NMAPScanner - Comprehensive Security Audit Report

Date: December 11, 2025 Auditor: Jordan Koch with Claude Code Project: NMAPScanner (Network Security Analysis Tool) Version: 2.3+ Scope: Complete security review based on OWASP Top 10 and secure coding standards

Executive Summary

Overall Security Grade: B Critical Issues: 1 High Issues: 2 Medium Issues: 3 Low Issues: 2 Good Practices: 8

NMAPScanner demonstrates generally good security practices with proper credential storage, command injection protection, and input sanitization. However, several critical issues require immediate attention, particularly in TLS/SSL validation and network security.

🔴 CRITICAL ISSUES (Fix Immediately)

1. Certificate Validation Bypass - MITM Vulnerability

File: UniFiController.swift (Lines 12-23) Severity: 🔴 CRITICAL CWE: CWE-295 (Improper Certificate Validation) CVSS Score: 8.1 (High)

Issue:

class UniFiURLSessionDelegate: NSObject, URLSessionDelegate {
    func urlSession(_ session: URLSession, didReceive challenge: URLAuthenticationChallenge, completionHandler: @escaping (URLSession.AuthChallengeDisposition, URLCredential?) -> Void) {
        // Accept self-signed certificates for UniFi controllers
        if challenge.protectionSpace.authenticationMethod == NSURLAuthenticationMethodServerTrust,
           let serverTrust = challenge.protectionSpace.serverTrust {
            let credential = URLCredential(trust: serverTrust)
            completionHandler(.useCredential, credential)  // ❌ ACCEPTS ALL CERTIFICATES!
        } else {
            completionHandler(.performDefaultHandling, nil)
        }
    }
}

Problem: This code blindly accepts ALL server certificates, including:

Self-signed certificates
Expired certificates
Certificates with wrong hostnames
Certificates from untrusted CAs
Malicious certificates from MITM attackers

Attack Scenario:

Attacker on same network performs ARP spoofing
Intercepts connection to UniFi controller
Presents their own certificate
Code accepts it without validation
Attacker sees username, password, and all API traffic in cleartext

Impact:

Username and password exposed to MITM attacker
Session cookies stolen
All API responses (device info, network topology) visible to attacker
Complete compromise of UniFi credentials

Recommended Fix:

class UniFiURLSessionDelegate: NSObject, URLSessionDelegate {
    // Allow user to explicitly trust specific certificate fingerprints
    private var trustedCertificates: Set<String> = []

    func urlSession(_ session: URLSession, didReceive challenge: URLAuthenticationChallenge, completionHandler: @escaping (URLSession.AuthChallengeDisposition, URLCredential?) -> Void) {

        guard challenge.protectionSpace.authenticationMethod == NSURLAuthenticationMethodServerTrust,
              let serverTrust = challenge.protectionSpace.serverTrust else {
            completionHandler(.performDefaultHandling, nil)
            return
        }

        // Get certificate chain
        let certificateCount = SecTrustGetCertificateCount(serverTrust)
        guard certificateCount > 0 else {
            completionHandler(.cancelAuthenticationChallenge, nil)
            return
        }

        // Get leaf certificate
        guard let certificate = SecTrustGetCertificateAtIndex(serverTrust, 0) else {
            completionHandler(.cancelAuthenticationChallenge, nil)
            return
        }

        // Calculate certificate fingerprint (SHA-256)
        let certData = SecCertificateCopyData(certificate) as Data
        var hash = [UInt8](repeating: 0, count: Int(CC_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH))
        certData.withUnsafeBytes {
            _ = CC_SHA256($0.baseAddress, CC_LONG(certData.count), &hash)
        }
        let fingerprint = hash.map { String(format: "%02hhx", $0) }.joined()

        // Check if certificate is trusted
        if trustedCertificates.contains(fingerprint) {
            // User has explicitly trusted this certificate
            let credential = URLCredential(trust: serverTrust)
            completionHandler(.useCredential, credential)
        } else {
            // First time seeing this certificate - prompt user
            Task { @MainActor in
                let shouldTrust = await promptUserToTrustCertificate(
                    fingerprint: fingerprint,
                    host: challenge.protectionSpace.host
                )

                if shouldTrust {
                    self.trustedCertificates.insert(fingerprint)
                    self.saveTrustedCertificates()
                    completionHandler(.useCredential, URLCredential(trust: serverTrust))
                } else {
                    completionHandler(.cancelAuthenticationChallenge, nil)
                }
            }
        }
    }

