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fix(hermes): normalize title generation inputs
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Lines changed: 177 additions & 261 deletions

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.oxfmtrc.json

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{
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"proseWrap": "preserve",
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"printWidth": 100,
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"tabWidth": 2,
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"useTabs": false,
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"singleQuote": false,
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"trailingComma": "es5",
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"bracketSpacing": true,
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"semi": true,
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"sortPackageJson": false,
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"ignorePatterns": []
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}

packages/pi-packages/pi-command-policy-bridge/README.md

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@@ -6,23 +6,15 @@ Applies the existing `pi-permissions.jsonc` bash command policy to command-beari
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- `interactive_shell` with `command`
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- `herdr_run_in_pane` with `command`
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This lets those tools be allowed at the tool level while preserving deterministic bash-policy guardrails for dangerous commands.
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Also adds jj-aware VCS guardrails:
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- Blocks Git mutating commands when running inside a jj repo (`.jj/` present) with concrete jj remediation guidance.
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- Requires explicit approval for mutating jj tool actions:
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- `jj_vcs.align_push`
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- `jj_stack_pr_flow.{publish,sync,close,init}`
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- `jj_workspace.{create,squash,delete}`
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This lets those tools be allowed at the tool level while preserving deterministic bash-policy deny rules for commands you never want agents to run.
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## Behavior
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For supported tool calls, the extension extracts the embedded command and evaluates it against `bash` rules in `pi-permissions.jsonc` using last-match-wins wildcard ordering:
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- `deny` blocks the tool call
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- `ask` prompts the user
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- `ask` is treated as `allow`
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- `allow` lets the tool call proceed
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- no matching rule prompts the user
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- no matching rule allows the tool call
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This is intentionally deterministic; it is not an LLM classifier.
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This package is intentionally a deny-list guardrail, not an approval system or LLM danger classifier.
Lines changed: 81 additions & 37 deletions
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@@ -1,48 +1,92 @@
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import { describe, expect, it } from "bun:test";
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import { mkdtempSync, mkdirSync, rmSync } from "node:fs";
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import { mkdtempSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
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import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
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import { join } from "node:path";
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import { evaluateToolGuard } from "./index";
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describe("pi-command-policy-bridge jj behavior", () => {
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it("blocks git add in jj repos with remediation", () => {
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const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "pi-jj-test-"));
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mkdirSync(join(dir, ".jj"));
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const decision = evaluateToolGuard({
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toolName: "bash",
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input: { command: "git add ." },
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workingDirectory: dir,
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});
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rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
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expect(decision.kind).toBe("deny");
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if (decision.kind !== "deny") return;
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expect(decision.reason).toContain("jj snapshots automatically");
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describe("pi-command-policy-bridge", () => {
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it("does not block git commands", () => {
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const decision = evaluateToolGuard({
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toolName: "bash",
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input: { command: "git add ." },
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});
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expect(decision.kind).toBe("allow");
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});
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it("does not block git add outside jj repos", () => {
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const decision = evaluateToolGuard({
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toolName: "bash",
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input: { command: "git add ." },
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workingDirectory: "/tmp",
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});
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expect(decision.kind).toBe("allow");
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it("allows jj_vcs align_push without prompting", () => {
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const decision = evaluateToolGuard({
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toolName: "jj_vcs",
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input: { action: "align_push" },
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workingDirectory: process.cwd(),
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});
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expect(decision.kind).toBe("allow");
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});
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it("requires approval for jj_vcs align_push", () => {
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const decision = evaluateToolGuard({
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toolName: "jj_vcs",
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input: { action: "align_push" },
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workingDirectory: process.cwd(),
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});
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expect(decision.kind).toBe("ask");
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});
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it("allows commands with no readable bash policy", () => {
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const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "pi-missing-policy-test-"));
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const previous = process.env.PI_PERMISSION_SYSTEM_POLICY_AGENT_DIR;
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process.env.PI_PERMISSION_SYSTEM_POLICY_AGENT_DIR = dir;
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it("allows jj_vcs status", () => {
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const decision = evaluateToolGuard({
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toolName: "jj_vcs",
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input: { action: "status" },
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workingDirectory: process.cwd(),
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});
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expect(decision.kind).toBe("allow");
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});
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try {
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const decision = evaluateToolGuard({
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toolName: "bash",
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input: { command: "echo safe" },
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});
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expect(decision.kind).toBe("allow");
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} finally {
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if (previous === undefined) {
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delete process.env.PI_PERMISSION_SYSTEM_POLICY_AGENT_DIR;
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} else {
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process.env.PI_PERMISSION_SYSTEM_POLICY_AGENT_DIR = previous;
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}
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rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
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}
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});
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it("allows bash policy ask rules without prompting", () => {
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const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "pi-policy-test-"));
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const previous = process.env.PI_PERMISSION_SYSTEM_POLICY_AGENT_DIR;
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process.env.PI_PERMISSION_SYSTEM_POLICY_AGENT_DIR = dir;
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writeFileSync(join(dir, "pi-permissions.jsonc"), '{ "bash": { "*": "ask" } }');
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try {
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const decision = evaluateToolGuard({
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toolName: "bash",
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input: { command: "echo safe" },
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});
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expect(decision.kind).toBe("allow");
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} finally {
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if (previous === undefined) {
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delete process.env.PI_PERMISSION_SYSTEM_POLICY_AGENT_DIR;
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} else {
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process.env.PI_PERMISSION_SYSTEM_POLICY_AGENT_DIR = previous;
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}
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rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
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}
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});
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it("denies explicit bash policy deny rules", () => {
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const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "pi-deny-policy-test-"));
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const previous = process.env.PI_PERMISSION_SYSTEM_POLICY_AGENT_DIR;
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process.env.PI_PERMISSION_SYSTEM_POLICY_AGENT_DIR = dir;
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writeFileSync(
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join(dir, "pi-permissions.jsonc"),
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'{ "bash": { "*": "allow", "*brew install*": "deny" } }'
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);
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try {
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const decision = evaluateToolGuard({
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toolName: "bash",
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input: { command: "brew install foo" },
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});
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expect(decision.kind).toBe("deny");
83+
} finally {
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if (previous === undefined) {
85+
delete process.env.PI_PERMISSION_SYSTEM_POLICY_AGENT_DIR;
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} else {
87+
process.env.PI_PERMISSION_SYSTEM_POLICY_AGENT_DIR = previous;
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}
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rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
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}
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});
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});

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