chore: strip explanatory comments from contract source (#81)

* chore: strip explanatory comments from contract source

Remove prose, doc, and inline comments across the events and profile
contracts (src + tests), keeping only the `// ===` banner section headers
that mark functions/groups plus SPDX license lines. Comment-only change:
no code, signatures, or logic touched; 232 tests pass and both debug and
wasm-release builds are clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: remove unnecessary whitespace in cancel_at_boundary_pays_partners_full_no_owner_residual test

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Author: 0xdevcollins

contracts/events/src/admin.rs

@@ -1,43 +1,20 @@
-// boundless-events: admin operations.
-//
-// Spec: boundless-platform-contract-prd.md Section 6.1.
-
 use soroban_sdk::{panic_with_error, Address, BytesN, Env, String};
 
 use crate::errors::Error;
 use crate::events as evt;
 use crate::storage;
 use crate::types::{PendingAdmin, PendingUpgrade};
 
-// Two-step admin rotation TTL: 7 days at the mainnet 5-second ledger cadence.
-// 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 / 5 = 120_960 ledgers.
 const PENDING_ADMIN_TTL_LEDGERS: u32 = 120_960;
 
-// Fee bps cap. 100% = 10_000 bps. L4 (2026-06 audit): tightened from 5_000
-// (50%) to 1_000 (10%). 10% covers the full envelope of real Boundless
-// pricing tiers; a config typo can no longer push the fee above operating
-// range. Per-event overrides still respect this cap.
 pub(crate) const MAX_FEE_BPS: u32 = 1_000;
 
-// H6: timelocked upgrade windows.
-//
-//   UPGRADE_TIMELOCK_LEDGERS    earliest gap between propose and apply.
-//                                ~1 day so off-chain monitors have a window
-//                                to react before the new wasm lands.
-//   PENDING_UPGRADE_TTL_LEDGERS  hard expiry on the proposal; ~30 days.
-//                                Past this the admin must re-propose.
-// Testnet builds (`--features testnet`) zero the upgrade timelock for fast
-// iteration; the default build (mainnet + everything else) keeps the full
-// ~1-day timelock. Fail-safe: omitting the flag yields the secure value, never 0.
 #[cfg(not(feature = "testnet"))]
 const UPGRADE_TIMELOCK_LEDGERS: u32 = 17_280;
 #[cfg(feature = "testnet")]
 const UPGRADE_TIMELOCK_LEDGERS: u32 = 0;
 const PENDING_UPGRADE_TTL_LEDGERS: u32 = 518_400;
 
-// Initial contract version. Written by __constructor and bumped on
-// apply_upgrade. Bump alongside any storage-layout or public-surface change
-// that warrants a migration entrypoint.
 pub const INITIAL_VERSION: &str = "1.1.0";
 
 // ============================================================
@@ -50,8 +27,6 @@ pub fn initialize(
     fee_bps: u32,
     profile_contract: Address,
 ) {
-    // Refuse double-init by checking the admin key in instance storage (the
-    // new home for admin/config per the 2026-06 audit).
     if env.storage().instance().has(&crate::types::DataKey::Admin) {
         panic_with_error!(env, Error::AlreadyInitialized);
     }
@@ -140,12 +115,6 @@ pub fn set_fee_bps(env: &Env, new_bps: u32) -> Result<(), Error> {
 
 pub fn set_fee_account(env: &Env, new_account: Address) -> Result<(), Error> {
     require_admin(env)?;
-    // M2 (2026-06 audit): we do not verify trustline existence at the
-    // contract layer because Soroban's SAC interface cannot reliably
-    // distinguish "no trustline" from "zero balance". Admin must verify
-    // off-chain BEFORE calling this; the FeeAccountUpdated event below is
-    // the signal off-chain monitors rely on to re-verify. See
-    // docs/audit-2026-06-stellar-skill.md M2.
     storage::set_fee_account(env, &new_account);
     storage::touch_instance(env);
     evt::FeeAccountUpdated {
@@ -190,33 +159,13 @@ pub fn unpause(env: &Env) -> Result<(), Error> {
 
