diff --git a/fuzz/src/router.rs b/fuzz/src/router.rs
index 786bfa3e589..80ea1f1bc73 100644
--- a/fuzz/src/router.rs
+++ b/fuzz/src/router.rs
@@ -222,6 +222,7 @@ pub fn do_test<Out: test_logger::Output>(data: &[u8], out: Out) {
 								channel_type: None,
 								short_channel_id: Some(scid),
 								inbound_scid_alias: None,
+								outbound_scid_alias: None,
 								channel_value_satoshis: capacity,
 								user_channel_id: 0, inbound_capacity_msat: 0,
 								unspendable_punishment_reserve: None,
diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs
index 43032c51a3c..8362f6d73b7 100644
--- a/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs
@@ -710,6 +710,11 @@ pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
 	// Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
 	// outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
 	// the channel's funding UTXO.
+	//
+	// We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
+	// publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
+	// associated channel mapping.
+	//
 	// We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
 	// to store all of them.
 	latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
@@ -1307,7 +1312,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
 			counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
 			holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
 			counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
-			minimum_depth: Some(config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth),
+			minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
 
 			counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
 
@@ -1987,12 +1992,6 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
 		if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
 			return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
 		}
-		if msg.minimum_depth == 0 {
-			// Note that if this changes we should update the serialization minimum version to
-			// indicate to older clients that they don't understand some features of the current
-			// channel.
-			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum confirmation depth must be at least 1".to_owned()));
-		}
 
 		if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
 			if *ty != self.channel_type {
@@ -2029,7 +2028,12 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
 		self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
 		self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
 		self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
-		self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
+
+		if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
+			self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
+		} else {
+			self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
+		}
 
 		let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
 			funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
@@ -2089,7 +2093,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
 		&self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
 	}
 
-	pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+	pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
 		if self.is_outbound() {
 			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
 		}
@@ -2164,12 +2168,12 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
 		Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
 			channel_id: self.channel_id,
 			signature
-		}, channel_monitor))
+		}, channel_monitor, self.check_get_funding_locked(0)))
 	}
 
 	/// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
 	/// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
-	pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+	pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
 		if !self.is_outbound() {
 			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
 		}
@@ -2238,7 +2242,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
 
 		log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
 
-		Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap()))
+		Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap(), self.check_get_funding_locked(0)))
 	}
 
 	/// Handles a funding_locked message from our peer. If we've already sent our funding_locked
@@ -3540,12 +3544,13 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
 	/// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
 	/// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
 	pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
-		mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
+		resend_funding_locked: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
 		mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
 		mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
 	) {
 		self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
 		self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
+		self.monitor_pending_funding_locked |= resend_funding_locked;
 		self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
 		self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
 		self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
@@ -3559,17 +3564,28 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
 		assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
 		self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
 
-		let funding_broadcastable = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound() {
-			self.funding_transaction.take()
-		} else { None };
+		// If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
+		// (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
+		// first received the funding_signed.
+		let mut funding_broadcastable =
+			if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+				self.funding_transaction.take()
+			} else { None };
+		// That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
+		// minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
+		if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
+			funding_broadcastable = None;
+		}
 
 		// We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateFailed (and
 		// we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for us to
-		// do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound
-		// channel which failed to persist the monitor on funding_created, and we got the funding
-		// transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted.
+		// do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're
+		// * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
+		//   the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
+		// * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the funding_locked before any broadcast at all.
 		let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
-			assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
+			assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
+				"Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
 			self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
 			let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
 			Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
@@ -4551,6 +4567,11 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
 		self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
 	}
 
+	/// Returns true if our funding_locked has been sent
+	pub fn is_our_funding_locked(&self) -> bool {
+		(self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32
+	}
+
 	/// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
 	pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
 		(self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
@@ -4581,7 +4602,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
 	}
 
 	fn check_get_funding_locked(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::FundingLocked> {
-		if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
+		if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
 			return None;
 		}
 
