Update docs/Interference_Scenarios_for_an_ARM64_Linux_System.md

Co-authored-by: Paul Albertella <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Igor Stoppa <[email protected]>

Author: igor-stoppa

docs/Interference_Scenarios_for_an_ARM64_Linux_System.md

@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ The choice of enabling them, despite the associated risk, might be driven by ove
 Of course one could attemtp to qualify them, but then it is necessary to consider the fact that in reality it is necessary to qualify them together with the user-space-provided policies they will enact.
 Without being configured by user-space, neither SELinux nor cgroups are of any particular use.
 
-An alternative - possibly more costly - path could be to instead isolate more safety relevant loads from non safety relevant ones, introducing a second virtual machine, with an hypervisor underneath.
+An alternative - possibly more costly - path could be to instead isolate more safety-relevant loads from non-safety-relevant ones, introducing a second virtual machine, with a hypervisor underneath.
 The caveat is that now the hypervisor can be a source of interference. And it is also necessary to have HW capable to support an EL2.
 It can be an interesting alternative, though, if using a Type1 hypervisor (like Xen), because it is relatively simpler than trying to qualify the Linux code.