    // Prompt user to trust certificate
    private func promptUserToTrustCertificate(fingerprint: String, host: String) async -> Bool {
        // Show alert with certificate details
        // Return true if user accepts, false otherwise
        // Store decision in Keychain for persistence
        return false  // Default to rejecting
    }

    // Save trusted certificates to Keychain
    private func saveTrustedCertificates() {
        let data = try? JSONEncoder().encode(Array(trustedCertificates))
        // Save to Keychain with kSecAttrService = "NMAPScanner-TrustedCerts"
    }
}

Alternative (If you trust your specific UniFi controller):

// Store UniFi controller's certificate fingerprint in settings
// Only accept that specific certificate

if let expectedFingerprint = UserDefaults.standard.string(forKey: "UniFiCertFingerprint"),
   fingerprint == expectedFingerprint {
    completionHandler(.useCredential, credential)
} else if expectedFingerprint == nil {
    // First connection - save fingerprint and proceed
    UserDefaults.standard.set(fingerprint, forKey: "UniFiCertFingerprint")
    completionHandler(.useCredential, credential)
} else {
    // Certificate changed! Potential MITM!
    completionHandler(.cancelAuthenticationChallenge, nil)
    await showSecurityAlert("Certificate mismatch! Potential MITM attack detected.")
}

Effort: 2-3 hours Priority: 🔴 CRITICAL - FIX IMMEDIATELY

🟠 HIGH PRIORITY ISSUES

2. Insecure Password Storage Delimiter

File: UniFiController.swift (Line 396) Severity: 🟠 HIGH CWE: CWE-522 (Insufficiently Protected Credentials)

Issue:

private func saveCredentials(host: String, username: String, password: String, siteName: String) {
    let credentials = "\(username):\(password):\(siteName)"  // ❌ Colon delimiter
    // ...
}

Problem:

Uses colon (:) as delimiter
If password contains :, parsing breaks
Example: password "pass:word:123" → splits incorrectly
Results in failed authentication

Attack Scenario:

User sets password with colons
App stores it correctly initially
On next launch, parsing fails
User credentials become unusable

Recommended Fix:

Use proper encoding instead of delimiters:

private struct UniFiCredentials: Codable {
    let host: String
    let username: String
    let password: String
    let siteName: String
}

private func saveCredentials(host: String, username: String, password: String, siteName: String) {
    let credentials = UniFiCredentials(
        host: host,
        username: username,
        password: password,
        siteName: siteName
    )

    guard let data = try? JSONEncoder().encode(credentials) else {
        print("⚠️ Failed to encode credentials")
        return
    }

    let query: [String: Any] = [
        kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
        kSecAttrService as String: "NMAPScanner-UniFi",
        kSecAttrAccount as String: host,
        kSecValueData as String: data  // JSON encoded, no delimiter issues
    ]

    SecItemDelete(query as CFDictionary)
    let status = SecItemAdd(query as CFDictionary, nil)
    if status != errSecSuccess {
        print("⚠️ Failed to save credentials: \(status)")
    }
}

private func loadCredentials() -> (host: String, username: String, password: String, siteName: String)? {
    let query: [String: Any] = [
        kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
        kSecAttrService as String: "NMAPScanner-UniFi",
        kSecReturnAttributes as String: true,
        kSecReturnData as String: true,
        kSecMatchLimit as String: kSecMatchLimitOne
    ]

    var item: CFTypeRef?
    let status = SecItemCopyMatching(query as CFDictionary, &item)

    guard status == errSecSuccess,
          let existingItem = item as? [String: Any],
          let host = existingItem[kSecAttrAccount as String] as? String,
          let data = existingItem[kSecValueData as String] as? Data,
          let credentials = try? JSONDecoder().decode(UniFiCredentials.self, from: data) else {
        return nil
    }

    return (credentials.host, credentials.username, credentials.password, credentials.siteName)
}

Effort: 30 minutes Priority: 🟠 HIGH - FIX THIS WEEK

3. IP Address Validation Missing

Files: AdvancedPortScanner.swift, SimpleNetworkScanner.swift, multiple Severity: 🟠 HIGH CWE: CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation)

Issue: Multiple functions accept IP address strings and pass them to nmap or other commands without validation:

// AdvancedPortScanner.swift:120
process.arguments = ["-sT", "-T4", "--top-ports", "1000", ipAddress]  // ❌ No validation

Problem:

While using array arguments prevents classic command injection
Invalid IP addresses waste resources
Malformed inputs could cause unexpected behavior
No sanitization of special characters

Potential Issues:

IP like "192.168.1.1; rm -rf /" won't inject commands (safe) but wastes scan
IP like "../../../etc/passwd" won't work but creates confusion
IP like "" (empty) causes nmap errors

Recommended Fix:

Add IP validation utility:

// Add to NetworkScanManager or create ValidationUtility.swift

enum IPValidationError: Error {
    case invalid Format
    case privateAddressNotAllowed
    case loopbackNotAllowed
    case multicastNotAllowed
    case emptyInput
}

struct IPValidator {
    /// Validate IP address format and type
    static func validateIPAddress(_ ip: String, allowPrivate: Bool = true) throws {
        // Check for empty
        guard !ip.isEmpty else {
            throw IPValidationError.emptyInput
        }

        // Remove whitespace
        let trimmed = ip.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)

        // Split into octets
        let octets = trimmed.split(separator: ".")
        guard octets.count == 4 else {
            throw IPValidationError.invalidFormat
        }

        // Validate each octet
        var octetValues: [Int] = []
        for octet in octets {
            guard let value = Int(octet), value >= 0 && value <= 255 else {
                throw IPValidationError.invalidFormat
            }
            octetValues.append(value)
        }

        // Check for loopback (127.0.0.0/8)
        if octetValues[0] == 127 {
            throw IPValidationError.loopbackNotAllowed
        }

        // Check for multicast (224.0.0.0/4)
        if octetValues[0] >= 224 && octetValues[0] <= 239 {
            throw IPValidationError.multicastNotAllowed
        }

        // Check for private addresses if not allowed
        if !allowPrivate {
            // 10.0.0.0/8
            if octetValues[0] == 10 {
                throw IPValidationError.privateAddressNotAllowed
            }
            // 172.16.0.0/12
            if octetValues[0] == 172 && octetValues[1] >= 16 && octetValues[1] <= 31 {
                throw IPValidationError.privateAddressNotAllowed
            }
            // 192.168.0.0/16
            if octetValues[0] == 192 && octetValues[1] == 168 {
                throw IPValidationError.privateAddressNotAllowed
            }
        }
    }

    /// Validate subnet (e.g., "192.168.1")
    static func validateSubnet(_ subnet: String) throws {
        let octets = subnet.split(separator: ".")
        guard octets.count >= 1 && octets.count <= 3 else {
            throw IPValidationError.invalidFormat
        }

        for octet in octets {
            guard let value = Int(octet), value >= 0 && value <= 255 else {
                throw IPValidationError.invalidFormat
            }
        }
    }
}

// Use in all scanning functions:
func scanTCPPorts(_ ipAddress: String) async -> [Int] {
    // Validate IP address first
    do {
        try IPValidator.validateIPAddress(ipAddress)
    } catch {
        print("❌ Invalid IP address: \(ipAddress) - \(error)")
        return []
    }

    // Proceed with scan...
    let process = Process()
    process.executableURL = URL(fileURLWithPath: "/usr/local/bin/nmap")
    process.arguments = ["-sT", "-T4", "--top-ports", "1000", ipAddress]
    // ...
}

Effort: 1-2 hours Priority: 🟠 HIGH - ADD VALIDATION TO ALL SCAN FUNCTIONS

4. UniFi Controller URL Validation Missing

File: UniFiController.swift (Line 62) Severity: 🟠 HIGH CWE: CWE-918 (Server-Side Request Forgery)

Issue:

func configure(host: String, username: String, password: String, siteName: String = "default") {
    self.baseURL = host.hasPrefix("http") ? host : "https://\(host)"  // ❌ No URL validation
    // ...
}

Problem:

User can provide any URL (http://evil.com, file://, ftp://)
No hostname validation
Could be used to make requests to unintended hosts

Recommended Fix:

func configure(host: String, username: String, password: String, siteName: String = "default") throws {
    // Validate and sanitize host
    var sanitizedHost = host.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)

    // Ensure it has a scheme
    if !sanitizedHost.hasPrefix("http://") && !sanitizedHost.hasPrefix("https://") {
        sanitizedHost = "https://\(sanitizedHost)"
    }

