Identity-Events/draft-ietf-secevent-http-poll.html at master · independentid/Identity-Events · GitHub

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  <link href="#rfc.toc" rel="Contents">
<link href="#rfc.section.1" rel="Chapter" title="1 Introduction and Overview">
<link href="#rfc.section.1.1" rel="Chapter" title="1.1 Notational Conventions">
<link href="#rfc.section.1.2" rel="Chapter" title="1.2 Definitions">
<link href="#rfc.section.2" rel="Chapter" title="2 SET Delivery">
<link href="#rfc.section.2.1" rel="Chapter" title="2.1 Polling Delivery using HTTP">
<link href="#rfc.section.2.2" rel="Chapter" title="2.2 Polling HTTP Request">
<link href="#rfc.section.2.3" rel="Chapter" title="2.3 Polling HTTP Response">
<link href="#rfc.section.2.4" rel="Chapter" title="2.4 Poll Request">
<link href="#rfc.section.2.4.1" rel="Chapter" title="2.4.1 Poll-Only Request">
<link href="#rfc.section.2.4.2" rel="Chapter" title="2.4.2 Acknowledge-Only Request">
<link href="#rfc.section.2.4.3" rel="Chapter" title="2.4.3 Poll with Acknowledgement">
<link href="#rfc.section.2.4.4" rel="Chapter" title="2.4.4 Poll with Acknowledgement and Errors">
<link href="#rfc.section.2.5" rel="Chapter" title="2.5 Poll Response">
<link href="#rfc.section.2.5.1" rel="Chapter" title="2.5.1 Poll Error Response">
<link href="#rfc.section.2.6" rel="Chapter" title="2.6 Error Response Handling">
<link href="#rfc.section.3" rel="Chapter" title="3 Authentication and Authorization">
<link href="#rfc.section.4" rel="Chapter" title="4 Security Considerations">
<link href="#rfc.section.4.1" rel="Chapter" title="4.1 Authentication Using Signed SETs">
<link href="#rfc.section.4.2" rel="Chapter" title="4.2 HTTP Considerations">
<link href="#rfc.section.4.3" rel="Chapter" title="4.3 Confidentiality of SETs">
<link href="#rfc.section.4.4" rel="Chapter" title="4.4 Access Token Considerations">
<link href="#rfc.section.4.4.1" rel="Chapter" title="4.4.1 Bearer Token Considerations">
<link href="#rfc.section.5" rel="Chapter" title="5 Privacy Considerations">
<link href="#rfc.section.6" rel="Chapter" title="6 IANA Considerations">
<link href="#rfc.references" rel="Chapter" title="7 References">
<link href="#rfc.references.1" rel="Chapter" title="7.1 Normative References">
<link href="#rfc.references.2" rel="Chapter" title="7.2 Informative References">
<link href="#rfc.appendix.A" rel="Chapter" title="A Unencrypted Transport Considerations">
<link href="#rfc.appendix.B" rel="Chapter" title="B Other Streaming Specifications">
<link href="#rfc.appendix.C" rel="Chapter" title="C Acknowledgments">
<link href="#rfc.appendix.D" rel="Chapter" title="D Change Log">
<link href="#rfc.authors" rel="Chapter">


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  <meta name="dct.creator" content="Backman, A., Ed., Jones, M., Ed., Scurtescu, M., Ansari, M., and A. Nadalin" />
  <meta name="dct.identifier" content="urn:ietf:id:draft-ietf-secevent-http-poll-12" />
  <meta name="dct.issued" scheme="ISO8601" content="2020-06-24" />
  <meta name="dct.abstract" content="This specification defines how a series of Security Event Tokens (SETs) can be delivered to an intended recipient using HTTP POST over TLS initiated as a poll by the recipient. The specification also defines how delivery can be assured, subject to the SET Recipient's need for assurance.   " />
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</head>

<body>

  <table class="header">
    <tbody>

    	<tr>
<td class="left">Security Events Working Group</td>
<td class="right">A. Backman, Ed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="left">Internet-Draft</td>
<td class="right">Amazon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="left">Intended status: Standards Track</td>
<td class="right">M. Jones, Ed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="left">Expires: December 26, 2020</td>
<td class="right">Microsoft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="left"></td>
<td class="right">M. Scurtescu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="left"></td>
<td class="right">Coinbase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="left"></td>
<td class="right">M. Ansari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="left"></td>
<td class="right">Cisco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="left"></td>
<td class="right">A. Nadalin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="left"></td>
<td class="right">Microsoft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="left"></td>
<td class="right">June 24, 2020</td>
</tr>


    </tbody>
  </table>

  <p class="title">Poll-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Using HTTP<br />
  <span class="filename">draft-ietf-secevent-http-poll-12</span></p>

  <h1 id="rfc.abstract"><a href="#rfc.abstract">Abstract</a></h1>
<p>This specification defines how a series of Security Event Tokens (SETs) can be delivered to an intended recipient using HTTP POST over TLS initiated as a poll by the recipient. The specification also defines how delivery can be assured, subject to the SET Recipient's need for assurance.  </p>
<h1 id="rfc.status"><a href="#rfc.status">Status of This Memo</a></h1>
<p>This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.</p>
<p>Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.</p>
<p>Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."</p>
<p>This Internet-Draft will expire on December 26, 2020.</p>
<h1 id="rfc.copyrightnotice"><a href="#rfc.copyrightnotice">Copyright Notice</a></h1>
<p>Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors.  All rights reserved.</p>
<p>This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.  Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.</p>


  <hr class="noprint" />
  <h1 class="np" id="rfc.toc"><a href="#rfc.toc">Table of Contents</a></h1>
  <ul class="toc">

