to the central monotone comparative statics results and a series of practical tools for using these techniques in applied models (with reference to original sources, when relevant). Throughout we demonstrate the techniques with examples drawn from political science               .},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Ashworth and Bueno De Mesquita - 2006 - Monotone Comparative Statics for Models of Politics.pdf}
}

@book{ashworthTheoryCredibilityIntegrating2021,
  title = {Theory and Credibility: Integrating Theoretical and Empirical Social Science},
  shorttitle = {Theory and Credibility},
  author = {Ashworth, Scott and Berry, Christopher R. and Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan},
  date = {2021},
  publisher = {Princeton University press},
  location = {Princeton (N.J.)},
  abstract = {"As political science has come to depend more and more on quantitative methods, with a significant focus on causal identification (put simply, "what causes what"), there has been a growing concern that the questions scholars address are getting smaller, shrinking to include only those topics for which the so-called "identification problem" can be satisfactorily solved. Yet even if this problem cannot yet be solved for many important and complex topics--democracy, inequality, violence, stability, and many more--there is much left to learn; in particular, clear theories that provide better insight into the central mechanisms at work. These theories can help orient new empirical work, thus fueling a virtuous cycle between empirical and theoretical insights. In this ambitious book. Ashworth et al address this key challenge in the field with a new vision of how to connect empirical and theoretical work, one rooted in the idea of "all else equal." Theory, the authors argue, implicitly rests of the idea of "all-else-equal," and it's precisely this question that empirical work attempts to confirm. Thus theory and empirics have an intrinsic connection, and in recognizing this scholars can bridge the gap between the two. The first part of the book examines the "all-else-equal" connection and goes on to show how how theoretical models yield empirical implications and how substantive identification is the lynch-pin of a credible research design. The second part then follows the progressive back-and-forth between theory and empirics in existing scholarship, breaking these interactions into five types: reinterpreting, elaboration, distinguishing, disentangling, and modeling the research design. Each chapter in this section provides concrete examples, discussing a handful of papers that illustrates the relevant interaction between theory and empirics. The overall goal of the book is to facilitate a closer and more productive interaction between theory and empirics in social science"},
  isbn = {978-0-691-21383-5 978-0-691-21382-8},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Ashworth et al. - 2021 - Theory and credibility integrating theoretical and empirical social science.pdf}
}

@article{axelrodEvolutionCooperation1981,
  title = {The {{Evolution}} of {{Cooperation}}},
  author = {Axelrod, Robert and Hamilton, William D},
  date = {1981},
  abstract = {Cooperation in organisms, whether bacteria or primates, has been a difficulty for evolutionary theory since Darwin. On the assumption that interactions between pairs of individuals occur on a probabilistic basis, a model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Deductions from the model, and the results of a computer tournament show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established. Potential applications include specific aspects of territoriality, mating, and disease.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {EGT},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Axelrod and Hamilton - 1981 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf;/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Axelrod and Hamilton - 1981 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf}
}

@article{ballesterWhosWhoNetworks2006,
  title = {Who's {{Who}} in {{Networks}}. {{Wanted}}: {{The Key Player}}},
  shorttitle = {Who's {{Who}} in {{Networks}}. {{Wanted}}},
  author = {Ballester, Coralio and Calvó-Armengol, Antoni and Zenou, Yves},
  date = {2006-09},
  journaltitle = {Econometrica},
  shortjournal = {Econometrica},
  volume = {74},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1403--1417},
  issn = {0012-9682, 1468-0262},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00709.x},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00709.x},
  urldate = {2025-10-08},
  abstract = {Finite population non-cooperative games with linear-quadratic utilities, where each player decides how much action she exerts, can be interpreted as a network game with local payo¤ complementarities, together with a globally uniform payo¤ substitutability component and an ownconcavity e¤ect. For these games, the Nash equilibrium action of each player is proportional to her Bonacich centrality in the network of local complementarities, thus establishing a bridge with the sociology literature on social networks. This Bonacich-Nash linkage implies that aggregate equilibrium increases with network size and density. We then analyze a policy that consists of targeting the key player, that is, the player who, once removed, leads to the optimal change in aggregate activity. We provide a geometric characterization of the key player identi…ed with an inter-centrality measure, which takes into account both a player’s centrality and her contribution to the centrality of the others.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Ballester et al. - 2006 - Who's Who in Networks. Wanted The Key Player 2.pdf}
}

@article{bonacichPowerCentralityFamily1987,
  title = {Power and {{Centrality}}: {{A Family}} of {{Measures}}},
  shorttitle = {Power and {{Centrality}}},
  author = {Bonacich, Phillip},
  date = {1987-03},
  journaltitle = {American Journal of Sociology},
  shortjournal = {American Journal of Sociology},
  volume = {92},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1170--1182},
  issn = {0002-9602, 1537-5390},
  doi = {10.1086/228631},
  url = {https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/228631},
  urldate = {2025-11-06},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Bonacich - 1987 - Power and Centrality A Family of Measures.pdf}
}

@book{borderFixedPointTheorems1999,
  title = {Fixed Point Theorems with Applications to Economics and Game Theory},
  author = {Border, Kim C.},
  date = {1999},
  edition = {Reprint},
  publisher = {Cambridge Univ. Press},
  location = {Cambridge},
  isbn = {978-0-521-26564-5 978-0-521-38808-5},
  langid = {english},
  pagetotal = {129},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Border - 1999 - Fixed point theorems with applications to economics and game theory.pdf}
}

