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EquiSmile Build Plan

Phase 29 — Free-text reply UI + Triage in desktop sidebar (2026-05-22)

Why

The 2026-05-21 client demo with Kathelijne surfaced two basic UX gaps:

  1. "How do you just basically respond to an email or whatsapp — that's basic functionality." The app only offered four pre-approved template replies on /en/triage.
  2. /en/triage (where the template replies lived) was missing from the desktop sidebar — Kathelijne couldn't find the page; only the mobile nav surfaced it.

Scope

  • Free-text reply composer on the enquiry detail page.
  • Operator types verbatim text → service decides channel (WhatsApp within the 24h customer-service window, otherwise email).
  • Outbound reuses the existing whatsappService.sendTextMessage / emailService.sendBrandedEmail paths so message-log + DEMO_MODE behaviour is preserved.
  • AuditLog row per operator action.
  • Sidebar gets a Triage link between Inbox and Enquiries.

Deliverables

  • lib/utils/whatsapp-window.ts — pure 24h-window helpers.
  • lib/services/reply.constants.tsMAX_REPLY_BODY_LENGTH in its own module so the client composer can import the constant without dragging the server-only reply service into the browser bundle.
  • lib/services/reply.service.tsreplyService.sendReply(input) returns a discriminated SendReplyResult. Channel selection mirrors the stock-reply service: enquiry's channel first, then customer's preferred, then whichever contact is populated.
  • app/api/enquiries/[id]/reply/route.ts — NURSE+ POST endpoint; maps service statuses to 200 / 400 / 404 / 409 (window-expired) / 422 / 500.
  • components/triage/FreeTextReplyComposer.tsx — client component with textarea, character counter, channel indicator, live 24h window status, send button. Disables when window expired.
  • app/[locale]/enquiries/[id]/page.tsx — embeds the composer below the message thread.
  • components/layout/Sidebar.tsx — adds Triage between Inbox and Enquiries.
  • messages/{en,fr}.jsonenquiries.reply.* namespace.
  • Tests: 24 new (window util ×7, service ×10, API ×7); all 1415 prior preserved → 1439 / 1439 green.

Verification

  • npm run lint — green
  • npm run typecheck — green
  • npx vitest run — 1439 / 1439 green
  • SKIP_ENV_VALIDATION=true npm run build — green
  • Manual on Vercel preview deferred to PR review.

Limits / follow-ups

  • 24h window anchor uses Enquiry.receivedAt as a proxy for "last inbound from this customer". For multi-message threads a later inbound resets it via the same webhook path. Anchoring on the most recent EnquiryMessage with direction = INBOUND is a future enhancement.
  • The composer lives on the enquiry detail page, not inline in /inbox (would clutter the list view). The detail-page placement matches the existing triage action card.
  • Free-text WhatsApp always uses sendTextMessage. Outside the 24h window deliverability is impossible by Meta policy — the service refuses, and the operator is routed to the existing stock-reply / template flow on /triage.

Phase 28 — DLQ visibility + replay for failed inbound webhooks (2026-05-21)

Why

The 2026-05-21 client demo exposed a silent data-loss class. The WhatsApp webhook returned 200 to Meta in ~50ms then processed the message asynchronously. When the async chain hit a Neon cold-start the message was logged and lost. Meta saw 200 so wouldn't retry; no operator-visible signal anywhere. Phase 27 fixed the in-app simulator side of the same incident; Phase 28 closes the real-WhatsApp side.

Scope

  • Webhook routes (/api/webhooks/whatsapp, /api/webhooks/email) enqueue async failures to the existing FailedOperation DLQ with scopes whatsapp-inbound / email-inbound and the originating message id as operationKey.
  • deadLetterService.replay(id) re-runs the original intake for these inbound scopes. Outbound scopes (whatsapp-send-text, email-send) keep their manual mark-replayed path because the triggering workflow can't be re-driven from the DLQ.
  • POST /api/admin/observability/failed-operations/[id]/replay — ADMIN-only, audit-logged in SecurityAuditLog (OTHER event, target FailedOperation), maps replay outcomes to 200 / 500 / 422 / 404 / 409.
  • /admin/observability DLQ table gets a new "Replay" button for PENDING rows whose scope is replayable. Existing "Mark replayed" / "Abandon" buttons preserved for outbound scopes and for cases where the operator wants to skip the auto-replay path.
  • i18n strings (EN: "Replay", FR: "Rejouer") added to messages/{en,fr}.json under observability.dlq.replay.

Deliverables

  • lib/services/dead-letter.service.ts — new replay() method, REPLAYABLE_SCOPES export, ReplayResult type. Re-uses the existing intake services without circular import.
  • app/api/webhooks/whatsapp/route.ts — wraps the async catch with a deadLetterService.enqueue call, extracts the first message id for operationKey.
  • app/api/webhooks/email/route.ts — synchronous path; intake throws are caught, enqueued, and surfaced as 500 to n8n (so n8n's own retry policy still gets a chance, but the DLQ row provides the operator-visible recovery path if n8n gives up).
  • app/api/admin/observability/failed-operations/[id]/replay/route.ts — new endpoint.
  • components/admin/ObservabilityDashboard.tsx — adds onReplay handler and conditionally rendered button for replayable scopes.
  • Tests: 17 new (dead-letter.service.test.ts +6 replay branches, webhooks/dlq-wiring.test.ts ×4, admin-observability-replay.test.ts ×6). Refactor preserves all 1398 existing tests → 1415 / 1415 green.
  • Docs: this entry + docs/KNOWN_ISSUES.md Phase 28 entry.

Verification

  • npm run lint — green
  • npm run typecheck — green
  • npx vitest run — 1415 / 1415 green
  • SKIP_ENV_VALIDATION=true npm run build — green
  • Manual on Vercel preview deferred to PR review: deliberately fail Neon (e.g. break DATABASE_URL temporarily, send a WhatsApp), confirm the row appears in /admin/observability with scope whatsapp-inbound, fix the credential, click Replay, confirm the message lands in /inbox and the row flips to REPLAYED.

Limits / follow-ups

  • Replay is single-row. A "Replay all PENDING" bulk action is trivial to add later if the DLQ ever has more than a handful of rows at once.
  • The stored payload is JSON.stringify(redact(raw)) — redact() scrubs Auth / api-key / signature headers but leaves the message body and phone number through (the same data that would have landed in Enquiry.rawText had intake succeeded). PII retention policy follows the existing rules for FailedOperation.

Phase Overview

Phase Name Branch Status
0 Scaffold feature/phase0-scaffold ✅ Complete
1 Foundation feature/phase1-foundation ✅ Complete
2 Core Features feature/phase2-core-features ✅ Complete
3 Messaging Intake feature/phase3-messaging-intake ✅ Complete
4 Triage Operations feature/phase4-triage-ops ✅ Complete
5 Route Planning feature/phase5-route-planning ✅ Complete
6 Booking & Confirmations feature/phase6-booking-confirmations ✅ Complete
7 Hardening & Polish feature/phase7-hardening-polish ✅ Complete
8 UAT & Launch feature/phase8-uat-launch ✅ Complete
9–13 Auth, Clinical, Demo, AI Vision, Idempotency various ✅ Complete (see migration history + docs/KNOWN_ISSUES.md)
14 Security Hardening (PRs A–E) feature/phase14-* ✅ Complete
15 Production-readiness uplift per-PR ✅ Complete (2026-04-23 — see docs/PRODUCTION_READINESS.md)
16 Overnight hardening (8 slices) per-PR ✅ Complete (2026-04-25 → 2026-04-27 — see docs/KNOWN_ISSUES.md Phase 16 sections)
17 Google Maps cost-control + go-live gate claude/equismile-resume-build-tDChx ✅ Complete (2026-05-13 — see docs/MAPS_COST_CONTROL.md)
18 Unified inbox + n8n Gmail wire-up + journey-planner reorder claude/equismile-phase18-unified-inbox-journey-ux ✅ Complete (2026-05-13)
19 Outlook setup + scope-clarification doc + handover runbook claude/equismile-phase19-handover-scope-outlook ✅ Complete (2026-05-13)
20 Template UX + customer-DB import + WhatsApp simulator + road-following routes claude/equismile-phase20-templates-import-simulator-routing ✅ Complete (2026-05-13 — see docs/IMPORT_GUIDE.md)
20.5 Docs handover refresh + sidebar scroll/collapse + macOS scrollbar claude/equismile-docs-refresh-handover, claude/equismile-sidebar-scroll-fixup ✅ Complete (2026-05-14 — see PRs #140 + #141)
21 Audit residue — Sentry error-sink option + Prisma pool-param boot warning claude/equismile-phase21-audit-residue ✅ Complete (2026-05-15)
22 Audit tail — WhatsApp token boot probe + pre-migrate snapshot + SW cache verification claude/equismile-phase22-audit-tail ✅ Complete (2026-05-16 — closes the 2026-04-18 audit)
23 Go-live runbooks — WhatsApp Meta production approval + production data load claude/equismile-phase23-operator-runbooks ✅ Complete (2026-05-16)
24 Operator readiness — UAT refresh + DR drill + operator quick-start claude/equismile-phase24-operator-readiness ✅ Complete (2026-05-19)
25 Build hardening — SKIP_ENV_VALIDATION honoured at module-import time claude/equismile-phase25-build-fix ✅ Complete (2026-05-19)

Phase 25 — Build hardening: SKIP_ENV_VALIDATION honoured at module-import time (2026-05-19)

Why

For three PRs in a row (#148, #149, prior local-build runs) the "five-check gate" verified four checks (lint, typecheck, prisma validate, tests) and noted the fifth (SKIP_ENV_VALIDATION=true npm run build) as a "pre-existing failure on origin/main." That gap was never properly closed; it got documented as acceptable rather than fixed.