  	<li>1.   <a href="#rfc.section.1">Introduction and Overview</a>
</li>
<ul><li>1.1.   <a href="#rfc.section.1.1">Notational Conventions</a>
</li>
<li>1.2.   <a href="#rfc.section.1.2">Definitions</a>
</li>
</ul><li>2.   <a href="#rfc.section.2">SET Delivery</a>
</li>
<ul><li>2.1.   <a href="#rfc.section.2.1">Polling Delivery using HTTP</a>
</li>
<li>2.2.   <a href="#rfc.section.2.2">Polling HTTP Request</a>
</li>
<li>2.3.   <a href="#rfc.section.2.3">Polling HTTP Response</a>
</li>
<li>2.4.   <a href="#rfc.section.2.4">Poll Request</a>
</li>
<ul><li>2.4.1.   <a href="#rfc.section.2.4.1">Poll-Only Request</a>
</li>
<li>2.4.2.   <a href="#rfc.section.2.4.2">Acknowledge-Only Request</a>
</li>
<li>2.4.3.   <a href="#rfc.section.2.4.3">Poll with Acknowledgement</a>
</li>
<li>2.4.4.   <a href="#rfc.section.2.4.4">Poll with Acknowledgement and Errors</a>
</li>
</ul><li>2.5.   <a href="#rfc.section.2.5">Poll Response</a>
</li>
<ul><li>2.5.1.   <a href="#rfc.section.2.5.1">Poll Error Response</a>
</li>
</ul><li>2.6.   <a href="#rfc.section.2.6">Error Response Handling</a>
</li>
</ul><li>3.   <a href="#rfc.section.3">Authentication and Authorization</a>
</li>
<li>4.   <a href="#rfc.section.4">Security Considerations</a>
</li>
<ul><li>4.1.   <a href="#rfc.section.4.1">Authentication Using Signed SETs</a>
</li>
<li>4.2.   <a href="#rfc.section.4.2">HTTP Considerations</a>
</li>
<li>4.3.   <a href="#rfc.section.4.3">Confidentiality of SETs</a>
</li>
<li>4.4.   <a href="#rfc.section.4.4">Access Token Considerations</a>
</li>
<ul><li>4.4.1.   <a href="#rfc.section.4.4.1">Bearer Token Considerations</a>
</li>
</ul></ul><li>5.   <a href="#rfc.section.5">Privacy Considerations</a>
</li>
<li>6.   <a href="#rfc.section.6">IANA Considerations</a>
</li>
<li>7.   <a href="#rfc.references">References</a>
</li>
<ul><li>7.1.   <a href="#rfc.references.1">Normative References</a>
</li>
<li>7.2.   <a href="#rfc.references.2">Informative References</a>
</li>
</ul><li>Appendix A.   <a href="#rfc.appendix.A">Unencrypted Transport Considerations</a>
</li>
<li>Appendix B.   <a href="#rfc.appendix.B">Other Streaming Specifications</a>
</li>
<li>Appendix C.   <a href="#rfc.appendix.C">Acknowledgments</a>
</li>
<li>Appendix D.   <a href="#rfc.appendix.D">Change Log</a>
</li>
<li><a href="#rfc.authors">Authors' Addresses</a>
</li>


  </ul>

  <h1 id="rfc.section.1">
<a href="#rfc.section.1">1.</a> <a href="#intro" id="intro">Introduction and Overview</a>
</h1>
<p id="rfc.section.1.p.1">This specification defines how a stream of Security Event Tokens (SETs) <a href="#RFC8417" class="xref">[RFC8417]</a> can be transmitted to an intended SET Recipient using HTTP <a href="#RFC7231" class="xref">[RFC7231]</a> over TLS. The specification defines a method to poll for SETs using HTTP POST.  This is an alternative SET delivery method to the one defined in <a href="#I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push" class="xref">[I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push]</a>.  </p>
<p id="rfc.section.1.p.2">Poll-based SET delivery is intended for scenarios where all of the following apply: </p>

<ul>
<li>The recipient of the SET is capable of making outbound HTTP requests.</li>
<li>The transmitter is capable of hosting a TLS-enabled HTTP endpoint that is accessible to the recipient.  </li>
<li>The transmitter and recipient are willing to exchange data with one another.  </li>
</ul>