@@ -4636,12 +4657,11 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
 	pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32,
 		txdata: &TransactionData, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
 	-> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
-		let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
 		if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
 			for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
-				// If we haven't yet sent a funding_locked, but are in FundingSent (ignoring
-				// whether they've sent a funding_locked or not), check if we should send one.
-				if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+				// Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
+				// check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
+				if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
 					if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
 						let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
 						if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
@@ -4758,9 +4778,9 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
 			// close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
 			// the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
 			//
-			// Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf channel,
-			// but not doing so may lead to the `ChannelManager::short_to_id` map being
-			// inconsistent, so we currently have to.
+			// Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
+			// 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the `ChannelManager::short_to_id` map
+			// being inconsistent, so we currently have to.
 			if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
 				let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
 					self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
@@ -4857,6 +4877,12 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
 		self.inbound_awaiting_accept
 	}
 
+	/// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
+	pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
+		assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
+		self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
+	}
+
 	/// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
 	/// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
 	///
@@ -5619,7 +5645,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
 }
 
 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
-const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
+const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
 
 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
 	(0, FailRelay),
@@ -5684,12 +5710,10 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
 
 		self.user_id.write(writer)?;
 
-		// Write out the old serialization for the config object. This is read by version-1
-		// deserializers, but we will read the version in the TLV at the end instead.
-		self.config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
-		self.config.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
-		self.config.announced_channel.write(writer)?;
-		self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
+		// Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
+		// deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
+		// `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
+		writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
 
 		self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
 		(self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
@@ -6667,7 +6691,7 @@ mod tests {
 		}]};
 		let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 		let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
-		let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
+		let (funding_signed_msg, _, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
 
 		// Node B --> Node A: funding signed
 		let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
index 8725059c360..8053f9c32cc 100644
--- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
@@ -93,6 +93,8 @@ use util::crypto::sign;
 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
 	Forward {
 		onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
+		/// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a "real" SCID, an
+		/// outbound SCID alias, or a phantom node SCID.
 		short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
 	},
 	Receive {
@@ -136,6 +138,8 @@ pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
 		// `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
 		// `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
 		// HTLCs.
+		//
+		// Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
 		prev_short_channel_id: u64,
 		prev_htlc_id: u64,
 		prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
@@ -149,6 +153,7 @@ pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
+	// Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
 	short_channel_id: u64,
 	htlc_id: u64,
 	incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
@@ -963,9 +968,25 @@ pub struct ChannelDetails {
 	/// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
 	/// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
 	///
+	/// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
+	/// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
+	///
 	/// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
+	/// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
 	/// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
+	/// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
+	/// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
 	pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
+	/// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
+	/// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
+	/// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
+	/// `Some(0)`).
+	///
+	/// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
+	///
+	/// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
+	/// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
+	pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
 	/// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
 	/// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
 	/// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
@@ -1083,6 +1104,16 @@ impl ChannelDetails {
 	pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
 		self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
 	}
+
+	/// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
+	/// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
+	/// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
+	///
+	/// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
+	/// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
+	pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
+		self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
+	}
 }
 
 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
@@ -1281,7 +1312,7 @@ macro_rules! remove_channel {
 }
 
 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
-	($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
+	($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_funding_locked: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
 		match $err {
 			ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
 				log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
@@ -1319,13 +1350,13 @@ macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
 				if !$resend_raa {
 					debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
 				}
-				$chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
+				$chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_funding_locked, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
 				(Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
 			},
 		}
 	};
-	($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
-		let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
+	($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_funding_locked: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
+		let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_funding_locked, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
 		if drop {
 			$entry.remove_entry();
 		}
@@ -1333,16 +1364,19 @@ macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
 	} };
 	($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
 		debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
-		handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
+		handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
 	} };
 	($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
-		handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
+		handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
+	};
+	($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_funding_locked: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
+		handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_funding_locked, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
 	};
 	($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
-		handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
+		handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
 	};
 	($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
-		handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
+		handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
 	};
 }
 
@@ -1398,7 +1432,7 @@ macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
 		let res = loop {
 			let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
 			if !forwards.is_empty() {
-				htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
+				htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or($channel_entry.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
 					$channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
 			}
 
@@ -1706,6 +1740,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
 					// `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
 					channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
 					short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
+					outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
 					inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
 					channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
 					unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
@@ -2285,6 +2320,9 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
 				action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
 			});
 		}
+		if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
+			return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
+		}
 		log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
 		self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
 	}
@@ -2296,7 +2334,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
 	/// May be called with channel_state already locked!
 	fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
 		log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
-		let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
+		let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
 			None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
 			Some(id) => id,
 		};
@@ -4111,20 +4149,45 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
 		}
 	}
 