The root cause was a real bug, not environmental noise: lib/env.ts invoked validateEnv() at module-import time which threw on missing DATABASE_URL. The flag SKIP_ENV_VALIDATION=true only gated the standalone scripts/check-env.ts validator, NOT the module-level validation. So when next build collected page data for any route that imported lib/env (directly or transitively), the build aborted with "Failed to collect page data for /api/appointments/[id]/cancel" — misleadingly attributed to that one route when every route was affected.

Deliverables

Code (one file, ~25 lines):

  • lib/env.tsvalidateEnv() now checks SKIP_ENV_VALIDATION at the top. When set, supplies a placeholder DATABASE_URL=postgresql://skip:skip@localhost:5432/skip (only when DATABASE_URL is unset) and lets Zod's .optional().default(…) fields fill the rest, returning a valid Env without throwing. A console.warn fires (suppressed in tests) so a production- runtime leak of the flag is loud rather than silent.

Tests:

  • __tests__/unit/lib/env-skip-validation.test.ts — 5 cases: throws when flag unset + DATABASE_URL missing (regression guard); does NOT throw when flag set + DATABASE_URL missing (the fix); placeholder applied when none provided; real DATABASE_URL preserved when provided alongside the flag; normal validation flow unchanged when flag unset and DATABASE_URL present.

Acceptance Criteria

  • npm run lint
  • npm run typecheck
  • npx prisma validate
  • npm run test — 1389 pass (+5 new), 0 regressions ✅
  • SKIP_ENV_VALIDATION=true npm run build ✅ — the fix target, five-check gate fully green for the first time
  • Production runtime semantics unchanged — when SKIP_ENV_VALIDATION is unset, the validator throws on missing required vars exactly as before. Real Vercel / Docker production builds where env vars are properly populated are unaffected.

Notes for future agents

  • The 2026-05-08 memory entry that said "five-check gate" had a footnote about the build step needing the SKIP flag. That footnote is now obsolete; the gate runs cleanly with the flag set and real production builds (Vercel) don't set the flag.
  • If next build ever starts failing again with "Environment variable validation failed", the diagnosis is not to re-add another escape-hatch — it's to find the new env var that's been added to envSchema with .min(1) or similar required constraint and either give it a .default(…) or extend the placeholder source object in validateEnv().

Phase 24 — Operator readiness: UAT refresh + DR drill + operator quick-start (2026-05-19)

Why

Track A slice 2 of the post-audit go-live plan. Phase 23 shipped the two externally-blocked runbooks (Meta approval, production data load); Phase 24 covers the three internally-actionable readiness gaps that remained:

  1. UAT report is stale. docs/UAT_v2_VALIDATION.md (2026-05-07) validated 25 cases against commit 7cb7efb. Phases 17–23 have shipped since — adding maps cost control, unified inbox + IMAP, CSV import, WhatsApp simulator, RouteMap DirectionsService, Sentry sink, WhatsApp token boot probe, pre-migrate snapshot, SW cache verification + VersionBanner. A future UAT pass needs to know what's still valid from v2 and what new test cases the intervening phases require.
  2. No operator-facing DR rehearsal book. docs/BACKUP.md and docs/OPERATIONS.md documented the restore procedure + the weekly automated restore-verify smoke test, but there was no "press here to practice" walkthrough for operators to rehearse DR scenarios on a dev environment before they need them in anger.
  3. No one-page operator onboarding. A new operator handed EquiSmile had to read 12+ docs to know what to do day 1 / week 1 / month 1. The doc-first principle in CLAUDE.md helps, but a single-page checklist that indexes the existing runbooks (without duplicating them) was the missing piece.

None of these are blocked on external input — they could be built in parallel with Kathelijne's Meta approval timer running from Phase 23.

Deliverables

A — docs/UAT_v3_REFRESH.md (~380 lines)

  • Delta-from-v2 table for each shipped phase (17–23) — which v2 cases need re-testing, which defects are now closed.
  • Resolution status update for v2's three defects: D-2 (zero invoices on prod — Phase-0 dep, status check needed), D-3 (missing recall workspace — resolved by Phase E /recalls shipped 2026-05-08), D-4 ("login broken" — likely DEMO_MODE env, status check needed).
  • 39 refreshed test cases across 9 sections (25 v2 baseline + 14 new): Section G Maps cost (3), Section H Inbox/IMAP (2), Section I Admin tools (3), Section J Observability/PWA (5), plus one new UAT-PLN-04 for Phase 18 drag-reorder persistence.
  • Execution checklist for a future live UAT pass (this doc is the plan, not the execution — the actual validation needs a live deploy URL).

B — docs/DR_DRILL.md (~330 lines)

  • Three rehearsal scenarios with full step-by-step:
    • Drill A — "Bad migration deployed an hour ago" (uses Phase 22 pre-migrate snapshot). RTO 30 min, RPO 0 if schema rollback chosen.
    • Drill B — "Disk lost overnight" (uses Phase 16 nightly dump + off-box copy). RTO 2 h, RPO ≤ 24 h.
    • Drill C — "Weekly automated restore-verify failed" (uses Phase 16 backup-restore-verify.sh). The meta-recovery drill — ensures the recovery path itself still works.
  • Each drill: scenario narrative, recovery targets, step-by-step rehearsal procedure, success criteria, common-failure table mapping rehearsal gotchas to production incident causes.
  • Cross-references docs/BACKUP.md § 4 + § 7 and docs/OPERATIONS.md § 4 rather than duplicating the restore reference manual.
  • Quarterly cadence recommendation + drill-run ticket template.

C — docs/OPERATOR_QUICKSTART.md (~140 lines)

  • Day 1 checklist (8 steps): get the stack up, verify probes, sign in.
  • Week 1 checklist (9 steps): load real data, start Meta approval timer, walk the simulator with Kathelijne.
  • Month 1 checklist (10 steps): Meta cutover, first DR drill, spend baseline establishment.
  • Stop conditions per phase — explicit "do not progress if X" guards.
  • Standing-state reference table linking each operational topic to its canonical doc.
  • Emergency-contacts sequence (5 scenarios → 5 doc references).

All three docs cross-reference the existing runbooks (SETUP, VERCEL, OPERATIONS, BACKUP, IMPORT_GUIDE, MAPS_COST_CONTROL, WHATSAPP_PRODUCTION_APPROVAL, PRODUCTION_DATA_LOAD, OUTLOOK_INBOUND, HANDOVER, SCOPE_CLARIFICATIONS) rather than duplicating them.

Acceptance Criteria

  • npm run lint
  • npm run typecheck
  • npx prisma validate
  • npm run test — 0 regressions ✅
  • npm run build — pre-existing failure under SKIP_ENV_VALIDATION (not regression)
  • All cross-referenced file paths and section numbers verified against current main.
  • No code changes; Phase 24 is doc-shaped by design (the underlying infrastructure was already in place from Phases 16–22).

Phase 23 — Go-live runbooks: WhatsApp Meta production approval + production data load (2026-05-16)

Why

Track A of the post-audit go-live plan splits into two slices. Phase 23 is the first slice — the two operator runbooks that front-load the externally-blocked work so Richard / Kathelijne can act on them in parallel while Phase 24 (UAT refresh + DR drill + operator guide) follows.

Two concrete gaps existed:

  1. No documented Meta approval pathway. docs/OPERATIONS.md § 1 covered token rotation post-approval, but there was no operator- facing runbook for the externally-blocked work: business verification, display name approval, template submission per locale, system-user token mint, webhook + verify-token install, cutover. The Meta review timer is the longest external lead time in the project (1–2 weeks typical); not having a runbook meant guess-and-check.
  2. No production data load runbook. docs/IMPORT_GUIDE.md covered CSV import mechanics but not the upstream prep: source-data inventory, dedup decisions, field-mapping calls specific to the Swiss practice context, pre-load data-quality checks, post-load verification queries, rollback paths. Kathelijne couldn't start prepping her CSVs without that guidance.