<p> In some scenarios, either push-based or poll-based delivery could be used, and in others, only one of them would be applicable.  </p>
<p id="rfc.section.1.p.3">A mechanism for exchanging configuration metadata such as endpoint URLs, cryptographic keys, and possible implementation constraints such as buffer size limitations between the transmitter and recipient is out of scope for this specification.  How SETs are defined and the process by which security events are identified for SET Recipients are specified in <a href="#RFC8417" class="xref">[RFC8417]</a>.  </p>
<h1 id="rfc.section.1.1">
<a href="#rfc.section.1.1">1.1.</a> <a href="#notat" id="notat">Notational Conventions</a>
</h1>
<p id="rfc.section.1.1.p.1">The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 <a href="#RFC2119" class="xref">[RFC2119]</a> <a href="#RFC8174" class="xref">[RFC8174]</a> when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.  </p>
<p id="rfc.section.1.1.p.2">Throughout this document, all figures may contain spaces and extra line wrapping for readability and due to space limitations.  </p>
<h1 id="rfc.section.1.2">
<a href="#rfc.section.1.2">1.2.</a> <a href="#defs" id="defs">Definitions</a>
</h1>
<p id="rfc.section.1.2.p.1">This specification utilizes terminology defined in <a href="#RFC8417" class="xref">[RFC8417]</a> and <a href="#I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push" class="xref">[I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push]</a>.  </p>
<h1 id="rfc.section.2">
<a href="#rfc.section.2">2.</a> <a href="#Delivery" id="Delivery">SET Delivery</a>
</h1>
<p id="rfc.section.2.p.1">When a SET is available for a SET Recipient, the SET Transmitter queues the SET in a buffer so that a SET Recipient can poll for SETs using HTTP POST.  </p>
<p id="rfc.section.2.p.2">In poll-based SET delivery using HTTP over TLS, zero or more SETs are delivered in a JSON <a href="#RFC8259" class="xref">[RFC8259]</a> document to a SET Recipient in response to an HTTP POST request to the SET Transmitter. Then in a following request, the SET Recipient acknowledges received SETs and can poll for more.  All requests and responses are JSON documents and use a <samp>Content-Type</samp> of <samp>application/json</samp>, as described in <a href="#httpPoll" class="xref">Section 2.1</a>.  </p>
<p id="rfc.section.2.p.3">After successful (acknowledged) SET delivery, SET Transmitters are not required to retain or record SETs for retransmission. Once a SET is acknowledged, the SET Recipient SHALL be responsible for retention, if needed.  Transmitters may also discard undelivered SETs under deployment-specific conditions, such as if they have not been polled for over too long a period of time or if an excessive amount of storage is needed to retain them.  </p>
<p id="rfc.section.2.p.4">Upon receiving a SET, the SET Recipient reads the SET and validates it in the manner described in Section 2 of <a href="#I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push" class="xref">[I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push]</a>.  The SET Recipient MUST acknowledge receipt to the SET Transmitter, and SHOULD do so in a timely fashion, as described in <a href="#pollRequest" class="xref">Section 2.4</a>.  The SET Recipient SHALL NOT use the event acknowledgement mechanism to report event errors other than those relating to the parsing and validation of the SET.  </p>
<h1 id="rfc.section.2.1">
<a href="#rfc.section.2.1">2.1.</a> <a href="#httpPoll" id="httpPoll">Polling Delivery using HTTP</a>
</h1>
<p id="rfc.section.2.1.p.1">This method allows a SET Recipient to use HTTP POST (Section 4.3.3 of <a href="#RFC7231" class="xref">[RFC7231]</a>) to acknowledge SETs and to check for and receive zero or more SETs. Requests MAY be made at a periodic interval (short polling) or requests MAY wait, pending availability of new SETs using long polling, per Section 2 of <a href="#RFC6202" class="xref">[RFC6202]</a>.  Note that short polling will result in retrieving zero or more SETs whereas long polling will typically result in retrieving one or more SETs unless a timeout occurs.  </p>
<p id="rfc.section.2.1.p.2">The delivery of SETs in this method is facilitated by HTTP POST requests initiated by the SET Recipient in which:</p>

<ul>
<li>The SET Recipient makes a request for available SETs using an HTTP POST to a pre-arranged endpoint provided by the SET Transmitter or,</li>
<li>after validating previously received SETs, the SET Recipient initiates another poll request using HTTP POST that includes acknowledgement of previous SETs and requests the next batch of SETs.</li>
</ul>
<p id="rfc.section.2.1.p.3">The purpose of the acknowledgement is to inform the SET Transmitter that delivery has succeeded and redelivery is no longer required.  Before acknowledgement, SET Recipients validate the received SETs and retain them in a manner appropriate to the recipient's requirements. The level and method of retention of SETs by SET Recipients is out of scope of this specification.</p>
<h1 id="rfc.section.2.2">
<a href="#rfc.section.2.2">2.2.</a> <a href="#pollReq" id="pollReq">Polling HTTP Request</a>
</h1>
<p id="rfc.section.2.2.p.1">When initiating a poll request, the SET Recipient constructs a JSON document that consists of polling request parameters and SET acknowledgement parameters in the form of JSON objects.  </p>
<p id="rfc.section.2.2.p.2">When making a request, the HTTP <samp>Content-Type</samp> header field is set to <samp>application/json</samp>.</p>
<p id="rfc.section.2.2.p.3">The following JSON object members are used in a polling request: </p>

<dl>
<dt>Request Processing Parameters</dt>
<dd style="margin-left: 8"><dl>
<dt>maxEvents</dt>
<dd style="margin-left: 8">
<br>An OPTIONAL integer value indicating the maximum number of unacknowledged SETs to be returned.  The SET Transmitter SHOULD NOT send more SETs than the specified maximum.  If more than the maximum number of SETs are available, the SET Transmitter determines which to return first; the oldest SETs available MAY returned first, or another selection algorithm MAY be used, such as prioritizing SETs in some manner that makes sense for the use case.  first. A value of <samp>0</samp> MAY be used by SET Recipients that would like to perform an acknowledge-only request. This enables the Recipient to use separate HTTP requests for acknowledgement and reception of SETs.  If this parameter is omitted, no limit is placed on the number of SETs to be returned.  </dd>
<dt>returnImmediately</dt>
<dd style="margin-left: 8">
<br>An OPTIONAL JSON boolean value that indicates the SET Transmitter SHOULD return an immediate response even if no results are available (short polling). The default value is <samp>false</samp>, which indicates the request is to be treated as an HTTP Long Poll, per Section 2 of <a href="#RFC6202" class="xref">[RFC6202]</a>. The timeout for the request is part of the configuration between the participants, which is out of scope of this specification.</dd>
</dl></dd>
<dt>SET Acknowledgment Parameters</dt>
<dd style="margin-left: 8"><dl>
<dt>ack</dt>
<dd style="margin-left: 8">
<br> A JSON array of strings whose values are the <samp>jti</samp> <a href="#RFC7519" class="xref">[RFC7519]</a> values of successfully received SETs that are being acknowledged.  If there are no outstanding SETs to acknowledge, this member is omitted or contains an empty array.  Once a SET has been acknowledged, the SET Transmitter is released from any obligation to retain the SET.  </dd>
<dt>setErrs</dt>
<dd style="margin-left: 8">
<br> A JSON object with one or more members whose keys are the <samp>jti</samp> values of invalid SETs received.  The values of these objects are themselves JSON objects that describe the errors detected using the <samp>err</samp> and <samp>description</samp> values specified in <a href="#errorResponse" class="xref">Section 2.6</a>.  If there are no outstanding SETs with errors to report, this member is omitted or contains an empty JSON object.  </dd>
</dl></dd>
</dl>

