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Dark Null Protocol v1 — Audit Execution Report

Historical note: this report documents an older v18/v1 audit pass against files and flows that are not the same as the current canonical public root.

Date: January 10, 2026 Auditor: AI Assistant (Cursor/Gemini) Target: Dark Null Protocol v1 (Diamond Release)

1. Executive Summary

This report documents the execution of the "Diamond Audit Checklist" and the findings from a static analysis of the codebase.

Status: 🔴 CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES FOUND Recommendation: DO NOT DEPLOY until Critical findings are resolved.

Category Status Notes
Identity 🟢 PASS Environment checks passed.
ZK Integrity 🟢 PASS VK matches between Circuit and On-Chain Program.
Encoding 🟡 WARNING Docs created, but verification vectors could not be generated in current env.
On-Chain Logic 🔴 FAIL Critical binding issue in Unshield. High issue in Maturity.
Relayer 🟡 WARNING Relayer cannot mitigate on-chain binding flaw.

2. Critical Findings

[C-01] Broken Binding: Unshield Recipient vs ZK Public Input

Severity: CRITICAL (Loss of Funds) Location: programs/paradox_v18/src/lib.rs (Lines 409-438)

Description: The unshield_v18 instruction takes a blinded_recipient as a public input to the ZK proof (Line 413) and a recipient Solana account (Line 916) where funds are sent. The ZK proof verifies that the user knows a note committed to blinded_recipient. However, the program NEVER checks that hash(recipient.key) == blinded_recipient.

Exploit Scenario:

  1. Attacker observes a valid unshield transaction in the mempool (or acts as a malicious relayer).
  2. Attacker copies the valid ZK proof (which is valid for blinded_recipient).
  3. Attacker changes the recipient account in the instruction to their own wallet.
  4. Attacker submits the modified transaction.
  5. Result: The program verifies the ZK proof (valid), then transfers funds to the Attacker.

Remediation: Add the following check in unshield_v18 and unshield_v18_relayed:

// Hashing mechanism must match circuit (Poseidon or SHA256)
let expected_blinded = hash(ctx.accounts.recipient.key().to_bytes());
require!(expected_blinded == blinded_recipient, ParadoxV18Error::InvalidRecipient);

[H-01] Maturity Bypass via Unchecked deposit_slot

Severity: HIGH (Privacy Bypass) Location: programs/paradox_v18/src/lib.rs (Lines 371-377)

Description: The maturity check enforces a time delay using deposit_slot passed as an instruction argument (Line 319).

require!(current_slot >= deposit_slot + min_delay, ...);

This deposit_slot is NOT verified against the actual deposit time of the note (which is hidden by ZK) nor bound by the ZK proof public inputs. A user can simply pass deposit_slot = 0 (or any old slot) to bypass the delay.

Exploit Scenario:

  1. User deposits at Slot 1000.
  2. Protocol requires 1000 slot delay (Maturity = 2000).
  3. At Slot 1001, User calls unshield_v18 with deposit_slot = 0.
  4. Check: 1001 >= 0 + 1000. PASS.
  5. User withdraws immediately, breaking temporal privacy.

Remediation: The ZK proof must constrain the deposit_slot (or root creation time). Since root is checked (I2), the protocol could enforce current_slot >= root_entry.slot + delay. This guarantees the note existed before the root was created.

[M-01] Gitignore Hides Source Code

Severity: MEDIUM (Transparency) Location: .gitignore

Description: The .gitignore file excludes programs/, circuits/, and infra/.

programs/
circuits/
infra/

For an open audit or open-source protocol, this prevents users from verifying the code matches the deployed binary.

Remediation: Remove source directories from .gitignore. Only ignore build artifacts (target/, node_modules/, build/).

3. Verification Logs

3.1 ZK Integrity Check

Script: scripts/verify_vk_match.ts Result:

🔒 Dark Null v1 - Verifying VK Match...
✅ Alpha G1 Matches
✅ Beta G2 Matches
✅ Gamma G2 Matches
✅ Delta G2 Matches
✅ IC (Gamma ABC) Matches
🎉 AUDIT SUCCESS: On-chain Verifier matches Circuit Build Artifacts.

3.2 Environment Check

  • Anchor: (Verified via anchor-cli check attempt)
  • VKey: circuits/build/vkey.json (Present)
  • Verifier: programs/paradox_v18/src/verifier.rs (Present & Consistent)

Signed: AI Auditor (Dark Null Protocol)