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<p>
<h2>Training Mankind's Representatives</h2>

<p>

Chief Astronaut Donald Slayton established a leapfrog pattern of
assigning a crew to back one mission, skip two, and then fly the next.
When Neil Armstrong, with Fred Haise to pilot the lunar module and Edwin
Aldrin the command module, was named to back up <cite>Apollo 8,</cite>
it seemed likely that his team would make the first lunar landing, if
the two intervening missions were successful. Then, in late 1968, after
Michael Collins recovered from a bone spur operation, Slayton moved
Haise to backup lunar module pilot, put Collins in as prime crew command
module pilot, and shifted Aldrin to the lunar module pilot slot.
Completing the backup teams were James Lovell (commander), William
Anders (command module pilot), and a support team made up of John
Swigert, Ronald Evans, William Pogue, and Thomas Mattingly (Slayton
assigned Mattingly as a fourth support crewman after President Nixon
nominated Anders as Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics and
Space Council).<a href = "#source16"><b>16</b></a><p>

One member of this lunar module crew would be the first man to walk on
the moon - the first human being to step onto any celestial body besides
the earth. The road leading to the determination of which pilot would
have his name so registered in the annals of time was long, winding,
and, in places, hard to follow.<p>

In mid-1963, when the lunar module began to take on its final shape,
NASA outlined the mission sequence to the news media in conservative
tones. Emphasis was on the probability that one man would remain aboard
to tend the lander's systems. There appeared to be no interest at the
time in who would stay and who would get out. The following year, the
agency identified the lunar module pilot to Congress and newsmen as the
man who would take a two-hour hike on the surface, while the commander
waited for his return. But the same year - 1964 - the Grumman-led Apollo
Mission Planning Task Force study indicated that both men could safely
leave the craft, one at a time, for up to three hours apiece. This group
had no interest in which man went out first; it was merely looking at
the mission sequence to ensure adequate hardware designs.<a href =
"#source17"><b>17</b></a><p>

During the succeeding years, Apollo officials Joseph Shea and George
Mueller frequently spoke publicly on lunar surface operations. Shea said
in July 1966 that the crewmen would take turns at the three-hour walks,
perhaps going out as many as three times during an 18-hour stay.
Mueller, speaking to an Australian audience two weeks before the fire in
January 1967, made it sound rather as though both men would go out, arm
in arm, when he remarked that &quot;the two astronauts will disembark
through the docking door and begin the manned exploration of the
moon.&quot;<a href = "#source18"><b>18</b></a> So far as is known, no
one asked who would do these things - or how they would be done. With
nearly 50 astronauts to choose from and with the names of most of them
unfamiliar to the public, people found it difficult to conjecture about
the identity of a moon-walking crew. In fact, after all the centuries of
science fiction and all the years of Apollo's existence as a viable
program, it was still hard to envision someone's actually landing on the
moon.<p>

By late summer of 1968, it was time to find out if the astronauts could
unload and set up the experiments in the Apollo lunar surface
experiments package (ALSEP), put together by The Bendix Corporation.
NASA Headquarters asked the Manned Spacecraft Center to schedule a
demonstration on 26 and 27 August. Schmitt and Don Lind were the test
astronauts for the occasion, and Schmitt was not happy with the results.
He said there was too much activity during the first period outside the
spacecraft and there were no clear procedures for the second. At a
review the next day, Apollo Spacecraft Program Manager George Low
suggested that the first landing mission include only one walk on the
surface. He listed priorities as he saw them: taking a sample of lunar
material in the immediate vicinity of the lander, inspecting and
photographing the vehicle to make sure everything was in order,
gathering at least one box of selected lunar surface soil and rocks, and
setting up either a &quot;partial ALSEP&quot; or an erectable antenna
and a television camera. Low proposed that the planned field geology
investigation be eliminated.<a href = "#source19"><b>19</b></a><p>