    // Parse and validate URL
    guard let url = URL(string: sanitizedHost),
          let scheme = url.scheme,
          let hostComponent = url.host,
          (scheme == "https" || scheme == "http") else {
        throw ConfigurationError.invalidURL
    }

    // Validate host is not localhost or internal metadata
    let blockedHosts = ["169.254.169.254", "127.0.0.1", "localhost"]
    if blockedHosts.contains(hostComponent) {
        throw ConfigurationError.blockedHost
    }

    // Warn if using HTTP instead of HTTPS
    if scheme == "http" {
        print("⚠️ WARNING: Using HTTP (unencrypted) for UniFi controller. Credentials will be sent in cleartext!")
    }

    self.baseURL = sanitizedHost
    self.username = username
    self.password = password
    self.siteName = siteName

    saveCredentials(host: sanitizedHost, username: username, password: password, siteName: siteName)
    isConfigured = true

    Task {
        await login()
    }
}

enum ConfigurationError: Error {
    case invalidURL
    case blockedHost
    case emptyCredentials
}

Effort: 1 hour Priority: 🟠 HIGH

🟡 MEDIUM PRIORITY ISSUES

5. Rate Limiting Not Implemented

Files: Multiple scanner classes Severity: 🟡 MEDIUM CWE: CWE-770 (Allocation of Resources Without Limits)

Issue:

No rate limiting on UniFi API calls
No throttling on network scans
Could overwhelm network or target devices
Could trigger IDS/IPS systems

Recommended Fix:

/// Rate limiter for network operations
actor RateLimiter {
    private var lastRequestTime: Date?
    private let minimumInterval: TimeInterval

    init(requestsPerSecond: Double) {
        self.minimumInterval = 1.0 / requestsPerSecond
    }

    func waitIfNeeded() async {
        if let lastTime = lastRequestTime {
            let elapsed = Date().timeIntervalSince(lastTime)
            if elapsed < minimumInterval {
                let waitTime = minimumInterval - elapsed
                try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: UInt64(waitTime * 1_000_000_000))
            }
        }
        lastRequestTime = Date()
    }
}

// Use in UniFiController:
private let rateLimiter = RateLimiter(requestsPerSecond: 2.0)  // Max 2 requests/sec

func fetchDevices() async -> [UniFiDevice] {
    await rateLimiter.waitIfNeeded()  // Rate limit API calls
    // ... existing code
}

Effort: 2-3 hours Priority: 🟡 MEDIUM

6. Sensitive Data in Logs

Files: Multiple (UniFiController.swift, AdvancedPortScanner.swift, etc.) Severity: 🟡 MEDIUM CWE: CWE-532 (Information Exposure Through Log Files)

Issue:

// Line 209 in UniFiController.swift
print("✅ UniFi Controller: Login response: \(json)")  // ❌ May contain sensitive data

Problem:

Login responses may contain session tokens, user IDs, permissions
Logs are often sent to crash reporting services
Console logs visible in macOS Console.app
Could leak sensitive information

Recommended Fix:

// Create logging utility with sensitive data masking

enum LogLevel {
    case debug, info, warning, error
}

struct SecureLogger {
    static func log(_ message: String, level: LogLevel = .info, maskSensitive: Bool = true) {
        #if DEBUG
        var masked = message
        if maskSensitive {
            // Mask common sensitive patterns
            masked = maskPattern(masked, pattern: #""password":\s*"[^"]+""#, replacement: "\"password\":\"***\"")
            masked = maskPattern(masked, pattern: #""token":\s*"[^"]+""#, replacement: "\"token\":\"***\"")
            masked = maskPattern(masked, pattern: #""cookie":\s*"[^"]+""#, replacement: "\"cookie\":\"***\"")
            masked = maskPattern(masked, pattern: #""apikey":\s*"[^"]+""#, replacement: "\"apikey\":\"***\"")
        }
        print("[\(level)] \(masked)")
        #else
        // Production: Only log warnings and errors
        if level == .warning || level == .error {
            print("[\(level)] \(message)")
        }
        #endif
    }

    private static func maskPattern(_ text: String, pattern: String, replacement: String) -> String {
        guard let regex = try? NSRegularExpression(pattern: pattern, options: [.caseInsensitive]) else {
            return text
        }
        let range = NSRange(text.startIndex..., in: text)
        return regex.stringByReplacingMatches(in: text, range: range, withTemplate: replacement)
    }
}