@inbook{brauningerTheoryBuildingCausal2020,
  title = {Theory {{Building}} for {{Causal Inference}}: {{EITM Research Projects}}},
  shorttitle = {Theory {{Building}} for {{Causal Inference}}},
  booktitle = {The {{SAGE Handbook}} of {{Research Methods}} in {{Political Science}} and {{International Relations}}},
  author = {Bräuninger, Thomas and Swalve, Tilko},
  date = {2020},
  pages = {121--141},
  publisher = {SAGE Publications Ltd},
  location = {1 Oliver's Yard,~55 City Road~London~EC1Y 1SP},
  doi = {10.4135/9781526486387.n10},
  url = {https://sk.sagepub.com/reference/the-sage-handbook-of-research-methods-in-political-science-and-ir/i1704.xml},
  urldate = {2025-10-08},
  bookauthor = {Curini, Luigi and Franzese, Robert},
  isbn = {978-1-5264-5993-0 978-1-5264-8638-7},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Bräuninger and Swalve - 2020 - Theory Building for Causal Inference EITM Research Projects.pdf}
}

@article{buenodemesquitaCommensurabilityProblemConceptual2020,
  title = {The {{Commensurability Problem}}: {{Conceptual Difficulties}} in {{Estimating}} the {{Effect}} of {{Behavior}} on {{Behavior}}},
  shorttitle = {The {{Commensurability Problem}}},
  author = {Bueno De Mesquita, Ethan and Tyson, Scott A.},
  date = {2020-05},
  journaltitle = {American Political Science Review},
  shortjournal = {Am Polit Sci Rev},
  volume = {114},
  number = {2},
  pages = {375--391},
  issn = {0003-0554, 1537-5943},
  doi = {10.1017/S0003055419000911},
  url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0003055419000911/type/journal_article},
  urldate = {2025-10-08},
  abstract = {We pose the               commensurability problem               : When do the estimates generated by actual research designs correspond to quantities of theoretical interest? We study this question in settings where both treatment and outcome are behavior and the treatment effect of interest is decomposable into direct and informational channels. We establish two results. First, the quantity estimated by an actual research design is only commensurate with the total effect in the ideal experiment if treatment status in the research design is a sufficient statistic for the decision-makers’ information. Second, a research design corresponding to a nonideal experiment isolates just the direct effect in the ideal experiment if two conditions hold: (i) there is no information effect in the nonideal experiment and (ii) the decision-maker’s response function is additively separable in treatment and information. We apply our results to three substantive literatures: the efficacy of protest, the empowerment of female candidates, and indiscriminate violence in counterinsurgency.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Bueno De Mesquita and Tyson - 2020 - The Commensurability Problem Conceptual Difficulties in Estimating the Effect of Behavior on Behavi.pdf}
}

@article{calvertRobustnessMultidimensionalVoting1985,
  title = {Robustness of the {{Multidimensional Voting Model}}: {{Candidate Motivations}}, {{Uncertainty}}, and {{Convergence}}},
  shorttitle = {Robustness of the {{Multidimensional Voting Model}}},
  author = {Calvert, Randall L.},
  date = {1985-02},
  journaltitle = {American Journal of Political Science},
  shortjournal = {American Journal of Political Science},
  volume = {29},
  number = {1},
  eprint = {2111212},
  eprinttype = {jstor},
  pages = {69},
  issn = {00925853},
  doi = {10.2307/2111212},
  url = {https://www.jstor.org/stable/2111212?origin=crossref},
  urldate = {2025-10-08},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Calvert - 1985 - Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty, and Convergence.pdf}
}

@article{carrubbaDefenseComparativeStatics2007,
  title = {In {{Defense}} of {{Comparative Statics}}: {{Specifying Empirical Tests}} of {{Models}} of {{Strategic Interaction}}},
  shorttitle = {In {{Defense}} of {{Comparative Statics}}},
  author = {Carrubba, Clifford J. and Yuen, Amy and Zorn, Christopher},
  date = {2007},
  journaltitle = {Political Analysis},
  shortjournal = {Polit. anal.},
  volume = {15},
  number = {4},
  pages = {465--482},
  issn = {1047-1987, 1476-4989},
  doi = {10.1093/pan/mpm008},
  url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1047198700006604/type/journal_article},
  urldate = {2025-10-08},
  abstract = {Beginning in 1999, Curtis Signorino challenged the use of traditional logits and probits analysis for testing discrete-choice, strategic models. Signorino argues that the complex parametric relationships generated by even the simplest strategic models can lead to wildly inaccurate inferences if one applies these traditional approaches. In their stead, Signorino proposes generating stochastic formal models, from which one can directly derive a maximum likelihood estimator. We propose a simpler, alternative methodology for theoretically and empirically accounting for strategic behavior. In particular, we propose carefully and correctly deriving one's comparative statics from one's formal model, whether it is stochastic or deterministic does not particularly matter, and using standard logit or probit estimation techniques to test the predictions. We demonstrate that this approach performs almost identically to Signorino's more complex suggestion.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Carrubba et al. - 2007 - In Defense of Comparative Statics Specifying Empirical Tests of Models of Strategic Interaction.pdf}
}