-	/// Called to accept a request to open a channel after [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`] has been
-	/// triggered.
+	/// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
 	///
 	/// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
 	/// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
 	/// the channel.
 	///
-	/// For inbound channels, the `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
+	/// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
 	/// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
-	/// with which `accept_inbound_channel` call.
+	/// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
 	///
 	/// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
 	/// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
 	pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+		self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
+	}
+
+	/// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
+	/// it as confirmed immediately.
+	///
+	/// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
+	/// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
+	/// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
+	///
+	/// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
+	/// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
+	///
+	/// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
+	/// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
+	///
+	/// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
+	/// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
+	///
+	/// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
+	/// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
+	pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+		self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
+	}
+
+	fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
 		let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
 
 		let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
@@ -4137,6 +4200,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
 				if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
 					return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
 				}
+				if accept_0conf { channel.get_mut().set_0conf(); }
 				channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
 					node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
 					msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
@@ -4228,7 +4292,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
 	}
 
 	fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
-		let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
+		let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut funding_locked), mut chan) = {
 			let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
 			let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 			let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
@@ -4263,7 +4327,8 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
 					// hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
 					// accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
 					// until we have persisted our monitor.
-					chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
+					chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, funding_locked.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
+					funding_locked = None; // Don't send the funding_locked now
 				},
 			}
 		}
@@ -4278,6 +4343,9 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
 					node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
 					msg: funding_msg,
 				});
+				if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
+					send_funding_locked!(channel_state.short_to_id, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
+				}
 				e.insert(chan);
 			}
 		}
@@ -4294,12 +4362,12 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
 					if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
 						return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
 					}
-					let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
+					let (monitor, funding_tx, funding_locked) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
 						Ok(update) => update,
 						Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
 					};
 					if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
-						let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
+						let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, funding_locked.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
 						if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
 							// We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
 							// it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
@@ -4310,6 +4378,9 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
 						}
 						return res
 					}
+					if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
+						send_funding_locked!(channel_state.short_to_id, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
+					}
 					funding_tx
 				},
 				hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
@@ -4660,7 +4731,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
 						} else {
 							if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
 									RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
-									raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
+									raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
 									raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
 									raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
 								break Err(e);
@@ -4676,7 +4747,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
 					break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
 							raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
 							chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
-								.expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
+								.unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
 							chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
 				},
 				hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
@@ -5515,6 +5586,19 @@ where
 							}
 						}
 					}
+					if channel.is_our_funding_locked() {
+						if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
+							// If we sent a 0conf funding_locked, and now have an SCID, we add it
+							// to the short_to_id map here. Note that we check whether we can relay
+							// using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e. enforce option_scid_alias
+							// then), and if the funding tx is ever un-confirmed we force-close the
+							// channel, ensuring short_to_id is always consistent.
+							let scid_insert = short_to_id.insert(real_scid, channel.channel_id());
+							assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == channel.channel_id(),
+								"SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
+								fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
+						}
+					}
 				} else if let Err(reason) = res {
 					update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, channel);
 					// It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
@@ -5927,6 +6011,7 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
 	(2, channel_id, required),
 	(3, channel_type, option),
 	(4, counterparty, required),
+	(5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
 	(6, funding_txo, option),
 	(8, short_channel_id, option),
 	(10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs b/lightning/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs
index c0e33e5b93a..e54874b9e2e 100644
--- a/lightning/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
 use ln::msgs;
 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
+use util::scid_utils;
 use util::test_utils;
 use util::test_utils::{panicking, TestChainMonitor};
 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
@@ -48,9 +49,13 @@ pub const CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH: u32 = 10;
 