Apollo Program Director Samuel Phillips, from Headquarters, had realized
after watching the demonstration that plans for the lunar surface walk
would need close attention and some sensible decisions. He asked Houston
Director Robert Gilruth to poll that center's key leaders and forward
their views so Mueller's management council could study the pros and
cons of the proposed surface activities. At that time, Rose reported to
his flight operations planning group on 30 August, the first landing
mission had two flight plans. The first called for one crewman to leave
the lander (although both would have the equipment for surface
expeditions) and the deletion of the experiments package; the second
plan required both the commander and the pilot to get out and set up the
six experiments in the package. Houston knew that Phillips favored
sending only one man out on the moon, but Gilruth wanted both crewmen to
go, so they could assist each other, if necessary. Gilruth's managers
also suggested deleting both the experiments package and the lunar
geology investigation.<a href = "#source20"><b>20</b></a><p>

Phillips passed Houston's recommendations on to the council, with the
reminder that descent, landing, and ascent maneuvers were new tasks and
that the astronauts needed all the training they could get. Eliminating
the experiments package would give them an additional 180 hours to train
for the more basic chores. Gemini experience had demonstrated the wisdom
of proceeding step by step, with very light workloads on the early
flights leading to more crowded schedules in later missions. This plan
would mean a very small return in scientific data from the first lunar
landing and would invite criticism from the scientific community. Wilmot
Hess, in Houston, was already urging that at least some easily handled
contingency experiments be included.<p>

Phillips also told the management council of Houston's preference for a
single period of exploration outside the spacecraft. Although he still
did not agree that both pilots should get out, he conceded that more
data would be gained from the interaction of two men with the lunar
surface. Phillips added that the psychological effect on a crewman of
landing on the moon and then being forbidden to step out on the surface
must be considered. In its October meeting, the council approved the use
of a scaled-down experiments package - an &quot;early Apollo scientific
experiments package&quot; - consisting of two subpackages: one
containing a passive seismic experiment, a solar cell array, an antenna,
and two plutonium heaters; the other, a laser ranging retroreflector.<a
href = "#source21"><b>21</b></a><p>

Apparently the council sided with Houston in its views on activities
outside the lander, because the center began planning for a two-man
exploration at a mission review meeting on 1 November. The second
astronaut would disembark after the first had been on the surface for an
hour, and the total time outside would be three hours. Low asked his
engineers to make sure that the control center was prepared to watch
over the lander's systems while both men walked on the moon.

<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c321a.jpg" width=384 height=580 ALT="Aldrin practices EVA"><p>

<cite>Aldrin, lunar module pilot for Apollo 11, sets up a solar wind
experiment during a practice session.</cite>

<p>
<hr>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c321b.jpg" width=501 height=408 ALT="Armstrong practices EVA"><p>

<cite>Mission commander Armstrong, opening a lunar sample box, rests it
on the lunar module's modular equipment stowage assembly (MESA)
hatch.</cite>

<p>
<hr>
<p>

When Houston began work on the two-man scheme, the planners used a 1964
concept that called for the lunar module pilot to emerge first.
Armstrong and Aldrin began concentrating on Apollo 11 as soon as they
finished their backup duties for <cite>Apollo 8</cite> in December.
Almost immediately, on the 20th, a procedures document listed the
commander as the first crewman to leave the lunar module. On a summary
minute-by-minute work chart, issued in January 1969, the crew positions
- commander and lunar module pilot - were crossed through and the
letters A and B were penciled in. A lunar surface operations chart,
using these letters, was then published, but without any identification
of either A or B.<a href = "#source22"><b>22</b></a>

<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c325a.jpg" width=510 height=400 ALT="Collins in CM simulator"><p>

<cite>Collins practices tending the command module alone; on the
mission, crewmates Armstrong and Aldrin will leave him in lunar orbit
and descend to explore the moon's surface.</cite>

<p>
<hr>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c325b.jpg" width=408 height=584 ALT="Armstrong in LM simulator"><p>

