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jenkins-metasploit
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automatic module_metadata_base.json update
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db/modules_metadata_base.json

Lines changed: 45 additions & 0 deletions
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@@ -9008,6 +9008,51 @@
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"needs_cleanup": false,
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"actions": []
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},
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"auxiliary_admin/networking/cisco_sdwan_vhub_auth_bypass": {
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"name": "Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller vHub Authentication Bypass",
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"fullname": "auxiliary/admin/networking/cisco_sdwan_vhub_auth_bypass",
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"aliases": [],
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"rank": 300,
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"disclosure_date": "2026-05-07",
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"type": "auxiliary",
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"author": [
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"sfewer-r7",
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"Crypto-Cat"
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],
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"description": "This module exploits an authentication bypass vulnerability (CVE-2026-20182)\n in the Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller. The vdaemon DTLS control-plane\n service performs no certificate or credential verification for connecting peers\n that claim to be a vHub (device type 2). The vbond_proc_challenge_ack() function\n implements device-type-specific verification through a series of conditional\n blocks, but contains no code path for device type 2 (vHub). After a DTLS\n handshake using any self-signed certificate, an attacker sends a CHALLENGE_ACK\n (msg_type=9) with the vHub device type encoded in the protocol header. The\n function falls through all verification checks and unconditionally sets\n peer->authenticated = 1.\n\n This module leverages the authentication bypass to inject an attacker-controlled\n SSH public key into the vmanage-admin user's authorized_keys file via a\n VMANAGE_TO_PEER message (msg_type=14), providing persistent SSH access to the\n controller over the NETCONF service (TCP port 830).\n\n Affected versions: Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller 20.12.6.1 and earlier.\n Consult Cisco's security advisory for a complete list of affected versions\n and patches.",
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"references": [
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"CVE-2026-20182",
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"URL-https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-sdwan-rpa2-v69WY2SW",
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"URL-https://blog.talosintelligence.com/sd-wan-ongoing-exploitation/",
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"URL-https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/ve-cve-2026-20182-critical-authentication-bypass-cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-controller-fixed/"
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],
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"platform": "",
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"arch": "",
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"rport": 12346,
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"autofilter_ports": [],
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"autofilter_services": [],
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"targets": null,
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"mod_time": "2026-05-15 09:43:25 +0000",
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"path": "/modules/auxiliary/admin/networking/cisco_sdwan_vhub_auth_bypass.rb",
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"is_install_path": true,
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"ref_name": "admin/networking/cisco_sdwan_vhub_auth_bypass",
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"check": true,
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"post_auth": false,
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"default_credential": false,
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"notes": {
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"Stability": [
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"crash-safe"
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],
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"Reliability": [],
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"SideEffects": [
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"artifacts-on-disk",
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"ioc-in-logs"
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]
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},
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"session_types": false,
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"needs_cleanup": false,
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"actions": []
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},
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"auxiliary_admin/networking/cisco_secure_acs_bypass": {
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"name": "Cisco Secure ACS Unauthorized Password Change",
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"fullname": "auxiliary/admin/networking/cisco_secure_acs_bypass",

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