Vulnerability

IDOR in GET/PATCH/DELETE /api/v1/flow/{flow_id}

The _read_flow helper in src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/flows.py branched on the AUTO_LOGIN setting to decide whether to filter by user_id. When AUTO_LOGIN was False (i.e., authentication was enabled), neither branch enforced an ownership check — the query returned any flow matching the given UUID regardless of who owned it.

This exposed any authenticated user to:

• Read any other user's flow, including embedded plaintext API keys
• Modify the logic of another user's AI agents
• Delete flows belonging to other users

The vulnerability was introduced by the conditional logic that was meant to accommodate public/example flows (those with user_id = NULL) under auto-login mode, but inadvertently left the authenticated path without an ownership filter.

Fix (PR #8956)

The fix removes the AUTO_LOGIN conditional entirely and unconditionally scopes the query to the requesting user:

-    auth_settings = settings_service.auth_settings
-    stmt = select(Flow).where(Flow.id == flow_id)
-    if auth_settings.AUTO_LOGIN:
-        stmt = stmt.where(
-            (Flow.user_id == user_id) | (Flow.user_id == None)  # noqa: E711
-        )
+    stmt = select(Flow).where(Flow.id == flow_id).where(Flow.user_id == user_id)

All three operations — read, update, and delete — route through _read_flow, so the single change covers the full attack surface. A cross-user isolation test (test_read_flows_user_isolation) was added to prevent regression.

Acknowledgements

We thank the security researcher who responsibly disclosed this vulnerability:

• @chximn-dt