 // ============================================================
 // UPGRADE (timelocked; H6)
-//
-// Three steps:
-//   1. propose_upgrade(wasm_hash, new_version) — admin-only; writes
-//      PendingUpgrade with proposed_at = now, available_at = now + TIMELOCK,
-//      expires_at = now + TTL. Off-chain monitors can see exactly which
-//      version + wasm is queued before it lands.
-//   2. apply_upgrade()                          — admin-only; requires
-//      now in [available_at, expires_at]; swaps the wasm hash and bumps
-//      the on-chain version label.
-//   3. cancel_pending_upgrade()                 — admin-only; prunes a stale
-//      or unwanted proposal so a fresh one can be queued.
-//
-// migrate(to_version) is a SEPARATE call that runs the one-shot data
-// migration matched to the just-applied version. Guard via MigratedToVersion.
-//
-// Spec: docs/audit-2026-06-stellar-skill.md H6.
 // ============================================================
 pub fn propose_upgrade(
     env: &Env,
     new_wasm_hash: BytesN<32>,
     new_version: String,
 ) -> Result<(), Error> {
     require_admin(env)?;
-    // Empty version is rejected; reuse InvalidPillar to stay inside the
-    // soroban contracterror 50-variant cap (a dedicated InvalidVersion
-    // would push us over). Off-chain monitors should treat InvalidPillar
-    // on propose_upgrade as "bad version label."
     if new_version.is_empty() {
         return Err(Error::InvalidPillar);
     }
@@ -262,7 +211,6 @@ pub fn apply_upgrade(env: &Env) -> Result<(), Error> {
         new_version: pending.new_version.clone(),
     }
     .publish(env);
-    // Keep the legacy Upgraded event for indexers built against the old shape.
     evt::Upgraded {
         new_wasm_hash: pending.wasm_hash,
     }
@@ -286,29 +234,6 @@ pub fn cancel_pending_upgrade(env: &Env) -> Result<(), Error> {
 
 // ============================================================
 // MIGRATE (post-upgrade one-shot; H6)
-//
-// Called once per version after apply_upgrade swaps the wasm. The shape
-// is:
-//
-//   1. Read the current Version label (set by apply_upgrade) and the
-//      previously-applied migration marker (MigratedToVersion). If the
-//      marker already equals the current Version, reject as
-//      MigrationAlreadyApplied — a second invocation is always a
-//      misconfiguration.
-//   2. Dispatch on (prev, current) and run the migration body. Bodies
-//      run cleanly inside the same tx as the marker write, so a failure
-//      reverts both — there is no half-migrated state to recover from.
-//   3. Stamp MigratedToVersion = current and emit Migrated{}.
-//
-// Mainnet bootstrap: the first deploy lands the constructor with the
-// current storage layout, so no migration body is needed. The first real
-// migration body will land with the first storage-layout upgrade after
-// mainnet goes live. We keep an empty match arm for the no-op case so the
-// shape is stable and future contributors do not have to debate where
-// the dispatch goes.
-//
-// NB: Soroban String only supports equality + length, no `as_str()` /
-// pattern matching. The dispatch below uses `String::from_str` + equality.
 // ============================================================
 pub fn migrate(env: &Env) -> Result<(), Error> {
     require_admin(env)?;
@@ -324,31 +249,8 @@ pub fn migrate(env: &Env) -> Result<(), Error> {
 
     // ============================================================
     // PER-(from -> to) MIGRATION DISPATCH
-    //
-    // Each future upgrade adds an `if` clause here with its migration body.
-    // Touch only persistent / instance entries that the new layout changes;
-    // anything the new code reads with backwards-compatible defaults can
-    // be left alone.
-    //
-    // Pattern:
-    //
-    //     if from_version == String::from_str(env, "0.2.0")
-    //         && current == String::from_str(env, "0.3.0")
-    //     {
-    //         migrate_0_2_0_to_0_3_0(env)?;
-    //     }
-    //
-    // The corresponding private fn lives below the match block. Keep it
-    // small enough to read; if the migration is large, split it into named
-    // helpers and call from inside the body.
     // ============================================================
 
