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Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: docs/en/credential-issuance-endpoint.rst
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@@ -768,7 +768,7 @@ The JWT proof type MUST contain the following parameters for the JOSE header and
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- Representing the public key chosen by the Wallet Instance, in JSON Web Key (JWK) [:rfc:`7517`] format that the Digital Credential shall be bound to, as defined in Section 4.1.3 of [:rfc:`7515`].
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3. The header parameter ``alg`` MUST indicate a registered asymmetric digital signature algorithm, and MUST NOT be set to `none`.
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4. The signature on the key proof MUST be verified using the public key specified in the header parameter.
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5. The header parameter MUST NOT contain a private key.
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6. The signature on the Wallet Unit Attestion JWT as the value of the ``key_attestation`` header parameter MUST be verified using the Wallet Provider's public key which is identified by the ``kid`` header parameter inside the Wallet Unit Attestation JWT.
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6. The signature on the Key Attestation JWT as the value of the ``key_attestation`` header parameter MUST be verified using the Wallet Provider's public key which is identified by the ``kid`` header parameter inside the Key Attestation JWT.
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7. If a ``c_nonce`` value was previously provided by the server, the ``nonce`` claim in the JWT MUST match this ``c_nonce`` value. Furthermore, the creation time of the JWT, as indicated by the ``iat`` claim or a server-managed timestamp via the ``nonce`` claim, MUST be within an acceptable window of time as determined by the server.
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When multiple Digital Credentials are issued together in a single batch, their lifecycle remains fully granular:
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* **Grouped triggers, independent updates**: regardless of the actor that triggers a batch status update (e.g. the Wallet Instance via Notification Endpoint with ``event=credential_deleted``, Wallet Provider via updating Wallet Unit Attestation status list) the status updating is handled as N separate status changes. The Credential Issuer updates each Credential's own status individually (for example, flipping its status-list bit to ``INVALID`` or ``SUSPENDED``). By default, a Wallet Instance MUST NOT trigger batch status updates when the User deletes local Credentials. Upon deletion, the Wallet Instance MAY, under the User's explicit consent, notify the Credential Issuer of the User's intention to revoke the affected Credential(s).
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* **Grouped triggers, independent updates**: regardless of the actor that triggers a batch status update (e.g. the Wallet Instance via Notification Endpoint with ``event=credential_deleted``, Wallet Provider via updating Wallet Instance and Key Attestation status list) the status updating is handled as one or more separate status changes. The Credential Issuer updates each Credential's status individually (for instance, by flipping its status-list bit to ``INVALID`` or ``SUSPENDED``). The Wallet Instance MUST NOT trigger batch status updates when the User deletes local Credentials. Upon deletion, the Wallet Instance MAY, under the User's explicit consent, notify the Credential Issuer of the User's intention to revoke the affected Credential(s).
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.. note::
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As the Wallet UI typically surfaces a batch as one Credential (e.g., 3 uses remaining), a User-driven deletion in the Wallet removes the entire batch locally. By default it does not request revocation at the Issuer. The Wallet MAY offer the User an optional prompt to request revocation at the Issuer as part of the deletion flow.
Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: docs/en/defined-terms.rst
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@@ -98,9 +98,9 @@ Below is the description of acronyms and definitions which are useful for furthe
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Register of entities participating in the IT-Wallet System.
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Not present in ARF 2.7.3; specific to IT-Wallet.
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**Key Attestation**
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Attestation from device OEM about secure key storage in hardware-backed keystore.
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Not present in ARF 2.7.3.
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**Key Attestation APIs (OEM)**
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A device manufacturer’s attestation mechanism that confirms whether cryptographic keys are stored securely in a hardware-backed keystore. Examples include Android Key Attestation API for Android devices and Apple DeviceCheck for iOS devices.
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Not present in ARF 2.7.3; specific to IT-Wallet.
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**Level of Assurance**
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In the Union **electronic identification** framework, **levels of assurance** express the degree of confidence in the **correctness of the identification** of natural or legal persons and in the possibility to **rely on electronic identification means**. For **notified electronic identification schemes**, `EIDAS`_ (as amended, including the European Digital Identity Framework codified by `EU_2024_1183`_) defines the levels **low**, **substantial**, and **high**.
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Unique configuration of a Wallet Solution for an individual User, including security features.
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Aligned with ARF 2.7.3.
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**Wallet Unit Attestation**
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Data object issued by a Wallet Provider that proves the keys used for key binding of Credentials reside in a trustworthy WSCD,
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and checks the Wallet Unit has not been revoked. Specific to IT-Wallet.
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**Key Attestation**
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Data object issued by a Wallet Provider that proves the keys used for key binding of Credentials reside in a trustworthy WSCD using the Key Attetstaion APIs (OEM).
Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: docs/en/official-resources.rst
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@@ -43,4 +43,3 @@ Brand Manual
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The Brand Manual containing complete indications for the use of graphic assets and the visual identity of the IT-Wallet System will soon be available at the :ref:`official website <official-resources:Official Website>`.
participant"Device Integrity Service APIs"asaats#springgreen
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participant"Wallet Provider backend"asbck
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user->app: Request a new operation that\nrequires a Wallet Unit Attestation
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user->app: Request a new operation that\nrequires a Key Attestation
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activateapp
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app->app: Check if Cryptographic Hardware Key \nTag (""hardware_key_tag""), Key Attestation APIs, and Device Integrity APIs are available
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app->app: Generates one or a batch of Credential key pair(s) to be attested in Wallet Unit Attestation (""key_pub_1"", ""key_priv_1"",..., ""key_pub_n"", ""key_priv_n"")
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app->app: Generates one or a batch of Credential key pair(s) to be attested in Key Attestation (""key_pub_1"", ""key_priv_1"",..., ""key_pub_n"", ""key_priv_n"")
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rnoteoverapp,bck#LIGHTGREEN
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Check Wallet Provider is part of the Federation and obtain its metadata
Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: docs/en/remote-flow.rst
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@@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ The request and its parameters are defined in Section 5 (Authorization Request)
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.. note::
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For the ``authorization_endpoint`` the use of universal links are preferred over custom url-schemes because, when properly configured using Assetlinks JSON for Android and Apple App Site Association for iOS, they provide enhanced security by reducing the risk of URL hijacking.
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Furthermore, universal links offer fallback mechanisms, allowing the flow to continue seamlessly in a browser even if the Wallet Instance is not installed, ensuring a smoother User experience. The URL schemes ``openid4vp://`` and ``haip-vp://`` defined in `OPENID4VP`_ and `OPENID4VC-HAIP`_are supported to ensure interoperability.
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Furthermore, universal links offer fallback mechanisms, allowing the flow to continue seamlessly in a browser even if the Wallet Instance is not installed, ensuring a smoother User experience. The URL schemes ``openid4vp://`` and ``haip-vp://`` defined in `OPENID4VP`_ and `OPENID4VC-HAIP`_ are supported to ensure interoperability.
Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: docs/en/test-plans-credential-issuer.rst
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@@ -831,7 +831,7 @@ This section provides the set of test cases designed for technical implementers
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* - CI_169
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- Data Model and lifecycle, Interoperability
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- Wallet Instance Status Monitoring for the Digital Credential Status Update
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- Credential Issuer establishes a monitoring mechanism of the current statuses of all the Wallet Unit Attestations related to the Wallet Instances to which the Credentials were issued.
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- Credential Issuer establishes a monitoring mechanism of the current statuses of all the Key Attestations related to the Wallet Instances to which the Credentials were issued.
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* - CI_170
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- Data Model and lifecycle, Interoperability
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- Credential Status Update Following Data Change Notification
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