Deliverables

A — docs/WHATSAPP_PRODUCTION_APPROVAL.md (10 sections)

  • Timeline expectation (2–3 weeks end-to-end, critical-path items identified).
  • Prerequisites: dedicated phone number (with the consumer-account gotcha called out), Swiss business verification documents (Handelsregisterauszug, VAT/UID, signatory), Meta Business account.
  • Business verification step-by-step with common rejection causes.
  • WhatsApp Business Account + phone number setup + display name review.
  • Template approval per template per locale: lists all nine templates from lib/demo/template-registry.ts × EN/FR = 18 submissions, with submission procedure + common rejection table.
  • System-user permanent token mint (cross-references docs/OPERATIONS.md § 1.2 rather than duplicating).
  • Webhook + verify-token install in the Meta App Dashboard.
  • Phased cutover: sandbox-with-test-number → production, using the Phase 20 simulator's "Send to me (real)" path as the verification step before full production.
  • Rollback plan: flip DEMO_MODE=true and restart.
  • Ongoing-operations notes (token rotation, template version bumps, conversation pricing, Phase 22 boot probe).
  • Failure-mode quick reference table.

B — docs/PRODUCTION_DATA_LOAD.md (9 sections)

  • Order-matters reminder (customers → yards → horses).
  • Source-data inventory (VetUp export / Outlook / appointment diary / WhatsApp history / handwritten notes).
  • Practice-specific field-mapping decisions for each profile (customers / yards / horses) that the generic IMPORT_GUIDE.md doesn't cover — couple-vs-single legal-entity question, E.164 Swiss numbers, francophone-vs-anglophone preferred language, when to leave Lat/Lng blank vs populated, owner-vs-yard-manager distinction for horses.
  • Data-quality pre-checks (one row per legal customer, E.164 phones, no clinical data in Notes).
  • Load procedure with manual pre-migrate snapshot bracket, customer- ID-lookup loop, batch-geocoding post-load.
  • Post-load verification SQL query (single-statement row-count rollup with deletedAt filtering).
  • Rollback paths at three time horizons (minutes → re-import with update; hours → restore from the manual snapshot; later → nightly backup window via docs/BACKUP.md § 4).
  • Common-gotchas table (multi-owner horses, yards-with-no-street- address, postcode typos surfaced via geocoding partial_match).

Both docs cross-reference existing operations docs (OPERATIONS, IMPORT_GUIDE, BACKUP, MAPS_COST_CONTROL) rather than duplicating their content.

Acceptance Criteria

  • npm run lint
  • npm run typecheck
  • npx prisma validate
  • npm run test — 0 regressions ✅
  • npm run build
  • Both runbooks cite real file paths, env vars, and Meta-side procedures — verified against lib/demo/template-registry.ts, docs/OPERATIONS.md, and docs/IMPORT_GUIDE.md.
  • No code changes; Phase 23 is doc-shaped by design (the underlying infrastructure was already in place from Phases 17, 20, 22).

Phase 22 — Audit tail: WhatsApp token probe + pre-migrate snapshot + SW cache verification (2026-05-16)

Why

Closes the MEDIUM/LOW residue from the 2026-04-18 production-readiness audit. With Phase 21 having already shipped the CRITICAL/HIGH items (Sentry option + Prisma pool warning), three concrete operational gaps remained:

  1. MED-05 — A revoked WHATSAPP_ACCESS_TOKEN was only discovered when the first outbound confirmation failed, often hours after the revocation. No boot-time signal existed.
  2. LOW-01 — The nightly pg_dump runs at 02:30 UTC. A destructive migration deployed at 14:00 left up to a 23-hour data-loss window if the schema corruption was not caught immediately.
  3. LOW-03 — Serwist's hashed-asset cache invalidation works correctly on next-navigation, but a tab that was open before the deploy (Kathelijne's inbox sitting open all day) silently keeps the old HTML/JS until the operator manually reloads.

Deliverables

A — MED-05 WhatsApp token boot probe

  • New lib/services/whatsapp-token-probe.service.ts. probe() makes a single GET https://graph.facebook.com/v21.0/<phone_number_id> with Authorization: Bearer <token> and a 5-second timeout.
    • HTTP 200 → log info, no further action.
    • HTTP 401 → write AuditLog{action:'WHATSAPP_TOKEN_INVALID', entityType:'config', entityId:'whatsapp-access-token'} and send a once-per-UTC-day alert email via emailService.sendBrandedEmail to MAPS_ALERT_EMAIL.
    • Any other status / network error → log warn, no audit, no alert (transient — never false-alarm).
  • Hooked into instrumentation.ts as a fire-and-forget call after the error sinks register. Skipped entirely in demo mode and when credentials are absent.
  • In-process dedup mirrors the Phase 17 maybeFireSoftCapAlert pattern (Set<string> keyed by UTC date; re-armed on restart).

B — LOW-01 pre-migrate snapshot automation

  • New docker/pre-migrate-snapshot.sh — runs pg_dump once before the migrator service and writes a labelled pre-migrate-<UTC-timestamp>.sql.gz into the existing backups_data volume. Skips on first-ever boot (empty schema).
  • New pre-migrate-snapshot compose service. Same safety guards as docker/backup-entrypoint.sh (libpq .pgpass, narrow env-var whitelists, no password literals in shell commands).
  • migrator now depends_on: pre-migrate-snapshot: service_completed_successfully so migrations are blocked until the snapshot lands.
  • Retention is governed by the nightly backup's existing BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS sweep — no separate knob.
  • Documented in docs/BACKUP.md § 7.

C — LOW-03 service-worker cache verification

  • Verified Serwist's precacheEntries: self.__SW_MANIFEST + skipWaiting: true + clientsClaim: true strategy is invalidation-safe for navigation-triggered loads. No code change required for the canonical case.
  • Shipped a defensive open-tab safety net regardless:
    • scripts/write-version.ts writes public/version.json = { sha, builtAt } at prebuild time (chained after check-env).
    • Checked-in placeholder public/version.json with sha:'dev' so the file always exists in dev / shallow-clone CI builds.
    • New client components/system/VersionBanner.tsx polls /version.json every 5 minutes (cache-busted), captures the bootstrap SHA on first poll, and surfaces a non-modal <div role="status" aria-live="polite"> banner when the SHA changes. Skipped when bootstrap SHA is 'dev'.
    • Mounted in app/[locale]/layout.tsx next to OfflineBanner.
  • New i18n keys under version.* in EN + FR.

Tests (11 new cases, 0 regressions)

File Cases
__tests__/unit/services/whatsapp-token-probe.service.test.ts 7
__tests__/unit/components/VersionBanner.test.tsx 4

Acceptance Criteria

  • npm run lint
  • npm run typecheck
  • npx prisma validate
  • npm run test — 0 regressions ✅
  • npm run build
  • Boot probe fires when WHATSAPP_ACCESS_TOKEN + WHATSAPP_PHONE_NUMBER_ID are set in non-demo mode; skips silently otherwise.
  • Pre-migrate snapshot lands in /backups before every migrator invocation; absent on first-ever boot.
  • Bumping public/version.json causes a long-lived tab to surface the refresh banner on the next 5-minute poll.
  • All five originally-flagged audit items (HIGH-02, HIGH-05, MED-05, LOW-01, LOW-03) are now ✅ in docs/PRODUCTION_READINESS_AUDIT_RESPONSE.md.

Phase 21 — Audit residue: Sentry option + pool-param enforcement (2026-05-15)

Why

Closes the two remaining CRIT/HIGH items from the 2026-04-18 production-readiness audit (HIGH-02 + HIGH-05) that weren't already covered by Phases 14–20. See docs/PRODUCTION_READINESS_AUDIT_RESPONSE.md for the full triage; everything else in the audit is shipped.

Deliverables

  • HIGH-02 (Sentry option). New lib/observability/sentry-error-sink.ts with a dynamic-import based factory: when SENTRY_DSN is set AND @sentry/nextjs is installed, registers a second error sink alongside the existing webhook sink (both fire in parallel). When the SDK isn't installed, logs a one-time warning to stderr and falls through. @sentry/nextjs stays an OPTIONAL operator install — no new hard dependency.
  • HIGH-05 (Pool-param boot warning). lib/utils/env-check.ts now warns when DATABASE_URL lacks ?connection_limit=10&pool_timeout=10 query params in non-demo mode. /api/status exposes probes.database.poolConfigured + poolMissing[] so the operator can see the gap on the observability page. The URL is never silently mutated — the operator decides whether to add the params.
  • Docs. .env.example documents both new vars; docs/OPERATIONS.md §6 (new) explains the Sentry trade-off vs. the existing webhook sink.

Files

File Action
lib/observability/sentry-error-sink.ts New
instrumentation.ts Register both sinks in parallel
lib/utils/env-check.ts Pool-param warning
app/api/status/route.ts Surface poolConfigured + poolMissing[]
.env.example Document SENTRY_DSN and the pool-tuning recipe
__tests__/unit/observability/sentry-error-sink.test.ts New
__tests__/unit/utils/env-check.test.ts +5 cases for pool-tuning warnings

Acceptance Criteria

  • npm run lint
  • npm run typecheck
  • npm run test — 1373 / 1373 pass, 0 regressions ✅
  • npm run build
  • Boot warning fires when DATABASE_URL lacks pool params (verified via the new env-check tests).
  • Sentry sink falls back gracefully when @sentry/nextjs is not installed (verified via the new sink test).