@book{clarkeModelDisciplinePolitical2012,
  title = {A {{Model Discipline Political Science}} and the {{Logic}} of {{Representations}}},
  author = {Clarke, Kevin A. and Primo, David M.},
  date = {2012-01-20},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195382198.001.0001},
  url = {https://academic.oup.com/book/7512},
  urldate = {2025-10-08},
  isbn = {978-0-19-538219-8},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Clarke and Primo - 2012 - A Model DisciplinePolitical Science and the Logic of Representations.pdf}
}

@article{clarkeModernizingPoliticalScience2007,
  title = {Modernizing {{Political Science}}: {{A Model-Based Approach}}},
  shorttitle = {Modernizing {{Political Science}}},
  author = {Clarke, Kevin A. and Primo, David M.},
  date = {2007-12},
  journaltitle = {Perspectives on Politics},
  shortjournal = {PPS},
  volume = {5},
  number = {04},
  issn = {1537-5927, 1541-0986},
  doi = {10.1017/S1537592707072192},
  url = {http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1537592707072192},
  urldate = {2025-10-08},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {main},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Clarke and Primo - 2007 - Modernizing Political Science A Model-Based Approach.pdf}
}

@article{corboStudyNashEquilibrium2006,
  title = {A Study of {{Nash}} Equilibrium in Contribution Games for Peer-to-Peer Networks},
  author = {Corbo, Jacomo and Calvó-Armengol, Antoni and Parkes, David},
  date = {2006-07},
  journaltitle = {ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review},
  shortjournal = {SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev.},
  volume = {40},
  number = {3},
  pages = {61--66},
  issn = {0163-5980},
  doi = {10.1145/1151374.1151388},
  url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/1151374.1151388},
  urldate = {2025-10-08},
  abstract = {We consider a stylized model of content contribution in a peer-to-peer network. The model is appealing because it allows for linear-quadratic payoff functions and for very general interaction patterns among agents. Furthermore, when the model has a unique Nash equilibrium (NE) we find that it is defined by a network centrality measure (Bonacich 1987), with L1 and L2 norms of the Bonacich index vector providing aggregate contribution and social welfare. Furthermore, we find that NE are always (even when they are non-unique) computable by solving a linear complementarity problem. We study the network designer’s problem of engineering the most efficient equilibrium outcome, proving that maximizing aggregate contribution can be reconciled with maximizing aggregate welfare. We also provide a partial characterization of optimal NE graphs and suggest different approaches for how a network designer can promote more efficient graph structures.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Corbo et al. - 2006 - A study of Nash equilibrium in contribution games for peer-to-peer networks.pdf}
}

@article{diermeierUseStructuralModels,
  title = {The {{Use}} of {{Structural Models}} in {{Coalition Politics}}},
  author = {Diermeier, Daniel and Li, Tong},
  abstract = {We discuss the role and implementation of the structural approach in empirical research and institutional analysis, with a particular focus on coalition politics. We use Diermeier, Eraslan and Merlo (2003) as a primary example to illustrate the thought process for the structural approach, the basic steps involved, especially in studying coalition politics, and the advantages of the model-based approach in analysing political phenomena and institutions. We also offer our views on the future of the structural analysis of coalition politics.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Diermeier and Li - The Use of Structural Models in Coalition Politics.pdf}
}

@article{ellicksonEstimatingDiscreteGames,
  title = {Estimating {{Discrete Games}}},
  author = {Ellickson, Paul B and Misra, Sanjog},
  abstract = {This paper provides a critical review of the methods for estimating static discrete games and their relevance for quantitative marketing. We discuss the various modeling approaches, alternative assumptions, and relevant trade-o§s involved in taking these empirical methods to data. We consider both games of complete and incomplete information, examine the primary methods for dealing with the coherency problems introduced by multiplicity of equilibria, and provide concrete examples from the literature. We illustrate the mechanics of estimation using a real world example and provide the computer code and dataset with which to replicate our results.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Ellickson and Misra - Estimating Discrete Games.pdf}
}

@article{EvolutionConventions,
  title = {The {{Evolution}} of {{Conventions}}},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {EGT},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/The Evolution of Conventions.pdf;/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Young 1993 The Evolution of Conventions.pdf}
}

@article{Fearon_1995,
  title = {Rationalist Explanations for War},
  author = {Fearon, James D.},
  date = {1995},
  journaltitle = {International Organization},
  volume = {49},
  number = {3},
  pages = {379--414},
  doi = {10.1017/S0020818300033324},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Fearon - 1995 - Rationalist explanations for war.pdf}
}

@article{Fearon_1998,
  title = {Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation},
  author = {Fearon, James D.},
  date = {1998},
  journaltitle = {International Organization},
  volume = {52},
  number = {2},
  pages = {269--305},
  doi = {10.1162/002081898753162820},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Fearon - 1998 - Bargaining, enforcement, and international cooperation.pdf}
}

@unpublished{Fearon1996,
  title = {Bargaining over Objects That Influence Future Bargaining Power},
  author = {Fearon, James D.},
  date = {1996},
  url = {https://web.stanford.edu/group/fearon-research/cgi-bin/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/bargaining.pdf},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago}
}