 /// Mine the given transaction in the next block and then mine CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1 blocks on
 /// top, giving the given transaction CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH confirmations.
-pub fn confirm_transaction<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, tx: &Transaction) {
-	confirm_transaction_at(node, tx, node.best_block_info().1 + 1);
+///
+/// Returns the SCID a channel confirmed in the given transaction will have, assuming the funding
+/// output is the 1st output in the transaction.
+pub fn confirm_transaction<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, tx: &Transaction) -> u64 {
+	let scid = confirm_transaction_at(node, tx, node.best_block_info().1 + 1);
 	connect_blocks(node, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
+	scid
 }
 /// Mine a signle block containing the given transaction
 pub fn mine_transaction<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, tx: &Transaction) {
@@ -59,7 +64,10 @@ pub fn mine_transaction<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, tx: &Transac
 }
 /// Mine the given transaction at the given height, mining blocks as required to build to that
 /// height
-pub fn confirm_transaction_at<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, tx: &Transaction, conf_height: u32) {
+///
+/// Returns the SCID a channel confirmed in the given transaction will have, assuming the funding
+/// output is the 1st output in the transaction.
+pub fn confirm_transaction_at<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, tx: &Transaction, conf_height: u32) -> u64 {
 	let first_connect_height = node.best_block_info().1 + 1;
 	assert!(first_connect_height <= conf_height);
 	if conf_height > first_connect_height {
@@ -74,6 +82,7 @@ pub fn confirm_transaction_at<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, tx: &T
 	}
 	block.txdata.push(tx.clone());
 	connect_block(node, &block);
+	scid_utils::scid_from_parts(conf_height as u64, block.txdata.len() as u64 - 1, 0).unwrap()
 }
 
 /// The possible ways we may notify a ChannelManager of a new block
diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs
index 48b4b07c7d7..53cadecb063 100644
--- a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs
@@ -9222,7 +9222,11 @@ fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
 
 	let funding_created = {
 		let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
-		let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
+		// Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
+		// another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
+		// try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
+		// channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
+		let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
 		let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
 		as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
 	};
@@ -9260,7 +9264,7 @@ fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
 	let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 	assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 	assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
-	assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
+	assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
 
 	let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
 	let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/priv_short_conf_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/priv_short_conf_tests.rs
index 47e2fb33e3c..f4f52a8baf4 100644
--- a/lightning/src/ln/priv_short_conf_tests.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/ln/priv_short_conf_tests.rs
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
 //! other behavior that exists only on private channels or with a semi-trusted counterparty (eg
 //! LSP).
 