Phase 20 — Template UX + customer-DB import + WhatsApp simulator + road-following routes (2026-05-13)

Why

User feedback after testing the live Vercel deployment surfaced four concrete asks bundled into a single overnight build:

  1. Templates editor too "raw" — positional {{1}} / {{2}} placeholders confused non-technical operators.
  2. No customer-database upload path. Export existed; import didn't. Practice needed bulk-load for Customers / Yards / Horses.
  3. No WhatsApp simulator. Operators couldn't preview a template against a real customer without actually sending.
  4. Map polyline crossed Lake Geneva — straight geodesic lines between yards on opposite shores rendered as routes across water.

Deliverables

A — Template editor UX

  • components/admin/TemplatesAdmin.tsx rewritten with click-to-insert placeholder pills, debounced auto-save (no Save button), live validation badges (ok / missing / unknown) and a "Preview as customer" panel that renders against real customer/appointment data.
  • lib/utils/template-placeholders.ts — bidirectional {{N}}[name] serialiser with round-trip-locked unit tests.
  • lib/services/template-render.service.ts — server-side renderer shared with the simulator; resolves customer/appointment/horse fields against the live DB.
  • app/api/admin/templates/preview/route.ts — POST renders a draft body against any customer.
  • New DELETE /api/admin/templates/[key] for the Reset-to-default button + messageTemplateService.deleteOverride().

B — Customer / yard / horse CSV import

  • lib/services/csv-parse.service.ts — RFC 4180 decoder.
  • lib/services/csv-import.service.ts — three profiles (customers / yards / horses) with validation, conflict detection, dry-run + atomic-transaction commit, audit-logged via IMPORT_RUN.
  • app/api/admin/import/{preview,commit}/route.ts — multipart upload endpoints, ADMIN-only, file SHA-256 recorded (no on-disk persist).
  • app/[locale]/admin/import/page.tsx + components/admin/ImportRunner.tsx — drag-drop UI with profile + conflict-policy selectors, dry-run preview table, downloadable CSV templates per profile.
  • New runbook docs/IMPORT_GUIDE.md.

C — WhatsApp Business simulator

  • app/[locale]/admin/simulator/page.tsx + components/admin/TemplateSimulator.tsx.
  • app/api/admin/simulator/send/route.ts — two modes: simulate (renders + audits, never touches Meta) and real (rate-limited 3/hour per admin, gated on WHATSAPP_TEST_NUMBER env var).
  • New WHATSAPP_TEST_NUMBER env var documented in .env.example.
  • Audit events: TEMPLATE_SIMULATED, TEMPLATE_TEST_SENT.

D — Real road-following routes on the map

  • components/maps/RouteMap.tsx — replaces the geodesic-true Polyline with a RouteDirections component that calls Google's client-side DirectionsService per leg. SessionStorage cache keyed by lat,lng→lat,lng. Falls back to a fainter geodesic line on per-leg failure.
  • New NEXT_PUBLIC_MAP_ROUTING_MODE env var (directions default, straight for demo deploys with synthetic coordinates).
  • Note in docs/MAPS_COST_CONTROL.md: client-side DirectionsService has zero impact on the Phase 17 server-side spend cap.

Cross-cutting

  • New i18n keys under admin.templates.*, admin.import.*, admin.simulator.*, nav.import, nav.simulator in EN + FR.
  • Sidebar gains two ADMIN-only entries: Import + Simulator.

Tests (35 new cases, 1367 total pass, 0 regressions)

File Cases
__tests__/unit/utils/template-placeholders.test.ts 11
__tests__/unit/services/csv-parse.test.ts 10
__tests__/unit/services/csv-import.test.ts 9
__tests__/unit/api/admin-simulator-send.test.ts 4
(existing) __tests__/unit/components/RouteMap.test.tsx updated polyline assertion to match the new RouteDirections component

Acceptance Criteria

  • npm run lint
  • npm run typecheck
  • npm run test — 1367 / 1367 ✅
  • npm run build
  • New routes registered: /[locale]/admin/import, /[locale]/admin/simulator, /api/admin/import/preview, /api/admin/import/commit, /api/admin/simulator/send, /api/admin/templates/preview

Phase 19 — Outlook setup + scope clarifications + handover runbook (2026-05-13)

Why

Three deferred items from the 2026-05-13 gap analysis were doc-shaped (not code-shaped). Bundling them into a single doc-only slice closes the analysis without spinning up three near-empty PRs:

  1. Outlook inbound — the n8n IMAP workflow from Phase 18 is provider-agnostic; what was missing was operator documentation for pointing it at Outlook / Microsoft 365.
  2. Auto AM/PM slot suggestion — explicitly excluded from MVP per contract § 3.3. Path A from the slice-planning conversation: document the exclusion in writing rather than build it. Bundled with the broader answer to Patrick's six scope questions.
  3. docs/HANDOVER.md (H-06) — source-code transfer runbook for moving the repo from the developer-owned RJK134 account to a practice-owned account.

Deliverables

  • docs/OUTLOOK_INBOUND.md — full setup runbook for IMAP + app password against Outlook / 365 using the existing Phase 18 workflow. Covers troubleshooting + an explicit "running Gmail AND Outlook simultaneously" pattern. OAuth2 / Microsoft Graph path documented as a future option, not built.
  • docs/SCOPE_CLARIFICATIONS.md — point-by-point answer to Patrick's six pointed questions about scheduling intelligence, with a consolidated "Out-of-scope register" table. The MVP is positioned as an "intelligent workflow automation and scheduling assistant", not an autonomous scheduler. Auto AM/PM slot suggestion is documented as deliberately out-of-scope (Q3) with a sketched path to "yes" for a future phase.
  • docs/HANDOVER.md — full source-code transfer runbook covering pre-transfer secret inventory (~40 env vars), external integration inventory (Meta, Vercel, n8n, Anthropic, Google), the transfer itself, post-transfer verification checklist, and a rollback plan (GitHub transfers are reversible within 48h).

Acceptance Criteria

  • All three new docs land in docs/
  • BUILD_PLAN.md updated with this entry ✅
  • KNOWN_ISSUES.md updated with Phase 19 section ✅
  • No code changes; no migrations; lint / typecheck / build unchanged
  • The "Out of scope" register in SCOPE_CLARIFICATIONS.md becomes the canonical reference for "what does EquiSmile MVP do?"

Phase 18 — Unified inbox + n8n Gmail + journey-planner reorder (2026-05-13)

Why

Three open items from the 2026-05-13 gap analysis against Patrick's consultant feedback and the April-12 build update doc:

  1. Unified inbox — the build update promised one screen for WhatsApp + email; in practice only the triage queue existed.
  2. n8n Gmail intake — webhook handler complete, but n8n/02-inbound-email.json was noOp stubs. No mail actually flowed.
  3. Route-planner reorder — Patrick's "vet always confirms the final order" promise was partial: the vet could approve/reject but not resequence proposed stops; no mobile-friendly affordance.

Deliverables

  • n8n workflow (n8n/02-inbound-email.json) replaced with real emailReadImap → Code (parse to webhook contract) → HTTP Request → IF (success/failure logger) chain. Shipped inactive; operator activates after configuring the IMAP credential in n8n UI.
  • Unified inbox at /[locale]/inbox:
    • Server page + new components/inbox/InboxView.tsx client component
    • Thread grouping by customer (anonymous senders grouped per sourceFrom so unknown numbers/emails aren't lumped together)
    • Channel filter (ALL / WhatsApp / Email), debounced search
    • Sidebar entry added; MobileNav promotes Inbox over triage queue
    • i18n keys under inbox.* + nav.inbox
  • Journey-planner reorder:
    • PATCH /api/route-planning/proposals/[id]/reorder-stops — transactional resequence; rejects on APPROVED+ status; validates that every existing stop appears exactly once
    • lib/repositories/route-run.repository.ts#reorderStops — atomic transaction; nulls stale per-stop travel figures
    • components/route-runs/RouteRunStopsList.tsx — HTML5 drag-and-drop
      • up/down arrow buttons (accessible, touch-friendly, ARIA-labelled); presents identically inline and inside the <BottomSheet> drawer
    • Mobile-focused "Reorder stops" trigger button opens the bottom sheet for a larger touch target experience
    • i18n keys under routeRuns.reorder.*
  • Tests (4 new files, 28 cases):
    • __tests__/unit/api/route-planning-reorder-stops.test.ts — 9 cases covering DRAFT/PROPOSED reorder, APPROVED/BOOKED lock, validation
    • __tests__/unit/components/RouteRunStopsList.test.tsx — 7 cases covering render, reorder controls, optimistic UI
    • __tests__/unit/components/InboxView.test.tsx — 5 cases covering thread grouping, channel filter wiring, empty + error states
    • __tests__/unit/n8n/inbound-email-workflow.test.ts — 7 cases locking the workflow against noOp regressions and verifying the Bearer-auth contract with the EquiSmile webhook

Acceptance Criteria

  • npm run lint passes ✅
  • npm run typecheck passes ✅
  • npm run test — 1332 tests pass (139 files), 0 regressions ✅
  • npm run build passes ✅
  • New routes registered: /[locale]/inbox, /api/route-planning/proposals/[id]/reorder-stops

Phase 17 — Google Maps cost-control + go-live readiness gate (2026-05-13)

Why

EQUISMILE_LIVE_MAPS=true was a live-billing footgun: no daily spend cap, no per-call telemetry, no operator dashboard. Enabling live Maps on a runaway batch (or against a malicious test of the geocode endpoint) could rack up unbounded cost before anyone noticed. The existing safety net was a single environment variable.

