chore: merge upstream/main (cbd05ad) domain-binding (#118) into SIWE_style_nonce — preserve atomic nonce claim (#116)

Merge upstream/main cbd05ad (fix: domain-bind wallet signature challenges)
while retaining atomic nonce claim (5dd4772). Resolves conflicts:

- src/modules/auth/auth.service.ts: retains generateNonce message +
  message_hash/issued_at + buildChallengeMessage from cbd05ad and
  injects atomic UPDATE ... count:'exact' claim before verify
  (burn-on-failure) from 5dd4772; removes trailing UPDATE; helpers
  resolveChallengeMessage/assertChallengeBinding preserved.
- test/unit/modules/auth/auth.service.spec.ts: merged suites keep
  origin domain-binding + HEAD TOCTOU atomicity (parallel
  double-verify, replay burned, expired burned) and fixes
  claimResult type.
- DTOs/e2e/env/docs/migration synced from upstream.

No merge markers, npm run build green, 61 tests pass.

Closes #116, incorporates #118.

Author: Adeyemi-cmd

.env.example

@@ -28,6 +28,20 @@ JWT_ACCESS_EXPIRATION=15m
 JWT_REFRESH_EXPIRATION=7d
 NONCE_EXPIRATION=300
 
+# Wallet signature challenges (issue #118)
+# Optional: exact host embedded in the challenge envelope's `domain` field
+# (defaults to the host of API_URL).
+AUTH_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN=
+# Legacy raw-nonce signatures (no domain binding) are deprecated. Keep true
+# during the migration window; set false to disable immediately. Note the
+# scheme is ALSO hard-disabled at runtime once AUTH_LEGACY_SIGNATURES_SUNSET
+# (below) has passed, so the flag does not need a manual flip at sunset.
+AUTH_ALLOW_LEGACY_RAW_SIGNATURES=true
+# Hard cutoff (YYYY-MM-DD) for the legacy raw-nonce scheme. After this date
+# legacy signatures are rejected even while AUTH_ALLOW_LEGACY_RAW_SIGNATURES
+# is true. Override to close the window early or extend it in an emergency.
+AUTH_LEGACY_SIGNATURES_SUNSET=2026-10-31
+
 # Redis
 REDIS_URL=redis://localhost:6379
 REDIS_DB=0

SECURITY.md

@@ -48,6 +48,14 @@ When reporting a vulnerability, please provide:
 
 1. **Wallet-Based Authentication**
    - Signature verification using Stellar cryptography
+   - Signatures are bound to a canonical StepFi challenge envelope (domain,
+     URI, wallet, nonce, issued-at, expires-at, network passphrase); the
+     nonce row stores a SHA-256 digest of the exact message, so a signature
+     captured from any other context cannot be replayed here
+   - Browser wallets verify per SEP-53; the legacy raw-nonce scheme is
+     deprecated and gated behind `AUTH_ALLOW_LEGACY_RAW_SIGNATURES`, and is
+     hard-disabled at runtime after `AUTH_LEGACY_SIGNATURES_SUNSET`
+     (default 2026-10-31) even if the flag is left true
    - Nonces expire after 5 minutes
    - JWTs expire after 15 minutes (access) / 7 days (refresh)
    - Refresh tokens are hashed before storage

context/architecture-context.md

@@ -84,8 +84,17 @@ Wallet address → `POST /auth/nonce` → client signs nonce with wallet →
 `POST /auth/verify` → JWT (access + refresh) issued.
 `POST /auth/refresh` rotates tokens.
 
-- SEP-0043 message signing supported for browser wallets (Freighter)
-- Raw Ed25519 signature verification for mobile (WalletConnect wallets)
+- Every accepted signature signs the canonical StepFi challenge envelope
+  (domain, URI, wallet, nonce, issued-at, expires-at, network passphrase);
+  the nonce row stores a SHA-256 digest of the exact message, so verification
+  only ever runs against the issued challenge (#118)
+- Browser wallets (Freighter) sign per SEP-53 (`signatureType: 'sep0043'`);
+  native clients sign the envelope with raw Ed25519
+  (`signatureType: 'envelope'`)
+- The legacy raw-nonce scheme is deprecated behind
+  `AUTH_ALLOW_LEGACY_RAW_SIGNATURES` and hard-disabled at runtime after
+  `AUTH_LEGACY_SIGNATURES_SUNSET` (default 2026-10-31), so the replayable
+  path closes automatically at the sunset even if the flag is left true
 - Nonces are single-use and expired by the `nonce-cleanup` cron
 