-    // No-op for the 1.0.0 -> 1.1.0 credit-removal upgrade: the contracts hold
-    // no events yet, so there are no EventRecord rows to rewrite. __constructor
-    // populates storage in the current shape, so admin can call migrate() once
-    // just to stamp the marker and unlock the audit trail (the Migrated event
-    // signals off-chain runbooks that the post-upgrade cleanup ran).
-
     storage::set_migrated_to_version(env, &current);
     storage::touch_instance(env);
     evt::Migrated {
@@ -404,8 +306,6 @@ pub fn require_admin(env: &Env) -> Result<(), Error> {
 }
 
 pub fn require_not_paused(env: &Env) -> Result<(), Error> {
-    // Every operation path runs this first, so this is the single spot to
-    // bump instance TTL on the hot path. Admin paths bump explicitly.
     storage::touch_instance(env);
     if storage::is_paused(env) {
         return Err(Error::Paused);

contracts/events/src/bounty.rs

@@ -1,10 +1,3 @@
-// boundless-events: bounty-specific behavior.
-//
-// Spec: boundless-platform-contract-prd.md Sections 6.3, 7.
-//
-// Bounties use ReleaseKind::Single. Credits (apply cost / refunds) are handled
-// off-chain; the contract only records applicants and ensures their profile.
-
 use soroban_sdk::{Address, BytesN, Env};
 
 use crate::admin;
@@ -40,11 +33,8 @@ pub fn apply(
 
     applicant.require_auth();
 
-    // append_applicant returns Err on duplicate or cap exceeded.
     storage::append_applicant(env, bounty_id, &applicant, MAX_APPLICANTS_PER_EVENT)?;
 
-    // Cross-contract: ensure the applicant has a profile (idempotent). Credits
-    // are charged off-chain now, so there is no on-chain spend here.
     let profile = profile_client::client(env);
     let bootstrap_op = idempotency::derive_child(env, &op_id, tag::BOOTSTRAP);
     profile.bootstrap(&applicant, &bootstrap_op);
@@ -76,17 +66,12 @@ pub fn withdraw_application(
 
     applicant.require_auth();
 
-    // Reject withdrawal if the applicant already submitted.
     if storage::get_submission(env, bounty_id, &applicant).is_some() {
         return Err(Error::SubmissionAlreadyExists);
     }
 
-    // Membership check + swap-remove. Slot lookup is O(1), so this avoids
-    // the prior O(n) linear scan even at the cap.
     storage::remove_applicant(env, bounty_id, &applicant)?;
 
-    // Credits (including any withdrawal refund) are handled off-chain.
-
     evt::ApplicationWithdrawn {
         event_id: bounty_id,
         applicant,

contracts/events/src/crowdfunding.rs

@@ -1,25 +1,3 @@
-// boundless-events: crowdfunding-specific behavior.
-//
-// Spec: boundless-crowdfunding-prd.md.
-//
-// Crowdfunding is a builder-led, community-funded pillar with these rules:
-//   - ReleaseKind::Multi(n>0): milestones drive release cadence, like grants.
-//   - deadline required: defines the funding window. Submitting/contributing
-//     after the deadline is rejected by the standard event-active checks.
-//   - Owner is the project builder. There is exactly one recipient, also
-//     the builder, registered as Winner at position 1 (100% of distribution).
-//   - No upfront owner deposit: create_event SKIPS escrow::deposit_with_fee
-//     for Pillar::Crowdfunding. Escrow starts at 0 and grows via add_funds
-//     from community backers.
-//   - winner_distribution MUST be a single entry at position 1 with 100%.
-//   - claim_milestone uses dynamic math:
-//         amount = remaining_escrow / (total_milestones - claimed_so_far)
-//     so each release pays a fair share of whatever the campaign actually
-//     raised. The first milestone takes 1/n of escrow, the next 1/(n-1) of
-//     what's left, ..., the last takes the entire remainder.
-//
-// The contract enforces only the on-chain shape. Off-chain layers add admin
-// review, community voting, milestone validation, and pause semantics.
 #![allow(dead_code)]
 
 use soroban_sdk::{Address, Env};
@@ -28,19 +6,15 @@ use crate::errors::Error;
 use crate::types::{EventRecord, ReleaseKind};
 
 pub fn validate_create(_env: &Env, record: &EventRecord, _owner: &Address) -> Result<(), Error> {
-    // Multi(n) required.
     match record.release_kind {
         ReleaseKind::Multi(n) if n > 0 => {}
         _ => return Err(Error::InvalidReleaseKind),
     }
 