-use chain::Watch;
+use chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch};
 use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
 use chain::keysinterface::{Recipient, KeysInterface};
 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ use ln::msgs;
 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, OptionalField, ChannelUpdate};
 use ln::wire::Encode;
 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
-use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
+use util::events::{ClosureReason, Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
 use util::config::UserConfig;
 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
 use util::test_utils;
@@ -564,3 +564,361 @@ fn test_scid_alias_returned() {
 		PaymentFailedConditions::new().blamed_scid(last_hop[0].inbound_scid_alias.unwrap())
 			.blamed_chan_closed(false).expected_htlc_error_data(0x1000|12, &err_data));
 }
+
+// Receiver must have been initialized with manually_accept_inbound_channels set to true.
+fn open_zero_conf_channel<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(initiator: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, receiver: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, initiator_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> bitcoin::Transaction {
+	initiator.node.create_channel(receiver.node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_001, 42, initiator_config).unwrap();
+	let open_channel = get_event_msg!(initiator, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, receiver.node.get_our_node_id());
+
+	receiver.node.handle_open_channel(&initiator.node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
+	let events = receiver.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+	assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+	match events[0] {
+		Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
+			receiver.node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &initiator.node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
+		},
+		_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+	};
+
+	let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(receiver, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, initiator.node.get_our_node_id());
+	assert_eq!(accept_channel.minimum_depth, 0);
+	initiator.node.handle_accept_channel(&receiver.node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
+
+	let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&initiator, &receiver.node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
+	initiator.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &receiver.node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
+	let funding_created = get_event_msg!(initiator, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, receiver.node.get_our_node_id());
+
+	receiver.node.handle_funding_created(&initiator.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
+	check_added_monitors!(receiver, 1);
+	let bs_signed_locked = receiver.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+	assert_eq!(bs_signed_locked.len(), 2);
+	let as_funding_locked;
+	match &bs_signed_locked[0] {
+		MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { node_id, msg } => {
+			assert_eq!(*node_id, initiator.node.get_our_node_id());
+			initiator.node.handle_funding_signed(&receiver.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
+			check_added_monitors!(initiator, 1);
+
+			assert_eq!(initiator.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
+			assert_eq!(initiator.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0)[0], tx);
+
+			as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(initiator, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, receiver.node.get_our_node_id());
+		}
+		_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+	}
+	match &bs_signed_locked[1] {
+		MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { node_id, msg } => {
+			assert_eq!(*node_id, initiator.node.get_our_node_id());
+			initiator.node.handle_funding_locked(&receiver.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
+		}
+		_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+	}
+
+	receiver.node.handle_funding_locked(&initiator.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
+
+	let as_channel_update = get_event_msg!(initiator, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, receiver.node.get_our_node_id());
+	let bs_channel_update = get_event_msg!(receiver, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, initiator.node.get_our_node_id());
+
+	initiator.node.handle_channel_update(&receiver.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_channel_update);
+	receiver.node.handle_channel_update(&initiator.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_update);
+
+	assert_eq!(initiator.node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
+	assert_eq!(receiver.node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
+
+	tx
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_simple_0conf_channel() {
+	// If our peer tells us they will accept our channel with 0 confs, and we funded the channel,
+	// we should trust the funding won't be double-spent (assuming `trust_own_funding_0conf` is
+	// set)!
+	// Further, if we `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf`, funding locked messages
+	// should fly immediately and the channel should be available for use as soon as they are
+	// received.
+
+	let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+	let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+	let mut chan_config = test_default_channel_config();
+	chan_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
+
+	let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(chan_config)]);
+	let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+	open_zero_conf_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], None);
+
+	send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_0conf_channel_with_async_monitor() {
+	// Test that we properly send out funding_locked in (both inbound- and outbound-) zero-conf
+	// channels if ChannelMonitor updates return a `TemporaryFailure` during the initial channel
+	// negotiation.
+
+	let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
+	let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
+	let mut chan_config = test_default_channel_config();
+	chan_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
+	let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(chan_config), None]);
+	let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+	create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1_000_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+
+	chan_config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
+	nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(chan_config)).unwrap();
+	let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+	nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
+	let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+	assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+	match events[0] {
+		Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
+			nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
+		},
+		_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+	};
+
+	let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+	assert_eq!(accept_channel.minimum_depth, 0);
+	nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
+
+	let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
+	nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
+	let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+	chanmon_cfgs[1].persister.set_update_ret(Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure));
+	nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
+	check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+	assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+	let channel_id = funding_output.to_channel_id();
+	nodes[1].chain_monitor.complete_sole_pending_chan_update(&channel_id);
+
+	let bs_signed_locked = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+	assert_eq!(bs_signed_locked.len(), 2);
+	chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure));
+
+	match &bs_signed_locked[0] {
+		MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { node_id, msg } => {
+			assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+			nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