 ---

docs/api/endpoints.md

@@ -21,9 +21,7 @@ Authorization: Bearer <access_token>
 
 ### POST /auth/nonce
 
-Generate a nonce for wallet signature authentication.
-
-**Status**: 🔴 Not Implemented (API-01)
+Generate a nonce and the canonical StepFi challenge message for wallet signature authentication.
 
 **Request**:
 ```json
@@ -32,43 +30,78 @@ Generate a nonce for wallet signature authentication.
 }
 ```
 
-**Response** (200 OK):
+**Response** (201 Created):
 ```json
 {
-  "nonce": "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890",
-  "expiresAt": "2026-02-13T10:05:00.000Z"
+  "nonce": "a1b2c3d4e5f67890abcdef1234567890a1b2c3d4e5f67890abcdef1234567890",
+  "expiresAt": "2026-02-13T10:05:00.000Z",
+  "message": "{\n  \"domain\": \"stepfi-api.onrender.com\",\n  \"address\": \"GABC...XYZ\",\n  \"statement\": \"StepFi requests that you sign this message to authenticate your wallet. This message does not trigger any blockchain transaction.\",\n  \"uri\": \"https://stepfi-api.onrender.com/api/v1/auth/verify\",\n  \"version\": \"1.0.0\",\n  \"nonce\": \"a1b2c3d4e5f67890abcdef1234567890a1b2c3d4e5f67890abcdef1234567890\",\n  \"issuedAt\": \"2026-02-13T10:00:00.000Z\",\n  \"expirationTime\": \"2026-02-13T10:05:00.000Z\",\n  \"networkPassphrase\": \"Test SDF Network ; September 2015\"\n}"
 }
 ```
 
+The `message` field is the exact text the wallet must sign. It binds the
+signature to StepFi's domain, URI, wallet address, nonce and network, so a
+signature captured from any other context cannot be replayed here. A SHA-256
+digest of this message is stored on the nonce row, and verification only ever
+accepts a signature over a message whose digest matches the stored challenge.
+
+**Errors**:
+- `400`: Invalid wallet format
+
 ---
 
 ### POST /auth/verify
 
 Verify wallet signature and receive JWT tokens.
 
-**Status**: 🔴 Not Implemented (API-02)
-
 **Request**:
 ```json
 {
   "wallet": "GABC...XYZ",
-  "signature": "MEUCIQ...",
-  "nonce": "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890"
-}
-```
+  "signature": "base64-ed25519-signature",
+  "nonce": "a1b2c3d4e5f67890abcdef1234567890a1b2c3d4e5f67890abcdef1234567890",
+  "signatureType": "envelope",
+  "message": "{\n  \"domain\": \"stepfi-api.onrender.com\",\n  ... same envelope returned by /auth/nonce ...\n}"
+}
+```
+
+`signatureType` selects exactly one verification scheme (the server never
+tries multiple formats):
+
+- `envelope` — native clients: raw Ed25519 over the canonical envelope UTF-8
+  text returned by `/auth/nonce`.
+- `sep0043` — browser wallets (Freighter): Ed25519 over
+  `SHA-256("Stellar Signed Message:\n" + envelope)` (SEP-53).
+- `raw` — **deprecated** legacy scheme: raw Ed25519 over the bare nonce hex.
+  Only accepted while `AUTH_ALLOW_LEGACY_RAW_SIGNATURES=true` (migration
+  window, sunset **2026-10-31**). The sunset is enforced at runtime: after
+  that date legacy signatures are rejected with
+  `AUTH_LEGACY_SIGNATURE_DISABLED` even if the flag is still true (override
+  via `AUTH_LEGACY_SIGNATURES_SUNSET`).
+
+`message` is optional: when omitted, the server reconstructs the canonical
+challenge from the stored nonce row. Either way the signature is verified
+against a message whose digest matches the challenge stored with the nonce —
+client-supplied alternatives are rejected (`AUTH_CHALLENGE_MISMATCH`), as are
+messages bound to a foreign domain/URI/network
+(`AUTH_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN_MISMATCH`, `AUTH_CHALLENGE_URI_MISMATCH`,
+`AUTH_CHALLENGE_NETWORK_MISMATCH`) or expired envelopes (`AUTH_NONCE_EXPIRED`).
 
 **Response** (200 OK):
 ```json
 {
   "accessToken": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9...",
   "refreshToken": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9...",
-  "expiresIn": 900
+  "expiresIn": 900,
+  "tokenType": "Bearer"
 }
 ```
 
 **Errors**:
-- `400`: Invalid signature or nonce
-- `404`: Nonce not found or expired
+- `400`: Validation failed (wallet, nonce, signature, or signatureType)
+- `401`: Nonce not found/already used (`AUTH_NONCE_NOT_FOUND`), expired
+  (`AUTH_NONCE_EXPIRED`), or signature invalid
+  (`AUTH_SIGNATURE_INVALID` / `AUTH_CHALLENGE_*`)
 
 ---
 

docs/setup/environment-variables.md

@@ -75,6 +75,49 @@ JWT_REFRESH_EXPIRATION=7d
 NONCE_EXPIRATION=300
 ```
 