// Replace all print statements:
SecureLogger.log("UniFi Controller: Login successful", level: .info)
SecureLogger.log("Login response: \(json)", level: .debug, maskSensitive: true)

Effort: 2-3 hours (find and replace all print statements) Priority: 🟡 MEDIUM

7. No Session Timeout / Auto-Logout

File: UniFiController.swift Severity: 🟡 MEDIUM CWE: CWE-613 (Insufficient Session Expiration)

Issue:

Session cookie stored indefinitely
No automatic re-authentication
No session expiration checks
User remains logged in forever

Recommended Fix:

class UniFiController: ObservableObject {
    private var sessionExpiration: Date?
    private let sessionDuration: TimeInterval = 3600  // 1 hour

    func login(mfaCode: String? = nil) async {
        // ... existing login code

        // After successful login:
        sessionExpiration = Date().addingTimeInterval(sessionDuration)

        // Start session monitor
        startSessionMonitor()
    }

    private func startSessionMonitor() {
        Timer.scheduledTimer(withTimeInterval: 60, repeats: true) { [weak self] _ in
            Task { @MainActor in
                await self?.checkSessionExpiration()
            }
        }
    }

    private func checkSessionExpiration() async {
        guard let expiration = sessionExpiration else { return }

        if Date() > expiration {
            print("⏰ Session expired - logging out")
            isConnected = false
            sessionCookie = nil

            // Optionally: Auto re-login if credentials available
            if isConfigured {
                await login()
            }
        }
    }
}

Effort: 1 hour Priority: 🟡 MEDIUM

🟢 LOW PRIORITY ISSUES

8. Error Messages Too Detailed

File: Multiple Severity: 🟢 LOW CWE: CWE-209 (Information Exposure Through an Error Message)

Issue:

lastError = "Login error: \(error.localizedDescription)"  // ❌ Too detailed

Problem:

Exposes internal error details to user
Could reveal system information
Helps attackers understand the system

Recommended Fix:

// Generic errors for users, detailed logs internally
private func handleLoginError(_ error: Error) {
    SecureLogger.log("Login failed: \(error)", level: .error)  // Internal log

    // Generic message for user
    if let urlError = error as? URLError {
        switch urlError.code {
        case .timedOut:
            lastError = "Connection timed out. Please check your network."
        case .cannotConnectToHost:
            lastError = "Cannot reach controller. Check IP address."
        default:
            lastError = "Connection failed. Please try again."
        }
    } else {
        lastError = "An error occurred. Please try again."
    }
}

Effort: 2 hours Priority: 🟢 LOW

9. No CSRF Token Validation

File: UniFiController.swift (Line 204) Severity: 🟢 LOW CWE: CWE-352 (Cross-Site Request Forgery)

Issue:

csrfToken = cookies.first(where: { $0.name == "csrf_token" })?.value  // Retrieved but not used

Problem:

CSRF token retrieved but never sent in POST requests
UniFi API may require it for state-changing operations
Not a vulnerability in desktop app context, but incomplete implementation

Recommended Fix:

// When making POST requests, add CSRF token:
var request = URLRequest(url: url)
request.httpMethod = "POST"
request.setValue("application/json", forHTTPHeaderField: "Content-Type")

if let cookie = sessionCookie {
    request.setValue("unifises=\(cookie)", forHTTPHeaderField: "Cookie")
}

if let token = csrfToken {
    request.setValue(token, forHTTPHeaderField: "X-CSRF-Token")  // Add CSRF token
}

Effort: 30 minutes Priority: 🟢 LOW (but good practice)

✅ GOOD SECURITY PRACTICES FOUND

1. Command Injection Protection ✅

Files: All Process() calls Status: ✅ SECURE

Evidence:

let process = Process()
process.executableURL = URL(fileURLWithPath: "/usr/sbin/arp")
process.arguments = ["-a"]  // ✅ Array arguments prevent injection

Why It's Good:

All Process() calls use hardcoded executable paths
Arguments passed as array, not string concatenation
No shell=true or /bin/sh usage
Immune to command injection attacks

2. Keychain Credential Storage ✅

File: UniFiController.swift (Lines 395-452) Status: ✅ SECURE

Why It's Good:

Credentials stored in macOS Keychain (encrypted)
Not stored in UserDefaults or plain files
Uses proper Keychain API (kSecClassGenericPassword)
Auto-loads on app launch
Properly deletes on logout

3. SecureField for Password Input ✅

File: UniFiDashboardView.swift (Line 651) Status: ✅ SECURE

SecureField("password", text: $password)  // ✅ Masked input

Why It's Good:

Password input is masked
Not visible in UI
Not in plaintext TextField

4. CSV Injection Protection ✅

File: ExportManager.swift (Lines 102-107) Status: ✅ SECURE

private func escapeCSV(_ field: String) -> String {
    if field.contains(",") || field.contains("\"") || field.contains("\n") {
        return "\"\(field.replacingOccurrences(of: "\"", with: "\"\""))\""
    }
    return field
}

Why It's Good:

Properly escapes CSV special characters
Prevents CSV injection attacks
Excel formula injection prevented

5. No Hardcoded Secrets ✅

Status: ✅ SECURE

Evidence: Scanned entire codebase, found:

❌ No API keys in code
❌ No passwords in code
❌ No tokens in code
❌ No hardcoded URLs with credentials
✅ All credentials requested from user or loaded from Keychain

6. MFA Support ✅

File: UniFiController.swift (Lines 134-164) Status: ✅ SECURE

Why It's Good:

Supports UniFi two-factor authentication
Detects MFA requirement from API
Prompts user for MFA code
Includes MFA token in login request

7. Timeout Configuration ✅

File: UniFiController.swift (Lines 48-51) Status: ✅ SECURE

let configuration = URLSessionConfiguration.default
configuration.timeoutIntervalForRequest = 30
configuration.timeoutIntervalForResource = 60

Why It's Good:

Prevents hanging connections
Reasonable timeouts (30s request, 60s total)
Mitigates slowloris-style attacks

8. Privilege Separation ✅

Status: ✅ GOOD DESIGN

Evidence:

App doesn't request root/admin privileges
UDP scanning noted as requiring elevated privileges (line 146 in AdvancedPortScanner.swift)
Graceful fallback if privileged operations fail
Doesn't use sudo or privilege escalation

📊 Security Summary by Category

Category	Issues Found	Status
Authentication & Authorization	2	🟠 Needs fixes
Input Validation	1	🟠 Add validation
Cryptography & Certificates	1	🔴 CRITICAL
Session Management	1	🟡 Add timeout
Logging & Monitoring	1	🟡 Sanitize logs
Command Injection	0	✅ SECURE
Credential Storage	0	✅ SECURE
SQL Injection	0	✅ N/A (no SQL)
XSS	0	✅ N/A (native app)

🎯 Recommended Implementation Priority

Phase 1: Critical Fixes (Day 1)

Time: 3-4 hours

✅ Fix certificate validation bypass (CRITICAL)
- Implement certificate pinning or user confirmation
- Add certificate fingerprint comparison
- Warn on certificate changes
✅ Fix password delimiter issue (HIGH)
- Use JSON encoding for credentials
- Update load/save functions
✅ Add IP address validation (HIGH)
- Create IPValidator utility
- Add to all scan functions

Phase 2: Security Hardening (Week 1)

Time: 4-6 hours

✅ Add URL validation for UniFi controller
- Validate scheme and hostname
- Block internal/metadata addresses
✅ Implement rate limiting
- Add to UniFi API calls
- Add to network scans
✅ Add session timeout
- Auto-logout after 1 hour
- Optional auto-reconnect

Phase 3: Polish (Week 2)

Time: 2-3 hours

✅ Sanitize log messages
- Mask sensitive data
- Generic error messages for users
✅ Add CSRF token to POST requests
- Complete CSRF protection

🔒 Additional Security Recommendations

1. Add Security Audit Log

Create audit trail for security-sensitive operations:

struct SecurityAuditLog {
    static func log(event: SecurityEvent, details: String) {
        let entry = AuditEntry(
            timestamp: Date(),
            event: event,
            details: details
        )
        // Save to secure file with append-only access
        saveAuditEntry(entry)
    }

    enum SecurityEvent: String {
        case loginAttempt = "Login Attempt"
        case loginSuccess = "Login Success"
        case loginFailure = "Login Failure"
        case configurationChange = "Configuration Changed"
        case credentialsCleared = "Credentials Cleared"
        case certificateRejected = "Certificate Rejected"
        case suspiciousActivity = "Suspicious Activity"
    }
}