+			check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+		}
+		_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+	}
+	match &bs_signed_locked[1] {
+		MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { node_id, msg } => {
+			assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+			nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
+		}
+		_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+	}
+
+	assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
+
+	assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+	nodes[0].chain_monitor.complete_sole_pending_chan_update(&channel_id);
+	let as_locked_update = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+
+	// Note that the funding transaction is actually released when
+	// get_and_clear_pending_msg_events, above, checks for monitor events.
+	assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
+	assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0)[0], tx);
+
+	match &as_locked_update[0] {
+		MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { node_id, msg } => {
+			assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+			nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
+		}
+		_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+	}
+	let bs_channel_update = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+	let as_channel_update = match &as_locked_update[1] {
+		MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { node_id, msg } => {
+			assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+			msg.clone()
+		}
+		_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+	};
+
+	chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(Ok(()));
+	chanmon_cfgs[1].persister.set_update_ret(Ok(()));
+
+	nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_channel_update);
+	nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_update);
+
+	assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
+	assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
+
+	send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
+
+	// Now that we have useful channels, try sending a payment where the we hit a temporary monitor
+	// failure before we've ever confirmed the funding transaction. This previously caused a panic.
+	let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
+
+	nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
+	check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+	let as_send = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0]);
+	nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_send.msgs[0]);
+	nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_send.commitment_msg);
+	check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+	let (bs_raa, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+	nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
+	check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+	nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
+	check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+	chanmon_cfgs[1].persister.set_update_ret(Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure));
+	nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
+	check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+	assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+	chanmon_cfgs[1].persister.set_update_ret(Ok(()));
+	let (outpoint, _, latest_update) = nodes[1].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&bs_raa.channel_id).unwrap().clone();
+	nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(outpoint, latest_update).unwrap();
+	check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
+	expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+	check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+	let bs_send = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
+	nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_send.msgs[0]);
+	commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], bs_send.commitment_msg, false);
+	expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
+	expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash, payment_secret, 1_000_000);
+	claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
+
+	confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
+	confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
+
+	send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_0conf_close_no_early_chan_update() {
+	// Tests that even with a public channel 0conf channel, we don't generate a channel_update on
+	// closing.
+	let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+	let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+	let mut chan_config = test_default_channel_config();
+	chan_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
+
+	let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(chan_config)]);
+	let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+	// This is the default but we force it on anyway
+	chan_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
+	open_zero_conf_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], Some(chan_config));
+
+	// We can use the channel immediately, but won't generate a channel_update until we get confs
+	send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
+
+	nodes[0].node.force_close_all_channels();
+	check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+	check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
+	let _ = get_err_msg!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_public_0conf_channel() {
+	// Tests that we will announce a public channel (after confirmation) even if its 0conf.
+	let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+	let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+	let mut chan_config = test_default_channel_config();
+	chan_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
+
+	let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(chan_config)]);
+	let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+	// This is the default but we force it on anyway
+	chan_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
+	let tx = open_zero_conf_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], Some(chan_config));
+
+	// We can use the channel immediately, but we can't announce it until we get 6+ confirmations
+	send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
+
+	let scid = confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
+	let as_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+	assert_eq!(confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx), scid);
+	let bs_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+	nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
+	nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
+
+	let bs_announcement = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+	assert_eq!(bs_announcement.len(), 1);
+	let announcement;
+	let bs_update;
+	match bs_announcement[0] {
+		MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
+			announcement = msg.clone();
+			bs_update = update_msg.clone();
+		},
+		_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+	};
+
+	let as_announcement = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+	assert_eq!(as_announcement.len(), 1);
+	match as_announcement[0] {
+		MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
+			assert!(announcement == *msg);
+			assert_eq!(update_msg.contents.short_channel_id, scid);
+			assert_eq!(update_msg.contents.short_channel_id, announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
+			assert_eq!(update_msg.contents.short_channel_id, bs_update.contents.short_channel_id);
+		},
+		_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+	};
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_0conf_channel_reorg() {
+	// If we accept a 0conf channel, which is then confirmed, but then changes SCID in a reorg, we
+	// have to make sure we handle this correctly (or, currently, just force-close the channel).
+
+	let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+	let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+	let mut chan_config = test_default_channel_config();
+	chan_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
+
+	let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(chan_config)]);
+	let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+	// This is the default but we force it on anyway