<cite>Armstrong practices in the lunar module simulator.</cite>

<p>
<hr>
<p>

Collins wrote in <cite>Carrying the Fire</cite> that Armstrong had
&quot;exercised his commander's prerogative&quot; and that Aldrin's
&quot;basic beef&quot; was this switch in who crawled out first. But
Slayton later took the credit (or blame) for making the change. &quot;I
observed the procedures under the old plan one day,&quot; he said,
&quot;and they appeared awkward to me.&quot; Slayton told Raymond G.
Zedekar, in charge of preparing a lunar surface operations plan, to
change the sequence. At the 15th lunar surface operations planning
meeting on 14 February, Zedekar said that Aldrin would follow the
commander to the lunar surface in less than the hour listed in the old
plan, to assist Armstrong with the outside tasks, and that the lunar
module pilot would return to the lander first. &quot;If the CDR returns
last,&quot; Zedekar remarked, &quot;the crewmen will be in their proper
respective positions in the LM.&quot; Since the portable life-sustaining
backpacks were stored directly behind the lunar module pilot's crew
station, getting out and then back in this sequence made crew movements
in the cabin easier.<a href = "#source23"><b>23</b></a><p>

Surprisingly, Mueller did not inform Administrator Thomas Paine<a href =
"#explanation1"><b>*</b></a> that the two men would take a 2-hour
40-minute walk, nor did he tell him that the order of exit had changed,
until 7 April - at least, that was the date of his written report. Even
more surprising was the fact that it was not until 14 April that a
newsman asked Low, &quot;Who will be the first out to the moon?&quot;
Low replied that, from &quot;the present way that we're working, . . .
the Commander gets out first.&quot; The change later roused a small
furor. Low was awakened in the middle of the night on 27 June by a call
from an Associated Press reporter, who told the Apollo manager that the
wire service had a story &quot;that Neil Armstrong had pulled rank on
Buzz Aldrin.&quot; (Armstrong, incidentally, was a civilian and Aldrin a
colonel in the Air Force.)<a href = "#explanation2"><b>**</b></a> <a
href = "#source24"><b>24</b></a><p>

Regardless of crew sequence, training was going to be rough. Although
the scope of the mission had been reduced, many still wondered whether
the astronauts could be ready by July. Until James McDivitt got his
<cite>Apollo 9</cite> crew off on its mission in early March,
Armstrong's group had only third priority on the training simulators.
Armstrong might have used the time to sharpen his lunar module piloting
skill, but the lunar landing training vehicle - the apparent cross
between a Rube Goldberg device and a child's tinker toy machine that was
called by some observers the &quot;flying bedstead&quot; had been
grounded. The Apollo 11 commander himself had ejected safely from a
similar vehicle just before it crashed on 6 May 1968. Soon after
completing that accident investigation in November, Joseph S. Algranti,
head of Houston's Aircraft Operations Office, had bailed out of another
crashing trainer on 8 December. The accident board reconvened,
presenting its findings in mid-February 1969. Some of NASA's top
officials thought the crew could get sufficient training on the static
simulator and on the tower suspension facility at Langley. But the
astronauts and their support personnel insisted that this free-flight
vehicle was essential to provide the experience they needed before
flying the last 150 meters to the lunar surface.<a href =
"#source25"><b>25</b></a><p>

In March, after two sessions, the Flight Readiness Review Board decided
to resume the training flights. Harold E. Ream, who had flown these
machines 35 times, was ready to put the trainer through a dozen hops in
early April. Mueller agreed to let Ream test the craft but, he told
Gilruth, he wanted another evaluation before any astronauts flew it. The
next month, Slayton summarized for Gilruth and his top staff the
aerodynamics and handling characteristics of the trainer, which had been
modified to overcome its unstable tendencies. Gilruth's group was
satisfied, and Mueller consented to the resumption of astronaut flights.
During three consecutive days - 14&ndash;16 June (eight times on the final
day) - Armstrong successfully rehearsed lunar landing operations with
the free-flight machine.<a href = "#source26"><b>26</b></a><p>

Although practicing the landing was critical, the crewmen did not stand
around and wait to fly the trainer. They had plenty of other work to do.
Armstrong and Aldrin polished procedures for their lunar surface
activities, and they watched with keen interest the final push to
qualify the extravehicular garb and life-sustaining systems. Collins,
meanwhile, concentrated on those 18 rendezvous recipes in his cookbook,
learning how to cope with all the different situations that the
simulator personnel dreamed up to test his abilities.<p>

