components: rename kebab-cased to snake_case

Component names were split 55 snake_case / 31 kebab-case / 1 mixed
(dmesg_kaslr-disabled), visible in -v output, -s glob patterns, install
paths, and docs. Standardise on the majority convention.

Author: bcoles

CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -389,11 +389,11 @@ because they have different implications for the inference engine:
 #### Disabled — `SF_KASLR_DISABLED`
 
 A handful of components detect a definitive opt-out and emit the scalar
-fact `SF_KASLR_DISABLED` via `kasld_emit_scalar()` — proc-cmdline (the
-`nokaslr` boot flag), boot-config / proc-config (no
-`CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE`), dmesg_kaslr-disabled (the cmdline /
+fact `SF_KASLR_DISABLED` via `kasld_emit_scalar()` — proc_cmdline (the
+`nokaslr` boot flag), boot_config / proc_config (no
+`CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE`), dmesg_kaslr_disabled (the cmdline /
 hibernation / loongarch "KASLR disabled" / "KASLR is disabled" lines),
-hibernation_nokaslr (LoongArch hibernation override), riscv64-no-seed
+hibernation_nokaslr (LoongArch hibernation override), riscv64_no_seed
 (FDT without `/chosen/kaslr-seed`), loongarch_kexec_file_nokaslr
 (`kexec_file` token), s390_kdump_nokaslr (`elfcorehdr=` kdump handoff).
 The orchestrator reads the scalar to set the summary's `kaslr.disabled`
@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ memory"). The kernel was still relocated by the boot stub to a
 firmware-/boot-stub-deterministic position — *not* the link-time
 default — so this signal MUST NOT be fed to `kaslr_disabled_pin`.
 
-The dmesg_kaslr-disabled component distinguishes the two by inspecting
+The dmesg_kaslr_disabled component distinguishes the two by inspecting
 the exact reason string in the kernel's "KASLR disabled" line and emits
 the appropriate fact. The summary flag `kaslr.disabled` stays *false*
 in this state: the engine has not pinned the kernel to a known address,

Makefile

@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ SRC_DIR := ./src
 HDRS := $(wildcard $(SRC_DIR)/include/*.h $(SRC_DIR)/include/kasld/*.h \
                     $(SRC_DIR)/include/kasld/arch/*.h)
 
-# Detect zlib (optional, for native gzip decompression in proc-config)
+# Detect zlib (optional, for native gzip decompression in proc_config)
 HAVE_ZLIB := $(shell echo 'int main(void){return 0;}' | $(CC) $(ALL_CFLAGS) $(ALL_LDFLAGS) -xc - -lz -o /dev/null 2>/dev/null && echo 1)
 
 # Detect pthread (optional, for parallel inference worker pool in orchestrator)
@@ -146,7 +146,8 @@ SRC_FILES := $(wildcard $(COMP_SRC_DIR)/*.c)
 BIN_FILES := $(patsubst $(COMP_SRC_DIR)/%.c,$(COMP_DIR)/%,$(SRC_FILES))
 
 # cc-component <cmd...>: run the compiler. Three outcomes:
-#   - Success: silent (same as today's `-cc ...` line).
+#   - Success: print `[built] <component>` so per-arch builds (especially
+#     `make cross`) make visible which components landed on this arch.
 #   - Failure caused ONLY by the arch-gate `#error "Architecture is not
 #     supported"` (and nothing else): print a single
 #     `[skip] <component> (architecture-gated)` line. The build of *this*
@@ -158,9 +159,11 @@ BIN_FILES := $(patsubst $(COMP_SRC_DIR)/%.c,$(COMP_DIR)/%,$(SRC_FILES))
 # semantic).
 define cc-component
 	@out=$$($(1) 2>&1); st=$$?; \
-	if [ $$st -ne 0 ] && \
-	   echo "$$out" | grep -q '#error.*Architecture is not supported'; then \
-	  echo "[skip] $(notdir $@) (architecture-gated)"; \
+	if [ $$st -eq 0 ]; then \
+	  echo "[built] $(notdir $@)"; \
+	  if [ -n "$$out" ]; then printf '%s\n' "$$out" >&2; fi; \
+	elif echo "$$out" | grep -q '#error.*Architecture is not supported'; then \
+	  echo "[skip]  $(notdir $@) (architecture-gated)"; \
 	elif [ -n "$$out" ]; then \
 	  printf '%s\n' "$$out" >&2; \
 	fi
@@ -187,9 +190,9 @@ check-headers: | $(COMP_DIR)
 $(COMP_DIR)/%: $(COMP_SRC_DIR)/%.c $(HDRS) | $(COMP_DIR)
 	$(call cc-component, $(CC) $(ALL_CFLAGS) $(ALL_LDFLAGS) -I$(SRC_DIR) $< -o $@)
 
