STATUS.md

Audit Status Tracker

Updated: 2026-04-17

Mainnet Gate: BLOCKED until all required scopes below are Completed with signed reports.

Engagements

ID	Auditor	Scope	Signed Ref	Signed On	Status	Report
AUD-2026-001	Redacted External Auditor (under NDA)	/contracts/ethereum	SOW-ETH-2026-02-14-A	2026-02-14	In progress	audits/reports/2026-02-14-preaudit-baseline.md
AUD-2026-002	Redacted External Auditor (under NDA)	Consensus + vote extensions	SOW-CONS-2026-02-14-B	2026-02-14	In progress	audits/reports/2026-02-14-preaudit-baseline.md
INT-2026-001	Internal Security Review	Full protocol (Go, Solidity, Rust)	N/A	2026-02-22	Completed	27 findings, all remediated and verified
INT-2026-002	Internal Full Audit v2	Full protocol -- 36 findings	N/A	2026-02-23	Completed	36 findings, all verified and CLOSED (2026-03-30)
CON-2026-001	External Consultant	VRF + protocol review	N/A	2026-02-28	Completed	RS-01 (Critical) verified and CLOSED (2026-03-30)
MR-2026-001	Multi-Repo Strict Snapshot	9 public repos -- governance/process	N/A	2026-02-24	Partially Remediated	10 findings: 7 partially remediated, 4 remediated locally (pending push)

Finding Summary (Internal Audit - INT-2026-001)

Severity	Open	In Progress	Closed	Accepted Risk
Critical	0	0	3	0
High	0	0	5	0
Medium	0	0	8	0
Low	0	0	7	0
Informational	0	0	6	0

Finding Summary (Consultant Review - CON-2026-001)

Severity	Open	In Progress	Closed	Accepted Risk
Critical	0	0	1	0

Consultant Finding: RS-01 (Critical)

• Title: Non-constant-time hash-to-curve in VRF implementation
• File: crates/consensus/src/vrf.rs (lines 457-496)
• Fix: Replaced try-and-increment with RFC 9380 Simplified SWU via k256::hash2curve
• Status: Fixed (2026-02-28)

Consultant Recommendations Addressed

• Threat model: Completed (docs/security/threat-model.md)
• Formal verification plan: Created (docs/security/FORMAL_VERIFICATION.md)
• Fuzzing infrastructure: Documented (docs/security/FUZZING.md)
• Monitoring & alerting: Documented (docs/security/MONITORING.md)
• Security runbooks & upgrade procedures: Created (docs/security/SECURITY_RUNBOOKS.md)
• Code quality standards: Documented (docs/security/CODE_QUALITY.md)
• Decentralization roadmap: Created (docs/security/DECENTRALIZATION_ROADMAP.md)

Pre-Audit Remediation Log (2026-02-14)

The following simulated/placeholder crypto implementations were replaced with production-grade libraries during the pre-audit hardening pass:

Component	File	Before	After
Kyber Core (keygen/encaps/decaps)	crates/core/src/crypto/kyber.rs	SHAKE-256 simulation	pqcrypto-kyber (kyber512/768/1024)
Kyber Transport (P2P)	crates/core/src/transport/kyber_libp2p.rs	DefaultHasher (SipHash)	pqcrypto-kyber + hkdf HKDF-SHA256
ECDSA Recover (VM)	crates/vm/src/precompiles/crypto.rs	Returned hash[0..20]	k256::ecdsa secp256k1 recovery
Dilithium Verify (VM)	crates/vm/src/precompiles/crypto.rs	Always returned true	pqcrypto-dilithium verify_detached
Kyber Decaps (VM)	crates/vm/src/precompiles/crypto.rs	SHA-256(input)	pqcrypto-kyber decapsulate
Hybrid Verify (VM)	crates/vm/src/precompiles/crypto.rs	Always returned true	Real ECDSA + Dilithium verify chain
Python Dilithium	sdk/python/.../dilithium.py	SHAKE-256 simulation	liboqs oqs.Signature (+ fallback)
Python Kyber	sdk/python/.../kyber.py	SHAKE-256 simulation	liboqs oqs.KeyEncapsulation (+ fallback)
Python ECDSA (Wallet)	sdk/python/.../wallet.py	SHAKE-256 simulation	ecdsa library (secp256k1, RFC 6979)
Python Address	sdk/python/.../wallet.py	Hex encoding	Bech32 encoding (aethel1...)
Python Key Export	sdk/python/.../wallet.py	No encryption	Fernet AES-256 + PBKDF2 (480k iters)
Verify Keeper Tests	x/verify/keeper/keeper_test.go	No tests	20+ unit tests (all pass)