In an attempt to simulate lunar surface conditions, Max Faget's group
set up a model of the lander in a thermovacuum chamber in Houston. The
chamber was not big enough for the pilots to move a hundred meters away
from their craft as they planned to do on the moon, but the engineers
did provide the desired lighting - a 15-degree sun angle - and the
proper temperature range. The crew crawled out of the lander, pulled a
package from the MESA (modular equipment stowage assembly) section in
the descent stage, and deployed the experiments. During one of these
sessions, Armstrong had to report: &quot;Mission Control this is Apollo
11, we can't get the hatch open.&quot;<a href =
"#source27"><b>27</b></a><p>

While the chamber tests were going on, two dozen engineers, mostly from
Faget's directorate, held monthly meetings on the status of the
extravehicular mobility unit. James Chamberlin, one of the nation's top
space vehicle and equipment designers, led the group, which operated
much as Rose's flight operations planning team did. The Design Review
Board studied the system, piece by piece, and then assigned Crew Systems
Division specialists to work on specific problems and submit their
resolutions for board approval. For example, Thomas Mattingly, the
astronaut representative on the board, reported that the reflective gold
coating on the helmet visors peeled after several cleanings with
solvent, allowing light to leak through.<p>

Another area under study was how well the crew could grasp lunar samples
with gloved hands. During a chamber run, the systems people coated one
of Armstrong's gloves with silicone and left the other uncoated.
Armstrong reported that the treated glove worked better, and the board
approved the change, which upset the scientists. Hess complained that
the silicone would contaminate the lunar samples and pointed out that
his group would have enough trouble with contamination by the fumes from
the descent engine exhaust and the attitude thruster fuel. &quot;Can't
we get rid of [the silicone]?&quot; Reminding Hess that time was too
short to look for a substitute, Low refused. Crew Systems Chief Robert
E. Smylie added that silicone was basically inorganic and that the tips
of the glove fingers and the lunar boots were already made of that
substance, so coating the gloves should not make much difference.<a href
= "#source28"><b>28</b></a><p>

Chamberlin's board also investigated suit fit and mobility. In chamber
sessions on 27 March and 7 April, Armstrong complained that his sleeves
were too tight and asked that some of the bulky material be removed from
inside the elbow. When he bent his arms, he said, some of his capillary
blood vessels ruptured. Aldrin, too, wanted adjustments, such as shorter
suit arms. There was some discussion about how hard it would be to walk
on the lunar surface wearing the big 85-kilogram pack on their backs -
even though the moon had only one-sixth the earth's gravity. Using Don
Lind as a test subject, Crew Systems discovered that there would be a
small shift in the center of mass. The crewmen could compensate for this
by leaning slightly forward. If they bent over too far, however, they
might overbalance and fall.<a href = "#source29"><b>29</b></a><p>

Throughout the training period, people worried about the crew's moving
around on the moon. In March 1969, Phillips wrote Low that it bothered
him that there was no way to measure energy expenditure or carbon
dioxide production during the lunar walk. Low replied that the
measurements already planned - oxygen and water consumption and heart
rates - would tell what was happening and the systems monitors would
watch the display indicators very closely.<a href =
"#source30"><b>30</b></a>

<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c325c.jpg" width=584 height=411 ALT="One sixth g simulator"><p>

<cite>To train for walking on the moon, a harness rigged to support all
but one-sixth of a man's weight was used by nearly all the astronaut
corps.</cite>

<p>
<hr>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c325d.jpg" width=585 height=408 ALT="LaRC training vehicle"><p>

<cite>For several years they also trained on the lunar landing training
vehicle, at Langley Research Center, to simulate landing the lunar
module.</cite>

