First owner-authorized runtime record captured on real BrowserPod

[yhay81]

Today Clawsembly captured its first owner-authorized runtime record on the real committed provider (browserpod@2.12.1, browser-local Node 22.15.0).

What ran end to end — browser-locally, behind the embedder-controlled boundary:

• exact-digest staging of the clawsembly-hello-agent@0.2.0 fixture (per-file SHA-256, integrity matched)
• dual readiness (ready log line + parseable session record) over the filesystem capability mailbox
• one hello.say round trip, then four capability-mediated chat turns across the default-deny boundary: denied before approval → completed after explicit approval → aborted in flight by the host → denied again after revocation
• payload-free audit (2 denied / 1 allowed) and a nonce-bound cooperative guest shutdown

The digest-bound evidence is committed at packages/hello-agent-binding/evidence/hello-agent-0.2.0.json and re-validated on every test run. The capture host is public at examples/hello-agent-evidence-host/ — with your own BrowserPod key you can reproduce the record.

Boundary of the claim: this is the hello-agent reference binding, not a real agent. OpenClaw's verified boot remains blocked by two vendor gaps (guest Node 22.15.0 vs. the stable release's engines range, and the missing node:sqlite binding, #47) — both reported upstream. Every OpenClaw report stays probing until owner-authorized runtime evidence exists for the exact artifact.

What this unblocks next:

• performance baselines on the real provider — cold/warm install, persistent reuse (#8)
• the first external consumer of the promotion-policy endpoint (#9, good first issue)

If you're embedding an upstream agent and want a host boundary you control, the SDK host starter is the copy-ready entry point. Questions and skepticism both welcome here.