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157 | 157 | //! honest players and another block `B_2` to `f + 1` other honest players. Normally, it would only be possible to create one quorum of `2f + 1` (for `B_2`), |
158 | 158 | //! however, with `h` other shares revealed another quorum of `2f + h` can be formed for `B_1`. |
159 | 159 | //! |
160 | | -//! #### Future Work: Dropping the Synchrony Assumption for `f` Bounded Reveals? |
| 160 | +//! #### DKG without a synchrony assumption |
161 | 161 | //! |
162 | | -//! It is possible to design a DKG/Resharing scheme that maintains a shared secret where at least `f + 1` honest players |
163 | | -//! must participate to recover the shared secret that doesn't require a synchrony assumption (`2f + 1` threshold |
164 | | -//! where at most `f` players are Byzantine). However, known constructions that satisfy this requirement require both |
165 | | -//! broadcasting encrypted dealings publicly and employing Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) to attest that encrypted dealings |
166 | | -//! were generated correctly ([Groth21](https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/339), [Kate23](https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/451)). |
167 | | -//! |
168 | | -//! As of January 2025, these constructions are still considered novel (2-3 years in production), require stronger |
169 | | -//! cryptographic assumptions, don't scale to hundreds of participants (unless dealers have powerful hardware), and provide |
170 | | -//! observers the opportunity to brute force decrypt shares (even if honest players are online). |
| 162 | +//! Some protocols achieve one round without synchrony assumptions, by combining |
| 163 | +//! encryption and ZK Proofs. We have an implementation of one such protocol, |
| 164 | +//! [Golden](https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1924), in [`crate::bls12381::golden_dkg`]. |
| 165 | +//! At the moment, that implementation is still experimental. |
171 | 166 | //! |
172 | 167 | //! ## Handling Complaints |
173 | 168 | //! |
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