f Discount unendorsed HTLCs to incentivise endorsement

Author: carlaKC

04-onion-routing.md

@@ -1479,7 +1479,7 @@ are calculated as follows:
   - `effective_fees` = `fees` - `opportunity_cost` 
 - otherwise: 
   - if successfully resolved AND `resolution_time` <= `resolution_period`
-    - `effective_fees` = `fees`
+    - `effective_fees` = `fees` * 0.5
   - otherwise: 
     - `effective_fees` = 0
 
@@ -1512,12 +1512,26 @@ A peer is classified as having "good" local reputation iff `reputation_revenue`
 otherwise the peer's reputation is classified as "neutral".
 
 ### Rationale
-If a HTLC is endorsed by a peer they have signaled that they expect the HTLC
-to resolve honestly, so will be held accountable for the manner in which they
-resolve. By contrast, if a HTLC was not endorsed by the upstream peer, it 
-should not have a negative impact on reputation. In the case where one of 
-these "unknown" HTLCs succeeds within the reasonable resolution threshold, the 
-peer is still credited with fees because the HTLC resolved desirably. 
+
+A jamming attack can only be achieved with good reputation, as the resources 
+available to neutral reputation nodes are limited by resource bucketing. If a 
+node is attacked, it is guaranteed to have been paid at least its 
+`routing_revenue` over the previous `reputation_window`.
+
+Reputation is only negatively affected if a HTLC was endorsed to help protect 
+the network's ability to forward "unknown" HTLCs - those from low-activity or 
+new entrants that may very well be honest, but have not build up good 
+reputation through a history of consistent, good behavior.
+
+Intuitively if a HTLC is endorsed by a peer they have signaled that they expect 
+the HTLC to resolve honestly, they should be held accountable for that signal.
+By contrast, if a HTLC was not endorsed by the upstream peer, it should not 
+have a negative impact on reputation. In the case where one of these 
+"unknown" HTLCs succeeds within the reasonable resolution threshold, the 
+peer is still credited with fees because the HTLC resolved desirably. This 
+allows new, unendorsed entrants to slowly build reputation over time. The fee 
+contribution of unendorsed HTLCs is discounted by 50% to incentivise nodes to 
+endorse HTLCs.
 
 # Test Vector