<p>
<hr>
<p>

In February 1969, NASA officials decided to construct a one-sixth
gravity simulator in the centrifuge building to get a closer look at
lunar locomotion. A pathway, with a simulated lunar surface, around the
periphery of the 46-meter-diameter rotunda would provide a walkway of
unlimited length. Dressed in full regalia and with umbilical lines
attached to the instruments inside the centrifuge checking biological
and metabolic data, an astronaut, suspended by a harness that would bear
all but one-sixth of his weight, could practice for walking and working
on the lunar surface. Since the simulator was completed too late in
their training to be of much use to the Armstrong crewmen and since they
did not plan to venture as far away from the lander as later crews,
Armstrong and Aldrin would check out and evaluate the facility after
their flight rather than before. Physicians were getting some of the
desired data during underwater training (where locomotion was similar to
that experienced in space) and in KC-135 aircraft Keplerian trajectories
(which duplicated weightlessness for a few seconds at the top of the
flight arc).<a href = "#source31"><b>31</b></a><p>

During February, Mueller asked Gilruth to hold a lunar surface
demonstration similar to the one given in August 1968. Gilruth arranged
the exhibition for the latter part of April 1969, and Phillips'
Certification Review Board would study the exercise to check on the
status of that part of the mission. An extravehicular activity committee
set up by Gilruth under his special assistant, Richard S. Johnston, had
already conducted many reviews of the plans, procedures, and equipment.
Mueller was pleased with the session, telling Paine that the simulation
was smooth and the crew was &quot;ready for the first lunar
landing.&quot; Phillips was disturbed when the demonstrators used a rope
pulley to haul equipment and samples up and down from the cabin to the
surface and back. He suggested that the astronauts carry the materials
in one hand. Low explained that the first rung on the ladder was 65
centimeters from the surface, and the crewmen could lift their legs only
30 centimeters with any ease. The astronauts would have to hop or pull
themselves up, using both hands, which they had done successfully in
water and on KC-135 aircraft. By the end of June, the final version of
the lunar surface operations plan was completed.<a href =
"#source32"><b>32</b></a><p>

Armstrong and Aldrin also trained at other places, especially at Langley
Research Center, where they worked on the suspended lunar landing
trainer equipped with realistic surface views and lighting. On 12 June,
NASA senior management agreed that the crew was ready for a 16 July
launch. Less than a month later, on 7 July, Mueller told Paine that
&quot;if Apollo 11 continues to progress on plan, the first men will set
foot on the moon two weeks from today.&quot;<a href =
"#source33"><b>33</b></a>

<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "explanation1"><b>*</b></a> Paine was no longer
&quot;Acting&quot; head of the agency. On 5 March 1969, President Nixon
had nominated him as Administrator, and on 3 April Vice-President Agnew
had sworn him into office.<p>

<a name = "explanation2"><b>**</b></a> Low informed the Public Affairs
Officer in Houston that &quot;the basic decision was made by my
Configuration Control Board . . . based on a recommendation by the
Flight Crew Operations Directorate. I am sure that Armstrong had made an
input to this recommendation, but he, by no means, had the final say.
The CCB decision was final.&quot;

<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "source16"><b>16</b>.</a> NASA, &quot;Apollo 11 Crew
Announcement,&quot; news release 69-9, 9 Jan. 1969; MSC; news release
69-2, 9 Jan. 1969; Michael Collins,<cite> Carrying The Fire: An
Astronaut's Journeys</cite> (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux,
1974), pp. 297, 312-14; &quot;Apollo XI - Flight Crew Named for Possible
Lunar Landing,&quot; MSC <cite>Roundup,</cite> 24 Jan. 1969; Cyril E.
Baker, telephone interview, 1 April 1976. See also discussion on
&quot;Selecting and Training Crews&quot; in chap. 11.<p>

<a name = "source17"><b>17</b>.</a> &quot;Lunar Bug Mission Sequence
Outlined,&quot; <cite>Aviation Week &amp; Space Technology,</cite> 22
July 1963, p. 161; House Committee on Science and Astronautics,
Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight, <cite>1965 NASA Authorization:
Hearings on H.R. 9641 (Superseded by H.R. 10456),</cite> 88th Cong., 2nd
sess., 1964, pp. 409, 442, and chart on crew activities; Donald E. Fink,
&quot;Apollo Chief, Co-pilot to Explore Moon,&quot; <cite>Aviation Week
&amp; Space Technology,</cite> 9 March 1964, pp. 22-23; Thomas G. Barnes
et al., Grumman, &quot;Apollo Mission Planning Task Force, Phase I
Progress Report,&quot; LED-540-7, 4 May 1964, 1, pp. 3-4, 4-21; 2, pp.
7-87, 7-88.<p>