@article{filsonBargainingFightingImpact2004,
  title = {Bargaining and Fighting: {{The}} Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, Duration, and Outcomes},
  author = {Filson, Darren and Werner, Suzanne},
  date = {2004},
  journaltitle = {American Journal of Political Science},
  volume = {48},
  number = {2},
  pages = {296--313},
  doi = {10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00071.x},
  url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00071.x},
  abstract = {Recent research suggests that democracies have advantages and disadvantages in wars. Democracies are more likely to win the wars they initiate and the ones in which they are targeted. Wars initiated by democracies are also uniformly shorter and less costly than wars initiated by nondemocracies. However, democracies are also less likely to continue fighting and less likely to win as war drags on. Democracies are also particularly likely to be targeted. We present a bargaining model that reconciles these divergent findings. The model explains why democracies are more likely to win but are also more likely to settle and more likely to be targeted than other types of regimes. The model's explanation of these facts differs in important ways from existing explanations. The model also suggests several new hypotheses relating regime type to the terms of settlement and the onset of war.},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Filson and Werner - 2004 - Bargaining and fighting The impact of regime type on war onset, duration, and outcomes.pdf}
}

@book{gehlbachFormalModelsDomestic2013,
  title = {Formal {{Models}} of {{Domestic Politics}}},
  author = {Gehlbach, Scott},
  date = {2013},
  series = {Analytical {{Methods}} for {{Social Research}}},
  publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Gehlbach S. 2013 Formal Models of Domestic Politics. Cambridge University Pres.pdf}
}

@article{grosecloseBuyingSupermajorities1996,
  title = {Buying {{Supermajorities}}},
  author = {Groseclose, Tim and Snyder, James M.},
  date = {1996},
  journaltitle = {American Political Science Review},
  edition = {2014/08/01},
  volume = {90},
  number = {2},
  pages = {303--315},
  publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
  issn = {0003-0554},
  doi = {10.2307/2082886},
  url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/2A797D3C2E464B0ABF326B85A22B4DB7},
  abstract = {Minimal winning coalitions have appeared as a key prediction or as an essential assumption of virtually all formal models of coalition formation, vote buying, and logrolling. Notwithstanding this research, we provide a model showing that supermajority coalitions may be cheaper than minimal winning coalitions. Specifically, if vote buyers move sequentially, and if the losing vote buyer is always granted a last chance to attack the winner's coalition, then minimal winning coalitions will generally not be cheapest, and equilibrium coalitions will generally not be minimal winning. We provide results relating equilibrium coalition size with preferences of the legislators and vote buyers, and we show that minimal winning coalitions should occur in only rare cases. We discuss these results in light of empirical work on coalition size and suggest other possible avenues for testing our model.}
}

@article{hellmannEvolutionSocialNetworks,
  title = {Evolution of Social Networks},
  author = {Hellmann, Tim and Staudigl, Mathias},
  abstract = {Modeling the evolution of networks is central to our understanding of modern large communication systems, such as the World-Wide-Web, as well as economic and social networks. The research on social and economic networks is truly interdisciplinary and the number of modeling strategies and concepts is enormous. In this survey we present some modeling approaches, covering classical random graph models and game-theoretic models, which may be used to provide a unified framework to model and analyze the evolution of networks.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Hellmann and Staudigl - Evolution of social networks.pdf}
}

@book{hofbauerEvolutionaryGamesPopulation2003,
  title = {Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics},
  author = {Hofbauer, Josef and Sigmund, Karl},
  date = {2003},
  edition = {Transferred to digital printing},
  publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
  location = {Cambridge},
  isbn = {978-0-521-62365-0 978-0-521-62570-8},
  langid = {english},
  pagetotal = {323},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Hofbauer and Sigmund - 2003 - Evolutionary games and population dynamics.pdf;/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Hofbauer and Sigmund - 2003 - Evolutionary games and population dynamics.pdf}
}

@article{holtBilateralConflictExperimental2024,
  title = {Bilateral {{Conflict}}: {{An Experimental Study}} of {{Strategic Effectiveness}} and {{Equilibrium}}},
  shorttitle = {Bilateral {{Conflict}}},
  author = {Holt, Charles A. and Palfrey, Thomas R.},
  date = {2024-10},
  journaltitle = {American Journal of Political Science},
  shortjournal = {American J Political Sci},
  volume = {68},
  number = {4},
  pages = {1431--1446},
  issn = {0092-5853, 1540-5907},
  doi = {10.1111/ajps.12810},
  url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12810},
  urldate = {2025-10-08},
  abstract = {Bilateral conflict involves an attacker with several alternative attack methods and a defender who can take various actions to better respond to different types of attack. These situations have wide applicability to political, legal, and economic disputes, but are particularly challenging to study empirically because the payoffs are unknown. Moreover, each party has an incentive to behave unpredictably, so theoretical predictions are stochastic. This paper reports results of an experiment where the details of the environment are tightly controlled. The results sharply contradict the Nash equilibrium predictions about how the two parties’ choice frequencies change in response to the relative effectiveness of alternative attack strategies. In contrast, nonparametric quantal response equilibrium predictions match the observed treatment effects. Estimation of the experimentally controlled payoff parameters across treatments accurately recovers the true values of those parameters with the logit quantal response equilibrium model but not with the Nash equilibrium model.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Holt and Palfrey - 2024 - Bilateral Conflict An Experimental Study of Strategic Effectiveness and Equilibrium.pdf}
}