<p> </p>
<h1 id="rfc.section.2.3">
<a href="#rfc.section.2.3">2.3.</a> <a href="#pollResp" id="pollResp">Polling HTTP Response</a>
</h1>
<p id="rfc.section.2.3.p.1">In response to a poll request, the SET Transmitter checks for available SETs and responds with a JSON document containing the following JSON object members: </p>

<dl>
<dt>sets</dt>
<dd style="margin-left: 8">
<br>A JSON object containing zero or more SETs being returned.  Each member name is the <samp>jti</samp> of a SET to be delivered and its value is a JSON string representing the corresponding SET. If there are no outstanding SETs to be transmitted, the JSON object SHALL be empty.  Note that both SETs being transmitted for the first time and SETs that are being re-transmitted after not having been acknowledged are communicated here.  </dd>
<dt>moreAvailable</dt>
<dd style="margin-left: 8">
<br>A JSON boolean value that indicates if more unacknowledged SETs are available to be returned.  This member MAY be omitted, with the meaning being the same as including it with the boolean value <samp>false</samp>.  </dd>
</dl>

<p> </p>
<p id="rfc.section.2.3.p.2">When making a response, the HTTP <samp>Content-Type</samp> header field is set to <samp>application/json</samp>.</p>
<h1 id="rfc.section.2.4">
<a href="#rfc.section.2.4">2.4.</a> <a href="#pollRequest" id="pollRequest">Poll Request</a>
</h1>
<p id="rfc.section.2.4.p.1">The SET Recipient performs an HTTP POST (see Section 4.3.4 of <a href="#RFC7231" class="xref">[RFC7231]</a>) to a pre-arranged polling endpoint URI to check for SETs that are available.  Because the SET Recipient has no prior SETs to acknowledge, the <samp>ack</samp> and <samp>setErrs</samp> request parameters are omitted.</p>
<p id="rfc.section.2.4.p.2">After a period of time configured in an out-of-band manner between the SET Transmitter and Recipient, a SET Transmitter MAY redeliver SETs it has previously delivered. The SET Recipient SHOULD accept repeat SETs and acknowledge the SETs regardless of whether the Recipient believes it has already acknowledged the SETs previously.  A SET Transmitter MAY limit the number of times it attempts to deliver a SET.  </p>
<p id="rfc.section.2.4.p.3">If the SET Recipient has received SETs from the SET Transmitter, the SET Recipient parses and validates that received SETs meet its own requirements and SHOULD acknowledge receipt in a timely fashion (e.g., seconds or minutes) so that the SET Transmitter can mark the SETs as received. SET Recipients SHOULD acknowledge receipt before taking any local actions based on the SETs to avoid unnecessary delay in acknowledgement, where possible.</p>
<p id="rfc.section.2.4.p.4">Poll requests have three variations: </p>

<dl>
<dt>Poll-Only</dt>
<dd style="margin-left: 8">
<br>In which a SET Recipient asks for the next set of events where no previous SET deliveries are acknowledged (such as in the initial poll request).</dd>
<dt>Acknowledge-Only</dt>
<dd style="margin-left: 8">
<br>In which a SET Recipient sets the <samp>maxEvents</samp> value to <samp>0</samp> along with <samp>ack</samp> and <samp>setErrs</samp> members indicating the SET Recipient is acknowledging previously received SETs and does not want to receive any new SETs in response to the request. </dd>
<dt>Combined Acknowledge and Poll</dt>
<dd style="margin-left: 8">
<br>In which a SET Recipient is both acknowledging previously received SETs using the <samp>ack</samp> and <samp>setErrs</samp> members and will wait for the next group of SETs in the SET Transmitters response.</dd>
</dl>
<h1 id="rfc.section.2.4.1">
<a href="#rfc.section.2.4.1">2.4.1.</a> <a href="#PollOnlyRequest" id="PollOnlyRequest">Poll-Only Request</a>
</h1>
<p id="rfc.section.2.4.1.p.1">In the case where no SETs were received in a previous poll (see <a href="#emptyPollResponse" class="xref">Figure 7</a>), the SET Recipient simply polls without acknowledgement parameters (<samp>ack</samp> and <samp>setErrs</samp>).</p>
<div id="rfc.figure.1"></div>
<div id="pollInitRequest"></div>
<p>The following is a non-normative example request made by a SET Recipient that has no outstanding SETs to acknowledge and is polling for available SETs at the endpoint <samp>https://notify.idp.example.com/Events</samp>: </p>
<pre>
  POST /Events HTTP/1.1
  Host: notify.idp.example.com
  Content-Type: application/json

  {
   "returnImmediately": true
  }
</pre>
<p class="figure">Figure 1: Example Initial Poll Request</p>
<p id="rfc.section.2.4.1.p.2">A SET Recipient can poll using default parameter values by passing an empty JSON object.</p>
<div id="rfc.figure.2"></div>
<div id="pollDefaultRequest"></div>
<p>The following is a non-normative example default poll request to the endpoint <samp>https://notify.idp.example.com/Events</samp>:</p>
<pre>
  POST /Events HTTP/1.1
  Host: notify.idp.example.com
  Content-Type: application/json

