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Updated approach
Signed-off-by: Paul Albertella <[email protected]>
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approach.md

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# OSEP proposed approach
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a) Identify and document system scope, losses and hazards
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a) Document scope of analysis using STPA
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* *Assumed* system context, boundaries of analysis, role of OS, etc
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* OS-level losses/hazards that *may* violate a system's safety goals
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* Specific to the topic: start simple and elaborate later!
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*In collaboration with other WGs e.g. Automotive?*
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b) Identify and document constraints and mitigations
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* Constraints: Criteria that must be satisfied to *prevent* hazard
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* Mitigations: To reduce *impact* of hazards that are not prevented
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* Assumed system context
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- Hardware features, role of OS, boundaries of analysis, etc
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- Doesn't have to be concrete / complex
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- Specific to topic: start simple and elaborate later!
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* Losses
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- OS-related outcomes that *may* violate a system's safety goals
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- i.e. lead to harm in a safety-related system
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* Hazards
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- OS-level system conditions that *may* lead to these losses
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* System-level constraints
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- Criteria that must be satisfied to *prevent* or *mitigate* hazards
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- May be a simple inversion of the hazard
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c) Identify and document kernel features or external mechanisms
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* To implement OS- or system-level constraints and mitigations
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* To be identified and/or investigated by other WGs?
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b) Identify and document system measures and mitigations for Linux
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d) Investigate and document processes and tools to:
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* Implement constraints or mitigations via engineering processes
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* Verify constraints and mitigations (at all levels)
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* Validate constraints, mitigations & verification measures in-context
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* Identify or provide other evidence to support claims
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*Out of scope for OSEP - LFSCS group?*
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* Provided by kernel features, compiler, hardware, etc
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* Find supporting evidence (design, tests, processes) for these
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* Identify responsibilities of components (kernel, compiler, etc)
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c) Perform hazard and risk analysis using STPA
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*In collaboration with LFSCS and Safety Architecture WGs?*
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* Based on inputs from (a) and (b)
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* Document control structure(s) for topic
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- Identify controllers and responsibilities
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- Functional abstraction of system elements
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- e.g. Kernel or subsystems, complier, other tools, etc
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- Define interactions as control actions and feedback
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- Identify Unsafe Control Actions and Loss Scenarios
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- Define Controller Constraints
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d) Identify and document process measures and mitigations
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* Identify engineering practices and tools to:
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- Implement constraints from (a) and (c)
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- Verify constraints from (a) and (c)
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- Evaluate and/or increase confidence in (b)
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- Identify or provide other evidence to support claims
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- e.g. Quality criteria
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* Find supporting evidence from FOSS communities
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- Formal, verifiable process or inconsistent practice?
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e) Identify and document claims and use cases
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* To illustrate how a+b+c+d might support an in-context safety argument
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* Use cases with kernel config(s) and hardware / system dependencies?
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* Evidence needed to support claims
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- How can other organisations use (d) to provide confidence?
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- What criteria does evidence need to satisfy?
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* Document use cases
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- In collaboration with Domain WGs?
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- With kernel config(s) and hardware / system dependencies?

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