-
-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 0
Expand file tree
/
Copy pathnext.config.ts
More file actions
196 lines (188 loc) · 8.13 KB
/
Copy pathnext.config.ts
File metadata and controls
196 lines (188 loc) · 8.13 KB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
import path from "node:path";
import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
import type { NextConfig } from "next";
import createNextIntlPlugin from "next-intl/plugin";
import { LEGACY_HOST_REDIRECT_EXCLUSIONS } from "./lib/domains/legacy-redirect";
const withNextIntl = createNextIntlPlugin("./i18n/request.ts");
const projectRoot = path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
const isDev = process.env.NODE_ENV === "development";
const supabaseUrl = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL ?? "";
// WebSocket origin for Supabase Realtime. Hosted projects are covered by the
// wss://*.supabase.co wildcard below, but a SELF-HOSTED Supabase URL is not:
// Realtime opens wss://<supabase-host>/realtime/v1/websocket, and WebKit
// throws synchronously on a CSP-blocked `new WebSocket()`, unmounting the
// dashboard into the error boundary (issue #893). The Docker image bakes the
// __NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_WS_URL__ sentinel at build time and
// docker-entrypoint.sh substitutes the real value at runtime (a build-time
// https-to-wss replace would only rewrite the sentinel); the fallback derives
// wss:/ws: from the https/http URL for non-Docker builds where the real URL
// is present at build time. Empty supabaseUrl stays empty, mirroring how
// ${supabaseUrl} is interpolated below (extra whitespace is valid in CSP).
const supabaseWsUrl =
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_WS_URL ??
supabaseUrl.replace(/^http(s?):/, "ws$1:");
const cspDirectives = [
"default-src 'self'",
// No analytics hosts here on purpose. PostHog replaced Recapt and is
// routed through the same-origin `/rl` rewrite below, so ingestion is
// covered by `connect-src 'self'` and its lazy-loaded replay/survey
// bundles by `script-src 'self'`. Adding `*.posthog.com` back would
// re-widen the policy for no benefit and undo the ad-blocker resistance.
`connect-src 'self' ${supabaseUrl} ${supabaseWsUrl} https://*.supabase.co wss://*.supabase.co https://*.enablebanking.com`,
`style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://*.enablebanking.com`,
`script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'${isDev ? " 'unsafe-eval'" : ""} https://*.enablebanking.com`,
"img-src 'self' data: blob: https:",
"font-src 'self'",
"worker-src 'self' blob:",
// object-src must explicitly allow blob:: Chrome's built-in PDF viewer
// renders inline PDFs via an internal <embed>, which falls under
// object-src. Without this, blob:-URL invoice previews (created via
// URL.createObjectURL on /api/invoices/preview-pdf responses) show
// "Det här innehållet har blockerats" in Chrome. Firefox uses PDF.js and
// Edge uses its own viewer, so neither hits this. See crbug.com/271452.
"object-src 'self' blob:",
`frame-src 'self' blob: ${supabaseUrl}`,
"frame-ancestors 'none'",
].join("; ");
const nextConfig: NextConfig = {
output: 'standalone',
// Build id inlined into the client bundle so a running tab can tell when a
// newer deploy is live (see components/system/DeployReloadPrompt). On Vercel
// this is the commit SHA; empty elsewhere (dev / self-hosted), which disables
// the check. The /api/version route reads the same var at runtime to compare.
env: {
NEXT_PUBLIC_BUILD_ID: process.env.VERCEL_GIT_COMMIT_SHA ?? '',
},
// Multiple lockfiles exist above this project (e.g. a parent yarn.lock),
// which makes Turbopack infer the wrong workspace root. Pin it explicitly.
turbopack: {
root: projectRoot,
},
skipTrailingSlashRedirect: true,
experimental: {
optimizePackageImports: ['recharts', 'date-fns', 'framer-motion'],
},
async redirects() {
const appUrlForRedirect = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL?.trim().replace(/\/$/, '')
return [
{
source: '/nyckeltal',
destination: '/kpi',
permanent: true,
},
// Dual-domain cutover (2026-07): the user-facing app moves to
// app.accounted.se; app.gnubok.se stays alive for machine traffic
// (MCP connectors, API keys, the Skatteverket OAuth callback,
// webhooks, crons). Only browser page traffic is forwarded: /api and
// /.well-known must keep answering on the legacy host, and /_next is
// excluded so already-open tabs keep loading assets until their next
// navigation. The redirect arms itself only once NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL
// points somewhere other than the legacy host, so merging this is
// inert and the actual cutover is the env flip + redeploy. Kept
// non-permanent until the cutover has soaked.
//
// auth/ and reset-password are excluded so email links that carry a
// PKCE code (password reset, signup confirmation) sent before the
// cutover still complete on the legacy host, where their code
// verifier / recovery-session cookies live (#1092). login and MFA
// pages are deliberately NOT excluded: serving a usable login page
// on the legacy host would establish sessions there and bounce
// users in a redirect loop.
...(appUrlForRedirect &&
appUrlForRedirect.startsWith('https://') &&
!appUrlForRedirect.includes('app.gnubok.se')
? [
{
source: `/:path(${LEGACY_HOST_REDIRECT_EXCLUSIONS}.*)`,
has: [{ type: 'host' as const, value: 'app.gnubok.se' }],
destination: `${appUrlForRedirect}/:path`,
permanent: false,
},
]
: []),
]
},
async headers() {
// The catch-all excludes /api/documents/:id/inline so the strict
// X-Frame-Options: DENY + frame-ancestors 'none' don't conflict with
// the embeddable override below: Next.js applies every matching
// header rule, and duplicate X-Frame-Options/CSP values trigger
// "Det här innehållet har blockerats" in Chromium browsers.
return [
{
source: "/((?!api/documents/[^/]+/inline$).*)",
headers: [
{
key: "Strict-Transport-Security",
value: "max-age=86400",
},
{
key: "X-Frame-Options",
value: "DENY",
},
{
key: "X-Content-Type-Options",
value: "nosniff",
},
{
key: "Referrer-Policy",
value: "strict-origin-when-cross-origin",
},
{
key: "Permissions-Policy",
value: "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=()",
},
{
key: "Content-Security-Policy",
value: cspDirectives,
},
],
},
// Document inline-preview proxy must be embeddable in same-origin
// iframes (used by the verifikat document preview Sheet). Excluded
// from the catch-all above so these values aren't shadowed by the
// stricter defaults.
//
// CSP is intentionally minimal: only `frame-ancestors 'self'`
// prevents cross-origin clickjacking on the user's documents.
// Adding `object-src 'none'` (or `default-src 'none'`) here breaks
// Chrome's built-in PDF viewer: Chrome renders inline PDFs through
// an internal <embed>, which the directive forbids, surfacing as
// "Det här innehållet har blockerats" in the document preview Sheet.
// Firefox uses PDF.js and Edge uses its own viewer, so neither hits
// this. See crbug.com/271452. X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff plus
// the explicit Content-Type from the route handler already prevent
// MIME-confusion abuse.
{
source: "/api/documents/:id/inline",
headers: [
{
key: "Strict-Transport-Security",
value: "max-age=86400",
},
{
key: "X-Frame-Options",
value: "SAMEORIGIN",
},
{
key: "X-Content-Type-Options",
value: "nosniff",
},
{
key: "Referrer-Policy",
value: "strict-origin-when-cross-origin",
},
{
key: "Permissions-Policy",
value: "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=()",
},
{
key: "Content-Security-Policy",
value: "frame-ancestors 'self'",
},
],
},
];
},
};
export default withNextIntl(nextConfig);