Deliverables

  • New MapsApiCall Prisma model + MapsOperation enum (additive migration 20260513000000_phase17_maps_api_call)
  • lib/services/maps-cost-tracker.service.tscheckBudget / recordCall / getDailySpendUsd / last7DaysSpend / recent
  • MapsBudgetExceededError thrown before the network call when the daily hard cap is breached
  • Wrappers around three live call sites: googleMapsClient.geocode, geocodingService.geocodeAddress, routeOptimizerService.optimizeRoute. Demo-mode is unwrapped.
  • Budget-driven gate in batchGeocodeYards() replaces the fixed 100ms inter-request delay (closes KI-001)
  • GET /api/admin/maps-usage + /[locale]/admin/maps-usage page — today's spend, 7-day rollup, recent calls, soft/hard cap banners
  • 5 new env vars in lib/env.ts: MAPS_DAILY_SPEND_CAP_USD, MAPS_SOFT_CAP_PCT, MAPS_ALERT_EMAIL, MAPS_PRICE_GEOCODE_USD, MAPS_PRICE_OPTIMIZE_TOURS_USD
  • Soft-cap alert email via emailService.sendBrandedEmail, dedup'd per-UTC-day to prevent flooding
  • New i18n keys under admin.mapsUsage.* in EN + FR
  • 3 new test files (26 cases): unit + integration coverage
  • New runbook docs/MAPS_COST_CONTROL.md

Acceptance Criteria

  • npm run lint passes ✅
  • npm run typecheck passes ✅
  • npx prisma validate passes ✅
  • npm run test — 1304 tests pass (135 files), 0 regressions ✅
  • npm run build passes ✅
  • Migration is additive only (no destructive ops) ✅
  • KI-001 moved to resolved in docs/KNOWN_ISSUES.md

Phase 0 — Scaffold

Deliverables

  • Tooling and configuration (package.json, tsconfig, Tailwind, ESLint, Prettier, Docker Compose)
  • Documentation skeleton
  • n8n workflow JSON skeletons (01–06)
  • Prisma schema with complete data model
  • Next.js App Router shell with bilingual i18n (EN/FR)
  • Shared libraries and test scaffolding
  • CLAUDE.md and .claude/ agent configuration
  • GitHub Actions CI workflow

Acceptance Criteria

  • npm run lint passes ✅
  • npm run typecheck passes ✅
  • npm run test passes ✅
  • npx prisma validate passes ✅
  • npm run build passes ✅

Phase 1 — Foundation

Deliverables

  • PWA shell with Serwist
  • Docker Compose verified (PostgreSQL + n8n healthy)
  • Prisma migration init
  • Idempotent seed data
  • Environment variable validation
  • Health check API endpoint
  • CI pipeline passing

Phase 2 — Core Features

Deliverables

  • Customer/yard/horse CRUD with bilingual UI
  • Manual enquiry creation
  • Triage classification interface
  • Planning pool view with filters
  • Repository/service layer pattern

Phase 3 — Messaging Intake

Deliverables

  • Meta WhatsApp Cloud API webhook handler
  • Email/IMAP intake endpoint
  • Message logging
  • n8n-to-app REST contract
  • Webhook signature verification

Phase 4 — Triage Operations

Deliverables

  • Triage rules engine (EN/FR)
  • Missing-information auto-detection
  • Manual override and escalation with audit trail
  • Triage task queue
  • Status machine for valid transitions

Phase 5 — Route Planning

Deliverables

  • Google Geocoding integration
  • Geographic clustering by postcode area
  • Route scoring algorithm
  • Google Route Optimisation API integration
  • Route proposal generation, review, approval

Phase 6 — Booking & Confirmations

Deliverables

  • Route approval to appointment conversion
  • WhatsApp/email confirmation dispatch (bilingual)
  • 24h/2h reminder scheduling
  • Cancel/reschedule handling
  • Visit outcome recording with follow-up

Phase 7 — Hardening & Polish

Deliverables

  • Retry logic with exponential backoff and jitter
  • Structured JSON logging with data masking
  • Error recovery UX (error boundaries, toast, offline banner)
  • WCAG 2.1 AA accessibility
  • PWA offline capabilities with request queue
  • Performance (skeletons, pagination)
  • Mobile polish (bottom sheet, safe-area insets)
  • Pre-flight check script

Phase 8 — UAT & Launch

Deliverables

  • Release candidate tag (rc/v1.0.0)
  • CHANGELOG.md and release notes
  • Comprehensive UAT test scripts (TC-001 through TC-008)
  • Environment validation script
  • Production readiness checklist
  • Deployment guide with rollback procedure
  • Enhanced seed data for realistic UAT testing
  • Multi-stage production Dockerfile
  • CI/CD enhancements (Docker build, security audit)
  • Final documentation update

Retrospective Audit (2026-04-20)

Following the release of rc/v1.0.0, a retrospective verification pass was run against every phase's master prompt.

Summary: All 10 phases (0–9) verdict GREEN with AMBER log. Zero RED findings. Non-negotiable checks all pass (lint, typecheck, test, prisma validate, build). In-audit fix applied to __tests__/unit/infra/demo-startup.test.ts to guard Windows exec-bit assertions.

State drift: The audit was anchored at fbafbd9. During publication, PRs #13–#17 landed Phase 12 work on main (current HEAD 3e295ba). AMBER-03 (seed counts) was resolved by PR #17's seed split; remaining AMBERs re-verified against the diff and stand.

Outstanding triage decisions for v1.1 include brand-colour reconciliation (AMBER-02), Phase 6 data-model richness (AMBER-08 through AMBER-13), and idempotency store externalisation (AMBER-14). See the findings file for the per-deliverable evidence tables.


Phase 9 — Authentication (GitHub OAuth)

Scope

  • Gate the internal operations UI behind GitHub sign-in using Auth.js v5 with the @auth/prisma-adapter.
  • Restrict access to an env-driven allow-list (ALLOWED_GITHUB_LOGINS), matching either GitHub login or email (case-insensitive).
  • Add standard Auth.js Prisma models (User, Account, Session, VerificationToken) with a role column and githubLogin stored on User for future RBAC and audit wiring.
  • Chain Auth.js middleware with the existing next-intl middleware; keep /api/webhooks/* (n8n) and /api/auth/* public.
  • Replace the hard-coded performedBy = "admin" default in app/api/triage-ops/override/route.ts with the signed-in user's GitHub login/email.

Deliverables

  • auth.ts, lib/auth/allowlist.ts (lib/auth/session.ts superseded by lib/auth/rbac.ts in PR E)
  • app/api/auth/[...nextauth]/route.ts
  • app/[locale]/login/page.tsx, components/auth/{SignInButton,UserMenu,AuthSessionProvider}.tsx
  • Prisma schema + migration for auth tables
  • Updated middleware.ts, lib/utils/env-check.ts, .env.example
  • Allow-list + middleware unit tests
  • Docs: SETUP (GitHub OAuth App section), ARCHITECTURE (Authentication section), KNOWN_ISSUES (KI-006)

Verification

  • npm run lint && npm run typecheck && npm run test pass.
  • npx prisma validate passes and a prisma migrate dev run creates the four auth tables.
  • Unauthenticated visits to any locale route redirect to /{locale}/login.
  • Allow-listed GitHub account signs in successfully; non-allow-listed account is denied with the notAuthorised banner.
  • /api/webhooks/whatsapp still accepts n8n calls with N8N_API_KEY alone (no session).
  • Triage override creates audit rows with performedBy set to the signed-in user, not "admin".

Phase 10 — Staff Model & Per-Vet Assignments

Scope

  • Support a 2+ vet practice by introducing a Staff model separate from the Auth User, so domain assignments are decoupled from auth plumbing.
  • Track appointment ownership (primary vet + joint assignments) and route-run leadership (lead + assistants) so "rounds with both vets" is explicit, not convention.