Production-Readiness Gate Status

Updated: 2026-03-02

Gate	Description	Status	Evidence
G1	Audit signoff	PASS	All findings closed (see tables above); external audits AUD-2026-001/002 in progress
G2	CI branch-protection gates	PASS	Core Required Gate, Security Required Gate, E2E Required Gate, Contracts Required Gate, Rust Required Gate, Load Test Required Gate all enforced
G3	Dependency integrity (Go vendoring)	PASS	GOFLAGS=-mod=mod in CI; go.sum integrity-checked; no replace directives
G4	Dependency integrity (Rust)	PASS	All [[bench]] targets have matching source files; cargo audit clean
G5	SAST / security scanning	PASS	.github/workflows/security-scans.yml: gosec, trivy, gitleaks, slither, govulncheck, cargo-audit, npm audit
G6	Formal verification / fuzzing	PASS	.github/workflows/fuzzing-ci.yml: Go native fuzzing + Rust cargo-fuzz (4 PQC targets)
G7	Fail-closed production config	PASS	AllowSimulated=false default in genesis; compile-time assertion via -tags production; runtime override in readiness.go; production genesis at integrations/deploy/config/genesis/genesis-mainnet.json
G8	HSM / key-management preflight	PASS	crypto/hsm/preflight.go: pre-start validation (connectivity, test-sign, key label, PKCS#11); cmd/aethelredd/hsm_preflight.go CLI gate
G9	Production-like E2E topology	PASS	e2e-docker-smoke CI job (Docker Compose real-node profile + verifiers + smoke tests); TestEndToEnd_RealNodeDockerSmokeGate
G10	Exploit simulation determinism	PASS	Seed-based deterministic RNG via AETHELRED_SCENARIO_SEED env var; math/rand.New(rand.NewSource(seed)) per scenario
G11	Ops readiness docs	PASS	Security runbooks, monitoring, threat model, formal verification plan all documented
G12	Docs hygiene (no host-local path leakage)	PASS	All /Users/... absolute paths replaced with relative paths; .github/workflows/docs-hygiene.yml enforces

Gate Evidence Cross-References

• G5 SAST: security-scans.yml runs on every PR and push to main/develop/release branches. Required gate blocks merge on failure.
• G6 Fuzzing: fuzzing-ci.yml runs Go go test -fuzz (4 fuzz targets in app/vote_extension_fuzz_test.go) and Rust cargo-fuzz (4 PQC fuzz targets in crates/core/fuzz/).
• G7 Production config: Three-layer enforcement: (1) DefaultParams().AllowSimulated = false in genesis types, (2) compile-time -tags production assertion in app/allow_simulated_prod.go, (3) runtime override in app/readiness.go.
• G8 HSM preflight: aethelredd hsm-preflight performs: HSM connectivity test, PKCS#11 session validation, test-sign operation, key label verification, failover readiness check.
• G10 Determinism: Set AETHELRED_SCENARIO_SEED=<int64> for reproducible partition/eclipse simulations. Each scenario runner creates a dedicated math/rand.Rand from the seed.

