Question on XRPL wallet secret key exposure and delayed theft risk

[DjordyvanRingelesteijn]

I have a technical question regarding XRPL wallet key management and threat models.

If an attacker gains access to encrypted XRP Ledger wallet secret keys stored by a third-party wallet provider during a breach, and users are later instructed to log in so that the provider re-encrypts sensitive data server-side using new encryption keys, does this remediation change or revoke the underlying XRPL wallet secret key itself?

More specifically, assuming the wallet address and secret key remain unchanged, is it technically possible for an attacker to later decrypt previously accessed encrypted key material offline and use the original secret key to sign transactions and steal funds — even years after the initial breach — without any further compromise of the user?

I’m not asking about any specific provider, just about XRPL’s key model and whether this scenario is technically plausible.