-# proc-config: link with zlib when available for native gzip decompression
+# proc_config: link with zlib when available for native gzip decompression
 ifeq ($(HAVE_ZLIB),1)
-$(COMP_DIR)/proc-config: $(COMP_SRC_DIR)/proc-config.c $(HDRS) | $(COMP_DIR)
+$(COMP_DIR)/proc_config: $(COMP_SRC_DIR)/proc_config.c $(HDRS) | $(COMP_DIR)
 	$(call cc-component, $(CC) $(ALL_CFLAGS) $(ALL_LDFLAGS) -I$(SRC_DIR) -DHAVE_ZLIB $< -lz -o $@)
 endif
 

docs/bypass-techniques.md

@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ The following KASLD components read from `dmesg` and `/var/log/dmesg`:
 * [dmesg_fake_numa_init.c](../src/components/dmesg_fake_numa_init.c)
 * [dmesg_free_area_init_node.c](../src/components/dmesg_free_area_init_node.c)
 * [dmesg_free_reserved_area.c](../src/components/dmesg_free_reserved_area.c)
-* [dmesg_kaslr-disabled.c](../src/components/dmesg_kaslr-disabled.c)
+* [dmesg_kaslr_disabled.c](../src/components/dmesg_kaslr_disabled.c)
 * [dmesg_last_pfn.c](../src/components/dmesg_last_pfn.c)
 * [dmesg_mem_init_kernel_layout.c](../src/components/dmesg_mem_init_kernel_layout.c)
 * [dmesg_mmu_idmap.c](../src/components/dmesg_mmu_idmap.c)
@@ -131,12 +131,12 @@ these files are readable by unprivileged users by default.
 
 The following KASLD components read from `/proc`:
 
-* [proc-kallsyms.c](../src/components/proc-kallsyms.c) — kernel symbol addresses from `/proc/kallsyms`
-* [proc-modules.c](../src/components/proc-modules.c) — loaded module addresses from `/proc/modules`
-* [proc-zoneinfo.c](../src/components/proc-zoneinfo.c) — memory zone boundaries from `/proc/zoneinfo`
-* [proc-cpuinfo.c](../src/components/proc-cpuinfo.c) — CPU information from `/proc/cpuinfo`
-* [proc-pid-syscall.c](../src/components/proc-pid-syscall.c) — kernel stack pointer from `/proc/<pid>/syscall`
-* [proc-stat-wchan.c](../src/components/proc-stat-wchan.c) — wait channel address from `/proc/<pid>/stat`
+* [proc_kallsyms.c](../src/components/proc_kallsyms.c) — kernel symbol addresses from `/proc/kallsyms`
+* [proc_modules.c](../src/components/proc_modules.c) — loaded module addresses from `/proc/modules`
+* [proc_zoneinfo.c](../src/components/proc_zoneinfo.c) — memory zone boundaries from `/proc/zoneinfo`
+* [proc_cpuinfo.c](../src/components/proc_cpuinfo.c) — CPU information from `/proc/cpuinfo`
+* [proc_pid_syscall.c](../src/components/proc_pid_syscall.c) — kernel stack pointer from `/proc/<pid>/syscall`
+* [proc_stat_wchan.c](../src/components/proc_stat_wchan.c) — wait channel address from `/proc/<pid>/stat`
 * [proc_timer_list.c](../src/components/proc_timer_list.c) — per-CPU timer base addresses from `/proc/timer_list`
 