  {}
</pre>
<p class="figure">Figure 2: Example Default Poll Request</p>
<h1 id="rfc.section.2.4.2">
<a href="#rfc.section.2.4.2">2.4.2.</a> <a href="#AckOnlyRequest" id="AckOnlyRequest">Acknowledge-Only Request</a>
</h1>
<p id="rfc.section.2.4.2.p.1">In this variation, the SET Recipient acknowledges previously received SETs and indicates it does not want to receive SETs in response by setting the <samp>maxEvents</samp> value to <samp>0</samp>.  This variation might be used, for instance, when a SET Recipient needs to acknowledge received SETs independently (e.g., on separate threads) from the process of receiving SETs.  </p>
<p id="rfc.section.2.4.2.p.2">If the poll needs to return immediately, then <samp>returnImmediately</samp> MUST also be present with the value <samp>true</samp>.  If it is <samp>false</samp>, then a long poll will still occur until an event is ready to be returned, even though no events will be returned.  </p>
<div id="rfc.figure.3"></div>
<div id="pollAckOnly"></div>
<p>The following is a non-normative example poll request with acknowledgement of SETs received (for example as shown in <a href="#pollResponse" class="xref">Figure 6</a>):</p>
<pre>
  POST /Events HTTP/1.1
  Host: notify.idp.example.com
  Content-Type: application/json

  {
    "ack": [
      "4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8",
      "3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30"
    ],
    "maxEvents": 0,
    "returnImmediately": true
  }
</pre>
<p class="figure">Figure 3: Example Acknowledge-Only Request</p>
<h1 id="rfc.section.2.4.3">
<a href="#rfc.section.2.4.3">2.4.3.</a> <a href="#pollAck" id="pollAck">Poll with Acknowledgement</a>
</h1>
<p id="rfc.section.2.4.3.p.1">This variation allows a recipient thread to simultaneously acknowledge previously received SETs and wait for the next group of SETs in a single request.</p>
<div id="rfc.figure.4"></div>
<div id="pollGoodResponse"></div>
<p>The following is a non-normative example poll with acknowledgement of the SETs received in <a href="#pollResponse" class="xref">Figure 6</a>:</p>
<pre>
  POST /Events HTTP/1.1
  Host: notify.idp.example.com
  Content-Type: application/json

  {
    "ack": [
      "4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8",
      "3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30"
    ],
    "returnImmediately": false
  }
</pre>
<p class="figure">Figure 4: Example Poll with Acknowledgement and No Errors</p>
<p id="rfc.section.2.4.3.p.2">In the above acknowledgement, the SET Recipient has acknowledged receipt of two SETs and has indicated it wants to wait until the next SET is available.</p>
<h1 id="rfc.section.2.4.4">
<a href="#rfc.section.2.4.4">2.4.4.</a> <a href="#pollAckErr" id="pollAckErr">Poll with Acknowledgement and Errors</a>
</h1>
<p id="rfc.section.2.4.4.p.1">In the case where errors were detected in previously delivered SETs, the SET Recipient MAY use the <samp>setErrs</samp> member to communicate the errors in the following poll request.  </p>
<div id="rfc.figure.5"></div>
<div id="pollErrorResponse"></div>
<p>The following is a non-normative example of a response acknowledging one successfully received SET and one SET with an error from the two SETs received in <a href="#pollResponse" class="xref">Figure 6</a>:</p>
<pre>
  POST /Events HTTP/1.1
  Host: notify.idp.example.com
  Content-Language: en-US
  Content-Type: application/json

  {
    "ack": ["3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30"],
    "setErrs": {
      "4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8": {
	"err": "authentication_failed",
	"description": "The SET could not be authenticated"
      }
    },
    "returnImmediately": true
  }
</pre>
<p class="figure">Figure 5: Example Poll Acknowledgement with Error</p>
<h1 id="rfc.section.2.5">
<a href="#rfc.section.2.5">2.5.</a> <a href="#pollGetAck" id="pollGetAck">Poll Response</a>
</h1>
<p id="rfc.section.2.5.p.1">In response to a valid poll request, the service provider MAY respond immediately if SETs are available to be delivered.  If no SETs are available at the time of the request, the SET Transmitter SHALL delay responding until a SET is available or the timeout interval has elapsed unless the poll request parameter <samp>returnImmediately</samp> is present with the value <samp>true</samp>.  </p>
<p id="rfc.section.2.5.p.2">As described in <a href="#pollResp" class="xref">Section 2.3</a>, a JSON document is returned containing members including <samp>sets</samp>, which SHALL contain zero or more SETs.</p>
<div id="rfc.figure.6"></div>
<div id="pollResponse"></div>
<p>The following is a non-normative example response to the request shown in <a href="#pollRequest" class="xref">Section 2.4</a>. This example shows two SETs being returned:</p>
<pre>
  HTTP/1.1 200 OK
  Content-Type: application/json