@article{johnsonModelsAsFablesAlternativeStandard2021,
  title = {Models-{{As-Fables}}: {{An Alternative}} to the {{Standard Rationale}} for {{Using Formal Models}} in {{Political Science}}},
  shorttitle = {Models-{{As-Fables}}},
  author = {Johnson, James},
  date = {2021-09},
  journaltitle = {Perspectives on Politics},
  shortjournal = {Perspect. polit.},
  volume = {19},
  number = {3},
  pages = {874--889},
  issn = {1537-5927, 1541-0986},
  doi = {10.1017/S1537592720003473},
  url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1537592720003473/type/journal_article},
  urldate = {2025-10-08},
  abstract = {Political scientists invoke the standard rationale to justify making and using formal models. It goes like this: (1) we rely on formal models to generate predictions, (2) we treat these predictions as empirical hypotheses, and (3) we seek to test these hypotheses against evidence derived from the “real world.” I show that this interpretation of formal models as directly empirical is inadequate just insofar as it fails to capture the way we actually use them. I then offer an alternative rationale for making and using formal models. Specifically, I argue that we use models, like we use fables, for conceptual purposes.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {main},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Johnson - 2021 - Models-As-Fables An Alternative to the Standard Rationale for Using Formal Models in Political Scie.pdf}
}

@article{kandoriLearningMutationLong1993,
  title = {Learning, {{Mutation}}, and {{Long Run Equilibria}} in {{Games}}},
  author = {Kandori, Michihiro and Mailath, George J. and Rob, Rafael},
  date = {1993-01},
  journaltitle = {Econometrica},
  shortjournal = {Econometrica},
  volume = {61},
  number = {1},
  eprint = {2951777},
  eprinttype = {jstor},
  pages = {29},
  issn = {00129682},
  doi = {10.2307/2951777},
  url = {https://www.jstor.org/stable/2951777?origin=crossref},
  urldate = {2025-10-08},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {EGT},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Kandori et al. - 1993 - Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games.pdf;/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Kandori et al. - 1993 - Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games.pdf}
}

@article{Kirshner01092000,
  title = {Rationalist Explanations for War?},
  author = {Kirshner, Jonathan},
  date = {2000},
  journaltitle = {Security Studies},
  volume = {10},
  number = {1},
  eprint = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410008429423},
  pages = {143--150},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  doi = {10.1080/09636410008429423},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410008429423},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Kirshner - 2000 - Rationalist explanations for war.pdf}
}

@article{kornerVectorsPureApplied,
  title = {Vectors, {{Pure}} and {{Applied}}},
  author = {Körner, T W},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Körner - Vectors, Pure and Applied.pdf}
}

@article{liebersonImplicationAnalysisPragmatic2008,
  title = {Implication {{Analysis}}: {{A Pragmatic Proposal}} for {{Linking Theory}} and {{Data}} in the {{Social Sciences}}},
  shorttitle = {Implication {{Analysis}}},
  author = {Lieberson, Stanley and Horwich, Joel},
  date = {2008-08},
  journaltitle = {Sociological Methodology},
  shortjournal = {Sociological Methodology},
  volume = {38},
  number = {1},
  pages = {1--50},
  issn = {0081-1750, 1467-9531},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9531.2008.00199.x},
  url = {https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9531.2008.00199.x},
  urldate = {2025-10-08},
  abstract = {Sociology and other social sciences struggle to emulate a model of scientific evidence that is often inappropriate. Not only do social researchers encounter special limits, but they are also handicapped by a distorted and idealized picture of practices in the “hard sciences.” Ironically, while often obliged to use data of lower quality, sociology employs standards for evaluating a theory that are not attained in the hard sciences. After a brief review of these obstacles, we describe a set of procedures for using empirical data to rigorously evaluate theories and hypotheses without resorting to the mimicking of hard science. The interaction between theory and evidence normally involves deriving implications from the theory (usually referred to as hypotheses) and then ascertaining how closely the empirical evidence meets these implications. The appropriateness of the implications is a key factor in the entire operation, linking as they do the data and the theory. The evaluation of a theory is no better than the theory's implications (as generated by the investigator) coupled with the quality and appropriateness of the evidence. It is our impression, however, that because this step is insufficiently addressed, there are unnecessary problems in the evaluation of theories. We use the term “Implication Analysis” to describe our efforts to review and improve current procedures.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Lieberson and Horwich - 2008 - Implication Analysis A Pragmatic Proposal for Linking Theory and Data in the Social Sciences.pdf}
}

@article{linEquilibriumMulticandidateProbabilistic,
  title = {Equilibrium in Multicandidate Probabilistic Spatial Voting},
  author = {Lin, Tse-Min and Enelow, James M and Dorussen, Han},
  abstract = {This paper presents a multicandidate spatial model of probabilistic voting in which voter utility functions contain a random element specific to each candidate. The model assumes no abstentions, sincere voting, and the maximization of expected vote by each candidate. We derive a sufficient condition for concavity of the candidate expected vote function with which the existence of equilibrium is related to the degree of voter uncertainty. We show that, under concavity, convergent equilibrium exists at a “minimum-sum point” at which total distances from all voter ideal points are minimized. We then discuss the location of convergent equilibrium for various measures of distance. In our examples, computer analysis indicates that non-convergent equilibria are only locally stable and disappear as voter uncertainty increases.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Lin et al. - Equilibrium in multicandidate probabilistic spatial voting.pdf}
}