// Use throughout code:
SecurityAuditLog.log(event: .loginAttempt, details: "User: \(username), Host: \(host)")

2. Implement Certificate Pinning for Known Controllers

For users with static UniFi controllers:

// Option in settings: "Trust this controller's certificate"
// Stores certificate fingerprint
// Rejects any other certificate (even if otherwise valid)

3. Add Network Scan Safety Limits

Prevent accidental scanning of entire internet:

// Validate subnet size
guard subnet.split(separator: ".").count == 3 else {
    throw ValidationError.subnetTooLarge
}

// Max: /24 subnet (254 hosts)
// Prevent scanning /8 or /16 (millions of hosts)

4. Sanitize Export Data

Ensure exports don't contain sensitive info:

// Before export, offer to redact:
// - Internal IP addresses
// - MAC addresses (GDPR/privacy)
// - Hostnames (may contain user info)
// - Credentials in scan results

📝 Code Quality Observations

Memory Management: ✅ EXCELLENT

All classes properly use @MainActor
No retain cycles found
Weak delegates where appropriate
Proper Task usage for async operations

Architecture: ✅ GOOD

Singleton pattern for managers (appropriate for scanning tools)
ObservableObject for SwiftUI integration
Proper separation of concerns

Error Handling: 🟡 NEEDS IMPROVEMENT

Good: Errors caught and handled
Bad: Too much detail in user-facing errors
Recommendation: Generic messages for users, detailed logs for developers

🚀 Implementation Checklist

Before Next Release:

📚 Resources Applied

Standards Referenced:

OWASP Top 10 (2021)
Apple Secure Coding Guide
CWE/SANS Top 25
NIST Cybersecurity Framework

Tools Recommended:

Static Analysis: SwiftLint with security rules
Dependency Scanning: OWASP Dependency-Check
Secrets Scanning: git-secrets or gitleaks

✅ Conclusion

Current State: NMAPScanner has a solid security foundation but requires immediate attention to the certificate validation issue.

Good News:

✅ No command injection vulnerabilities
✅ Credentials properly stored in Keychain
✅ No hardcoded secrets
✅ Good input sanitization for exports

Must Fix:

🔴 Certificate validation bypass - CRITICAL MITM vulnerability
🟠 Password storage fragility
🟠 Missing input validation

Estimated Effort: 10-15 hours total for all fixes

Security Grade After Fixes: A

Report End

Created by Jordan Koch with Claude Code Based on secure coding standards from CLAUDE.md

FilesExpand file tree

SECURITY_AUDIT_REPORT.md

Latest commit

History

SECURITY_AUDIT_REPORT.md

File metadata and controls

NMAPScanner - Comprehensive Security Audit Report

Executive Summary

🔴 CRITICAL ISSUES (Fix Immediately)

1. Certificate Validation Bypass - MITM Vulnerability

🟠 HIGH PRIORITY ISSUES

2. Insecure Password Storage Delimiter

3. IP Address Validation Missing

4. UniFi Controller URL Validation Missing

🟡 MEDIUM PRIORITY ISSUES

5. Rate Limiting Not Implemented

6. Sensitive Data in Logs

7. No Session Timeout / Auto-Logout

🟢 LOW PRIORITY ISSUES

8. Error Messages Too Detailed

9. No CSRF Token Validation

✅ GOOD SECURITY PRACTICES FOUND

1. Command Injection Protection ✅

2. Keychain Credential Storage ✅

3. SecureField for Password Input ✅

4. CSV Injection Protection ✅

5. No Hardcoded Secrets ✅

6. MFA Support ✅

7. Timeout Configuration ✅

8. Privilege Separation ✅

📊 Security Summary by Category

🎯 Recommended Implementation Priority

Phase 1: Critical Fixes (Day 1)

Phase 2: Security Hardening (Week 1)

Phase 3: Polish (Week 2)

🔒 Additional Security Recommendations

1. Add Security Audit Log

2. Implement Certificate Pinning for Known Controllers

3. Add Network Scan Safety Limits

4. Sanitize Export Data

📝 Code Quality Observations

Memory Management: ✅ EXCELLENT

Architecture: ✅ GOOD

Error Handling: 🟡 NEEDS IMPROVEMENT

🚀 Implementation Checklist

📚 Resources Applied

✅ Conclusion