  {
  "sets": {
    "4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8":
     "eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0.
     eyJqdGkiOiI0ZDM1NTllYzY3NTA0YWFiYTY1ZDQwYjAzNjNmYWFkOCIsImlhdCI6MTQ
     1ODQ5NjQwNCwiaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwiYXVkIjpbIm
     h0dHBzOi8vc2NpbS5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9GZWVkcy85OGQ1MjQ2MWZhNWJiYzg3OTU5M
     2I3NzU0IiwiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tL0ZlZWRzLzVkNzYwNDUxNmIx
     ZDA4NjQxZDc2NzZlZTciXSwiZXZlbnRzIjp7InVybjppZXRmOnBhcmFtczpzY2ltOmV
     2ZW50OmNyZWF0ZSI6eyJyZWYiOiJodHRwczovL3NjaW0uZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vVXNlcn
     MvNDRmNjE0MmRmOTZiZDZhYjYxZTc1MjFkOSIsImF0dHJpYnV0ZXMiOlsiaWQiLCJuY
     W1lIiwidXNlck5hbWUiLCJwYXNzd29yZCIsImVtYWlscyJdfX19.",
    "3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30":
     "eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0.
     eyJqdGkiOiIzZDBjM2NmNzk3NTg0YmQxOTNiZDBmYjFiZDRlN2QzMCIsImlhdCI6MTQ
     1ODQ5NjAyNSwiaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwiYXVkIjpbIm
     h0dHBzOi8vamh1Yi5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9GZWVkcy85OGQ1MjQ2MWZhNWJiYzg3OTU5M
     2I3NzU0IiwiaHR0cHM6Ly9qaHViLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tL0ZlZWRzLzVkNzYwNDUxNmIx
     ZDA4NjQxZDc2NzZlZTciXSwic3ViIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tL1V
     zZXJzLzQ0ZjYxNDJkZjk2YmQ2YWI2MWU3NTIxZDkiLCJldmVudHMiOnsidXJuOmlldG
     Y6cGFyYW1zOnNjaW06ZXZlbnQ6cGFzc3dvcmRSZXNldCI6eyJpZCI6IjQ0ZjYxNDJkZ
     jk2YmQ2YWI2MWU3NTIxZDkifSwiaHR0cHM6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9zY2ltL2V2ZW50
     L3Bhc3N3b3JkUmVzZXRFeHQiOnsicmVzZXRBdHRlbXB0cyI6NX19fQ."
   }
  }
</pre>
<p class="figure">Figure 6: Example Poll Response</p>
<p id="rfc.section.2.5.p.3">In the above example, two SETs whose <samp>jti</samp> values are <samp>4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8</samp> and <samp>3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30</samp> are delivered.</p>
<div id="rfc.figure.7"></div>
<div id="emptyPollResponse"></div>
<p>The following is a non-normative example response to the request shown in <a href="#PollOnlyRequest" class="xref">Section 2.4.1</a>, which indicates that no new SETs or unacknowledged SETs are available:</p>
<pre>
  HTTP/1.1 200 OK
  Content-Type: application/json

  {
   "sets": {}
  }
</pre>
<p class="figure">Figure 7: Example No SETs Poll Response</p>
<p id="rfc.section.2.5.p.4">Upon receiving the JSON document (e.g., as shown in <a href="#pollResponse" class="xref">Figure 6</a>), the SET Recipient parses and verifies the received SETs and notifies the SET Transmitter of successfully received SETs and SETs with errors via the next poll request to the SET Transmitter, as described in <a href="#pollAck" class="xref">Section 2.4.3</a> or <a href="#pollAckErr" class="xref">Section 2.4.4</a>.</p>
<h1 id="rfc.section.2.5.1">
<a href="#rfc.section.2.5.1">2.5.1.</a> <a href="#PollErrorResponse" id="PollErrorResponse">Poll Error Response</a>
</h1>
<p id="rfc.section.2.5.1.p.1">In the event of a general HTTP error condition in the context of processing a poll request, the service provider responds with the applicable HTTP Response Status Code, as defined in Section 6 of <a href="#RFC7231" class="xref">[RFC7231]</a>.</p>
<p id="rfc.section.2.5.1.p.2">Service providers MAY respond to any invalid poll request with an HTTP Response Status Code of 400 (Bad Request) even when a more specific code might apply, for example if the service provider deemed that a more specific code presented an information disclosure risk. When no more specific code might apply, the service provider SHALL respond to an invalid poll request with an HTTP Status Code of 400.</p>
<p id="rfc.section.2.5.1.p.3">The response body for responses to invalid poll requests is left undefined, and its contents SHOULD be ignored.  </p>
<p>The following is a non-normative example of a response to an invalid poll request: </p>
<pre>
  HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
</pre>
<p class="figure">Example Poll Error Response</p>
<h1 id="rfc.section.2.6">
<a href="#rfc.section.2.6">2.6.</a> <a href="#errorResponse" id="errorResponse">Error Response Handling</a>
</h1>
<p id="rfc.section.2.6.p.1">If a SET is invalid, error codes from the IANA "Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes" registry established by <a href="#I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push" class="xref">[I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push]</a> are used in error responses.  As described in Section 2.3 of <a href="#I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push" class="xref">[I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push]</a>, an error response is a JSON object providing details about the error that includes the following name/value pairs: </p>
<p></p>

<dl>
<dt>err</dt>
<dd style="margin-left: 8">
<br> A value from the IANA "Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes" registry that identifies the error.  </dd>
<dt>description</dt>
<dd style="margin-left: 8">
<br> A human-readable string that provides additional diagnostic information.  </dd>
</dl>