@article{mckelveyQuantalResponseEquilibria1995,
  title = {Quantal {{Response Equilibria}} for {{Normal Form Games}}},
  author = {McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R.},
  date = {1995},
  journaltitle = {Games and Economic Behavior},
  volume = {10},
  number = {1},
  pages = {6--38},
  issn = {0899-8256},
  doi = {10.1006/game.1995.1023},
  url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825685710238},
  abstract = {We investigate the use of standard statistical models for quantal choice in a game theoretic setting. Players choose strategies based on relative expected utility and assume other players do so as well. We define a quantal response equilibrium (ORE) as a fixed point of this process and establish existence. For a logit specification of the error structure, we show that as the error goes to zero, QRE approaches a subset of Nash equilibria and also implies a unique selection from the set of Nash equilibria in generic games. We fit the model to a variety of experimental data sets by using maximum likelihood estimation. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C19, C44, C72, C92.},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/McKelvey, Palfrey 1995 Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games, Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 10, Issue 1, Pages 6-38.pdf}
}

@book{mortonMethodsModelsGuide2005,
  title = {Methods and Models: A Guide to the Empirical Analysis of Formal Models in Political Science},
  shorttitle = {Methods and Models},
  author = {Morton, Rebecca B.},
  date = {2005},
  edition = {Repr},
  publisher = {Cambridge Univ. Press},
  location = {Cambridge},
  isbn = {978-0-521-63300-0 978-0-521-63394-9},
  langid = {english},
  pagetotal = {326},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Morton - 2005 - Methods and models a guide to the empirical analysis of formal models in political science.pdf}
}

@book{nowakEvolutionaryDynamicsExploring2006,
  title = {Evolutionary Dynamics: Exploring the Equations of Life},
  shorttitle = {Evolutionary Dynamics},
  author = {Nowak, Martin A.},
  date = {2006},
  publisher = {The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press},
  location = {Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England},
  isbn = {978-0-674-02338-3 978-0-674-41774-8},
  langid = {english},
  pagetotal = {1},
  keywords = {EGT},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Nowak - 2006 - Evolutionary dynamics exploring the equations of life.pdf}
}

@article{nowakEvolutionaryGamesSpatial1992,
  title = {Evolutionary Games and Spatial Chaos},
  author = {Nowak, Martin A. and May, Robert M.},
  date = {1992-10},
  journaltitle = {Nature},
  shortjournal = {Nature},
  volume = {359},
  number = {6398},
  pages = {826--829},
  issn = {0028-0836, 1476-4687},
  doi = {10.1038/359826a0},
  url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/359826a0},
  urldate = {2025-10-08},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {EGT},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Nowak and May - 1992 - Evolutionary games and spatial chaos.pdf}
}

@article{nowakEvolutionIndirectReciprocity1998,
  title = {Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by Image Scoring},
  author = {Nowak, Martin A. and Sigmund, Karl},
  date = {1998-06},
  journaltitle = {Nature},
  shortjournal = {Nature},
  volume = {393},
  number = {6685},
  pages = {573--577},
  issn = {0028-0836, 1476-4687},
  doi = {10.1038/31225},
  url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/31225},
  urldate = {2025-10-11},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {EGT},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Nowak and Sigmund - 1998 - Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring.pdf}
}

@article{nowakFiveRulesEvolution2006,
  title = {Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation},
  author = {Nowak, Martin A.},
  date = {2006},
  journaltitle = {Science},
  volume = {314},
  number = {5805},
  eprint = {https://www.science.org/doi/pdf/10.1126/science.1133755},
  pages = {1560--1563},
  doi = {10.1126/science.1133755},
  url = {https://www.science.org/doi/abs/10.1126/science.1133755},
  abstract = {Cooperation is needed for evolution to construct new levels of organization. Genomes, cells, multicellular organisms, social insects, and human society are all based on cooperation. Cooperation means that selfish replicators forgo some of their reproductive potential to help one another. But natural selection implies competition and therefore opposes cooperation unless a specific mechanism is at work. Here I discuss five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection. For each mechanism, a simple rule is derived that specifies whether natural selection can lead to cooperation.},
  keywords = {EGT},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Nowak - Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation.pdf}
}

@article{ohtsukiSimpleRuleEvolution2006,
  title = {A Simple Rule for the Evolution of Cooperation on Graphs and Social Networks},
  author = {Ohtsuki, Hisashi and Hauert, Christoph and Lieberman, Erez and Nowak, Martin A.},
  date = {2006-05},
  journaltitle = {Nature},
  shortjournal = {Nature},
  volume = {441},
  number = {7092},
  pages = {502--505},
  issn = {0028-0836, 1476-4687},
  doi = {10.1038/nature04605},
  url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/nature04605},
  urldate = {2025-10-08},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {EGT},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Ohtsuki et al. - 2006 - A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks.pdf}
}

@book{pearlCausalityModelsReasoning2009,
  title = {Causality: {{Models}}, {{Reasoning}}, and {{Inference}}},
  author = {Pearl, Judea},
  date = {2009},
  edition = {2},
  publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
  location = {Cambridge, UK},
  isbn = {978-0-521-89560-6},
  keywords = {EGT},
  note = {Chapters 1 and 2 define causal diagrams (DAGs) and the structural model framework.}
}

@article{reiterExploringBargainingModel2003,
  title = {Exploring the {{Bargaining Model}} of {{War}}},
  author = {Reiter, Dan},
  date = {2003-03},
  journaltitle = {Perspective on Politics},
  shortjournal = {APSA},
  volume = {1},
  number = {1},
  pages = {27--43},
  issn = {15375927, 15410986},
  doi = {10.1017/S1537592703000033},
  url = {http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1537592703000033},
  urldate = {2025-12-30},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Corsi Anno 4/International Relations/Primo Parziale/1-Introduction and Theoretical Framework/Reiter - 2003 - Exploring the Bargaining Model of War.pdf}
}

