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| 1 | +# XSTRP — External Review Overview (Phase C1) |
| 2 | + |
| 3 | +## Purpose of This Review |
| 4 | + |
| 5 | +XSTRP (XRP Safe Transfer & Recovery Protocol) Phase C1 defines a **minimal, frozen protocol core** |
| 6 | +for safe, recoverable asset transfers under adversarial conditions. |
| 7 | + |
| 8 | +This review seeks feedback on: |
| 9 | +- Logical correctness |
| 10 | +- State machine safety |
| 11 | +- Failure handling |
| 12 | +- Protocol invariants |
| 13 | +- Threat model alignment |
| 14 | + |
| 15 | +This review does NOT seek feedback on: |
| 16 | +- Cryptographic primitives |
| 17 | +- XRPL integration |
| 18 | +- Performance |
| 19 | +- UX |
| 20 | +- Production readiness |
| 21 | + |
| 22 | +Phase C1 is intentionally minimal and frozen. |
| 23 | + |
| 24 | +--- |
| 25 | + |
| 26 | +## What Is XSTRP (In One Paragraph) |
| 27 | + |
| 28 | +XSTRP defines a transfer protocol in which funds cannot be irreversibly lost due to receiver |
| 29 | +inaction, malformed proofs, or adversarial interference. Transfers proceed through an explicit |
| 30 | +state machine and complete only upon valid receiver participation. All failure modes resolve |
| 31 | +to deterministic recovery. |
| 32 | + |
| 33 | +--- |
| 34 | + |
| 35 | +## Frozen Scope (Phase C1) |
| 36 | + |
| 37 | +The following components are FINAL and immutable: |
| 38 | + |
| 39 | +- RFC-XSTRP-0001 (v1.0) |
| 40 | +- TransferIntent data model |
| 41 | +- State machine and transitions |
| 42 | +- CompletionProof v1 semantics |
| 43 | +- Proof validation enforcement |
| 44 | +- Optional IntentBinding metadata (non-enforced) |
| 45 | +- Serialization guarantees |
| 46 | + |
| 47 | +No cryptography or ledger integration exists in Phase C1. |
| 48 | + |
| 49 | +--- |
| 50 | + |
| 51 | +## Threat Model Assumptions |
| 52 | + |
| 53 | +XSTRP assumes: |
| 54 | +- An adversarial environment |
| 55 | +- No trusted intermediaries |
| 56 | +- No trusted transport |
| 57 | +- No trusted counterparty |
| 58 | +- Correctness of the underlying ledger (out of scope) |
| 59 | + |
| 60 | +Threats and guarantees are defined in `THREAT-MODEL.md`. |
| 61 | + |
| 62 | +--- |
| 63 | + |
| 64 | +## Reviewer Guidance |
| 65 | + |
| 66 | +Reviewers are encouraged to focus on: |
| 67 | +- Whether any state allows permanent fund loss |
| 68 | +- Whether invalid or malicious actions can force completion |
| 69 | +- Whether recovery paths are sound and unambiguous |
| 70 | +- Whether the protocol violates its own stated guarantees |
| 71 | + |
| 72 | +Suggested questions: |
| 73 | +- Can funds become stranded? |
| 74 | +- Can completion occur without receiver intent? |
| 75 | +- Can sender intent be altered post-creation? |
| 76 | +- Are failure modes exhaustive? |
| 77 | + |
| 78 | +--- |
| 79 | + |
| 80 | +## Review Boundary |
| 81 | + |
| 82 | +This review applies strictly to Phase C1 as frozen at: |
| 83 | + |
| 84 | +**Release:** `v1.0.0-core` |
| 85 | + |
| 86 | +Any findings should reference this boundary explicitly. |
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