<a name = "source18"><b>18</b>.</a> Joseph F. Shea, &quot;The Apollo
Program,&quot; speech given in July 1966, p. 27; George E. Mueller,
&quot;Apollo Program,&quot; No. 3 in series of lectures at the
University of Sydney, Australia, 10&ndash;11 Jan. 1967, p. III-21.<p>

<a name = "source19"><b>19</b>.</a> Leroy E. Day TWX to MSC, Attn.:
Mgr., ASPO, &quot;ALSEP Deployment Demonstration,&quot; 22 Aug. 1968;
MSC, &quot;Lunar Missions Review,&quot; 27 Aug. 1968.<p>

<a name = "source20"><b>20</b>.</a> TWX Phillips to MSC, Attn.: Gilruth,
&quot;Lunar Mission Planning,&quot; 29 Aug. 1968; MSC, &quot;Results of
33rd G Mission FOP Meeting&quot;; Gilruth to Phillips, &quot;Proposed
revisions to the first lunar landing mission plan,&quot; 6 Sept.
1968.<p>

<a name = "source21"><b>21</b>.</a> &quot;Results of 35th G Mission FOP
Meeting,&quot; enc., Phillips to OMSF Management Council, &quot;EVA
activities for the first Lunar Landing Mission,&quot; n.d.; A. E. Morse,
Jr., to Mgr., ASPO, &quot;KSC; Support for the: LM-5 Early Apollo
Scientific Payload (EASEP),&quot; 12 Nov. 1968; Phillips to Mueller,
&quot;Extravehicular Activities for the First Lunar Landing
Mission,&quot; 19 Oct. 1968.<p>

<a name = "source22"><b>22</b>.</a> Low to NASA Hq., Attn.: Phillips,
Lunar EVA capability, 14 Oct. 1968; MSC, &quot;Mission Review of the
First Lunar Extravehicular Activity,&quot; 1 Nov. 1968; Low memo,
&quot;Minutes of November 1, 1968, Monthly Mission Review (G Mission
EVA),&quot; 13 Nov. 1968; MSC, &quot;Results of 13th Lunar Surface
Operations Planning (LSOP) Meeting,&quot; 15 Nov. 1968; John H.
Covington, &quot;Reference EVA Procedures, Mission G (CM107/LM5),&quot;
20 Dec. 1968, pp. 3-22, 3-23, 3-24; John B. Lee memo, &quot;Mission G
timeline,&quot; 11 Feb. 1969, with enc.<p>

<a name = "source23"><b>23</b>.</a> Collins, <cite>Carrying the
Fire,</cite> p. 347; Robert Sherrod, &quot;Men for the Moon,&quot; in
Edgar M. Cortright, ed., <cite>Apollo Expeditions to the Moon,</cite>
NASA SP-350 (Washington, 1975), p. 160; Slayton and Raymond G. Zedekar,
telephone interviews, 18 March 1976; Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp.,
Space Div., &quot;Anatomy of the NASA Grumman Apollo Lunar Module,&quot;
in <cite>Apollo Spacecraft News Reference</cite> (Bethpage, N.Y., 1969);
MSC, &quot;Results of 15th LSOP Meeting,&quot; 14 Feb. 1969; L. J.
Riche, G. M. Colton, and T. A. Guillory, &quot;Apollo 11, Apollo
AS-506/CSM-107/LM-5, Preliminary Flight Plan,&quot; 15 April 1969, pp.
3-78, 3-79.<p>

<a name = "source24"><b>24</b>.</a> OMSF Weekly Report, 7 April 1969;
<cite>Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1969: Chronology on Science,
Technology, and Policy,</cite> NASA SP-4014 Washington, 1970, pp. 68,
100; MSC, &quot;Apollo Program History,&quot; briefing, 14 April 1969,
tape D-1; Low to Brian M. Duff, &quot;Press Inquiry,&quot; 27 June 1969,
as cited in Ertel and Newkirk, <cite>Apollo Chronology,</cite> 4.<p>