@book{safinaWordsWhatAnimals2015,
  title = {Beyond {{Words}}: {{What Animals Think}} and {{Feel}}},
  author = {Safina, Carl},
  date = {2015},
  publisher = {{Henry Holt and Company}},
  location = {New York},
  isbn = {978-0-8050-9888-4},
  keywords = {EGT},
  note = {Explores animal cognition and emotions, linking behavioral evidence with questions of consciousness.}
}

@book{Schelling1966,
  title = {Arms and Influence},
  author = {Schelling, Thomas C.},
  date = {1966},
  publisher = {Yale University Press},
  location = {New Haven},
  note = {Classic work on deterrence, coercion, and the strategic use of uncertainty in conflict.}
}

@book{schellingStrategyConflict1960,
  title = {The {{Strategy}} of {{Conflict}}},
  author = {Schelling, Thomas C.},
  date = {1960},
  publisher = {Harvard University Press},
  location = {Cambridge, MA},
  isbn = {978-0-674-84031-7},
  keywords = {EGT},
  note = {Classic work on strategic behavior and conflict theory.}
}

@article{signorinoStructureUncertaintyDiscrete2003,
  title = {Structure and {{Uncertainty}} in {{Discrete Choice Models}}},
  author = {Signorino, Curtis S.},
  date = {2003},
  journaltitle = {Political Analysis},
  shortjournal = {Polit. anal.},
  volume = {11},
  number = {4},
  pages = {316--344},
  issn = {1047-1987, 1476-4989},
  doi = {10.1093/pan/mpg020},
  url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1047198700010391/type/journal_article},
  urldate = {2025-10-08},
  abstract = {Social scientists are often confronted with theories in which one or more actors make choices over a discrete set of options. In this article, I generalize a broad class of statistical discrete choice models, with both well-known and new nonstrategic and strategic special cases. I demonstrate how to derive statistical models from theoretical discrete choice models and, in doing so, I address the statistical implications of three sources of uncertainty: agent error, private information about payoffs, and regressor error. For strategic and some nonstrategic choice models, the three types of uncertainty produce different statistical models. In these cases, misspecifying the type of uncertainty leads to biased and inconsistent estimates, and to incorrect inferences based on estimated probabilities.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Signorino - 2003 - Structure and Uncertainty in Discrete Choice Models.pdf}
}

@book{silberbergStructureEconomicsMathematical2001,
  title = {The Structure of Economics: A Mathematical Analysis},
  shorttitle = {The Structure of Economics},
  author = {Silberberg, Eugene and Suen, Wing-chuen and Suen, Wing-chuen},
  date = {2001},
  edition = {3. ed., internat. ed},
  publisher = {Irwin McGraw-Hill},
  location = {Boston},
  isbn = {978-0-07-234352-6 978-0-07-118136-5},
  langid = {english},
  pagetotal = {668},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Silberberg et al. - 2001 - The structure of economics a mathematical analysis.pdf}
}

@article{smithBargainingNatureWar2004,
  title = {Bargaining and the Nature of War},
  author = {Smith, Alastair and Stam, Allan C.},
  date = {2004},
  journaltitle = {Journal of Conflict Resolution},
  volume = {48},
  number = {6},
  pages = {783--813},
  doi = {10.1177/0022002704268026},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002704268026},
  abstract = {A model of bargaining embedded within a random-walk model of warfare is developed. The conflict model contains aspects of both lottery-based and war-of-attrition models of conflict. Results show that future disputes are less likely to lead to armed conflict following long rather than short wars. Furthermore, should a subsequent dispute lead to armed conflict, the higher the cost and the longer the previous war, the shorter the conflict is likely to last.},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Smith and Stam - 2004 - Bargaining and the nature of war.pdf}
}

@book{smithEvolutionTheoryGames1982,
  title = {Evolution and the {{Theory}} of {{Games}}},
  author = {Smith, John Maynard},
  date = {1982},
  publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
  location = {Cambridge},
  isbn = {978-0-521-28884-2},
  keywords = {EGT},
  note = {Introduces evolutionary game theory; see chapter 5 for discussion on conflict avoidance under perfect information.}
}

@article{smithLogicAnimalConflict1973,
  title = {The Logic of {{Animal Conflict}}},
  author = {Smith, J Maynard},
  date = {1973},
  volume = {246},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {EGT},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Smith - 1973 - The logic of Animal COnflict.pdf}
}

@article{smithTestingTheoriesStrategic1999,
  title = {Testing {{Theories}} of {{Strategic Choice}}: {{The Example}} of {{Crisis Escalation}}},
  shorttitle = {Testing {{Theories}} of {{Strategic Choice}}},
  author = {Smith, Alastair},
  date = {1999-10},
  journaltitle = {American Journal of Political Science},
  shortjournal = {American Journal of Political Science},
  volume = {43},
  number = {4},
  eprint = {2991827},
  eprinttype = {jstor},
  pages = {1254},
  issn = {00925853},
  doi = {10.2307/2991827},
  url = {https://www.jstor.org/stable/2991827?origin=crossref},
  urldate = {2025-10-08},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {EGT},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Smith - 1999 - Testing Theories of Strategic Choice The Example of Crisis Escalation.pdf}
}

