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Add external review overview for Phase C1
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REVIEW-OVERVIEW.md

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# XSTRP — External Review Overview (Phase C1)
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## Purpose of This Review
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XSTRP (XRP Safe Transfer & Recovery Protocol) Phase C1 defines a **minimal, frozen protocol core**
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for safe, recoverable asset transfers under adversarial conditions.
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This review seeks feedback on:
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- Logical correctness
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- State machine safety
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- Failure handling
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- Protocol invariants
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- Threat model alignment
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This review does NOT seek feedback on:
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- Cryptographic primitives
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- XRPL integration
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- Performance
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- UX
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- Production readiness
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Phase C1 is intentionally minimal and frozen.
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---
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## What Is XSTRP (In One Paragraph)
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XSTRP defines a transfer protocol in which funds cannot be irreversibly lost due to receiver
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inaction, malformed proofs, or adversarial interference. Transfers proceed through an explicit
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state machine and complete only upon valid receiver participation. All failure modes resolve
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to deterministic recovery.
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---
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## Frozen Scope (Phase C1)
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The following components are FINAL and immutable:
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- RFC-XSTRP-0001 (v1.0)
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- TransferIntent data model
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- State machine and transitions
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- CompletionProof v1 semantics
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- Proof validation enforcement
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- Optional IntentBinding metadata (non-enforced)
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- Serialization guarantees
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No cryptography or ledger integration exists in Phase C1.
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---
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## Threat Model Assumptions
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XSTRP assumes:
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- An adversarial environment
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- No trusted intermediaries
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- No trusted transport
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- No trusted counterparty
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- Correctness of the underlying ledger (out of scope)
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Threats and guarantees are defined in `THREAT-MODEL.md`.
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---
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## Reviewer Guidance
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Reviewers are encouraged to focus on:
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- Whether any state allows permanent fund loss
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- Whether invalid or malicious actions can force completion
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- Whether recovery paths are sound and unambiguous
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- Whether the protocol violates its own stated guarantees
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Suggested questions:
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- Can funds become stranded?
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- Can completion occur without receiver intent?
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- Can sender intent be altered post-creation?
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- Are failure modes exhaustive?
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---
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## Review Boundary
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This review applies strictly to Phase C1 as frozen at:
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**Release:** `v1.0.0-core`
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Any findings should reference this boundary explicitly.

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