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docs: remove docker-in-docker references
Co-authored-by: Mossaka <5447827+Mossaka@users.noreply.github.com>
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docs-site/src/content/docs/index.md

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@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ title: Agentic Workflow Firewall
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description: Network firewall for AI agents with domain whitelisting - control egress HTTP/HTTPS traffic using Squid proxy and Docker containers.
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---
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A network firewall designed specifically for AI agents and agentic workflows. Control which domains your AI agents can access while maintaining full filesystem access and Docker-in-Docker capabilities.
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A network firewall designed specifically for AI agents and agentic workflows. Control which domains your AI agents can access while maintaining full filesystem access in a containerized environment.
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:::tip[Part of GitHub Next]
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This project is part of GitHub Next's explorations of [Agentic Workflows](https://github.com/githubnext/gh-aw). Learn more on the [GitHub Next website](https://githubnext.com/projects/agentic-workflows/)! ✨
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**Key Capabilities:**
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- **Domain Allowlist & Blocklist**: Allow specific domains and block exceptions with wildcard pattern support
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- **URL Path Filtering**: Restrict access to specific URL paths with [SSL Bump](/gh-aw-firewall/reference/ssl-bump/)
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- **Docker-in-Docker Enforcement**: Spawned containers inherit firewall restrictions
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- **Host-Level Protection**: Uses iptables DOCKER-USER chain for defense-in-depth
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- **Zero Trust**: Block all traffic by default, allow only what you explicitly permit
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- **Full Auditability**: Comprehensive logging of all allowed and blocked traffic
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--prompt "Search arXiv for papers on AI safety"
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```
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### Docker-in-Docker
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Spawned containers automatically inherit firewall restrictions:
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```bash
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sudo awf \
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--allow-domains api.github.com,registry-1.docker.io,auth.docker.io \
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-- docker run --rm curlimages/curl -fsS https://api.github.com/zen
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```
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The spawned container's network traffic is also filtered through the firewall.
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## How It Works
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The firewall uses a containerized architecture with three security layers:
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│ ┌──────────────────────────────┐ │
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│ │ Copilot Container │ │
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│ │ • Full filesystem access │ │
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│ │ • Docker-in-Docker support │ │
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│ │ • iptables NAT redirection │ │
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│ └──────────┬───────────────────┘ │
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│ │ All HTTP/HTTPS │
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The firewall uses Docker's **DOCKER-USER iptables chain** to enforce rules at the host level. This means:
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- All containers on the firewall network are subject to filtering
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- Spawned containers cannot bypass the firewall
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- Protection works even with Docker-in-Docker
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- No container-level configuration needed
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### Comprehensive Logging

docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/ssl-bump.md

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- The session CA is injected only into the agent container's trust store
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- Host system trust stores are NOT modified
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- Spawned containers inherit the modified trust store
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- This means spawned containers can also have HTTPS traffic intercepted
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### Traffic Visibility
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