diff --git a/crypto/rand_extra/getrandom_fillin.h b/crypto/rand_extra/getrandom_fillin.h
index 9b18b7e9fdd..7a03709d2f4 100644
--- a/crypto/rand_extra/getrandom_fillin.h
+++ b/crypto/rand_extra/getrandom_fillin.h
@@ -8,8 +8,7 @@
 #include "internal.h"
 
 
-#if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_URANDOM)
-
+#if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_URANDOM) && defined(OPENSSL_LINUX)
 #include <sys/syscall.h>
 
 #if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64)
@@ -54,7 +53,7 @@
 #define GRND_RANDOM 2
 #endif
 
-#endif  // OPENSSL_LINUX
+#endif  // OPENSSL_RAND_URANDOM && OPENSSL_LINUX
 
 
 #endif  // OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_RAND_GETRANDOM_FILLIN_H
diff --git a/crypto/rand_extra/urandom.c b/crypto/rand_extra/urandom.c
index c8b611abea8..1aa71038c5b 100644
--- a/crypto/rand_extra/urandom.c
+++ b/crypto/rand_extra/urandom.c
@@ -353,7 +353,12 @@ static void ensure_getrandom_is_initialized(void) {
 static void ensure_dev_urandom_is_initialized(void) {
 
   // On platforms where urandom doesn't block at startup, we ensure that the
-  // kernel has sufficient entropy before continuing.
+  // kernel has sufficient entropy before continuing. We do this via the
+  // RNDGETENTCNT ioctl from <linux/random.h>, which is Linux-specific.
+  //
+  // On other URANDOM-path platforms (e.g. AIX) we have no portable way to
+  // query the kernel entropy pool, so we skip this pre-check and proceed.
+#if defined(OPENSSL_LINUX)
   for (;;) {
     int entropy_bits = 0;
     if (ioctl(urandom_fd, RNDGETENTCNT, &entropy_bits)) {
@@ -376,6 +381,7 @@ static void ensure_dev_urandom_is_initialized(void) {
     struct timespec sleep_time = {.tv_sec = 0, .tv_nsec = MILLISECONDS_250 };
     nanosleep(&sleep_time, &sleep_time);
   }
+#endif  // OPENSSL_LINUX
 
   random_flavor_state = STATE_READY;
 }