<p> </p>
<p id="rfc.section.2.6.p.3">When included as part of a batch of SETs, the above JSON is included as part of the <samp>setErrs</samp> member, as defined in <a href="#pollReq" class="xref">Section 2.2</a> and <a href="#pollAckErr" class="xref">Section 2.4.4</a>.  </p>
<p id="rfc.section.2.6.p.4">When the SET Recipient includes one or more error responses in a request to the SET Transmitter, it must also include in the request a <samp>Content-Language</samp> header field whose value indicates the language of the error descriptions included in the request.  The method of language selection in the case when the SET Recipient can provide error messages in multiple languages is out of scope for this specification.  </p>
<h1 id="rfc.section.3">
<a href="#rfc.section.3">3.</a> <a href="#aa" id="aa">Authentication and Authorization</a>
</h1>
<p id="rfc.section.3.p.1">The SET delivery method described in this specification is based upon HTTP over TLS <a href="#RFC2818" class="xref">[RFC2818]</a> and standard HTTP authentication and authorization schemes, as per <a href="#RFC7235" class="xref">[RFC7235]</a>.  The TLS server certificate MUST be validated using DNS-ID <a href="#RFC6125" class="xref">[RFC6125]</a> and/or DANE <a href="#RFC6698" class="xref">[RFC6698]</a>.  As per Section 4.1 of <a href="#RFC7235" class="xref">[RFC7235]</a>, a SET delivery endpoint SHALL indicate supported HTTP authentication schemes via the <samp>WWW-Authenticate</samp> header field when using HTTP authentication.  </p>
<p id="rfc.section.3.p.2">Authorization for the eligibility to provide actionable SETs can be determined by using the identity of the SET Issuer, validating the identity of the SET Transmitter, or via other employed authentication methods.  Likewise, the SET Transmitter may choose to validate the identity of the SET Recipient, perhaps using mutual TLS.  Because SETs are not commands, SET Recipients are free to ignore SETs that are not of interest after acknowledging their receipt.</p>
<h1 id="rfc.section.4">
<a href="#rfc.section.4">4.</a> <a href="#Security" id="Security">Security Considerations</a>
</h1>
<h1 id="rfc.section.4.1">
<a href="#rfc.section.4.1">4.1.</a> <a href="#payloadAuthentication" id="payloadAuthentication">Authentication Using Signed SETs</a>
</h1>
<p id="rfc.section.4.1.p.1">JWS signed SETs can be used (see <a href="#RFC7515" class="xref">[RFC7515]</a> and Section 5 of <a href="#RFC8417" class="xref">[RFC8417]</a>) to enable the SET Recipient to validate that the SET Issuer is authorized to provide actionable SETs.  </p>
<h1 id="rfc.section.4.2">
<a href="#rfc.section.4.2">4.2.</a> <a href="#HTTP" id="HTTP">HTTP Considerations</a>
</h1>
<p id="rfc.section.4.2.p.1">SET delivery depends on the use of Hypertext Transfer Protocol and is thus subject to the security considerations of HTTP Section 9 of <a href="#RFC7230" class="xref">[RFC7230]</a> and its related specifications.</p>
<h1 id="rfc.section.4.3">
<a href="#rfc.section.4.3">4.3.</a> <a href="#Confidentiality" id="Confidentiality">Confidentiality of SETs</a>
</h1>
<p id="rfc.section.4.3.p.1">SETs may contain sensitive information, including Personally Identifiable Information (PII), or be distributed through third parties.  In such cases, SET Transmitters and SET Recipients MUST protect the confidentiality of the SET contents.  In some use cases, using TLS to secure the transmitted SETs will be sufficient.  In other use cases, encrypting the SET as described in JWE <a href="#RFC7516" class="xref">[RFC7516]</a> will also be required.  The Event delivery endpoint MUST support at least TLS version 1.2 <a href="#RFC5246" class="xref">[RFC5246]</a> and SHOULD support the newest version of TLS that meets its security requirements, which as of the time of this publication is TLS 1.3 <a href="#RFC8446" class="xref">[RFC8446]</a>.  The client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check using DNS-ID <a href="#RFC6125" class="xref">[RFC6125]</a> and/or DANE <a href="#RFC6698" class="xref">[RFC6698]</a>.  How a SET Recipient determines the expected service identity to match the SET Transmitter's server certificate against is out of scope for this document.  The implementation security considerations for TLS in "Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS" <a href="#RFC7525" class="xref">[RFC7525]</a> MUST be followed.  </p>
<h1 id="rfc.section.4.4">
<a href="#rfc.section.4.4">4.4.</a> <a href="#AT" id="AT">Access Token Considerations</a>
</h1>
<p id="rfc.section.4.4.p.1">If HTTP Authentication is performed using OAuth access tokens <a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">[RFC6749]</a>, implementers MUST take into account the threats and countermeasures documented in Section 8 of <a href="#RFC7521" class="xref">[RFC7521]</a>.</p>
<h1 id="rfc.section.4.4.1">
<a href="#rfc.section.4.4.1">4.4.1.</a> <a href="#bearerConsiderations" id="bearerConsiderations">Bearer Token Considerations</a>
</h1>
<p id="rfc.section.4.4.1.p.1">Transmitting Bearer tokens <a href="#RFC6750" class="xref">[RFC6750]</a> using TLS helps prevent their interception.  </p>
<p id="rfc.section.4.4.1.p.2">Bearer tokens SHOULD have a limited lifetime that can be determined directly or indirectly (e.g., by checking with a validation service) by the service provider. By expiring tokens, clients are forced to obtain a new token (which usually involves re-authentication) for continued authorized access. For example, in OAuth 2.0, a client MAY use an OAuth refresh token to obtain a new bearer token after authenticating to an authorization server, per Section 6 of <a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">[RFC6749]</a>.</p>
<p id="rfc.section.4.4.1.p.3">Implementations supporting OAuth bearer tokens need to factor in security considerations of this authorization method <a href="#RFC7521" class="xref">[RFC7521]</a>. Since security is only as good as the weakest link, implementers also need to consider authentication choices coupled with OAuth bearer tokens. The security considerations of the default authentication method for OAuth bearer tokens, HTTP Basic, are well documented in <a href="#RFC7617" class="xref">[RFC7617]</a>, therefore implementers are encouraged to prefer stronger authentication methods.  </p>
<h1 id="rfc.section.5">
<a href="#rfc.section.5">5.</a> <a href="#Privacy" id="Privacy">Privacy Considerations</a>
</h1>
<p id="rfc.section.5.p.1">SET Transmitters should attempt to deliver SETs that are targeted to the specific business and protocol needs of subscribers.</p>
<p id="rfc.section.5.p.2">When sharing personally identifiable information or information that is otherwise considered confidential to affected users, SET Transmitters and Recipients MUST have the appropriate legal agreements and user consent or terms of service in place.  Furthermore, data that needs confidentiality protection MUST be encrypted, at least with TLS and sometimes also using JSON Web Encryption (JWE) <a href="#RFC7516" class="xref">[RFC7516]</a>.  </p>
