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| 1 | +Git v2.30.6 Release Notes |
| 2 | +========================= |
| 3 | + |
| 4 | +This release addresses the security issues CVE-2022-39253 and |
| 5 | +CVE-2022-39260. |
| 6 | + |
| 7 | +Fixes since v2.30.5 |
| 8 | +------------------- |
| 9 | + |
| 10 | + * CVE-2022-39253: |
| 11 | + When relying on the `--local` clone optimization, Git dereferences |
| 12 | + symbolic links in the source repository before creating hardlinks |
| 13 | + (or copies) of the dereferenced link in the destination repository. |
| 14 | + This can lead to surprising behavior where arbitrary files are |
| 15 | + present in a repository's `$GIT_DIR` when cloning from a malicious |
| 16 | + repository. |
| 17 | + |
| 18 | + Git will no longer dereference symbolic links via the `--local` |
| 19 | + clone mechanism, and will instead refuse to clone repositories that |
| 20 | + have symbolic links present in the `$GIT_DIR/objects` directory. |
| 21 | + |
| 22 | + Additionally, the value of `protocol.file.allow` is changed to be |
| 23 | + "user" by default. |
| 24 | + |
| 25 | + * CVE-2022-39260: |
| 26 | + An overly-long command string given to `git shell` can result in |
| 27 | + overflow in `split_cmdline()`, leading to arbitrary heap writes and |
| 28 | + remote code execution when `git shell` is exposed and the directory |
| 29 | + `$HOME/git-shell-commands` exists. |
| 30 | + |
| 31 | + `git shell` is taught to refuse interactive commands that are |
| 32 | + longer than 4MiB in size. `split_cmdline()` is hardened to reject |
| 33 | + inputs larger than 2GiB. |
| 34 | + |
| 35 | +Credit for finding CVE-2022-39253 goes to Cory Snider of Mirantis. The |
| 36 | +fix was authored by Taylor Blau, with help from Johannes Schindelin. |
| 37 | + |
| 38 | +Credit for finding CVE-2022-39260 goes to Kevin Backhouse of GitHub. |
| 39 | +The fix was authored by Kevin Backhouse, Jeff King, and Taylor Blau. |
| 40 | + |
| 41 | + |
| 42 | +Jeff King (2): |
| 43 | + shell: add basic tests |
| 44 | + shell: limit size of interactive commands |
| 45 | + |
| 46 | +Kevin Backhouse (1): |
| 47 | + alias.c: reject too-long cmdline strings in split_cmdline() |
| 48 | + |
| 49 | +Taylor Blau (11): |
| 50 | + builtin/clone.c: disallow `--local` clones with symlinks |
| 51 | + t/lib-submodule-update.sh: allow local submodules |
| 52 | + t/t1NNN: allow local submodules |
| 53 | + t/2NNNN: allow local submodules |
| 54 | + t/t3NNN: allow local submodules |
| 55 | + t/t4NNN: allow local submodules |
| 56 | + t/t5NNN: allow local submodules |
| 57 | + t/t6NNN: allow local submodules |
| 58 | + t/t7NNN: allow local submodules |
| 59 | + t/t9NNN: allow local submodules |
| 60 | + transport: make `protocol.file.allow` be "user" by default |
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