<a name = "source25"><b>25</b>.</a> Collins, <cite>Carrying the
Fire,</cite> pp. 327-28, 330; &quot;Armstrong Unhurt in Ejection from
Moon Lander Trainer,&quot; MSC <cite>Roundup,</cite> 10 May 1968;
Mueller TWX to MSC and Flight and Langley Research Centers, Attn.:
Gilruth, Paul F. Bikle, and Cortright, &quot;LLTV Flight Readiness
Review,&quot; 21 Nov. 1968; &quot;There Comes a Time When It's Better to
Go Than Stay,&quot; caption for photograph of LLTV crash on 8 Dec., MSC
<cite>Roundup,</cite> 20 Dec. 1968; Mueller memo for LLTV-1 Review
Board, &quot;Investigation and Review of Crash of Lunar Landing Training
Vehicle #1,&quot; 11 Dec. 1968; Mueller TWX to Langley, Flight Research,
and MSC, Attn.: Dirs., &quot;Lunar Landing Training Vehicle (LLTV)
Review Board,&quot; 16 Dec. 1968; NASA, &quot;Review Board
Reconvened,&quot; news release 69-5, 8 Jan. 1969; Mueller TWX to MSC,
Flight Research, and Langley, Attn.: Gilruth, Gene J. Matranga, William
H. Phillips, and James B. Whitten, &quot;Lunar Landing Training Vehicle
(LLTV),&quot; 13 Feb. 1969; Mueller to Gilruth, 19 Feb. 1969.<p>

<a name = "source26"><b>26</b>.</a> MSC, minutes, LLTV No. 2 Flight
Readiness Review Board (FRRB), signed by Gilruth, 1 April 1969; MSC news
release 69-24, 3 April 1969; &quot;Lunar Landing Trainer Resumes Test
Flight Program at Ellington,&quot; MSC <cite>Roundup,</cite> 18 April
1969; Mueller TWX to MSC, Attn.: Gilruth, 3 April 1969; Slayton memo,
&quot;Lunar Landing Training Vehicle (LLTV) aerodynamic
characteristics,&quot; 23 May 1969; Gilruth TWX to NASA Hq.: Attn.: Maj.
Gen. John D. Stevenson, 31 May 1969; Flight Crew Ops. Dir., Weekly
Activity Report, 7-13 June 1969; OMSF Weekly Report, 16 June 1969.<p>

<a name = "source27"><b>27</b>.</a> MSC Flight Ops. Dir., &quot;Flight
Operations Plan, Mission G-1,&quot; 21 March 1969, p. 2-5; Slayton to
Dir., Eng. and Dev. (E&amp;D), 18 March 1969, with encs., &quot;General
Test Requirements&quot; and &quot;Chamber Training Schedule&quot;;
Randolph H. Hester memo for record, &quot;LM EVA prep-exercise with
Armstrong and Aldrin - Apollo 11 team,&quot; 12 May 1969; Johnnie W.
Colburn memo for record, &quot;Adequacy of LM 5/6 Crew Training Thermal
Simulation,&quot; 26 May 1969.<p>

<a name = "source28"><b>28</b>.</a> Lee, minutes of EMU Design Review
Board Meetings, 10 and 24 Jan., 7 and 20 Feb., 28 March, and 25 April
1969; Robert E. Smylie to Asst. Dir., Chem. and Mech. Sys., &quot;EMU
thermal testing,&quot; 18 March 1969; Harley L. Stutesman to Crew Sys.
Div., Apollo Support Br. Sec. Heads, &quot;LM-5 prime crew EMU fit
check,&quot; 6 May 1969, and &quot;Operation comments resulting from EMU
lunar qual program,&quot; 8 April 1969, with enc.; Smylie to Mgr., ASPO,
&quot;Coating of EV gloves to improve grasping capabilities,&quot; 15
May 1969; Wilmot N. Hess to Mgr., ASPO, &quot;EVA gloves,&quot; 19 May
1969; Low to Hess, &quot;EVA gloves,&quot; 21 May 1969; Smylie to Mgr.,
ASPO, &quot;EVA gloves,&quot; 26 May 1969.<p>