Deliverables

  • Prisma: Staff model, AppointmentAssignment join, RouteRunAssistant join, RouteRun.leadStaffId FK. Additive migration only.
  • Repository/service: staff.repository.ts, staff.service.ts (list/create/update/deactivate + assignToAppointment/assignToRouteRun + appointmentsForCalendar).
  • API: GET|POST /api/staff, GET|PATCH|DELETE /api/staff/[id], POST|DELETE /api/staff/assign (target=appointment|routeRun).
  • UI: /{locale}/staff management page (list + create modal + toggle active).
  • Validations: lib/validations/staff.schema.ts (zod).
  • i18n: EN + FR strings for Staff page, roles, assignment labels.
  • Seed: demo-staff-rachel (lead vet, maroon), demo-staff-second (visiting vet, blue), demo-staff-nurse (green).
  • Tests: 10 service unit tests (create/duplicate email/assignment with primary flag/route-run lead+assistant/calendar filter).

Verification

  • npm run lint, typecheck, test, prisma validate all pass.
  • POST /api/staff { name } creates a vet; duplicate email returns 409.
  • POST /api/staff/assign { target: 'appointment', appointmentId, staffId, primary: true } unflags other primaries for that appointment.
  • POST /api/staff/assign { target: 'routeRun', routeRunId, staffId, isLead: true } writes RouteRun.leadStaffId.

Phase 11 — VetUp Dataset Export

Scope

  • Provide a clean CSV export of the EquiSmile dataset that can be ingested by VetUp (or any patient-centric PMS). Column schema is kept in VETUP_PATIENT_COLUMNS so it's a one-file change when the client confirms VetUp's actual headers.

Deliverables

  • lib/services/csv.service.ts — RFC 4180 encoder (CRLF, quote-escaping, null → empty, Date → ISO-8601).
  • lib/services/vetup-export.service.ts — three profiles: patient (horse-centric with denormalised owner + yard), customers, yards.
  • GET /api/export/vetup?profile=patient|customers|yards — streams CSV with Content-Disposition: attachment.
  • Customers page gains three download buttons (VetUp, Customers, Yards).
  • 13 unit tests (10 CSV encoder + 3 export service).

Verification

  • curl /api/export/vetup?profile=patient returns a CSV with the VetUp-patient header and one row per horse.
  • Fields with commas or double quotes are correctly RFC-4180 quoted/escaped.
  • Null fields render as empty (no literal "null" string).

Phase 12 — Clinical Records

Scope

  • Per-horse clinical history: PDF/image attachments, dental charts, tooth-level findings, prescriptions. Sets up the data model that the Phase 13 vision pipeline will populate.

Deliverables

  • Prisma: HorseAttachment, DentalChart, ClinicalFinding, Prescription models + 4 new enums (AttachmentKind / FindingCategory / FindingSeverity / PrescriptionStatus). Additive migration.
  • lib/services/attachment.service.ts — upload/list/read-bytes/delete; relative path kept in DB so storage backend (FS/S3) is swappable; 25 MB limit; allow-list of image+PDF mimes.
  • lib/services/clinical-record.service.ts — CRUD for dental charts, findings, prescriptions; trims inputs, validates duration/withdrawal non-negative, mutates status + timestamp atoms on transitions.
  • API: GET|POST /api/horses/[id]/attachments, GET|DELETE /api/attachments/[id], GET|POST /api/horses/[id]/clinical, PATCH /api/prescriptions/[id].
  • .env.example adds ATTACHMENT_STORAGE_DIR; .gitignore excludes data/attachments/.

Verification

  • curl -F file=@chart.pdf /api/horses/<id>/attachments → row inserted, bytes on disk under $ATTACHMENT_STORAGE_DIR/<horseId>/….
  • GET /api/attachments/<id> streams the original bytes inline.
  • POST /api/horses/<id>/clinical { kind:'prescription', medicineName, dosage } returns 201 ACTIVE row; PATCH /api/prescriptions/<id> { status:'CANCELLED', cancelledReason } sets status + cancelledAt.
  • 16 unit tests (8 attachment, 8 clinical-record).

Phase 13 — Vision Pipeline (Claude)

Scope

  • Analyse uploaded PDF dental charts and clinical images with Claude (Opus 4.7), producing structured findings + prescriptions that land directly in the Phase 12 clinical models. Acts as decision support — the vet reviews everything before acceptance.

Deliverables

  • lib/integrations/anthropic.client.ts — singleton SDK client; throws if ANTHROPIC_API_KEY unset; model override via EQUISMILE_VISION_MODEL.
  • lib/services/vision-analysis.service.ts — builds vision message (document block for PDFs, image block for JPEG/PNG/WebP/GIF), calls Claude with adaptive thinking + output_config.format: json_schema using a strict Zod schema (generalNotes, findings[], prescriptions[], confidence). System prompt is cache-control marked. Validates response locally before persisting.
  • Post-processing writes one DentalChart (linked to the source attachment) with all findings + any explicitly-recorded prescriptions, attributed to the calling staff member.
  • API: POST /api/attachments/[id]/analyse — returns { dentalChartId, findingIds[], prescriptionIds[], result }; returns 503 if ANTHROPIC_API_KEY is missing.
  • .env.example: ANTHROPIC_API_KEY + optional EQUISMILE_VISION_MODEL.
  • 14 unit tests (schema validation, extract/fallback/JSON error paths, service-level attachment lookup, persist=true vs false, PDF-vs-image block selection, staff attribution, cache_control placement).

Verification

  • POST /api/attachments/<id>/analyse with an equine dental PDF: returns 201 with findings[] and prescriptions[] populated; new DentalChart row linked via attachmentId.
  • Without ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: 503 "Vision analysis unavailable".
  • Corrupt/off-topic PDF: model returns confidence: "low", empty findings, explanatory generalNotes — no findings/prescriptions written beyond the chart row.
  • System prompt cached: usage.cache_read_input_tokens > 0 on the second analyse call in a 5-minute window.

Phase 13 — Postgres Idempotency Store (AMBER-14)

Scope

  • Replace the in-memory processedKeys: Set<string> in lib/utils/retry.ts with a Postgres-backed store so idempotency markers survive restarts and are shared across instances.

Deliverables

  • Prisma: IdempotencyKey { key @id, scope, createdAt, expiresAt? } with indexes on scope and expiresAt. Additive migration.
  • lib/services/idempotency.service.ts: hasProcessed(key), markProcessed(key, scope, ttlMs?) (upsert-based, concurrency-safe), pruneExpired(now).
  • lib/utils/retry.ts: hasBeenProcessed / markAsProcessed / clearProcessedKeys are now async and delegate to the service. Default TTL 30 days.
  • Call sites (lib/services/whatsapp.service.ts) updated with await.
  • docs/KNOWN_ISSUES.md AMBER-14 marked resolved.
  • 8 new idempotency-service tests; existing retry.test.ts idempotency suite converted to async + uses an in-memory mock of the service.

Verification

  • Restart the app between two sends with the same idempotency key → second call still detects the dupe (was previously lost).
  • POST /api/health shows the new table in prisma migrate status.
  • Expired keys are pruned automatically on first hasProcessed read (self-healing).

Phase 14 — Security Hardening (PR A: Auth + Headers)

Scope

  • Harden authentication and introduce defence-in-depth HTTP response headers.

Deliverables

  • lib/auth/redirect.tsisSafeCallbackUrl / safeCallbackUrl. Rejects absolute URLs, protocol-relative URLs (//evil), percent-encoded variants, javascript:/data: schemes, path traversal, CR/LF/NUL injection, and oversize values. Wired into middleware.ts, auth.ts redirect callback, and app/[locale]/login/page.tsx.
  • lib/auth/allowlist.ts — upgraded to constant-time comparison via crypto.timingSafeEqual (no short-circuit walk; length-gated).
  • auth.ts — explicit secure cookie config (__Secure- / __Host- prefixes, SameSite=Lax, HttpOnly, Secure in production), 30-day session with 24-hour rotation, trustHost only when AUTH_URL is set, useSecureCookies in prod, redirect callback that enforces same-origin.
  • lib/security/headers.ts + middleware wiring — adds:
    • Content-Security-Policy (pragmatic for HTML; strict default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none' for API)
    • Strict-Transport-Security (production only)
    • X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
    • X-Frame-Options: DENY
    • Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
    • Permissions-Policy (disables camera/mic/etc.)
    • Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin
    • Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: same-origin
  • Tests: 12 redirect tests + 8 header tests + 5 new allowlist tests + 2 new middleware tests.

Verification

  • npm run lint, typecheck, test, prisma validate all pass (674 tests across 73 files).
  • Open-redirect vectors (//evil, %2F%2Fevil, /javascript:..., /../admin, CR/LF injection) are rejected by both the middleware callbackUrl attach step and the Auth.js redirect callback.
  • Non-allow-listed sign-in attempts are logged without identifiers; production cookies carry __Secure- prefix.

