update readme

Author: mmsaki

README.md

@@ -1,13 +1,14 @@
-# Async Swap CSMM Hook
+# Async Swap AMM
 
-We use Uniswap V4’s hook to implement a new batch-auction style MEV-resilient mechanism for AMM. Our approach expands the recent theoretical work of https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3564246.3585233, and mitigates MEVs by imposing a specific transaction ordering rule so that transactions in different directions (buy or sell) are matched as much as possible. A technical challenge in our hook implementation is that we need to impose constraints (the transaction ordering rule) on the block level instead of individual transaction levels. Our MEV-resilient AMM has a nice property in that an MEV-maximizing builder will order transactions in such a way that no MEV opportunities remain.
+We use Uniswap V4’s hook to implement a new batch-auction style MEV-resilient mechanism for AMM. Our approach expands the recent theoretical work of https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3564246.3585233, and mitigates MEVs by imposing a specific transaction ordering rule so that transactions in different directions (buy or sell) are matched as much as possible. A technical challenge in our hook implementation is that we need to impose constraints (the transaction ordering rule) on the block level instead of individual transaction levels. Our MEV-resilient Asyn Swap AMM has a nice property in that an MEV-maximizing builder will order transactions in such a way that no MEV opportunities remain.
 
 Batch auctions have been advocated for preventing manipulative behaviors either in traditional limit-order markets (e.g., Budish, Crampton, and Shin 2015 against HFT rat race) or on AMMs (e.g., Ferreira and Parks 2023 against MEV). In this project, we demonstrate how Uniswap V4 hooks can implement batch auctions natively on constant-product AMMs. We overcome the technical challenge in our hook implementation in that we need to impose constraints (the transaction ordering rule) on the block level instead of individual transaction levels. Our resulting MEV-resilient AMM has a nice property in that an MEV-maximizing builder will order transactions in such a way that no MEV opportunities remain.
 
 - [AsyncCSMM - hook contract](https://github.com/classcool/async-swap/blob/main/src/AsyncCSMM.sol)
 - [Router - add liquidity, swap & fill async orders](https://github.com/classcool/async-swap/blob/main/src/router.sol)
 - [Live Demo Frontend](https://frontend-mu-one-27.vercel.app/)
 - [Video Walkthrough](https://www.loom.com/share/b66cfb28f41b452c8cb6debceea35631?sid=962ac2ae-c2d4-49ff-b621-b99428b44ff9)
+- [Transaction Ordering rules walkthorugh video](https://www.loom.com/share/15839f36efaf42e48642b5f1269c6709?sid=ab37fb1b-a31a-4519-9973-d34a7777360f)
 
 ## Install