+	chan_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
+	let tx = open_zero_conf_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], Some(chan_config));
+
+	// We can use the channel immediately, but we can't announce it until we get 6+ confirmations
+	send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
+
+	mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
+	mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
+
+	// Send a payment using the channel's real SCID, which will be public in a few blocks once we
+	// can generate a channel_announcement.
+	let real_scid = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
+	assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), real_scid);
+
+	let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
+	assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id, real_scid);
+	send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1]]], 10_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
+	claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
+
+	disconnect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
+	disconnect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
+
+	// At this point the channel no longer has an SCID again. In the future we should likely
+	// support simply un-setting the SCID and waiting until the channel gets re-confirmed, but for
+	// now we force-close the channel here.
+	check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
+		err: "Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at 0 confs, now have 0 confs.".to_owned()
+	});
+	check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
+	check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
+		err: "Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at 0 confs, now have 0 confs.".to_owned()
+	});
+	check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
+}
diff --git a/lightning/src/routing/router.rs b/lightning/src/routing/router.rs
index dc094b9b6e0..c02da4d705f 100644
--- a/lightning/src/routing/router.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/routing/router.rs
@@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ enum CandidateRouteHop<'a> {
 impl<'a> CandidateRouteHop<'a> {
 	fn short_channel_id(&self) -> u64 {
 		match self {
-			CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details } => details.short_channel_id.unwrap(),
+			CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details } => details.get_outbound_payment_scid().unwrap(),
 			CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop { short_channel_id, .. } => *short_channel_id,
 			CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { hint } => hint.short_channel_id,
 		}
@@ -777,7 +777,7 @@ where L::Target: Logger {
 		HashMap::with_capacity(if first_hops.is_some() { first_hops.as_ref().unwrap().len() } else { 0 });
 	if let Some(hops) = first_hops {
 		for chan in hops {
-			if chan.short_channel_id.is_none() {
+			if chan.get_outbound_payment_scid().is_none() {
 				panic!("first_hops should be filled in with usable channels, not pending ones");
 			}
 			if chan.counterparty.node_id == *our_node_pubkey {
@@ -1331,7 +1331,7 @@ where L::Target: Logger {
 					let mut features_set = false;
 					if let Some(first_channels) = first_hop_targets.get(&ordered_hops.last().unwrap().0.node_id) {
 						for details in first_channels {
-							if details.short_channel_id.unwrap() == ordered_hops.last().unwrap().0.candidate.short_channel_id() {
+							if details.get_outbound_payment_scid().unwrap() == ordered_hops.last().unwrap().0.candidate.short_channel_id() {
 								ordered_hops.last_mut().unwrap().1 = details.counterparty.features.to_context();
 								features_set = true;
 								break;
@@ -1742,6 +1742,7 @@ mod tests {
 			funding_txo: Some(OutPoint { txid: bitcoin::Txid::from_slice(&[0; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }),
 			channel_type: None,
 			short_channel_id,
+			outbound_scid_alias: None,
 			inbound_scid_alias: None,
 			channel_value_satoshis: 0,
 			user_channel_id: 0,
@@ -5474,6 +5475,7 @@ mod benches {
 			channel_type: None,
 			short_channel_id: Some(1),
 			inbound_scid_alias: None,
+			outbound_scid_alias: None,
 			channel_value_satoshis: 10_000_000,
 			user_channel_id: 0,
 			balance_msat: 10_000_000,
diff --git a/lightning/src/util/config.rs b/lightning/src/util/config.rs
index 3868d29aab4..bdd222e31c5 100644
--- a/lightning/src/util/config.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/util/config.rs
@@ -22,7 +22,15 @@ pub struct ChannelHandshakeConfig {
 	/// Applied only for inbound channels (see ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth for the
 	/// equivalent limit applied to outbound channels).
 	///
+	/// A lower-bound of 1 is applied, requiring all channels to have a confirmed commitment
+	/// transaction before operation. If you wish to accept channels with zero confirmations, see
+	/// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] and
+	/// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf`].
+	///
 	/// Default value: 6.
+	///
+	/// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
+	/// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf
 	pub minimum_depth: u32,
 	/// Set to the number of blocks we require our counterparty to wait to claim their money (ie
 	/// the number of blocks we have to punish our counterparty if they broadcast a revoked
@@ -159,6 +167,24 @@ pub struct ChannelHandshakeLimits {
 	///
 	/// Default value: 144, or roughly one day and only applies to outbound channels.
 	pub max_minimum_depth: u32,
+	/// Whether we implicitly trust funding transactions generated by us for our own outbound
+	/// channels to not be double-spent.
+	///
+	/// If this is set, we assume that our own funding transactions are *never* double-spent, and
+	/// thus we can trust them without any confirmations. This is generally a reasonable
+	/// assumption, given we're the only ones who could ever double-spend it (assuming we have sole
+	/// control of the signing keys).
+	///
+	/// You may wish to un-set this if you allow the user to (or do in an automated fashion)
+	/// double-spend the funding transaction to RBF with an alternative channel open.
+	///
+	/// This only applies if our counterparty set their confirmations-required value to 0, and we
+	/// always trust our own funding transaction at 1 confirmation irrespective of this value.
+	/// Thus, this effectively acts as a `min_minimum_depth`, with the only possible values being
+	/// `true` (0) and `false` (1).
+	///
+	/// Default value: true
+	pub trust_own_funding_0conf: bool,
 	/// Set to force an incoming channel to match our announced channel preference in
 	/// [`ChannelConfig::announced_channel`].
 	///
@@ -187,6 +213,7 @@ impl Default for ChannelHandshakeLimits {
 			min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
 			max_channel_reserve_satoshis: <u64>::max_value(),
 			min_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
+			trust_own_funding_0conf: true,
 			max_minimum_depth: 144,
 			force_announced_channel_preference: true,
 			their_to_self_delay: MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
diff --git a/lightning/src/util/events.rs b/lightning/src/util/events.rs
index ef0c619b02e..8d5fe00facf 100644
--- a/lightning/src/util/events.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/util/events.rs
@@ -331,6 +331,10 @@ pub enum Event {
 		path: Vec<RouteHop>,
 		/// The channel responsible for the failed payment path.
 		///
+		/// Note that for route hints or for the first hop in a path this may be an SCID alias and
+		/// may not refer to a channel in the public network graph. These aliases may also collide
+		/// with channels in the public network graph.
+		///
 		/// If this is `Some`, then the corresponding channel should be avoided when the payment is
 		/// retried. May be `None` for older [`Event`] serializations.
 		short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
diff --git a/lightning/src/util/scid_utils.rs b/lightning/src/util/scid_utils.rs
index 8552358c35a..676c303bfa8 100644
--- a/lightning/src/util/scid_utils.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/util/scid_utils.rs
@@ -79,6 +79,10 @@ pub(crate) mod fake_scid {
 	const MAX_NAMESPACES: u8 = 8; // We allocate 3 bits for the namespace identifier.
 	const NAMESPACE_ID_BITMASK: u8 = 0b111;
 