-    // Funding window required.
     if record.deadline.is_none() {
         return Err(Error::DeadlineRequired);
     }
 
-    // Distribution must be exactly one entry at position 1 with 100%. The
-    // builder is the sole recipient; no co-recipient splits are supported.
     if record.winner_distribution.len() != 1 {
         return Err(Error::InvalidDistribution);
     }

contracts/events/src/errors.rs

@@ -1,32 +1,24 @@
-// boundless-events: error codes.
-//
-// Spec: boundless-platform-contract-prd.md Section 14.
-
 use soroban_sdk::contracterror;
 
 #[contracterror]
 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Ord)]
 #[repr(u32)]
 pub enum Error {
-    // Init
     AlreadyInitialized = 1,
     AdminCannotBeZero = 2,
     FeeAccountCannotBeZero = 3,
     ProfileContractCannotBeZero = 4,
     InvalidFeeBps = 5,
     NotInitialized = 6,
 
-    // Auth
     Unauthorized = 10,
     NotAdmin = 11,
     PendingAdminMismatch = 12,
     PendingAdminExpired = 13,
 
-    // Token
     TokenNotSupported = 20,
     FeeAccountMissingTrustline = 21,
 
-    // Event lifecycle
     EventNotFound = 30,
     EventNotActive = 31,
     InvalidPillar = 32,
@@ -38,14 +30,11 @@ pub enum Error {
     DeadlineMustBeFuture = 38,
     TitleTooLong = 39,
 
-    // Participation
     ApplicantAlreadyApplied = 40,
     ApplicantNotApplied = 41,
     SubmissionNotFound = 42,
     SubmissionAlreadyExists = 43,
-    // 44 (InsufficientCredits) retired with on-chain credits; left as a gap.
 
-    // Winners
     NoSubmissions = 50,
     InvalidWinnerPosition = 51,
     DuplicateWinnerPosition = 52,
@@ -55,20 +44,15 @@ pub enum Error {
     InsufficientEscrow = 56,
     WinnersAlreadySelected = 90,
 
-    // Contributions
     BelowMinimumContribution = 57,
     InvalidContributionAmount = 58,
 
-    // Capacity (per-event list caps; see MAX_*_PER_EVENT in event_ops)
     TooManyApplicants = 59,
 
-    // Idempotency
     OpAlreadySeen = 60,
 
-    // Capacity continued
     TooManyContributors = 61,
 
-    // Paged cancellation flow
     CancellationNotStarted = 62,
     CancellationAlreadyStarted = 63,
     CancellationNotFinished = 64,
@@ -78,9 +62,7 @@ pub enum Error {
     UpgradeProposalExpired = 68,
     MigrationAlreadyApplied = 69,
 
-    // Pause
     Paused = 70,
 
-    // Cross-contract
     ProfileCallFailed = 80,
 }

contracts/events/src/escrow.rs

@@ -46,25 +46,13 @@ pub fn release(env: &Env, token_addr: &Address, recipient: &Address, amount: i12
     client.transfer(&contract, recipient, &amount);
 }
 
-/// Deposit exactly `amount` into escrow with NO platform fee taken here.
-///
-/// Used by pillars (crowdfunding) that charge the fee at release instead, so the
-/// funder pays exactly `amount` and a cancel refunds it in full. Returns the
-/// amount credited to escrow (== `amount`).
 pub fn deposit_no_fee(env: &Env, token_addr: &Address, from: &Address, amount: i128) -> i128 {
     let contract = env.current_contract_address();
     let client = token::Client::new(env, token_addr);
     client.transfer(from, &contract, &amount);
     amount
 }
 
-/// Release `amount` from escrow, taking the platform fee off the top: the
-/// recipient receives `amount - fee` and the fee account receives `fee`.
-///
-/// Used by pillars (crowdfunding) where the RECIPIENT bears the fee. The funder
-/// already deposited their full pledge via `deposit_no_fee`. The full `amount`
-/// leaves escrow (net to recipient + fee to platform), so callers decrement
-/// `remaining_escrow` by `amount`.
 pub fn release_with_fee_at(
     env: &Env,
     token_addr: &Address,