Phase 14 — Security Hardening (PR B: RBAC + Audit Log)

Scope

  • Enforce least-privilege on sensitive API routes and record every security-relevant action in an append-only audit log.

Deliverables

  • lib/auth/rbac.tsROLES enum (admin | vet | nurse | readonly) + normaliseRole + hasRole + requireAuth + requireRole + withRole + AuthzError. Unknown roles default to readonly (deny-by-default).
  • Prisma: SecurityAuditLog + SecurityAuditEvent enum with 17 event types. Additive migration 20260420130000_phase14_security_audit.
  • lib/services/security-audit.service.ts: record(event, actor, ...) (best-effort, never blocks the primary request), recent({limit, event}) for admin dashboards; detail is truncated to 500 chars; no secrets.
  • Route lockdowns (with audit where appropriate):
    • GET/POST /api/export/vetupADMIN + EXPORT_DATASET audit
    • POST /api/staffADMIN + STAFF_CREATED
    • PATCH /api/staff/[id]ADMIN + ROLE_CHANGED | STAFF_UPDATED
    • DELETE /api/staff/[id]ADMIN + STAFF_DEACTIVATED
    • GET /api/staff + GET /api/staff/[id]READONLY
    • POST/DELETE /api/staff/assignVET
    • GET /api/attachments/[id]NURSE + ATTACHMENT_DOWNLOADED
    • DELETE /api/attachments/[id]VET + ATTACHMENT_DELETED
    • POST /api/attachments/[id]/analyseVET + VISION_ANALYSIS_INVOKED
    • GET /api/horses/[id]/attachmentsNURSE
    • POST /api/horses/[id]/attachmentsVET (uploader attribution taken from session, not form)
    • GET /api/horses/[id]/clinicalNURSE
    • POST /api/horses/[id]/clinical (dentalChart/finding/prescription) → VET + CLINICAL_RECORD_CREATED
    • PATCH /api/prescriptions/[id]VET + PRESCRIPTION_STATUS_CHANGED
    • GET /api/statusADMIN
  • auth.ts sign-in denial callback writes SIGN_IN_DENIED audit events with a coarse actor label (no denied-user identifiers stored).
  • /api/setup lint warning cleaned up as a drive-by.
  • Tests: 15 RBAC tests + 10 audit-service tests. Net 695 passing across 75 files.

Verification

  • A nurse cannot POST /api/horses/<id>/clinical or DELETE /api/attachments/<id> (403).
  • A readonly cannot POST /api/staff (403) but can GET /api/customers.
  • A vet cannot GET /api/export/vetup (admin-only).
  • Every admin export, attachment delete/download, clinical mutation, prescription status change, and vision-analysis invocation lands in SecurityAuditLog.

Phase 14 — Security Hardening (PR C: Webhook HMAC + Rate limiting + Log redaction)

Scope

  • Harden public-path webhook auth, cap abuse-prone routes with a rate limiter, and introduce a log-redaction utility so secrets can't leak via structured logs.

Deliverables

  • lib/utils/signature.ts — new constantTimeStringEquals helper; new verifyWhatsAppVerifyToken that uses it so the GET-challenge verify token can't be probed by timing.
  • app/api/webhooks/whatsapp/route.tsGET swaps === for constant-time compare; POST rate-limited per client IP (300/min) before parsing body.
  • app/api/webhooks/email/route.tsPOST rate-limited per client IP (200/min) before signature check.
  • lib/utils/rate-limit.ts — in-memory sliding-window limiter, rateLimiter({windowMs, max, now, maxKeys}) + rateLimitedResponse helper + clientKeyFromRequest. Per-key LRU-bounded to 10,000 keys.
  • Wired into: POST /api/attachments/[id]/analyse (20/hour per user — caps Claude Opus 4.7 spend) and GET /api/export/vetup (10/hour per admin — discourages automated exfil).
  • lib/utils/log-redact.tsredact(value) walks any object, replaces values of sensitive keys (authorization, api_key, cookie, password, signature, etc.) with [redacted]; also redacts Bearer … and sk-… string values regardless of key.
  • Tests: 11 rate-limit + 10 log-redact + 6 new signature tests. Net 722 passing across 77 files.

Verification

  • Spamming POST /api/webhooks/whatsapp 301 times in a minute from one IP returns 429 with Retry-After.
  • GET /api/export/vetup?profile=patient 11 times from the same admin returns 429.
  • redact({authorization: 'Bearer sk-xxx'}) returns {authorization: '[redacted]'}.
  • WhatsApp GET verification with a same-length wrong token no longer short-circuits compared to a matching token (no timing oracle).

Limits / follow-ups

  • The rate limiter is in-memory per Node instance. Horizontal scaling needs a Redis (or Postgres — same pattern as IdempotencyKey) backend.
  • The log-redact utility is available but not yet automatically wired into every console.log; adopt on a per-call basis as call sites are reviewed.

Phase 14 — Security Hardening (PR D: AMBER gap closure)

Scope

  • Resolve the functional gaps logged during the v1.0.0 retrospective audit. Split across three data-model additions, three audit-service wirings, a dead-letter queue, a visit-requests operator page, and docs reconciliation for the items that were naming/narrative gaps rather than code gaps.

Deliverables

  • Prisma additive migration 20260420140000_phase14_amber_gap_closure:
    • AMBER-06: Yard gets nullable geocodeSource, geocodePrecision, formattedAddress.
    • AMBER-10: ConfirmationDispatch { appointmentId, channel, sentAt, success, externalMessageId?, errorMessage? }.
    • AMBER-11: AppointmentResponse { appointmentId, kind, channel, receivedAt, rawText?, enquiryMessageId? } + AppointmentResponseKind enum.
    • AMBER-13: AppointmentStatusHistory { appointmentId, fromStatus?, toStatus, changedBy, reason?, changedAt }.
    • AMBER-15: FailedOperation { scope, operationKey?, payload, lastError, attempts, status, createdAt, updatedAt } + FailedOperationStatus enum.
  • lib/services/appointment-audit.service.ts: logConfirmationDispatch, logResponse, logStatusChange (skips no-op transitions), plus readers. Best-effort writes.
  • lib/services/dead-letter.service.ts: enqueue (runs redact() + caps sizes), list({status,scope,limit}), markStatus.
  • Wirings:
    • confirmationService.sendConfirmation writes a ConfirmationDispatch row on every attempt (success or failure).
    • bookingService.bookRoute, rescheduleService.cancelAppointment / markNoShow, visitOutcomeService.completeVisit each write AppointmentStatusHistory rows in the same transaction as the status mutation.
    • whatsappService.sendTextMessage / sendTemplateMessage and emailService.sendEmail enqueue FailedOperation rows on permanent failure.
  • app/[locale]/visit-requests/page.tsx (AMBER-04) — list view with planning-status + urgency filters; sidebar entry + EN/FR i18n.
  • Docs: docs/ARCHITECTURE.md new "Domain vocabulary reconciliation" section (AMBER-05, 07, 08, 12) with explicit mapping tables; docs/KNOWN_ISSUES.md updated — 10 AMBERs closed.
  • eslint.config.mjs: argsIgnorePattern: ^_ so _text-style deliberately-unused args stop tripping the linter.
  • Tests: 6 appointment-audit + 7 dead-letter = 13 new tests. Net (pre-PR D baseline 722) → see running-totals below.

AMBERs closed in PR D

  • AMBER-04 (code) — /visit-requests route + UI
  • AMBER-05 (docs) — triage vocabulary reconciliation
  • AMBER-06 (code) — geocoding metadata
  • AMBER-07 (docs) — RouteRun naming rationale
  • AMBER-08 (docs) — AppointmentStatus rationale
  • AMBER-10 (code) — ConfirmationDispatch
  • AMBER-11 (code) — AppointmentResponse
  • AMBER-12 (docs) — ReminderSchedule rationale
  • AMBER-13 (code) — AppointmentStatusHistory
  • AMBER-15 (code) — FailedOperation DLQ

Verification

  • SELECT event, actor, targetType FROM "SecurityAuditLog" after a full booking → cancellation cycle shows the expected trail of events AND AppointmentStatusHistory shows null → PROPOSED → CANCELLED.
  • Forcing a WhatsApp send against an invalid phone number enqueues a FailedOperation row whose payload contains [redacted] for any Bearer/api_key value that may have been attempted.
  • /en/visit-requests loads at 390px width; filters refine the returned list.
  • Only documentation-only AMBERs remain open: AMBER-09 (AppointmentHorse link table) — deferred per the audit note (adequate until per-appointment horse metadata is tracked).

Phase 14.1 — Truthfulness pass

Scope

  • Verify the overnight hardening report claims against the repo, fix any mismatches with the smallest safe change, and lock the fix in with a regression test.

Findings & fixes

  • Uploader attribution spoofing (high-severity) — app/api/horses/[id]/attachments POST previously fell back to uploadedById read from the multipart form if present, and used subject.id (Auth.js User.id) as a second fallback. Two bugs:

    1. Authenticated vet could spoof a colleague as the uploader by adding uploadedById=<victim-staff-id> to the form.
    2. HorseAttachment.uploadedById FK references Staff.id, so the fallback would also fail the FK check (or silently mis-attribute) when subject.id is a bare User id.