+	const BLOCKS_PER_MONTH: u32 = 144 /* blocks per day */ * 30 /* days per month */;
+	pub(crate) const MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW: u32 = BLOCKS_PER_MONTH;
+
+
 	/// Fake scids are divided into namespaces, with each namespace having its own identifier between
 	/// [0..7]. This allows us to identify what namespace a fake scid corresponds to upon HTLC
 	/// receipt, and handle the HTLC accordingly. The namespace identifier is encrypted when encoded
@@ -100,7 +104,6 @@ pub(crate) mod fake_scid {
 			// Ensure we haven't created a namespace that doesn't fit into the 3 bits we've allocated for
 			// namespaces.
 			assert!((*self as u8) < MAX_NAMESPACES);
-			const BLOCKS_PER_MONTH: u32 = 144 /* blocks per day */ * 30 /* days per month */;
 			let rand_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
 
 			let segwit_activation_height = segwit_activation_height(genesis_hash);
@@ -109,7 +112,7 @@ pub(crate) mod fake_scid {
 			// We want to ensure that this fake channel won't conflict with any transactions we haven't
 			// seen yet, in case `highest_seen_blockheight` is updated before we get full information
 			// about transactions confirmed in the given block.
-			blocks_since_segwit_activation = blocks_since_segwit_activation.saturating_sub(BLOCKS_PER_MONTH);
+			blocks_since_segwit_activation = blocks_since_segwit_activation.saturating_sub(MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
 
 			let rand_for_height = u32::from_be_bytes(rand_bytes[..4].try_into().unwrap());
 			let fake_scid_height = segwit_activation_height + rand_for_height % (blocks_since_segwit_activation + 1);
diff --git a/lightning/src/util/test_utils.rs b/lightning/src/util/test_utils.rs
index 3682a0e8f0a..1d4eccd81e6 100644
--- a/lightning/src/util/test_utils.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/util/test_utils.rs
@@ -116,6 +116,11 @@ impl<'a> TestChainMonitor<'a> {
 			expect_channel_force_closed: Mutex::new(None),
 		}
 	}
+
+	pub fn complete_sole_pending_chan_update(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
+		let (outpoint, _, latest_update) = self.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(channel_id).unwrap().clone();
+		self.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(outpoint, latest_update).unwrap();
+	}
 }
 impl<'a> chain::Watch<EnforcingSigner> for TestChainMonitor<'a> {
 	fn watch_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>) -> Result<(), chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {