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docs(oracle19c): durable Oracle-specific documentation
Concise docs covering only the Oracle-specific deltas from generic RDS broker behavior: README (offering + deltas), licensing (SE2+License-Included rationale + SE2-vs-EE deltas / ISSO risk-deviation), hardening-baseline (hardened values + SC-8/SC-13 + platform-SG dependency; links the STIG overlay repo), limitations, connection-examples (TCPS), design-notes (durable why), operator credential- rotation (Oracle master is DBA-class).
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‎docs/oracle19c/README.md‎

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# Oracle Database 19c on Amazon RDS
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Oracle Database **19c Standard Edition 2 (SE2)**, **License Included**, offered as
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an Amazon RDS plan on the existing `aws-rds` service. It is provisioned, bound, and
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rotated exactly like the other RDS plans (PostgreSQL / MySQL) — the generic
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`cf create-service` / `cf bind-service` / `VCAP_SERVICES` flow is documented in the
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top-level [README.md](../../README.md) and applies unchanged. This directory
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documents **only** the Oracle-specific deltas.
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## Plan
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`oracle-se2-license-included-dev` — a **dev/test tier** plan (the `-dev` suffix
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mirrors the sandbox-only `micro-psql` / `small-mysql` tier). **Not
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production-ready.**
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- `db.t3.medium`, 20 GB `gp3`, `encrypted: true` (KMS at rest)
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- private only (no public accessibility)
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- backup retention **14 days**
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- `oracle-se2` 19c, `licenseModel: license-included`
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## Oracle-specific deltas you must know
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- **TLS on port 2484 (TCPS), not 1521.** RDS Oracle serves TLS on a dedicated TCPS
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listener. The binding advertises `port=2484`, `protocol=tcps`. Plaintext `1521`
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is the RDS default port. See [connection-examples.md](connection-examples.md).
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- **Fixed SID `ORCL`.** RDS Oracle constrains DBName/SID to ≤8 uppercase chars; the
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broker uses a stable `ORCL`. The unique per-instance identifier is the
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`DBInstanceIdentifier`, not the SID.
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- **Master credential per binding.** Same model as the other RDS engines — the
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binding returns the instance master credential; the customer creates
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least-privilege in-database users. This matters **more** on Oracle because the
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RDS master is **DBA-class**. See [limitations.md](limitations.md) and
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[../../ops/oracle19c/credential-rotation.md](../../ops/oracle19c/credential-rotation.md).
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- **`ENABLE_ORACLE` staged-rollout flag.** Oracle provisioning is off unless the
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broker environment sets `ENABLE_ORACLE`. This gates when the new offering appears
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— it is **not** a security control.
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- **License Included (no BYOL).** AWS holds the Oracle license and bundles it into
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the instance price — no license key, no attestation. See [licensing.md](licensing.md).
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## Pages
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- [licensing.md](licensing.md) — SE2 + License Included; SE2-vs-EE deltas
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- [hardening-baseline.md](hardening-baseline.md) — hardened parameter/option/log baseline
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- [connection-examples.md](connection-examples.md) — TCPS connect strings + client examples
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- [limitations.md](limitations.md) — Oracle-specific limitations
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- [design-notes.md](design-notes.md) — the durable "why" behind the design
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- [../../ops/oracle19c/credential-rotation.md](../../ops/oracle19c/credential-rotation.md) — rotation

‎docs/oracle19c/connection-examples.md‎

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# Oracle 19c — connecting a bound app
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After `cf bind-service`, the credentials appear in `VCAP_SERVICES` under the
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`aws-rds` service. Reading credentials (`cf env`), opening space egress
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(`cf bind-security-group trusted_local_networks_egress`), and tunnelling from a
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laptop (`cf ssh -L`) are identical to the Postgres/MySQL flow — see the top-level
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[README.md](../../README.md). This page covers only the Oracle-specific connection
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detail.
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## Binding payload (Oracle-specific keys)
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```json
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{
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"uri": "oracle://APP_USER:REDACTED@(DESCRIPTION=(ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=TCPS)(HOST=my-oracle.abc.us-gov-west-1.rds.amazonaws.com)(PORT=2484))(CONNECT_DATA=(SID=ORCL)))",
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"jdbcUrl": "jdbc:oracle:thin:@(DESCRIPTION=(ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=TCPS)(HOST=my-oracle.abc.us-gov-west-1.rds.amazonaws.com)(PORT=2484))(CONNECT_DATA=(SID=ORCL)))",
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"port": "2484",
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"protocol": "tcps",
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"service_name": "ORCL",
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"sid": "ORCL",
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"ssl_required": "true",
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"ssl_server_dn_match": "true",
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"ca_cert_bundle_url": "https://truststore.pki.us-gov-west-1.rds.amazonaws.com/global/global-bundle.pem"
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}
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```
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The binding uses a full Oracle connect `DESCRIPTION` on the **TCPS listener (port
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2484)** — not EZConnect, which cannot express `PROTOCOL=TCPS`. `ssl_required=true`
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and `ssl_server_dn_match=true` tell the client to encrypt **and** verify the server
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identity against `ca_cert_bundle_url` (the GovCloud RDS CA bundle). No hardcoded
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server-cert DN is published — the RDS cert subject is Amazon-owned and rotates, so
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the driver derives it from the trusted cert. The instance uses the RDS default RSA CA
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(`rds-ca-rsa2048-g1`), compatible with the ECDHE_RSA cipher.
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## JDBC (Java)
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```bash
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# import the GovCloud RDS CA bundle (ca_cert_bundle_url from the binding):
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wget https://truststore.pki.us-gov-west-1.rds.amazonaws.com/global/global-bundle.pem
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keytool -importcert -alias rds-ca -file global-bundle.pem \
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-keystore truststore.jks -storepass "$TRUSTSTORE_PW" -noprompt
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```
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```java
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String url = System.getenv("ORACLE_JDBC_URL"); // the TCPS jdbcUrl from the binding
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Properties p = new Properties();
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p.put("user", username);
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p.put("password", password);
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p.put("oracle.net.ssl_server_dn_match", "true"); // ssl_server_dn_match=true
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p.put("javax.net.ssl.trustStore", "truststore.jks");
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p.put("javax.net.ssl.trustStorePassword", System.getenv("TRUSTSTORE_PW"));
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Connection c = DriverManager.getConnection(url, p);
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```
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## SQL*Plus
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```bash
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# full TCPS connect descriptor (EZConnect cannot express PROTOCOL=TCPS):
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sqlplus 'APP_USER@(DESCRIPTION=(ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=TCPS)(HOST=<host>)(PORT=2484))(CONNECT_DATA=(SID=ORCL)))'
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```
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Configure a wallet / truststore holding the imported GovCloud RDS CA bundle so the
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client trusts the server certificate.
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## Python (python-oracledb, thin mode)
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```python
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import oracledb
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dsn = (
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"(DESCRIPTION=(ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=TCPS)(HOST=<host>)(PORT=2484))"
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"(CONNECT_DATA=(SID=ORCL))"
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"(SECURITY=(SSL_SERVER_DN_MATCH=TRUE)))"
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)
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# config_dir points at a directory holding the imported GovCloud RDS CA bundle
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# (ca_cert_bundle_url) as the trust store the thin driver reads.
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conn = oracledb.connect(user=username, password=password, dsn=dsn,
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config_dir="/path/to/wallet")
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```
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The listener negotiates **TLS 1.2** (RDS Oracle has no 1.3) with the FIPS-validated
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AEAD cipher `TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384`; `FIPS.SSLFIPS_140=TRUE` means
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the client **must** offer a FIPS cipher or the handshake fails. See
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[hardening-baseline.md](hardening-baseline.md).
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> **Use a least-privilege user, not the master.** The bound credential is the
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> instance master, which on Oracle is **DBA-class**. Connect as the master once to
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> create a least-privilege application user, then run your app as that user.
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> Creating in-database users is the customer's responsibility — see
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> [limitations.md](limitations.md).

‎docs/oracle19c/design-notes.md‎

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# Oracle 19c — design notes
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The durable rationale behind the Oracle offering. The code and tests are the source
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of truth; this captures the non-obvious "why".
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## SE2 + License Included
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License Included is **SE2-only** on RDS; Enterprise Edition is **BYOL-only** — they
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are mutually exclusive. License Included is chosen to remove the unlicensed-Oracle
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liability: AWS holds the license and it is inseparable from the running instance, so
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cloud.gov cannot facilitate an unlicensed Oracle DB on GSA-operated infrastructure
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(BYOL would only reallocate that liability via attestation, not remove it). The
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consequence is SE2, which lacks the EE-only features (notably Oracle-native TDE and
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FGA). Those SE2 STIG deltas are accepted as an ISSO risk/deviation, with RDS-KMS
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at-rest encryption and standard/unified auditing as the compensating controls. If a
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control is ever found to *require* TDE or FGA, the edition decision must be re-opened
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(EE + BYOL). See [licensing.md](licensing.md).
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## STIG validation lives in the overlay, not the broker
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The broker is a Go service that provisions and configures RDS. STIG validation
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(InSpec/Cinc controls, SQL assessment, RDS-applicability mapping, evidence) lives in
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the separate `cg-oracle-database-19c-stig-overlay` repo. **The broker never runs
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InSpec/Cinc.** This keeps a clean separation of duties — the thing being audited does
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not audit itself — avoids a Ruby/InSpec runtime in a Go broker, and lets controls
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evolve independently. **Broker configures; overlay validates.** See
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[hardening-baseline.md](hardening-baseline.md).
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## Hardened baseline as embedded YAML behind a per-engine abstraction
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Engine behavior is dispatched through an `RDSBaseline` engine-strategy interface
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(`mysqlBaseline`, `postgresBaseline`, `oracle19cBaseline`), and the hardened values
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live as structured YAML under `services/rds/baselines/oracle19c/` rather than
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hard-coded Go conditionals. This makes the hardening values directly reviewable by a
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security reviewer, keeps Oracle logic out of scattered `if DbType == "..."`
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conditionals, and keeps the declarative baseline portable if RDS brokerage ever
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moves to CSB (which is also declarative). Broker *runtime* behavior (async
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lifecycle, credential encryption, state) is not portable and is deliberately out of
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the baseline files.
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## Why `ENABLE_ORACLE` exists
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`ENABLE_ORACLE` gates a staged rollout of a new offering not yet validated on a live
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foundation — it governs when the offering appears, not per-request approval. It is
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**not** a security or boundary control: Oracle uses the same credential model as the
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Postgres/MySQL plans (master credential per binding; customer creates least-privilege
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users).

‎docs/oracle19c/hardening-baseline.md‎

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# Oracle 19c — hardening baseline
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Every brokered Oracle instance is provisioned with a broker-managed hardened
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parameter group, default audit log exports, and an SSL option group. The
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authoritative values live in the reviewable, embedded baseline files under
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[`services/rds/baselines/oracle19c/`](../../services/rds/baselines/oracle19c/); this
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page documents the durable deltas and the controls they map to.
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## Parameter group (`baselines/oracle19c/parameters.yml`)
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| Parameter | Value | Apply | STIG intent |
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|-----------|-------|-------|-------------|
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| `audit_trail` | `DB,EXTENDED` | pending-reboot | enable DB auditing |
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| `audit_sys_operations` | `TRUE` | pending-reboot | audit privileged SYS ops |
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| `sec_case_sensitive_logon` | `TRUE` | immediate | case-sensitive passwords |
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| `remote_login_passwordfile` | `NONE` | pending-reboot | disable remote OS password-file auth |
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| `resource_limit` | `TRUE` | immediate | enforce profile resource limits |
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| `sql92_security` | `TRUE` | pending-reboot | SQL92 DML-predicate least privilege |
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`pending-reboot` parameters take effect after a reboot; the broker surfaces
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pending-reboot state via the existing async/modify path. All six are base Oracle
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init parameters available in SE2 (none are EE-only), so the baseline fully applies.
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## Log exports (`baselines/oracle19c/log_exports.yml`)
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Default CloudWatch exports: `alert`, `audit`, `listener`. `trace` and `oemagent` are
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opt-in (high-volume / requires OEM).
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## Option group — SSL / TCPS (SC-8 / SC-8(1) / SC-13)
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The create path provisions an RDS Oracle **SSL option group** and attaches it,
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serving TLS on a dedicated **TCPS listener (port 2484)**:
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| Setting | Value | Intent |
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|---------|-------|--------|
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| listener port | `2484` (TCPS) | separate TLS listener (RDS Oracle serves TLS off-port) |
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| `SQLNET.SSL_VERSION` | `1.2` | TLS 1.2 — RDS Oracle ceiling (no 1.3); acceptable for FedRAMP Moderate |
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| `SQLNET.CIPHER_SUITE` | `TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384` | FIPS AEAD suite; RSA-CA-compatible |
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| `FIPS.SSLFIPS_140` | `TRUE` | FIPS 140 crypto mode |
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This delivers encryption-in-transit (SC-8 / SC-8(1)) with FIPS-validated crypto
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(SC-13); DISA Oracle 19c STIG **V-270579** (SC-8(2)) + **V-270571** (SC-13). The
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instance uses the RDS default RSA CA (`rds-ca-rsa2048-g1`), compatible with the
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ECDHE_RSA cipher (an ECDSA-only suite would need the ECC CA and is rejected
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fail-closed before the AWS call). `FIPS.SSLFIPS_140=TRUE` means clients **must**
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negotiate a FIPS cipher or the handshake fails. No attack-surface options (XML DB
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HTTP listener, `extproc`, Java VM, APEX) are enabled.
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> **TLS-only depends on the platform security group (durable operational fact).**
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> The broker provisions + attaches the SSL option and expresses the 2484 intent, but
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> **cannot** open `2484` ingress or deny plaintext `1521` — that is a platform
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> security-group change owned by cg-provision, outside the broker's IAM. TLS-only
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> enforcement requires cg-provision to allow `2484` and deny `1521`.
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## STIG validation lives in the overlay
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SQL-level hardening (profiles, default-account lockout, unified audit policies,
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PUBLIC-grant review) and full STIG validation are **not** in the broker. They live
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in the separate
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[`cg-oracle-database-19c-stig-overlay`](https://github.com/cloud-gov/cg-oracle-database-19c-stig-overlay)
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repo, whose `control-layers.yml` classifies each control by layer
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(`broker_infra`, `aws_rds_parameter_group`, `aws_rds_option_group`, `sql_hardening`,
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`aws_inherited`, `not_applicable_rds`, …) — which is what stops the ~33 OS/listener
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controls from failing misleadingly on managed RDS. The broker configures; the
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overlay validates. See [design-notes.md](design-notes.md).

‎docs/oracle19c/licensing.md‎

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# Oracle 19c — licensing (SE2 + License Included)
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The `oracle-se2-license-included-dev` plan uses Amazon RDS **License Included**: AWS
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holds the Oracle Database license and bundles it into the instance price. Customers
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do **not** buy or bring an Oracle license — no license key, no BYOL entitlement, no
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attestation, no license parameter. There is **no unlicensed state**: cloud.gov never
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facilitates an unlicensed Oracle database, because the license is held by AWS and is
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inseparable from the running instance.
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## Why License Included (and therefore SE2)
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- **License Included is Standard Edition 2 (SE2) only** on RDS; Enterprise Edition
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is **BYOL-only**. The two are mutually exclusive — you cannot have License
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Included + EE. Choosing License Included to remove the unlicensed-Oracle liability
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means the offering is **SE2**.
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- **Cost.** The bundled license makes an Oracle plan cost more than an
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open-source-engine plan. Cost is handled the same way as the Postgres/MySQL RDS
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plans — the instance carries `free: false` and the underlying AWS charge is
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passed through to agencies as **cloud.gov resource credits** (this broker's
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catalog does not itself carry a per-plan price figure).
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## SE2 STIG deviations (ISSO risk/deviation)
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SE2 does not include the Enterprise-Edition-only security features. The material
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gaps, and how they are handled on this offering:
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| EE-only feature (absent in SE2) | Handling on this offering |
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|---|---|
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| **Oracle-native TDE** (tablespace / column encryption) | **RDS storage-level encryption at rest (AES-256 / KMS)** (`encrypted: true`) — edition-independent, the same at-rest control the Postgres/MySQL plans use. |
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| **Fine-Grained Auditing (FGA)** | **Standard / unified (mixed-mode) auditing** via `audit_trail` + CloudWatch `audit` export. (Even on EE, RDS does not export FGA events to CloudWatch.) |
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| Oracle Database Vault | **Not applicable** — unsupported on RDS even for EE. |
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| VPD, Label Security, Data Redaction, Partitioning, Data Guard | Not available on SE2; not part of this offering's control posture. |
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Whether a specific STIG control is satisfied by **RDS-KMS at-rest encryption** in
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place of Oracle-native TDE, and by **standard/unified auditing** in place of FGA, is
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a control-interpretation decision recorded as an **ISSO risk/deviation acceptance**.
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If a control is found to *require* Oracle-native TDE or FGA, the edition decision
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(EE + BYOL, licensing handled by attestation) must be re-opened — see
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[design-notes.md](design-notes.md).
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## References
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- [design-notes.md](design-notes.md) — SE2 + License Included rationale
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- [README.md](README.md) — the `oracle-se2-license-included-dev` plan
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- AWS: *Licensing Amazon RDS for Oracle* (License Included is SE2-only)
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- AWS: *Amazon RDS for Oracle pricing* (License Included bundles the Oracle license)

‎docs/oracle19c/limitations.md‎

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# Oracle 19c — known limitations & caveats
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Oracle-specific limitations only. Generic RDS behavior is documented in the
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top-level [README.md](../../README.md).
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## Credential model (intended boundary — not a limitation)
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The binding returns the instance **master credential**, the same model as the
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Postgres/MySQL RDS plans. Creating least-privilege application users *inside* the
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database is the customer's responsibility — the intended shared-responsibility
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boundary. On Oracle this matters more: the RDS master user is **DBA-class** (it
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carries the DBA-style role RDS grants), more privileged than a Postgres/MySQL
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master. Bind apps to a **least-privilege user you create**, not to the master. This
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is customer guidance, not a broker-enforced gate.
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## Limitations
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1. **No in-place engine-version update.** `oracle19cBaseline.SupportsEngineVersionUpdate()`
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returns false; version is pinned by the plan.
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2. **Fixed SID `ORCL`.** RDS Oracle constrains DBName/SID to ≤8 uppercase chars. The
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unique per-instance identifier is the `DBInstanceIdentifier`, not the SID.
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3. **SE2 lacks the EE-only features.** No Oracle-native TDE, Fine-Grained Auditing
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(FGA), VPD, Label Security, Data Redaction, Partitioning, or Data Guard. At-rest
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encryption is provided by RDS-KMS storage encryption and auditing by
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standard/unified auditing; the residual TDE/FGA control interpretation is an
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accepted ISSO risk/deviation — see [licensing.md](licensing.md). An accepted
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deviation of the chosen edition, not an unfinished feature.
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4. **TLS-only needs the platform security group.** The broker provisions + attaches
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the SSL option group (TCPS 2484, TLS 1.2, `TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384`,
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`FIPS.SSLFIPS_140=TRUE`) and the binding advertises TCPS/2484, but it cannot open
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`2484` ingress or deny plaintext `1521` — that is a cg-provision security-group
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change. See [hardening-baseline.md](hardening-baseline.md).
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5. **TLS 1.2 ceiling.** RDS Oracle SSL supports TLS 1.2 only (no 1.3). Acceptable for
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FedRAMP Moderate.
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6. **~33 OS/listener STIG controls are AWS-inherited / not applicable** on managed
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RDS. They are classified in the overlay's `control-layers.yml`, not remediated in
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the broker; any that cannot be met become POA&M candidates.
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7. **`ENABLE_ORACLE` staged-rollout switch.** Oracle provisioning is off until the
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broker environment opts in. A rollout control for a new offering — **not** a
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security/boundary control (the credential model matches Postgres/MySQL).

‎ops/oracle19c/credential-rotation.md‎

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# Oracle 19c — credential rotation
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Oracle uses the **same customer-initiated rotation flow as the other RDS engines**
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(Postgres/MySQL): `cf update-service -c '{"rotate_credentials": true}'`, then
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unbind/bind and restage. The full step-by-step (including the downtime caveat and
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the need to recreate service keys) is documented for the platform at
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[docs.cloud.gov — Rotate your credentials](https://docs.cloud.gov/platform/services/relational-database/#rotate-your-credentials);
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the Oracle steps are identical. There is no automatic/scheduled rotation.
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```bash
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cf update-service my-oracle -c '{"rotate_credentials": true}'
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cf unbind-service my-app my-oracle
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cf bind-service my-app my-oracle # VCAP_SERVICES is populated at bind time
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cf restage my-app --strategy rolling
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```
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## Oracle-specific note: the master is DBA-class
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The rotated credential is the **instance master**, which on Oracle is a **DBA-class**
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account — more privileged than a Postgres/MySQL master. Do **not** point production
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apps directly at the master. Connect as the master once to create a least-privilege
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application user, and bind/run your app as that user; rotating the master does not
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change an app user the customer created. Creating least-privilege in-database users
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is the customer's responsibility (the intended shared-responsibility boundary). See
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[../../docs/oracle19c/limitations.md](../../docs/oracle19c/limitations.md).

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