<a name = "source29"><b>29</b>.</a> Hester memo for record,
&quot;Comments by crew during suiting and debriefing on the 8&prime;
[2.4-meter] chamber runs held in Building 7 between 3/27/69 and
4/7/69,&quot; 2 May 1969; Charles C. Lutz memo, &quot;EMU weight
summary,&quot; 21 May 1969, with enc.; C. E. Whitsett, Jr., &quot;Effect
of the Extravehicular Mobility Unit on Man's Center of Mass and
Inertias,&quot; 17 Feb. 1969.<p>

<a name = "source30"><b>30</b>.</a> Phillips to MSC, Attn.: Mgr., ASPO,
&quot;Initiation of a Program for the Measurement of Carbon Dioxide
Production during Lunar Exploration,&quot; 1 March 1969; Low to
Phillips, 5 May 1969, with enc., Faget to Mgr., ASPO, &quot;Study of the
Measurement of CO2 Production During Lunar Exploration,&quot; 25 April
1969, with enc., subj. as above.<p>

<a name = "source31"><b>31</b>.</a> Edwin Samfield to Eng. Div. Files,
&quot;Lunar Gravity Simulator Test Setup, Building 29,&quot; 6 Feb.
1969; Mueller to Gilruth, 14 Feb. 1969; Gilruth to Phillips, 14 March
1969, with enc., &quot;Lunar Gravity Simulation Program Plan&quot;;
Phillips to Gilruth, 28 March 1969; Aleck C. Bond to Dir., Flight Crew
Ops., &quot;1/6th G Simulator in Building 29,&quot; 25 April 1969;
Gilruth to Phillips, 20 May 1969; Bond to Dir., Flight Crew Ops.,
&quot;1/6th G vertical simulator in Building 29,&quot; 20 May 1969;
Slayton to Asst. Dir., Chem. and Mech. Sys., &quot;One-sixth G simulator
in Building 29,&quot; 29 May 1969.<p>

<a name = "source32"><b>32</b>.</a> Mueller to Gilruth, 10 Feb. 1969;
Gilruth to Mueller, 24 Feb. 1969; Mueller to Gilruth, 26 March 1969;
Phillips TWX to MSC, Attn.: Mgr., ASPO, &quot;Apollo 11 Lunar Surface
Activities Demonstration DCR,&quot; 8 April 1969; Richard S. Johnston
memo, &quot;NASA Committee on EVA,&quot; 10 April 1969, with enc.,
&quot;EVA Guideline&quot;; OMSF Weekly Report, 28 April 1969; Low memo
for record, &quot;Action items resulting from lunar surface
extravehicular activity demonstration,&quot; 24 April 1969; Phillips to
MSC, Attn.: Low, &quot;Comments on Lunar Surface EVA
Demonstration,&quot; 14 lay 1969; Low memo, &quot;Lunar surface EVA
demonstration,&quot; 2 June 1969; Low to NASA Hq., Attn.: Phillips,
&quot;Comments on lunar surface EVA demonstration,&quot; 9 July 1969;
Johnston to Capt. William W. Wood, &quot;Comments on Apollo Preliminary
Lunar Surface Operations Plan,&quot; 20 May 1969; John K. Holcomb to
North, &quot;Review of Apollo 11 Preliminary Lunar Surface Operations
Plan (LSOP),&quot; 28 May 1969; William H. Wood, Jr., &quot;Apollo 11
Lunar Surface Operations Plan: Final,&quot; 13 June 1969.<p>

<a name = "source33"><b>33</b>.</a> Low to Slayton, &quot;Mueller's
letter on lunar landing training,&quot; 17 March 1969, and &quot;Langley
nighttime simulations,&quot; 23 June 1969; Cortright to Gilruth, 27 June
1969; Phillips letter, &quot;Apollo 11 Lunar Surface Operations Design
Certification Review [DCR],&quot; 29 May 1969; NASA, &quot;Apollo 11
Launch July 16,&quot; news release, unnumbered, 12 June 1969; OMSF
Weekly Reports, 16 June and 7 July 1969.

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