+### Wallet Signature Challenges (issue #118)
+
+Wallet authentication is bound to a canonical, domain-scoped challenge
+envelope signed by the wallet (see `docs/api/endpoints.md`). The envelope's
+`domain`, `uri` and `networkPassphrase` fields are derived from these
+variables; a signature bound to a different environment is rejected.
+
+```env
+# Base URL of the API. Used to derive the challenge envelope's `uri` field
+# (and the `domain` field when AUTH_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN is unset).
+API_URL=https://stepfi-api.onrender.com
+
+# Optional: exact host embedded in the challenge envelope's `domain` field.
+# Defaults to the host of API_URL. Must match the public origin clients
+# reach this API from.
+AUTH_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN=stepfi-api.onrender.com
+
+# Whether the deprecated legacy raw-nonce signature scheme (signature over
+# the bare nonce hex, no domain binding) is still accepted. Defaults to true
+# during the documented migration window; set to false to disable it
+# immediately. When false, legacy requests fail with
+# AUTH_LEGACY_SIGNATURE_DISABLED.
+AUTH_ALLOW_LEGACY_RAW_SIGNATURES=true
+
+# Hard cutoff (YYYY-MM-DD) for the legacy raw-nonce scheme. After this date
+# legacy signatures are rejected with AUTH_LEGACY_SIGNATURE_DISABLED even
+# while AUTH_ALLOW_LEGACY_RAW_SIGNATURES is still true, so the migration
+# window closes automatically at the sunset — no manual ops action required.
+# Defaults to 2026-10-31. Override to close the window early or (in an
+# emergency) to extend it. Malformed values fall back to the default.
+AUTH_LEGACY_SIGNATURES_SUNSET=2026-10-31
+```
+
+**Migration window**: existing mobile clients sign the bare nonce. They must
+be updated to sign the canonical challenge envelope returned by
+`POST /auth/nonce` (`signatureType: "envelope"`). Until the sunset date
+(**2026-10-31**) the legacy scheme remains accepted while
+`AUTH_ALLOW_LEGACY_RAW_SIGNATURES=true`; after that date the legacy scheme
+is rejected **at runtime** (the sunset is enforced in code, not just
+documented), so only domain-bound signatures are accepted even if the flag
+was never flipped. Set `AUTH_ALLOW_LEGACY_RAW_SIGNATURES=false`
+immediately if you do not need the migration window at all.
+
 ### Redis (Caching)
 
 ```env

src/modules/auth/auth.module.ts

@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import { SupabaseService } from '../../database/supabase.client';
 import { UsersRepository } from '../../database/repositories/users.repository';
 import { getJwtConfig } from '../../config/jwt.config';
 import { AdminModule } from '../admin/admin.module';
-
 import { RolesGuard } from '../../auth/guards/roles.guard';
 
 @Module({