deny.toml

# cargo-deny policy. Run: cargo deny check  (part of ./scripts/check.sh)

[advisories]
# Unmaintained transitive crates pulled in by embassy/cortex-m; no fix upstream.
# The sole *vulnerability* ignored below (rsa) is a deliberate, documented
# exception: no fixed release exists, it is the chosen OpenPGP RSA backend,
# we already use its blinded sign/decrypt APIs, and the Marvin attack
# needs precise decryption-timing measurements over many queries — outside this
# local-USB-token threat model. Everything else here is merely "unmaintained".
ignore = [
    "RUSTSEC-2024-0436", # paste — unmaintained, via pio-core
    "RUSTSEC-2026-0110", # bare-metal — deprecated, via cortex-m
    "RUSTSEC-2026-0173", # proc-macro-error2 — unmaintained, build-time only (pio-proc -> embassy-rp)
    "RUSTSEC-2023-0071", # rsa — Marvin timing side-channel; no fix upstream, mitigated by blinding (see above)
]

[licenses]
allow = [
    "MIT",
    "Apache-2.0",
    "BSD-3-Clause",
    "Zlib",
    "Unicode-3.0",
    "BlueOak-1.0.0", # minicbor — permissive, with a patent grant
]
confidence-threshold = 0.9
# Our own firmware crates are `publish = false`; don't license-scan them.
private = { ignore = true }

[bans]
multiple-versions = "warn"

[sources]
unknown-registry = "deny"
unknown-git = "deny"
allow-git = [
    "https://github.com/embassy-rs/embassy",
    "https://github.com/embassy-rs/rp-pac",
]