 The following KASLD components read from `/sys`:
@@ -154,9 +154,9 @@ The following KASLD components read from `/sys`:
 * [sysfs_firmware_memmap.c](../src/components/sysfs_firmware_memmap.c) — firmware memory map from `/sys/firmware/memmap/`
 * [sysfs_iommu_reserved_regions.c](../src/components/sysfs_iommu_reserved_regions.c) — physical DRAM addresses of IOMMU reserved regions from `/sys/kernel/iommu_groups/*/reserved_regions`
 * [sysfs_iscsi_transport_handle.c](../src/components/sysfs_iscsi_transport_handle.c) — iSCSI transport handle from `/sys/class/iscsi_transport/`
-* [sysfs-kernel-notes-xen.c](../src/components/sysfs-kernel-notes-xen.c) — Xen notes from `/sys/kernel/notes`
+* [sysfs_kernel_notes_xen.c](../src/components/sysfs_kernel_notes_xen.c) — Xen notes from `/sys/kernel/notes`
 * [sysfs_memory_blocks.c](../src/components/sysfs_memory_blocks.c) — memory block addresses from `/sys/devices/system/memory/`
-* [sysfs-module-sections.c](../src/components/sysfs-module-sections.c) — module section addresses from `/sys/module/*/sections/`
+* [sysfs_module_sections.c](../src/components/sysfs_module_sections.c) — module section addresses from `/sys/module/*/sections/`
 * [sysfs_nd_region.c](../src/components/sysfs_nd_region.c) — NVDIMM/PMem region physical start addresses from `/sys/bus/nd/devices/region*/`
 * [sysfs_nf_conntrack.c](../src/components/sysfs_nf_conntrack.c) — netfilter conntrack hash from `/sys/module/nf_conntrack/`
 * [sysfs_pci_resource.c](../src/components/sysfs_pci_resource.c) — PCI BAR addresses from `/sys/bus/pci/devices/`
@@ -174,9 +174,9 @@ enabled, the `PAGE_OFFSET` (vmsplit), and other layout-relevant settings.
 
 The following KASLD components read boot configuration:
 
-* [boot-config.c](../src/components/boot-config.c) — reads `/boot/config-*` for `CONFIG_RELOCATABLE`, `CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE`, and `CONFIG_PAGE_OFFSET`
-* [proc-config.c](../src/components/proc-config.c) — reads `/proc/config.gz` for the same configuration options
-* [proc-cmdline.c](../src/components/proc-cmdline.c) — reads `/proc/cmdline` to check for `nokaslr`
+* [boot_config.c](../src/components/boot_config.c) — reads `/boot/config-*` for `CONFIG_RELOCATABLE`, `CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE`, and `CONFIG_PAGE_OFFSET`
+* [proc_config.c](../src/components/proc_config.c) — reads `/proc/config.gz` for the same configuration options
+* [proc_cmdline.c](../src/components/proc_cmdline.c) — reads `/proc/cmdline` to check for `nokaslr`
 * [hibernation_nokaslr.c](../src/components/hibernation_nokaslr.c) — checks whether hibernation resume has disabled KASLR
 
 ## Side-channels
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ The following KASLD components exploit syscall and interface leaks:
 * [mincore.c](../src/components/mincore.c) — `mincore()` heap page disclosure via uninitialized memory (CVE-2017-16994; patched in v4.15)
 * [bcm_msg_head_struct.c](../src/components/bcm_msg_head_struct.c) — CAN BCM `bcm_msg_head` struct uninitialized 4-byte padding hole leaks kernel stack pointer via `recvmsg()` (CVE-2021-34693; patched in v5.12)
 * [pppd_kallsyms.c](../src/components/pppd_kallsyms.c) — set-uid-root `pppd` opens `/proc/kallsyms` as root, bypassing the `kptr_restrict` open-time check in pre-v4.8 kernels
-* [qemu-tcg-iret.c](../src/components/qemu-tcg-iret.c) — QEMU TCG `iret` emulation bug causes the hypervisor to read from the host kernel stack instead of the guest user stack, leaking a kernel address (patched in QEMU 9.1; not a kernel bug)
+* [qemu_tcg_iret.c](../src/components/qemu_tcg_iret.c) — QEMU TCG `iret` emulation bug causes the hypervisor to read from the host kernel stack instead of the guest user stack, leaking a kernel address (patched in QEMU 9.1; not a kernel bug)
 
 ## ioctl leaks
 
@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ space directly, without reading any files or exploiting vulnerabilities.
 
 The following KASLD components use brute-force probing:
 
-* [mmap-brute-vmsplit.c](../src/components/mmap-brute-vmsplit.c) — determines `PAGE_OFFSET` (vmsplit) on 32-bit systems by mapping pages across the address space until failure
+* [mmap_brute_vmsplit.c](../src/components/mmap_brute_vmsplit.c) — determines `PAGE_OFFSET` (vmsplit) on 32-bit systems by mapping pages across the address space until failure
 
 ## Weak entropy
 
@@ -421,7 +421,7 @@ This state is materially different from a deliberate opt-out
   not from compile-time information.
 