@article{szaboEvolutionaryGamesGraphs2007,
  title = {Evolutionary Games on Graphs},
  author = {Szabó, György and Fáth, Gábor},
  date = {2007-07},
  journaltitle = {Physics Reports},
  shortjournal = {Physics Reports},
  volume = {446},
  number = {4--6},
  pages = {97--216},
  issn = {03701573},
  doi = {10.1016/j.physrep.2007.04.004},
  url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0370157307001810},
  urldate = {2025-10-11},
  abstract = {Game theory is one of the key paradigms behind many scientific disciplines from biology to behavioral sciences to economics. In its evolutionary form and especially when the interacting agents are linked in a specific social network the underlying solution concepts and methods are very similar to those applied in non-equilibrium statistical physics. This review gives a tutorial-type overview of the field for physicists. The first four sections introduce the necessary background in classical and evolutionary game theory from the basic definitions to the most important results. The fifth section surveys the topological complications implied by non-mean-field-type social network structures in general. The next three sections discuss in detail the dynamic behavior of three prominent classes of models: the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Rock–Scissors–Paper game, and Competing Associations. The major theme of the review is in what sense and how the graph structure of interactions can modify and enrich the picture of long term behavioral patterns emerging in evolutionary games.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {EGT},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Szabó and Fáth - 2007 - Evolutionary games on graphs 2.pdf;/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Szabó and Fáth - 2007 - Evolutionary games on graphs.pdf}
}

@article{taylorEvolutionaryGameDynamics2004,
  title = {Evolutionary Game Dynamics in Finite Populations},
  author = {Taylor, C and Fudenberg, D and Sasaki, A and Nowak, M},
  date = {2004-11},
  journaltitle = {Bulletin of Mathematical Biology},
  shortjournal = {Bulletin of Mathematical Biology},
  volume = {66},
  number = {6},
  pages = {1621--1644},
  issn = {00928240},
  doi = {10.1016/j.bulm.2004.03.004},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1016/j.bulm.2004.03.004},
  urldate = {2025-10-08},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {EGT},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Taylor et al. - 2004 - Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations.pdf}
}

@article{taylorEvolutionaryStableStrategies1978,
  title = {Evolutionary Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics},
  author = {Taylor, Peter D. and Jonker, Leo B.},
  date = {1978-07},
  journaltitle = {Mathematical Biosciences},
  shortjournal = {Mathematical Biosciences},
  volume = {40},
  number = {1--2},
  pages = {145--156},
  issn = {00255564},
  doi = {10.1016/0025-5564(78)90077-9},
  url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/0025556478900779},
  urldate = {2025-10-08},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {EGT},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Peter Taylor, Jonker 1978 Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics, Mathematical Biosciences, Volume 40, Issues 1–2, Pages 145-156, ISSN 0025-5564.pdf}
}

@book{vonneumannTheoryGamesEconomic1990,
  title = {Theory of Games and Economic Behavior},
  author = {family=Neumann, given=John, prefix=von, useprefix=true and Morgenstern, Oskar},
  date = {1990},
  edition = {6., paperback printing},
  publisher = {Princeton University Press},
  location = {Princeton},
  isbn = {978-0-691-00362-7 978-0-691-04183-4},
  langid = {english},
  pagetotal = {641}
}

@article{wagnerBargainingWar2000,
  title = {Bargaining and {{War}}},
  author = {Wagner, R. Harrison},
  date = {2000},
  journaltitle = {American Journal of Political Science},
  volume = {44},
  number = {3},
  eprint = {2669259},
  eprinttype = {jstor},
  pages = {469--484},
  publisher = {[Midwest Political Science Association, Wiley]},
  issn = {00925853, 15405907},
  doi = {10.2307/2669259},
  url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2669259},
  urldate = {2025-12-30},
  abstract = {[Nearly all wars end not because the states that are fighting are incapable of further fighting but because they agree to stop. Thus to explain why wars occur one must explain why states must fight before reaching agreement, which implies that war must be considered part of the bargaining process that leads to a negotiated settlement and not as an alternative to it. However, most attempts to explain the occurrence of war assume that it is entirely the result of a choice made before it begins. I show that this way of posing the problem can only lead to misleading conclusions by analyzing a model in which a negotiated settlement remains possible after war starts.]},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Wagner - 2000 - Bargaining and War.pdf}
}

@article{wittmanHowWarEnds1979,
  title = {How a War Ends: A Rational Model Approach},
  author = {Wittman, Donald},
  date = {1979},
  journaltitle = {Journal of Conflict Resolution},
  volume = {23},
  number = {4},
  pages = {743--763},
  doi = {10.1177/002200277902300408},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/002200277902300408},
  abstract = {This article discusses the necessary conditions for two countries at war to come to a settlement and explores how domestic and military costs, time preferences and attitudes toward risk affect the timing and the outcome of the peace. It views the termination of war as a process of rational calculations by the participants; unless both sides believe that they can be made better off by a settlement, the war will continue. An important result of this approach is that a reduction of hostilities may reduce the probability of a settlement taking place and thus prolong the war. It is also shown that increasing the probability of winning may not increase the probability of a settlement and that a country which only values the present need not be at a disadvantage in the negotiation.},
  file = {/Users/filippo/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-UniversitàCommercialeLuigiBocconi/Desktop/Game Theory/Fomal Models/Wittman - 1979 - How a war ends a rational model approach.pdf}
}