Update deposit/refund rules

Sure — here’s a cleaner, simpler version.

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# ✅ **Commit Title**

**Make compensation apply only to relevant voter groups and fix refund logic**

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# ✅ **Commit Description**

Updated the CIP so that only governance groups **relevant** to a given action type generate compensation. Added the `EffectiveRate` logic, updated the compensation pot formulas, and fixed the deposit/refund rules so that any portion tied to non-relevant groups isn’t consumed and is returned to the proposer.

This makes the CLM behave correctly when, for example, SPOs can vote but their votes aren’t counted towards ratification. Only DReps/CC get compensated, and the SPO portion of the deposit stays refundable.

Author: Thomas-nada

CIP-????/README.md

@@ -108,24 +108,58 @@ This occurs atomically during governance-action completion.
 
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+## Compensation Eligibility Based on Relevant Governance Actor Groups
+
+For each governance action type, the protocol specifies which governance actor groups are **relevant** to the ratification of that action. Only these *relevant* groups contribute to the tally for that action, and only these groups may generate compensation under the CLM.
+
+Governance actor groups that are **non-relevant** for a given governance action type may cast votes, but their votes do **not** affect the tally and they do **not** receive compensation. Their associated portion of the compensation rate is **not consumed**.
+
+Let `RelevantActors` be the set of governance actor groups relevant for the governance action type. Define:
+
+```
+EffectiveRate(group) =
+    compensationRate(group), if group ∈ RelevantActors
+    0, otherwise
+```
+
+Only these `EffectiveRate` values are used for compensation pot creation.
+
+### Refund Behavior
+
+Any portion of the governance deposit corresponding to compensation rates for **non-relevant** governance actor groups:
+
+* is **not added** to any compensation pool,
+* is **not consumed**, and
+* remains part of the **refundable deposit** that may be returned to the proposer when the governance action finalizes.
+
+Thus:
+
+```
+TotalCompensation = govDeposit × Σ(EffectiveRate(group))
+
+RefundableDeposit = govDeposit − TotalCompensation
+```
+
+---
+
 ### Compensation Pot Creation
 
 Let `govDeposit` be the required deposit for the governance action.
 
 ```
 TotalCompensation =
-  govDeposit × (ccCompensationRate + drepCompensationRate + spoCompensationRate)
+  govDeposit × Σ(EffectiveRate(group))
 ```
 
 Split into:
 
 ```
-CC_Pool   = govDeposit × ccCompensationRate
-DRep_Pool = govDeposit × drepCompensationRate
-SPO_Pool  = govDeposit × spoCompensationRate
+CC_Pool   = govDeposit × EffectiveRate(CC)
+DRep_Pool = govDeposit × EffectiveRate(DRep)
+SPO_Pool  = govDeposit × EffectiveRate(SPO)
 ```
 
-The remainder is refund-eligible for the proposer if the action passes.
+The remainder is refund-eligible for the proposer when the action expires.
 
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@@ -202,13 +236,7 @@ Actors without a reward address remain part of vote weighting but receive no pay
 
 ### Deposit Finality
 
-
-The compensation portion of the deposit:
-
-- **is always consumed**, regardless of proposal outcome  
-- **is never refundable to the proposer**  
-
-This internalizes governance processing costs.
+The compensation portion of the deposit corresponding to EffectiveRate(group) values greater than zero is consumed. Any portion corresponding to groups with EffectiveRate(group) = 0 (i.e., non-relevant governance actor groups) is not consumed and remains refundable.
 
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