<p id="rfc.section.5.p.3">In some cases, subject identifiers themselves may be considered sensitive information, such that their inclusion within a SET may be considered a violation of privacy.  SET Issuers and SET Transmitters should consider the ramifications of sharing a particular subject identifier with a SET Recipient (e.g., whether doing so could enable correlation and/or de-anonymization of data) and choose appropriate subject identifiers for their use cases.  </p>
<h1 id="rfc.section.6">
<a href="#rfc.section.6">6.</a> <a href="#IANA" id="IANA">IANA Considerations</a>
</h1>
<p id="rfc.section.6.p.1">This specification requires no IANA actions.  </p>
<h1 id="rfc.references">
<a href="#rfc.references">7.</a> References</h1>
<h1 id="rfc.references.1">
<a href="#rfc.references.1">7.1.</a> Normative References</h1>
<table><tbody>
<tr>
<td class="reference"><b id="I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push">[I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push]</b></td>
<td class="top">
<a>Backman, A.</a>, <a>Jones, M.</a>, <a>Scurtescu, M.</a>, <a>Ansari, M.</a> and <a>A. Nadalin</a>, "<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-secevent-http-push-12">Push-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Using HTTP</a>", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-secevent-http-push-12, June 2020.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="reference"><b id="RFC2119">[RFC2119]</b></td>
<td class="top">
<a>Bradner, S.</a>, "<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2119">Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</a>", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="reference"><b id="RFC2818">[RFC2818]</b></td>
<td class="top">
<a>Rescorla, E.</a>, "<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2818">HTTP Over TLS</a>", RFC 2818, DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="reference"><b id="RFC5246">[RFC5246]</b></td>
<td class="top">
<a>Dierks, T.</a> and <a>E. Rescorla</a>, "<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246">The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2</a>", RFC 5246, DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="reference"><b id="RFC6125">[RFC6125]</b></td>
<td class="top">
<a>Saint-Andre, P.</a> and <a>J. Hodges</a>, "<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125">Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS)</a>", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March 2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="reference"><b id="RFC6698">[RFC6698]</b></td>
<td class="top">
<a>Hoffman, P.</a> and <a>J. Schlyter</a>, "<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6698">The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol: TLSA</a>", RFC 6698, DOI 10.17487/RFC6698, August 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="reference"><b id="RFC7231">[RFC7231]</b></td>
<td class="top">
<a>Fielding, R.</a> and <a>J. Reschke</a>, "<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7231">Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content</a>", RFC 7231, DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="reference"><b id="RFC7515">[RFC7515]</b></td>
<td class="top">
<a>Jones, M.</a>, <a>Bradley, J.</a> and <a>N. Sakimura</a>, "<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7515">JSON Web Signature (JWS)</a>", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="reference"><b id="RFC7516">[RFC7516]</b></td>
<td class="top">
<a>Jones, M.</a> and <a>J. Hildebrand</a>, "<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7516">JSON Web Encryption (JWE)</a>", RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="reference"><b id="RFC7519">[RFC7519]</b></td>
<td class="top">
<a>Jones, M.</a>, <a>Bradley, J.</a> and <a>N. Sakimura</a>, "<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519">JSON Web Token (JWT)</a>", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="reference"><b id="RFC7521">[RFC7521]</b></td>
<td class="top">
<a>Campbell, B.</a>, <a>Mortimore, C.</a>, <a>Jones, M.</a> and <a>Y. Goland</a>, "<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7521">Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants</a>", RFC 7521, DOI 10.17487/RFC7521, May 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="reference"><b id="RFC7525">[RFC7525]</b></td>
<td class="top">
<a>Sheffer, Y.</a>, <a>Holz, R.</a> and <a>P. Saint-Andre</a>, "<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7525">Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)</a>", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="reference"><b id="RFC8174">[RFC8174]</b></td>
<td class="top">
<a>Leiba, B.</a>, "<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8174">Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</a>", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="reference"><b id="RFC8259">[RFC8259]</b></td>
<td class="top">
<a>Bray, T.</a>, "<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8259">The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format</a>", STD 90, RFC 8259, DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="reference"><b id="RFC8417">[RFC8417]</b></td>
<td class="top">
<a>Hunt, P.</a>, <a>Jones, M.</a>, <a>Denniss, W.</a> and <a>M. Ansari</a>, "<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8417">Security Event Token (SET)</a>", RFC 8417, DOI 10.17487/RFC8417, July 2018.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="reference"><b id="RFC8446">[RFC8446]</b></td>
<td class="top">
<a>Rescorla, E.</a>, "<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446">The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3</a>", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018.</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
<h1 id="rfc.references.2">
<a href="#rfc.references.2">7.2.</a> Informative References</h1>
<table><tbody>
<tr>
<td class="reference"><b id="RFC6202">[RFC6202]</b></td>
<td class="top">
<a>Loreto, S.</a>, <a>Saint-Andre, P.</a>, <a>Salsano, S.</a> and <a>G. Wilkins</a>, "<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6202">Known Issues and Best Practices for the Use of Long Polling and Streaming in Bidirectional HTTP</a>", RFC 6202, DOI 10.17487/RFC6202, April 2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="reference"><b id="RFC6749">[RFC6749]</b></td>
<td class="top">
<a>Hardt, D.</a>, "<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749">The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework</a>", RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="reference"><b id="RFC6750">[RFC6750]</b></td>
<td class="top">
<a>Jones, M.</a> and <a>D. Hardt</a>, "<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6750">The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage</a>", RFC 6750, DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="reference"><b id="RFC7230">[RFC7230]</b></td>
<td class="top">
<a>Fielding, R.</a> and <a>J. Reschke</a>, "<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230">Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing</a>", RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="reference"><b id="RFC7235">[RFC7235]</b></td>
<td class="top">