 KASLD emits a distinct scalar fact for each. The
-`dmesg_kaslr-disabled` component classifies each `KASLR disabled` line
+`dmesg_kaslr_disabled` component classifies each `KASLR disabled` line
 by its reason and emits `SF_KASLR_DISABLED` (opt-out) or
 `SF_KASLR_RANDOMIZATION_FAILED` (machinery failed). Only the former
 drives the engine's `kaslr_disabled_pin` rule. See

docs/kaslr.md

@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ and memory layout interpretation depend on knowing the correct vmsplit.
 Since KASLD is typically compiled on one system and deployed to another,
 the compile-time `PAGE_OFFSET` assumption may not match the target system.
 KASLD handles this at runtime: components that detect the actual `PAGE_OFFSET`
-(e.g. `mmap-brute-vmsplit`, `boot-config`) emit a `pageoffset` tagged result,
+(e.g. `mmap_brute_vmsplit`, `boot_config`) emit a `pageoffset` tagged result,
 and the orchestrator automatically adjusts all layout boundaries before
 performing validation and analysis.
 

docs/usage.md

@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ Readable debugfs:             no
 Readable /boot/System.map:    yes
 Readable /boot/config:        yes
 
---- boot-config ---
+--- boot_config ---
 [.] checking for CONFIG_VMSPLIT_1G... 
 [.] checking for CONFIG_VMSPLIT_2G... 
 [.] checking for CONFIG_VMSPLIT_2G_OPT... 
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ S physical_start conf=parsed value=0x1000000
 S kernel_align conf=parsed value=0x200000
 [.] checking for CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE... 
 
---- boot-params-facts ---
+--- boot_params_facts ---
 S init_size conf=parsed value=0x37ed000
 S kernel_align conf=parsed value=0x200000
 
@@ -167,24 +167,24 @@ leaked initrd physical start: 0x000000003173d000
 leaked initrd physical end:   0x0000000034b95ea8
 P initrd pos=base conf=parsed lo=0x3173d000 hi=0x34b95ea8
 
---- bootconfig-facts ---
+--- bootconfig_facts ---
 
---- cmdline-hugepages ---
+--- cmdline_hugepages ---
 [-] no `hugepages=` on /proc/cmdline
 
---- cmdline-mem ---
+--- cmdline_mem ---
 [-] no `mem=` token on /proc/cmdline
 
---- cmdline-memmap ---
+--- cmdline_memmap ---
 [-] no avoidance `memmap=` reservations on cmdline
 
---- cmdline-region ---
+--- cmdline_region ---
 P cmdline pos=base conf=parsed lo=0x8f000 hi=0x8f7fe
 
---- cpuinfo-facts ---
+--- cpuinfo_facts ---
 S phys_addr_bits conf=parsed value=0x2d
 
---- devicetree-facts ---
+--- devicetree_facts ---
 
 --- dmesg_acpi_dynamic_ssdt ---
 [.] searching dmesg for ACPI dynamic OEM table loads ...
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ S phys_addr_bits conf=parsed value=0x2d
 [-] fopen(/var/log/dmesg): No such file or directory
 [-] dmesg: access denied (klogctl and /var/log/dmesg both inaccessible)
 
---- dmesg_kaslr-disabled ---
+--- dmesg_kaslr_disabled ---
 [.] searching dmesg for 'KASLR disabled' or 'KASLR is disabled' ...
 [-] klogctl(SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER): Operation not permitted
 [-] fopen(/var/log/dmesg): No such file or directory
@@ -321,10 +321,10 @@ S phys_addr_bits conf=parsed value=0x2d
 [-] fopen(/var/log/dmesg): No such file or directory
 [-] dmesg: access denied (klogctl and /var/log/dmesg both inaccessible)
 
---- efi-present ---
+--- efi_present ---
 S efi_present conf=parsed value=0x0
 
---- fdt-facts ---
+--- fdt_facts ---
 
 --- firmware_memmap ---
 P ram pos=base conf=parsed lo=0x100000 hi=0x7fedffff
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ P ram pos=base conf=parsed lo=0x0 hi=0x9e7ff
 
 --- hibernation_nokaslr ---
 
---- kernel-image-facts ---
+--- kernel_image_facts ---
 S image_size conf=parsed value=0x2861320
 
 --- kernel_notes_buildid ---
@@ -342,46 +342,46 @@ kernel.lto: 0
 kernel.build_salt: "6.12.38+deb13-amd64"
 kernel.build_id: 5783470ea1883c7d668e98f3c2928751600ccd28
 
---- meminfo-facts ---
+--- meminfo_facts ---
 S memtotal conf=parsed value=0x78fa7000
 S max_pfn conf=parsed value=0x80000
 
---- page-size ---
+--- page_size ---
 S page_size conf=parsed value=0x1000
 
 --- perf_event_open ---
 [.] trying perf_event_open sampling ...
 [-] syscall(SYS_perf_event_open): Permission denied
 [-] no kernel address found via perf_event_open
 
---- proc-cmdline ---
+--- proc_cmdline ---
 [.] trying /proc/cmdline ...
 [-] Kernel was not booted with nokaslr flag.
 