    Fix: ignore the form field entirely; resolve staffRepository.findByUserId(subject.id) and store staff?.id ?? null. New regression suite __tests__/unit/api/horses-attachments.test.ts locks in four cases: session→staff happy path, spoofed form value dropped, no-linked-staff falls back to null, description passes through unchanged.

Other claims re-verified (no code change needed)

  • Every Appointment.status mutation site (bookingService, rescheduleService.cancel/markNoShow, visitOutcomeService) now writes AppointmentStatusHistory; no stray mutation site exists.
  • Every requireRole placement matches the overnight report (/api/export/vetup ADMIN, /api/staff mutations ADMIN, /api/attachments/[id] NURSE GET + VET DELETE, /api/attachments/[id]/analyse VET, /api/horses/[id]/clinical NURSE GET + VET POST, /api/horses/[id]/attachments NURSE GET + VET POST, /api/prescriptions/[id] VET, /api/status ADMIN).
  • Rate limits wired at the four claimed routes (webhooks/whatsapp, webhooks/email, export/vetup, attachments/[id]/analyse).
  • deadLetterService.enqueue called from three claimed sites (whatsapp sendTextMessage, whatsapp sendTemplateMessage, email sendEmail).
  • applySecurityHeaders wraps every branch of middleware.ts (6 call sites).
  • verifyWhatsAppVerifyToken is the only verify-token check in app/api/webhooks/whatsapp/route.ts (no residual ===).

Verification

  • npm run lint, typecheck, test, prisma validate, build — all green. Net 739 tests passing (+4 new).

Phase 14 — Security Hardening (PR E: overnight gap-closure pass)

Scope

Overnight hardening sweep focused on data-access RBAC, fail-closed webhook auth, and rate limiting. Priority: protect customer/clinical data and close the remaining unauthenticated-integration paths.

Deliverables

  • Fail-closed n8n / webhook authlib/utils/signature.ts#requireN8nApiKey replaces ad-hoc if (env.N8N_API_KEY) checks. Returns HTTP 500 in production when the key is unset, instead of silently accepting anonymous traffic. Applied to:
    • /api/webhooks/email
    • /api/n8n/triage-result, /api/n8n/geocode-result, /api/n8n/route-proposal
    • /api/n8n/trigger/send-email, /api/n8n/trigger/send-whatsapp, /api/n8n/trigger/request-info
    • /api/reminders/check
  • Middleware public-paths/api/n8n/* and /api/reminders/check added so n8n server-to-server calls are not blocked by the session middleware while the fail-closed API-key gate runs in the handler.
  • Per-route rate limits on every n8n-authenticated endpoint (60–300 req/min per IP) plus a 30 req/min per-IP limiter on /api/auth/{callback,signin,verify-request,session} in middleware.ts to slow magic-link / OAuth callback abuse.
  • RBAC + auditrequireRole added to customer / horse / yard / enquiry / visit-request / appointment / dashboard / triage-ops / triage-tasks / route-planning endpoints. DELETEs on Customer / Yard / Horse now write SecurityAuditLog entries (CUSTOMER_DELETED, YARD_DELETED, HORSE_DELETED). Override endpoint now derives performedBy from the RBAC subject, closing a spoofable-actor gap.
  • Geocoding provenance runtime coverage — both geocodingService.geocodeYard and updateYardCoordinates now write geocodeSource / geocodePrecision / formattedAddress (columns existed from PR D but weren't populated on the Google path).
  • Tests — signature-gate tests (6 new cases), middleware public-path tests (3 new cases), customer delete RBAC + audit tests (2 new cases). All existing suites adapted.

Verification

  • npm run lint, typecheck, test, prisma validate, build — all green. Net 749 tests passing (+10 net new).
  • Manual: confirmed unauthenticated GET /api/n8n/triage-result now returns 500 in a non-demo env with N8N_API_KEY unset; returns 401 with it set and no Bearer header; returns 200 with correct Bearer.
  • Manual: DELETE /api/customers/:id with a NURSE session now returns 403; with ADMIN returns 200 and writes a CUSTOMER_DELETED row.

Phase 30 — Phase 2 build (eleven slices, ten rounds, two days) (2026-05-26 → 2026-05-27)

The full build of contract draft v3 § 4.2 plus the five new requirements surfaced in Kathelijne's 2026-05-26 planning call. Ten PRs (#161 → #172). Full per-feature description in docs/PHASE_2_DELIVERY_SUMMARY.md; this section is the build-plan-shaped summary.

Scope

Slice Feature Round PR
§ 2.1 Quick WhatsApp Answer Mode 2 #163
§ 2.2 VetUp data-shape import 6 #167
§ 2.3 Structured Fiche dentaire dental chart 3 #164
§ 2.4 WhatsApp self-message → invoice line 4 #165
§ 2.5 Voice-note intake + wake-word routing 9 #170
§ 2.6 Vet-pairing routing 5 #166
§ 2.7 Unified visit timing model 1 #161
§ 2.8 Practice scheduling config (singleton + admin UI) 1 + 10 #161 / #172
§ 2.9 Vaccination reminder cron already shipped pre-Phase-2
§ 2.10 Slot suggestion engine 7 #168
§ 2.11 FAQ AI (curation + matcher + Quick Answer integration) 8 + 10 #169 / #172
On-prem deployment artefact 10 #172

Deliverables

Schema additions (additive, all backward-compatible):

  • New enums: VisitServiceType, AnimalSpecies, AnimalSex, SelfInvoiceTaskStatus, plus 5 new FindingCategory values
  • New models: PracticeSchedulingConfig (singleton), SelfInvoiceTask, FaqEntry
  • Customer + Horse gained 12 VetUp-parity nullable columns
  • DentalChart.checklist JSONB for the 11-section structured form
  • VisitRequest.services array + suggestedSlots JSONB + suggestedSlotsAt
  • RouteRun.parallelGroupId + RouteRunStop.isJoint for vet pairing
  • EnquiryMessage.isVoiceNote / audioMediaId / audioTranscript / wakeIntent for voice intake

New services:

  • lib/services/draft-generation.service.ts (3-tone AI drafts)
  • lib/services/dental-chart-prefill.service.ts (free-text → structured JSON)
  • lib/services/self-invoice-parser.service.ts (parse vet WhatsApp self-messages)
  • lib/services/self-invoice.service.ts (PENDING → INVOICED workflow)
  • lib/services/voice-transcription.service.ts (STT interface + mock backend)
  • lib/services/wake-word.service.ts (pure detector)
  • lib/services/vet-pairing.service.ts (joint/solo classification + distribution)
  • lib/services/visit-timing.service.ts (unified timing calculator)
  • lib/services/practice-config.service.ts (singleton with 30s cache)
  • lib/services/slot-suggestion.service.ts (haversine-based scoring)
  • lib/services/faq.service.ts (CRUD + audit)
  • lib/services/faq-matcher.service.ts (lexical + LLM two-pass)
  • lib/services/vetup-import.service.ts (CSV parser + idempotent upsert)

New UI surfaces:

  • /[locale]/enquiries/[id]/answer — Quick Answer Mode
  • /[locale]/horses/[id]/dental-charts/new — structured dental form
  • /[locale]/admin/self-invoice — pending self-invoice tasks
  • /[locale]/admin/practice-config — tunable scheduling config
  • /[locale]/admin/faqs — FAQ curation
  • Inline panels on /visit-requests (slot suggestions) + /route-runs (parallel-route badges)
  • Voice-note + intent badges in the message thread

New infra:

  • docker-compose.onprem.yml + supporting Caddy / backup / env files
  • CLI: scripts/import-vetup.ts

LLM stack: single Claude Haiku integration via the pre-existing @anthropic-ai/sdk. Same client surface (getAnthropicClient + DRAFT_MODEL) reused across four features (drafts, dental prefill, self-invoice parsing, FAQ matching). DEMO_MODE / no-key fallback path on every LLM service so the demo runs offline.

Voice transcription: deterministic mock with deterministic per-mediaId hash. Production-ready interface — callWhisper() in voice-transcription.service.ts is the single function to wire up (one OpenAI / Gemini SDK call).

Verification

  • Five-check gate (lint / typecheck / prisma validate / npm test / build) green on every push across all ten rounds
  • Net 1,743 tests passing on main after Round 10 merge (up from ~1,440 pre-Phase-2)
  • ~270 new test cases added across the rounds covering parsers, services, API routes, components
  • No regressions on the existing Phase 1 surface — every UI page rendered + tested with the new fields nullable
  • Both new admin pages + each new feature route registered in the production build manifest
  • DEMO_MODE behaviour verified end-to-end on each round before push (mock STT, mock drafts, mock parser, mock matcher all return deterministic output)