Active Pre-Audit Hardening Branches

The current external review window includes additional hardening on top of the March 30 verified baseline.

Branch / PR	Scope	Current Head	Status	Evidence
ramesh/broad-review-cleanup-20260416 / #139	Repo review-surface cleanup for TypeScript SDK and VSCode tooling	Branch head in PR	In Review	PR checks + local npm run typecheck, npm run compile, npm run lint, npm test
ramesh/protocol-hardening-sweep-20260416 / #141	Bridge relayer persistence and authority, burn nonce extraction, fail-closed zk proof and TEE/VM verification, authenticated simulated keeper attestations, deterministic simulated EZKL verification, deterministic simulated keeper zk proof binding, secure-by-default TEE precompile registry wiring, seal verifier fail-closed defaults, stateful seal revocation approval/execution, removal of the ordinary privileged seal-revocation bypass, narrowed raw keeper revoke entrypoints, quorumed emergency seal revocation, explicit authority enforcement on governance-only vault keeper methods, authority-gated non-overwritable relay liveness challenges with audit logging, loopback-by-default admin consensus-audit endpoint enforcement with explicit bearer-token authorization for remote exposure, truthful simulated/degraded health reporting with 503 reserved for genuinely unhealthy runtime posture, redacted public health diagnostics with detailed output gated to loopback or explicit token authorization, loopback-by-default metrics endpoint enforcement with explicit bearer-token authorization for remote scraping, forwarded proxy traffic no longer inheriting unauthenticated loopback trust on admin, metrics, or detailed health routes, fail-closed remote TEE endpoint validation across startup and health probing, fail-closed readiness endpoint probing for configured verifier targets, fail-closed EZKL remote prover/verifier endpoint validation, fail-closed DCAP collateral and CRL endpoint validation, fail-closed mirrored worker Nitro remote endpoint validation, fail-closed drand relay endpoint validation with bounded local fallback decoding, fail-closed TEE worker backend proxy endpoint validation, fail-closed lightweight attestation collateral backends, fail-closed Nitro parser placeholder path, fail-closed ARM parser and signature placeholder paths, fail-closed shared endpoint literal-IP bypasses, loopback-or-bearer TEE worker API enforcement with token-aware remote client requests, fail-closed SGX TCB placeholder evaluation, Nitro remote client bearer-token alignment, fail-closed TEE startup gating for real remote verifier modes, explicit simulated Nitro client identity with schema-consistent quote/proof artifacts, fail-closed Nitro payload confidentiality handling, fail-closed seal signature verification semantics, fail-closed seal export provenance semantics, honest PQC backend availability gating, fail-closed enhanced seal signature semantics, fail-closed seal import provenance semantics, aligned simulated TEE platform taxonomy across app and PoUW validation, ABCI vote-extension request binding for validator identity and height, runtime enforcement of locked PoUW governance parameters, governance compatibility and compliance alignment with runtime lock policy, auditable trusted-measurement registry mutations with legacy Nitro index reconciliation, bonded-quorum trusted-measurement emergency revocation, aligned security audit and threat-model narratives with the hardened production governance posture, formal threat-model/open-item truth-alignment for live downtime slashing enforcement, cryptographic mempool signature enforcement, fail-closed VM job-registry proof verification, owner-bound sovereign payload encryption and fail-closed sovereign access control, validator slashing economic-penalty enforcement, timelock-safe automation keeper ownership, fail-closed non-local deployment authority resolution, real hybrid secp256k1 + Dilithium signer/verification in the worker runtime, governance bootstrap, Cruzible deployability	Latest branch head in PR	In Review	docs/audits/protocol-hardening-sweep-2026-04-16.md

These branches are additive hardening tranches and do not reopen any finding that was already marked CLOSED on the March 30 baseline. They exist to reduce residual reviewer risk before the next external audit pass.

Notes

• Update this file in every audit-related PR.
• Each closed finding must link to a commit/PR in /audits/remediation/.