---- proc-config ---
+--- proc_config ---
 [.] checking /proc/config.gz ...
 [-] Could not read /proc/config.gz
 
---- proc-cpuinfo ---
+--- proc_cpuinfo ---
 [.] checking /proc/cpuinfo ...
 [.] Address sizes: 45 bits physical, 48 bits virtual
 [.] Paging level 4: PAGE_OFFSET floor -> 0xffff800000000000
 V page_offset pos=base conf=parsed lo=0xffff800000000000
 
---- proc-iomem-kernel ---
+--- proc_iomem_kernel ---
 [-] /proc/iomem appears masked (kptr_restrict?); addresses read as 0
 
---- proc-kallsyms ---
+--- proc_kallsyms ---
 
---- proc-modules ---
+--- proc_modules ---
 [.] reading /proc/modules ...
 [-] no kernel address found in /proc/modules
 
---- proc-stat-wchan ---
+--- proc_stat_wchan ---
 [.] checking /proc/173583/stat 'wchan' field ...
 [-] no kernel address found in /proc/pid/stat wchan
 
---- proc-zoneinfo ---
+--- proc_zoneinfo ---
 [.] searching /proc/zoneinfo for zone start_pfn and spanned ...
 lowest zone start PFN:  1 (phys 0x0000000000001000)
 P ram pos=interior conf=parsed sample=0x1000
@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ note: phys and virt KASLR are decoupled on this arch; cannot derive directmap vi
 [.] scanning /proc/timer_list for timer base addresses ...
 [-] fopen: Permission denied
 
---- qemu-tcg-iret ---
+--- qemu_tcg_iret ---
 [.] trying QEMU TCG iret leak ...
 [-] QEMU TCG IRET fault not triggered
 
@@ -403,12 +403,12 @@ IDT base:  0xfffffe0000000000
 IDT limit: 0x0fff (4096 bytes, 256 entries)
 [-] IDT is in the CPU entry area (CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y) — no leak
 
---- sysfs-kernel-notes-xen ---
+--- sysfs_kernel_notes_xen ---
 [.] checking /sys/kernel/notes ...
 [-] Xen notes appear stale (unrelocated); discarding
 [-] no kernel addresses found in ELF notes
 
---- sysfs-module-sections ---
+--- sysfs_module_sections ---
 [.] trying /sys/modules/*/sections/.text ...
 [-] no kernel address found in /sys/module sections
 
@@ -498,13 +498,13 @@ note: phys and virt KASLR are decoupled on this arch; cannot derive directmap vi
 [-] timeout after 28672 iterations (5s); likely patched
 [-] kernel base not found in mincore info leak
 
---- mmap-arm64-va-bits ---
+--- mmap_arm64_va_bits ---
 
---- mmap-brute-vmsplit ---
+--- mmap_brute_vmsplit ---
 [.] searching 32-bit address space for kernel virtual address space start ...
 [-] Could not locate kernel virtual address space
 
---- mmap-riscv64-va-bits ---
+--- mmap_riscv64_va_bits ---
 
 --- nilfs2_ioctl ---
 [.] trying nilfs2 NILFS_IOCTL_GET_SUINFO heap leak ...
@@ -543,7 +543,7 @@ Physical DRAM / initrd [1]:
 
 ----------------------------------------
 Physical DRAM / cmdline [1]:
-  0x000000000008f000  cmdline (cmdline-region, parsed)
+  0x000000000008f000  cmdline (cmdline_region, parsed)
   ==> 0x000000000008f000  (parsed, 1 source)
 
 ----------------------------------------

extra/check-results

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
 #     sudo ./extra/check-results results.txt
 #   validate from stdin pipe:
 #     ./build/*/kasld -v 2>&1 | sudo ./extra/check-results
-#     ./build/*/components/proc-kallsyms 2>&1 | sudo ./extra/check-results -
+#     ./build/*/components/proc_kallsyms 2>&1 | sudo ./extra/check-results -
 #
 # Requires: root (for unhashed /proc/kallsyms and /proc/iomem)
 # ---