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1 | 1 | package manifest |
2 | 2 |
|
3 | 3 | import ( |
| 4 | + "archive/tar" |
4 | 5 | "bytes" |
5 | 6 | "compress/gzip" |
6 | 7 | "os" |
@@ -81,28 +82,112 @@ func TestArchiveNotDirectory(t *testing.T) { |
81 | 82 | } |
82 | 83 | } |
83 | 84 |
|
84 | | -func TestExtractPathTraversal(t *testing.T) { |
85 | | - // This test ensures the extract function rejects path traversal attacks |
86 | | - // We can't easily create a malicious tar, but we test that normal paths work |
87 | | - srcDir := t.TempDir() |
88 | | - testDir := filepath.Join(srcDir, "safe") |
89 | | - if err := os.MkdirAll(testDir, 0755); err != nil { |
90 | | - t.Fatal(err) |
91 | | - } |
92 | | - if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(testDir, "file.txt"), []byte("safe"), 0644); err != nil { |
93 | | - t.Fatal(err) |
94 | | - } |
95 | | - |
| 85 | +// createTarGzBytes builds a tar.gz archive in memory with arbitrary entry names. |
| 86 | +// This allows crafting malicious archives for security testing. |
| 87 | +func createTarGzBytes(t *testing.T, entries map[string]string) []byte { |
| 88 | + t.Helper() |
96 | 89 | var buf bytes.Buffer |
97 | | - if _, err := Archive(&buf, testDir); err != nil { |
98 | | - t.Fatal(err) |
| 90 | + gzw := gzip.NewWriter(&buf) |
| 91 | + tw := tar.NewWriter(gzw) |
| 92 | + |
| 93 | + for name, content := range entries { |
| 94 | + if err := tw.WriteHeader(&tar.Header{ |
| 95 | + Name: name, |
| 96 | + Size: int64(len(content)), |
| 97 | + Mode: 0644, |
| 98 | + Typeflag: tar.TypeReg, |
| 99 | + }); err != nil { |
| 100 | + t.Fatalf("writing tar header for %q: %v", name, err) |
| 101 | + } |
| 102 | + if _, err := tw.Write([]byte(content)); err != nil { |
| 103 | + t.Fatalf("writing tar content for %q: %v", name, err) |
| 104 | + } |
99 | 105 | } |
100 | 106 |
|
101 | | - dstDir := t.TempDir() |
102 | | - _, err := Extract(&buf, dstDir) |
103 | | - if err != nil { |
104 | | - t.Fatalf("extract: %v", err) |
| 107 | + // Close tar then gzip explicitly (not defer) to ensure full flush. |
| 108 | + if err := tw.Close(); err != nil { |
| 109 | + t.Fatalf("closing tar writer: %v", err) |
105 | 110 | } |
| 111 | + if err := gzw.Close(); err != nil { |
| 112 | + t.Fatalf("closing gzip writer: %v", err) |
| 113 | + } |
| 114 | + return buf.Bytes() |
| 115 | +} |
| 116 | + |
| 117 | +func TestExtractPathTraversal(t *testing.T) { |
| 118 | + t.Run("rejected paths", func(t *testing.T) { |
| 119 | + tests := []struct { |
| 120 | + name string |
| 121 | + entry string |
| 122 | + }{ |
| 123 | + {"direct traversal", "../escape.txt"}, |
| 124 | + {"relative traversal", "subdir/../../escape.txt"}, |
| 125 | + {"deep traversal", "foo/bar/../../../etc/shadow"}, |
| 126 | + {"bare dotdot", ".."}, |
| 127 | + } |
| 128 | + |
| 129 | + for _, tt := range tests { |
| 130 | + t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { |
| 131 | + data := createTarGzBytes(t, map[string]string{tt.entry: "malicious"}) |
| 132 | + destDir := t.TempDir() |
| 133 | + _, err := Extract(bytes.NewReader(data), destDir) |
| 134 | + if err == nil { |
| 135 | + t.Errorf("expected error for path %q, got nil", tt.entry) |
| 136 | + } |
| 137 | + if err != nil && !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "invalid path") { |
| 138 | + t.Errorf("expected 'invalid path' error for %q, got: %v", tt.entry, err) |
| 139 | + } |
| 140 | + |
| 141 | + // Verify no files were written outside destDir. |
| 142 | + entries, _ := os.ReadDir(destDir) |
| 143 | + if len(entries) > 0 { |
| 144 | + t.Errorf("expected no files written for traversal path, found %d entries", len(entries)) |
| 145 | + } |
| 146 | + }) |
| 147 | + } |
| 148 | + }) |
| 149 | + |
| 150 | + t.Run("accepted safe path", func(t *testing.T) { |
| 151 | + data := createTarGzBytes(t, map[string]string{ |
| 152 | + "manifest/safe.txt": "safe content", |
| 153 | + }) |
| 154 | + destDir := t.TempDir() |
| 155 | + _, err := Extract(bytes.NewReader(data), destDir) |
| 156 | + if err != nil { |
| 157 | + t.Fatalf("unexpected error for safe path: %v", err) |
| 158 | + } |
| 159 | + |
| 160 | + got, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(destDir, "manifest", "safe.txt")) |
| 161 | + if err != nil { |
| 162 | + t.Fatalf("reading extracted file: %v", err) |
| 163 | + } |
| 164 | + if string(got) != "safe content" { |
| 165 | + t.Errorf("got %q, want %q", got, "safe content") |
| 166 | + } |
| 167 | + }) |
| 168 | + |
| 169 | + // filepath.Clean resolves "foo/../bar" to "bar" which stays within destDir, |
| 170 | + // so the HasPrefix check correctly allows it. This differs from the core |
| 171 | + // package's regex which rejects any path containing ".." — both behaviors |
| 172 | + // are correct for their context (file-based vs in-memory extraction). |
| 173 | + t.Run("non-escaping dotdot accepted", func(t *testing.T) { |
| 174 | + data := createTarGzBytes(t, map[string]string{ |
| 175 | + "foo/../bar.txt": "resolved content", |
| 176 | + }) |
| 177 | + destDir := t.TempDir() |
| 178 | + _, err := Extract(bytes.NewReader(data), destDir) |
| 179 | + if err != nil { |
| 180 | + t.Fatalf("unexpected error for non-escaping dotdot: %v", err) |
| 181 | + } |
| 182 | + |
| 183 | + got, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(destDir, "bar.txt")) |
| 184 | + if err != nil { |
| 185 | + t.Fatalf("reading extracted file: %v", err) |
| 186 | + } |
| 187 | + if string(got) != "resolved content" { |
| 188 | + t.Errorf("got %q, want %q", got, "resolved content") |
| 189 | + } |
| 190 | + }) |
106 | 191 | } |
107 | 192 |
|
108 | 193 | func TestCountFiles(t *testing.T) { |
|
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